United States v. Christopher Strode ( 2009 )


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  •                               In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 08-1611
    U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    C HRISTOPHER S TRODE,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
    No. 06 CR 0082—Sarah Evans Barker, Judge.
    A RGUED O CTOBER 29, 2008—D ECIDED JANUARY 14, 2009
    Before P OSNER, M ANION, and K ANNE, Circuit Judges.
    M ANION, Circuit Judge. After a five-day trial, a jury
    convicted Christopher Strode of two counts of conspiring
    to possess with the intent to distribute 1,000 kilograms
    or more of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1)
    and 846, one count of manufacturing with the intent
    to distribute 100 marijuana plants in violation of 21 U.S.C.
    § 841(a)(1), and two counts of money laundering in vio-
    lation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and 1957. The
    2                                               No. 08-1611
    district court sentenced Strode to 192 months’ imprison-
    ment. Strode appeals, challenging his sentence. We affirm.
    I.
    Strode operated a large-scale marijuana distribution
    ring in Indianapolis, Indiana, from 2002 until November
    2004. His source of supply was in Phoenix, Arizona,
    though he also was in the process of growing large quanti-
    ties of marijuana in a house he owned in Indianapolis.
    Strode had his associates make numerous trips transport-
    ing tens of thousands of dollars in cash to Phoenix, where
    they exchanged the cash for marijuana and transported
    the marijuana back to Indianapolis. Their preferred
    method for hauling the marijuana was using caravans of
    rental cars. In early 2003, Strode joined forces with John
    Conway, another distributor who had been selling mari-
    juana in Indianapolis since 2001, to expand the operation
    for shipment of marijuana from Phoenix to Indianapolis.
    At trial, several witnesses discussed the quantity of
    marijuana that the trips to Phoenix yielded. Conway
    testified that, from 2003 to the end of 2004, he and Strode
    transported between 20,000 and 30,000 pounds of mari-
    juana from Phoenix to Indianapolis. William Askew, an
    associate of Conway’s, testified about several trips he made
    transporting marijuana with Strode from Arizona to
    Indiana. Payton Blackwell, an associate of Strode’s, stated
    that Strode paid him a “pound of weed” to transport
    $70,000 to Arizona in January 2003. After that first trip,
    Blackwell continued to transport large amounts of cash for
    Strode. He further stated that, in addition to transporting
    No. 08-1611                                              3
    cash, he began escorting the marijuana back to
    Indianapolis once a week at the end of March 2003 and,
    after he lost his job in August 2003, two to three times a
    week. According to Blackwell, he helped Strode transport
    marijuana for eleven months, and the smallest load of
    marijuana he helped transport was around three
    hundred pounds. In addition, Blackwell testified that in
    December 2003 he participated in a ten-car caravan trans-
    porting marijuana from Phoenix to Indianapolis. Finally,
    both John Berndt and Samuel Standard, two of Strode’s
    other drug couriers, testified about the multiple trips
    they made transporting marijuana on Strode’s behalf.
    Berndt made three trips from Indianapolis to Phoenix and
    back, transporting over fifty pounds of marijuana in a
    rental car each time, while Standard made two.
    The government presented hotel, airline, and car rental
    records that corroborated the testimony of Conway,
    Blackwell, and Askew about many of the trips to Arizona.
    The government also presented evidence of several sei-
    zures of marijuana and cash by law enforcement officers.
    For example, Texas State Trooper Oscar Esqueda testified
    that he seized 89 pounds of marijuana from a Ford Taurus
    driven by Martin Allen, another of Strode’s couriers.
    Allen’s vehicle was part of a three-car convoy transporting
    marijuana from Arizona to Indianapolis. On another
    occasion, Esqueda stopped Standard and seized 257
    pounds of marijuana from the rental car Standard was
    driving. Shortly thereafter, another state trooper pulled
    over a rental car that appeared to be traveling in tandem
    with Standard; Strode was driving that vehicle.
    4                                              No. 08-1611
    A grand jury indicted Strode in May 2006 along with six
    others, including Conway and Askew. Strode was arrested
    but later released pending trial, subject to several condi-
    tions. One of the conditions of Strode’s release forbade
    contact with any of his co-defendants or potential wit-
    nesses. A few months later, on November 3, 2006, Strode
    happened upon Conway at the Indianapolis City-County
    Building where Conway was attempting to pay his child
    support. Despite the court’s no-contact condition, Strode
    approached Conway and told him that they needed to
    meet to get their stories straight. Later that same day,
    Strode, Conway, and Askew met at Glover’s Auto Sales
    in Indianapolis. At the meeting, Strode acknowledged
    that he was subject to the no-contact order, that they
    “ain’t supposed to be havin’ this conversation right
    now,” and that if the government found out about their
    meeting they could be detained until the end of trial. A
    good portion of the protracted and profanity-laced con-
    versation among the three was spent attempting to deter-
    mine who was talking to law enforcement and how the
    government knew so much about their operations.
    Throughout the conversation, Strode repeatedly reassured
    the others that he was not the source of the snitching.
    Unbeknownst to Strode, snitches lay on every side. Both
    Conway and Askew had met with federal agents prior
    to meeting at Glover’s. The agents had outfitted Conway
    with a recording device, and, as a consequence, the entire
    conversation at Glover’s was recorded. Caught violating
    the no-contact order, Strode had his pretrial release
    revoked and was detained through trial. The jury found
    him guilty on two marijuana conspiracy counts, one
    count of manufacturing marijuana, and two counts of
    No. 08-1611                                                   5
    money laundering. The jury did acquit Strode, however,
    of the 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) violation alleged in count five
    of the indictment, which concerned a firearm found at the
    house in Indianapolis where Strode had been growing
    marijuana.
    At sentencing, the district court determined that
    Strode’s offense conduct involved between 3,000 and
    10,000 kilograms of marijuana and therefore set his base
    offense level at 34 under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(3). Next, the
    district court gave Strode a two-level enhancement for
    possession of a dangerous weapon under U.S.S.G.
    § 2D1.1(b)(1). The district court also added a one-level
    enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 for obstruction of
    justice based on the November 2006 meeting at Glover’s.
    After a four-level enhancement for Strode’s leadership
    role, the district court arrived at a total offense level of 41,
    translating into an advisory guidelines range of 324 to 405
    months. Believing that it could not “justify a sentence
    within the guidelines given what everybody else has
    gotten,” the district court applied the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
    factors to reduce Strode’s guidelines range five levels to
    188 to 235 months. It then sentenced Strode to a total term
    of 192 months’ imprisonment. Strode appeals that sen-
    tence.
    II.
    On appeal, Strode claims the district court erred in
    fashioning his sentence in three respects, one involving the
    determination of the quantity of marijuana used to calcu-
    late his base offense level and the other two dealing with
    the enhancements he received for obstruction of justice
    6                                                No. 08-1611
    and possession of a firearm. We can quickly dispatch of
    Strode’s challenge to the district court’s drug calcula-
    tion, which we review under the deferential clear error
    standard. United States v. Seymour, 
    519 F.3d 700
    , 710 (7th
    Cir. 2008). The district court determined that the amount
    of marijuana for which Strode was responsible was be-
    tween 3,000 and 10,000 kilograms and therefore set Strode’s
    base offense level at 34. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(3). Strode
    argues on appeal that the district court should have
    found only 1,000 to 3,000 kilograms of marijuana, corre-
    sponding to a base offense level of 32. See 
    id. § 2D1.1(c)(4).
    According to Strode, the district court’s calculation im-
    properly relied on Conway’s estimate that 20,000 to 30,000
    pounds (or approximately 9,000 to 13,600 kilograms) of
    marijuana were involved in Strode’s drug trafficking
    conspiracy.
    The problem with Strode’s argument is that during the
    sentencing hearing his attorney offered an alternative
    drug calculation not involving Conway’s 20,000-to-30,000-
    pound estimate, yet still came up with a total of 8,000
    pounds—or approximately 3,628 kilograms—of marijuana
    involved in the conspiracy. The Guidelines require the
    district court to make a “reasonable estimate” of the
    drug quantity, United States v. Acosta, 
    534 F.3d 574
    , 582 (7th
    Cir. 2008); Strode conceded in the district court that a
    quantity of marijuana around 3,600 kilograms was just
    that.1 Said Strode’s attorney at the sentencing hearing:
    1
    The PSR recommended, and the government contended at
    sentencing, that Strode’s offenses involved over 10,000 kilo-
    (continued...)
    No. 08-1611                                               7
    So when we look at the objective records, Your Honor,
    not that we’d rely on one person’s memory or another
    person’s memory, assuming that every trip, one-way
    trip from Phoenix to Indianapolis was marijuana, and
    assuming every round trip was marijuana, it seems to
    me, Your Honor, that we were dealing with approxi-
    mately 40 to 45 trips.
    If we assume that each one of those trips is 200
    pounds, that’s approximately—40 times 200 is . . .
    8,000 pounds. . . . So everything she has said about the
    volume of this is consistent with what we believe
    the most accurate amount of pounds is. And so we
    believe at a minimum, it’s a guideline level that the
    most that’s supported by the evidence would be a
    guideline level 34, if not the guideline level 32.2
    Strode’s attorney concluded: “And so 3,000 kilos is 6,000-
    some pounds, and so we think that is a pretty good
    estimate. And we think that that’s what is supported by the
    evidence.”
    Not surprisingly, Strode now presents to this court a
    different estimate—2,800 kilograms. That estimate is based
    1
    (...continued)
    grams of marijuana and therefore merited an offense level of
    36. See U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(c)(2).
    2
    At the sentencing hearing, Strode offered no method of
    calculating the marijuana quantity that would have resulted
    in a figure between 1,000 and 3,000 pounds and warranted a
    level 32. Instead, Strode argued that he deserved a level 32
    simply because that was the level that “everybody in this
    case who pled guilty to the marijuana conspiracy” received.
    8                                               No. 08-1611
    on 31 trips from Arizona over a 90-week span, with each
    trip involving 200 pounds of marijuana. But Strode gives
    no explanation of why this new estimate is more accurate
    than the one he presented as “the most accurate amount”
    to the district court. Much less does Strode now argue that
    his previous estimate is not “supported by the evi-
    dence”—as he claimed it was—and that the district court
    thus erred by relying on it.
    In any event, Strode’s new estimate is inconsistent with
    the trial testimony. Strode assumes that the conspiracy
    involved only one trip from Arizona with marijuana every
    2.9 weeks. Blackwell testified, however, that he was
    escorting marijuana from Phoenix to Indianapolis once a
    week beginning in March 2003, and two to three times a
    week starting in August 2003. Thus, we reject Strode’s new
    estimate and hold that the district court did not commit
    clear error by relying on the conservative estimate of the
    drug quantity provided by Strode’s own counsel.
    Next, Strode argues that the district court should not
    have enhanced his sentence one level under U.S.S.G.
    § 3C1.1 for obstruction of justice.3 Section 3C1.1 provides a
    two-level enhancement for a defendant who “willfully
    obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or im-
    pede, the administration of justice with respect to the
    investigation, prosecution, or sentencing” of the offense
    3
    The government does not cross-appeal the district court’s
    decision to give a one-level enhancement for obstruction of
    justice instead of a two-level enhancement as provided
    under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1.
    No. 08-1611                                                   9
    of conviction. The commentary to § 3C1.1 lists as an
    example of obstructive conduct “threatening, intimidating,
    or otherwise unlawfully influencing a co-defendant . . .
    directly or indirectly, or attempting to do so.” U.S.S.G.
    § 3C1.1 application note 4(a) (2007). The district court
    found that Strode attempted to influence the testimony and
    defenses of his co-defendants during their conversation at
    Glover’s, which violated the court’s no-contact order, and
    that the attempt constituted obstruction of justice under
    § 3C1.1. As the district court put it, “So was there in-
    timidation? Probably not. Were there threats? No, there
    didn’t need to be. But there sure was an orchestration to
    get everybody on the same page.”
    Although Strode claims that his conversation with
    Askew and Conway did not constitute obstruction under
    § 3C1.1 as a matter of law, Strode does not contest that
    attempting to influence one’s co-defendants to “stay
    strong” and refrain from cooperating with the government
    in the face of a federal indictment meets the definition of
    “obstruction of justice” contained in § 3C1.1 and the
    commentary to that section. Cf. United States v. Wright, 
    37 F.3d 358
    , 362 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding telephone call to co-
    defendant obstructive where the gist of the message
    informed the co-defendant that “if you testify against me,
    I will testify against you”); United States v. Robinson, 
    14 F.3d 1200
    , 1203-04 (7th Cir. 1994) (finding phone conversation
    obstructive where defendant attempted to influence his co-
    defendant not to testify for the government). Rather, Strode
    challenges the district court’s factual finding that Strode
    had such a purpose in mind during the meeting at
    Glover’s. Strode claims that the district court misconstrued
    10                                               No. 08-1611
    the conversation between Conway, Askew, and himself.
    According to Strode, he was not attempting to encourage
    his co-defendants to stay strong and prevent them from
    cooperating with the government. He characterizes the
    meeting as a “mere attempt to discover who is or might be
    cooperating.”
    We review a district court’s factual findings supporting
    a § 3C1.1 enhancement for clear error. United States v.
    Dale, 
    498 F.3d 604
    , 608 (7th Cir. 2007). In the context of the
    recorded conversation at Glover’s, we do not find the
    district court’s interpretation of what was said to be
    clearly erroneous. Admittedly, the transcript of the con-
    versation, as the district court noted, is “not entirely
    straightforward.” However, Strode spends a great deal
    of effort throughout the conversation attempting to
    convince Askew and Conway that he “ain’t said nothin’ ”
    and was not cooperating with the government. The district
    court reasonably concluded that those assurances were
    meant to strengthen Askew’s and Conway’s resolve and
    prevent them from cooperating with the government by
    conveying that Strode was in this with them. Though
    Strode never explicitly stated that he did not want
    Askew and Conway to cooperate with the government,
    indirectly implying a need for everyone to keep quiet is not
    a barrier to an obstruction enhancement. See United States
    v. Cherif, 
    943 F.2d 692
    , 703 (7th Cir. 1991) (finding that a
    letter to a co-conspirator advising her that she did “not
    know anything” about their fraudulent scheme was a
    “subtle and somewhat clever attempt to tell her, ‘Don’t
    spill the beans’ ” and justified a § 3C1.1 enhancement).
    No. 08-1611                                              11
    Moreover, the context of the conversation clearly
    reveals an obstructive intent. See 
    Wright, 37 F.3d at 362
    (noting that allegedly obstructive statement must be
    “view[ed] in context”). Strode told Conway that the
    purpose for the meeting was so that they could get their
    stories straight. Moreover, Strode knew the consequences
    if the court caught him meeting with his co-defen-
    dants—immediate imprisonment. That Strode knew the
    stakes yet chose to meet with his co-defendants anyway
    strongly suggests that Strode did not want to see
    Conway and Askew simply to shoot the breeze or catch
    up on old times. Rather, it suggests a specific business
    purpose: to see if he could persuade his co-defendants
    not to cooperate with the government by demonstrating
    his own loyalty to them. Although his plan did not work
    as intended because Askew and Conway had already
    turned on him, an unsuccessful attempt suffices under
    § 3C1.1. See United States v. Fuller, 
    532 F.3d 656
    , 666 (7th
    Cir. 2008). The enhancement was therefore properly
    applied.
    Lastly, Strode argues that his sentence should not have
    been enhanced two levels under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1)
    for possession of a firearm. We again apply the clear
    error standard of review to assess the accuracy of the
    district court’s application of that enhancement. United
    States v. Idowu, 
    520 F.3d 790
    , 793 (7th Cir. 2008). Section
    2D1.1(b)(1) provides: “If a dangerous weapon (including a
    firearm) was possessed, increase by 2 levels.” We have
    defined “possession” to include firearms possessed by
    coconspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy that the
    defendant could have reasonably foreseen. Acosta, 534
    12                                             No. 08-1611
    F.3d at 588. “Once the government has proved possession,
    the defendant must show it is clearly improbable that
    the weapon was connected with the offense.” 
    Id. The district
    court did not commit clear error by
    applying § 2D1.1(b)(1). Indeed, it had its pick of firearms
    from which to choose, any one of which was sufficient to
    assess the enhancement. There was a firearm that
    Blackwell testified he saw in Strode’s BMW; a firearm that
    both Conway and Ironn Anderson, another Strode associ-
    ate, testified they saw in Strode’s waistband; two
    firearms law enforcement officers observed in vehicles
    driven by Strode during traffic stops on two separate
    occasions; three more firearms law enforcement officers
    recovered from homes used by Strode in his drug dis-
    tribution operation (not including the loaded weapon
    officers found at Strode’s grow house that was the
    subject of count five of the indictment); a firearm
    found during a search of Strode’s residence; and a firearm
    that Askew, Conway, and Blackwell testified Blackwell
    pointed at Conway in response to Strode’s order to
    prevent Conway from leaving Blackwell’s garage until
    Strode arrived to settle a dispute over the proper dis-
    tribution of some of the marijuana.
    Other than the two firearms found in one of the resi-
    dences, Strode makes no claim that the evidence was
    insufficient to support an enhancement on the basis of his
    possession of those weapons. Nor does Strode argue that
    those firearms were unconnected to his drug operations
    or that he could not have foreseen them. Instead, Strode
    contends that those instances of firearms possession
    No. 08-1611                                                 13
    suffer from a “credibility problem.” According to Strode,
    the jury’s acquittal of him on the charge of possessing
    the firearm in the grow house in furtherance of the
    marijuana-growing operation shows that the jury found
    the other instances of gun possession lacking in “cred-
    ibility and probative value.”
    That argument has no merit. We do not see how Strode’s
    acquittal on that charge sheds any light on what the jury
    thought of the other, uncharged acts of gun possession
    that came out during the course of trial. Moreover, the
    different standards of proof between trial and sentencing
    make the jury’s determination irrelevant to the applica-
    tion of the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement. Despite the acquit-
    tal, although not necessary in this case, the district court
    could have permissibly enhanced Strode’s sentence
    under § 2D1.1(b)(1) for the weapon that was involved in
    the acquitted charge if it found that the enhancement
    was supported by a preponderance of the evidence. See
    United States v. Watts, 
    519 U.S. 148
    , 149 (1997); United
    States v. Price, 
    418 F.3d 771
    , 788 (7th Cir. 2005). If even the
    acquitted conduct was fair game, then the district court
    certainly was not prevented from applying the enhance-
    ment based on any of the uncharged instances of firearm
    possession proved by a preponderance of the evidence
    at sentencing.
    III.
    The district court committed no error in sentencing
    Strode. The district court’s drug quantity calculation,
    which comported with what Strode’s attorney advanced
    14                                              No. 08-1611
    as reasonable in the district court, was not clearly errone-
    ous. The district court properly enhanced Strode’s sentence
    one level for obstruction of justice based on Strode’s
    conversation with his co-defendants in violation of the
    court’s no-contact order. And the district court properly
    enhanced Strode’s sentence two levels based on the
    numerous instances of firearm possession by Strode in the
    record. We therefore A FFIRM Strode’s conviction and
    sentence.
    1-14-09