United States v. Recendiz, Gerardo ( 2009 )


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  •                               In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821
    U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    G ERARDO R ECENDIZ, A RMANDO N AVAR, and
    M ARCO T HOMAS,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 03 CR 1136—Charles R. Norgle, Judge.
    A RGUED O CTOBER 20, 2008—D ECIDED M ARCH 3, 2009
    Before B AUER, K ANNE, and W ILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
    K ANNE, Circuit Judge. On October 3, 2005, a jury con-
    victed Armando Navar and Marco Thomas of a number of
    federal crimes related to their participation in a Chicago
    cocaine distribution network. The district court sentenced
    Navar and Thomas to 324 and 360 months in prison,
    respectively. On appeal, Navar challenges his conviction,
    2                               Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821
    arguing that the district court made several evidentiary
    and procedural errors and that his counsel was ineffective.
    Thomas joins only Navar’s assertion that trial counsel
    improperly shifted the burden of proof during his opening
    statement, in violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due
    process. We find no error below and affirm both convic-
    tions.
    Co-defendant Gerardo Recendiz pleaded guilty to
    multiple charges related to his participation in the same
    drug distribution network and was sentenced to 135
    months in prison. Recendiz’s attorney filed an Anders brief
    requesting permission to withdraw from representing
    Recendiz. We grant the motion to withdraw and dismiss
    Recendiz’s appeal.
    I. B ACKGROUND
    Armando Navar and Marco Thomas were members of a
    drug trafficking organization that smuggled substantial
    quantities of cocaine from Mexico into the United States
    and distributed it on the streets of Chicago. The organiza-
    tion’s leader was Saul Saucedo, who resides in Mexico and
    oversees his organization from afar.
    A. The Cast of Characters
    Armando Navar is originally from Mexico, and he is
    married to Saul Saucedo’s sister, Lorena. Before coming to
    the United States, Navar worked as a physician and was
    known as “the Doctor” within the Saucedo organization.
    Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821                          3
    During the relevant time period, Navar worked for
    Saucedo as a high-level operative in Chicago. In this
    capacity, Navar aided in the delivery of multi-kilogram
    quantities of cocaine from Mexico, where they were stored
    in stash houses around the city. Navar assisted in distrib-
    uting large amounts of the cocaine to brokers for the
    organization, who sold it to wholesale dealers, who in turn
    distributed the drugs to their street-level, paying custom-
    ers. Couriers delivered the proceeds back to higher-
    ranking members of the organization, who allocated the
    profits and eventually smuggled the remainder back to
    Saucedo in Mexico. The drug operation was vast, involved
    hundreds of kilograms of cocaine, and generated millions
    of dollars.
    One broker for the Saucedo organization was a man
    named Jesus Herrera. Navar first met Herrera in 1997,
    when Herrera began dating Navar’s sister-in-law—Saul
    Saucedo’s younger sister—Cynthia. Navar disapproved of
    the relationship and distrusted Herrera because he was
    from a disfavored town in Mexico and was older than
    Cynthia. Navar confronted Herrera on one occasion
    and barred Cynthia from seeing him, largely out of
    respect for her father, who had entrusted her to Navar’s
    care. Following his intervention, Navar did not com-
    municate or interact with Herrera for some time.
    Years later, Herrera began purchasing cocaine from the
    Saucedo organization. Herrera initially dealt with an
    operative named Gabe, but Navar assumed this business
    following Gabe’s arrest. From late 2002 until mid-Septem-
    ber 2003, Navar sold cocaine to Herrera approximately two
    4                          Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821
    to three times per month, in average quantities of ten to
    fifteen kilograms. Herrera owned a furniture store on the
    west side of Chicago, but he attempted to keep his drug
    business separate and leased a nearby warehouse to
    conceal cocaine.
    Concerned for his reputation, business, and safety,
    Herrera enlisted Ahmed “Eddie” Tmiri as his primary
    assistant in carrying out the drug transactions. Tmiri had
    worked for Herrera in the furniture store for six years
    before joining the drug operation. Typically, after Herrera
    arranged a sale, Tmiri picked up the money and delivered
    the cocaine to the buyer, allowing Herrera to distance
    himself from the criminal activity. Because of Tmiri’s
    assistance, Herrera split with him the profits earned from
    each transaction.
    Herrera sold cocaine to many different dealers, one of
    whom was Navar’s co-defendant Marco Thomas. Herrera
    sold cocaine to Thomas from the spring of 2003 until their
    last transaction on September 3, 2003. The transactions
    occurred approximately two or three times per month,
    each in an amount of approximately ten to fifteen kilo-
    grams of cocaine.
    B. The Drug Busts
    Near the beginning of 2003, the Drug Enforcement
    Administration began investigating the Saucedo organiza-
    tion after the DEA’s Colorado Springs office intercepted
    phone conversations of a known money carrier, who
    revealed that he was making a trip to Chicago to pick up
    Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821                            5
    anywhere from $1 million to $2 million. The DEA’s Chi-
    cago office took over the investigation in mid-2003.
    During the course of the investigation, the DEA obtained
    permission to wiretap multiple telephone numbers associ-
    ated with members of the Saucedo organization. Among
    these telephone numbers was a prepaid cellular phone
    used by Jesus Herrera. Herrera testified that he communi-
    cated with Navar and Thomas primarily via prepaid
    phones referred to as “throwaways,” which allowed users
    to avoid providing identifying information associated with
    a regular cellular phone account and, at least theoretically,
    to avoid wiretaps.
    Herrera’s efforts to evade a wiretap were unsuccessful.
    Between August 1 and September 15, 2003, the DEA
    recorded approximately 530 telephone calls on Herrera’s
    number. Of these, the government introduced as evidence
    at trial sixty-five conversations related to drug transac-
    tions: thirty-nine calls between Herrera and Navar, and
    twenty-six calls between Herrera and Thomas. The con-
    versations revealed the details of various drug deals,
    most often communicated using code language. Herrera
    explained that they avoided the word cocaine but dis-
    cussed quantities, the price per kilogram, their typical
    terms or “standing orders,” and meeting places for deliver-
    ing the drugs.
    Based upon these conversations and additional surveil-
    lance, the DEA learned of an upcoming drug transaction
    involving Navar and Thomas. On September 2, 2003,
    Navar informed Herrera that cocaine was available, and
    Herrera reserved ten kilograms. Herrera called Thomas to
    6                         Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821
    inform him of the cocaine and coordinate an exchange for
    the next day. On September 3, Herrera confirmed the
    transaction with both Thomas and Navar. Just before
    noon, Thomas called Herrera’s courier, Tmiri, and the two
    arranged a meeting at a restaurant to exchange the money.
    DEA agents observed the exchange of a duffel bag and
    followed both Thomas and Tmiri when they departed.
    Tmiri proceeded to a White Hen Pantry, where he collected
    a package from a white minivan carrying two Hispanic
    men, and the two vehicles quickly separated and left. The
    minivan proceeded to what was later discovered to be a
    stash house; agents followed Tmiri’s car to an apart-
    ment on the west side of Chicago. At that point, Thomas
    reappeared, parked beside Tmiri, and removed a box from
    Tmiri’s trunk. Tmiri testified that Thomas took the box
    into the apartment building, which belonged to Thomas’s
    sister, and then both men drove away.
    Following this exchange, law enforcement stopped both
    Tmiri and Thomas. In Thomas’s Cadillac Escalade, agents
    discovered a loaded semiautomatic handgun, two plastic
    bags containing cocaine, and approximately $23,500 in
    cash. Investigators later learned that Thomas had repeat-
    edly deposited proceeds into four different bank accounts
    in amounts just below $10,000, to avoid bank disclosure
    rules. An IRS Special Agent testified at trial that agents
    also discovered $498,500 cash in Thomas’s safe deposit
    box, $87,000 in three separate hiding places in Thomas’s
    home, a .357 Magnum, a .9mm handgun, a money-
    counting machine, and documents that appeared to be
    drug ledgers.
    Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821                           7
    The DEA continued to monitor phone calls between
    Navar and Herrera. The next day, September 4, Herrera
    informed Navar that they “had a problem with the dogs,”
    which he explained at trial meant the police. Herrera
    suggested that they move their drugs to another location.
    Law enforcement followed the trail, and on September 15,
    agents stopped a white van leaving the new location with
    21 kilograms of cocaine. A search of the stash house
    revealed over 500 kilograms of cocaine hidden in the
    floorboards and the attic, as well as weapons, equipment
    for pressing and packaging cocaine, and a drug ledger.
    The DEA arrested Herrera, who provided information
    about “the Doctor” that led to Navar’s identification and
    arrest. Herrera also identified Navar’s voice on a number
    of the recorded calls between him and Navar.
    On April 1, 2004, a grand jury indicted eleven individuals
    who were involved in the conspiracy to distribute drugs
    for the Saucedo organization. The indictment charged
    Armando Navar with conspiracy to distribute cocaine in
    violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, distribution of more than five
    kilograms of cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),
    and three counts of using a communication facility during
    a felony in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). The indictment
    charged Thomas with the same conspiracy to distribute
    cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and a number of
    other related counts.
    On September 20, 2005, a jury trial began in the United
    States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois.
    Prior to trial, Herrera and Tmiri accepted plea agreements
    and agreed to testify against Navar and Thomas. The
    8                          Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821
    government also called law enforcement agents involved
    in the investigation. On October 3, 2005, a jury found both
    defendants guilty of each count of the indictment. On May
    9, 2006, the district court sentenced Navar to 324 months’
    confinement; on June 16, 2006, Thomas received 360
    months. Both filed timely notices of appeal, and we
    consolidated their appeals.
    II. A NALYSIS OF THE C ONSOLIDATED A PPEALS
    OF N AVAR AND T HOMAS
    In his brief, Navar presents no fewer than ten issues for
    our review. Among them are a variety of alleged eviden-
    tiary and constitutional errors, as well as an ineffective
    assistance of counsel claim based upon his trial attorney’s
    failure to address some of these alleged errors. We will
    address the bulk of Navar’s arguments. Thomas joins only
    Navar’s first argument regarding counsel’s remarks during
    his opening statement. Because Navar bases his ineffective
    assistance of counsel claim on three issues similar to those
    he challenges substantively, we will address the merits of
    his individual arguments first, then turn to the ineffective
    assistance claim.
    A. Defense Counsel’s Comments During His Opening
    Statement
    Navar’s first argument, which Thomas joins, is that
    Navar’s counsel made certain comments during his
    opening statement that improperly shifted the burden of
    proof, thereby violating the defendants’ Fifth Amendment
    right to due process. The following exchanges regarding
    Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821                               9
    the burden of proof occurred in front of the jury at trial.
    During her opening statement, the prosecutor correctly
    informed the jury that the government must prove the
    charges beyond a reasonable doubt, which she explained
    “is the standard of proof in . . . every criminal case in the
    city of Chicago.” Following the government’s statement,
    Navar’s counsel gave his opening statement, in which he
    made the following remarks to the jury regarding the
    burden of proof:
    Members of the jury, Mr. Hyman and I, Larry and
    I, intend to prove to you—that’s right, we who
    have no burden, it’s true. As you heard my adver-
    sary say, Ms. Noller and his Honor will tell you
    again, instruct you later . . . that the government
    has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
    in every criminal case. But in this case, members of
    the jury, I will respectfully tell you now that we
    appreciate those advantages, but we don’t want
    those advantages. He is presumed innocent, that’s
    true, but we don’t want any advantage at all
    because we will confidently prove to you . . . by the
    end of this case that Armando Navar is an innocent
    person and being set up and being framed by a
    person who has an absolute visceral hate for
    Armando Navar.
    ....
    I’m going to prove to you that Armando Navar
    meddled in a relationship between Herrera and
    Armando Navar’s sister-in-law, because he at some
    point, many times, told his sister-in-law that
    Herrera wasn’t good enough for her. . . .
    10                           Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821
    ....
    I will competently prove—we will competently
    prove to you that Armando Navar is not a drug
    dealer, that the indictment is a false accusation . . .
    .
    These are the comments that Navar challenges in this
    appeal. Following Navar’s opening statement, Thomas’s
    counsel correctly stated that Thomas must be guilty
    beyond a reasonable doubt and also noted that “[t]he
    government welcomes their burden of proof; it’s your job
    to hold them to their burden of proof.”
    During closing argument at the end of the trial, both the
    prosecutor and Thomas’s counsel again stated the correct
    burden of proof. Navar’s counsel, perhaps reassessing the
    strength of his case, abandoned the bravado displayed in
    his opening statement and referred to the correct burden of
    proof no less than nine different times during his closing
    argument. Finally, the district court gave the jury a de-
    tailed charge explaining that the defendants are presumed
    innocent and must be proven guilty beyond a reasonable
    doubt.
    Navar now asserts that trial counsel’s comments during
    his opening statement were improper. Navar argues that
    even though “the defense did not make a motion for a
    mistrial because the defense made the improper argu-
    ment . . . , the court itself should have stopped the proce-
    dure and had a mistrial declared.” (Petr.’s Br. 19.) We find
    Navar’s argument unconvincing. Not surprisingly, Navar’s
    counsel did not stop his opening statement to lodge an
    objection to his own comments; Thomas also did not object.
    Thus, we review for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b);
    Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821                            11
    United States v. Sandoval-Gomez, 
    295 F.3d 757
    , 762 (7th Cir.
    2002). In determining whether plain error exists, we ask
    (1) whether there was any error at all; (2) if so, whether
    that error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious; and (3) if the
    error was plain, whether it affected defendant’s substantial
    rights, i.e., whether it affected the outcome of the case.
    United States v. Olano, 
    507 U.S. 725
    , 732-34 (1993).
    Placed in the full context of the trial, which included the
    above statements, Navar’s argument borders on frivolity.
    First, we agree with the government that the appropriate
    avenue to address these types of alleged misstatements by
    one’s own counsel is via a Sixth Amendment claim for
    ineffective assistance. Navar brought such a claim and
    included his counsel’s comments as one basis for it, which
    we address below. Thomas, of course, cannot bring an
    ineffective assistance claim based upon the conduct of
    another co-defendant’s attorney. Thus, we consider the
    merits of defendants’ claims and find that they fail.
    In support of his argument, Navar analogizes his coun-
    sel’s remarks only to cases involving inappropriate com-
    ments by a prosecutor, and he invites us, without legal
    support, to apply the same standard of conduct to defense
    counsel. (Petr.’s Br. 21 (citing United States v. Vargas, 
    583 F.2d 380
    (7th Cir. 1978); United States v. Segna, 
    555 F.2d 226
    (9th Cir. 1977)).) However, overturning a conviction due
    to a prosecutor’s improper comments is no easy feat. See
    United States v. Sandoval, 
    347 F.3d 627
    , 631 (7th Cir. 2003)
    (noting that to constitute prosecutorial misconduct,
    comments must be both improper and deprive defendant
    of a fair trial); 
    Sandoval-Gomez, 295 F.3d at 763
    (listing
    12                          Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821
    numerous factors a court considers to determine whether
    defendant was denied a fair trial); see also United States v.
    Amerson, 
    185 F.3d 676
    , 685 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that a
    prosecutor’s improper comments, even at closing argu-
    ment, “rarely rise to the level of reversible error” (quota-
    tions omitted)). Navar’s attempt to obtain a new trial
    because his counsel’s comments purportedly deprived him
    of a fair trial is decidedly more difficult.
    Navar’s first obstacle to success is to convince us that the
    standards that apply to a prosecutor’s comments should
    apply with equal force to defense counsel’s. We do not
    agree with the comparison. In a criminal case, the prosecu-
    tor is in the unique position of representing the govern-
    ment, as opposed to advocating on behalf of a client. As
    the Supreme Court observed: “The United States Attorney
    is the representative not of an ordinary party to a contro-
    versy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern
    impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at
    all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution
    is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall
    be done.” Berger v. United States, 
    295 U.S. 78
    , 88 (1935).
    Therefore, a prosecutor’s statements—and their impact—
    are evaluated in a different light than those made by
    defense counsel, for a jury must have confidence in the
    prosecutor’s faithful observation of the “duty to refrain
    from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful
    conviction.” 
    Id. But even
    more damaging to Navar’s claim is that even if
    defense counsel could make such a strong statement
    regarding the burden of proof so as to violate his own
    Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821                              13
    client’s constitutional rights, Navar’s counsel made no such
    statement here. His comments were merely confident
    assertions regarding the strength of his case and did not
    shift the burden of proof or confuse the jury. He also
    referred to the correct burden multiple times, thereby
    ameliorating any possible self-inflicted prejudice. See
    
    Sandoval-Gomez, 295 F.3d at 763
    (stating that one factor in
    determining whether a defendant was denied a fair trial
    due to a prosecutor’s remarks is the defense’s opportunity
    to counter any prejudice). Thomas’s counsel and the
    prosecutor both stated the proper burden of proof, and the
    court gave the jury the correct instruction, which we
    assume it understood and followed. See Briggs v. Marshall,
    
    93 F.3d 355
    , 360 (7th Cir. 1996); Bae v. Peters, 
    950 F.2d 469
    ,
    481 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Boyde v. California, 
    494 U.S. 370
    ,
    384 (1990) (“[A]rguments of counsel generally carry less
    weight with a jury than do instructions from the court. The
    former are usually billed in advance to the jury as matters
    of argument, not evidence . . . ; the latter, we have often
    recognized, are viewed as definitive and binding state-
    ments of the law.” (citation omitted)).
    Consequently, Navar’s argument fails; he does not
    present any error, much less a plain one affecting substan-
    tial rights. See 
    Olano, 507 U.S. at 733-34
    . Even if the state-
    ments were improper under the standard applicable
    to a prosecutor’s misstatements, they did not deprive
    Navar of the right to a fair trial, i.e., they did not “ ‘so
    infect[] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting
    conviction a denial of due process.’ ” Kappos v. Hanks, 
    54 F.3d 365
    , 367 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Darden v. Wainwright,
    14                          Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821
    
    477 U.S. 168
    , 181 (1986)). Thomas merely adopted Navar’s
    argument, and his claim fails for the same reasons.
    B. Identification Testimony
    Next, Navar challenges certain identification testimony
    provided by two witnesses during the trial. A witness’s
    identification violates a defendant’s right to due process
    when the identification procedure is “ ‘so impermissibly
    suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of
    irreparable misidentification.’” United States v. Williams,
    
    522 F.3d 809
    , 810 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Simmons v. United
    States, 
    390 U.S. 377
    , 384 (1968)). To determine whether a
    particular procedure violated a defendant’s constitutional
    rights, we undertake a well-settled, two-pronged analysis:
    (1) whether the process was unduly suggestive, and (2) if
    so, whether the identification was nevertheless suf-
    ficiently reliable. United States v. Griffin, 
    493 F.3d 856
    , 865
    (7th Cir. 2007); Rodriguez v. Peters, 
    63 F.3d 546
    , 556 (7th
    Cir. 1995); United States ex rel. Kosik v. Napoli, 
    814 F.2d 1151
    , 1155 (7th Cir. 1987).
    In conducting this analysis, we must remember that our
    purpose is only to determine whether the district court
    properly permitted the jury to hear the identification
    testimony. We will not assess the accuracy of the actual
    identification, for that is the exclusive province of the jury.
    
    Kosik, 814 F.2d at 1156
    . Our role, rather, is to determine
    whether the identification was so unreliable that the
    defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial should have
    precluded its admission. 
    Id. Nos. 06-1754,
    06-2380 & 06-2821                               15
    We generally review a district court’s decision not to
    suppress identification testimony de novo, with due defer-
    ence to its findings of fact. United States v. Hawkins, 
    499 F.3d 703
    , 707 (7th Cir. 2007). However, because Navar’s
    counsel did not object to either identification, we review
    for plain error. 
    Sandoval-Gomez, 295 F.3d at 762
    ; see 
    also supra
    pt. II.A. Navar first argues that the trial court erred
    by permitting a witness to leave the witness stand to
    identify Navar as the individual known as “the Doctor.”
    His second challenge is that the trial court should not have
    permitted a law enforcement officer to identify Navar’s
    voice on a previously recorded conversation between
    Navar and Herrera. We consider separately whether each
    procedure was proper.
    1.   Ahmed Tmiri’s In-Court Identification of Navar as “the
    Doctor”
    During the trial, Ahmed Tmiri testified that he delivered
    drugs and collected money for Jesus Herrera. He stated
    that Herrera began obtaining drugs from someone known
    as “the Doctor,” whose real name was “Navarro.” Toward
    the beginning of his testimony, when asked whether he
    saw “the Doctor” in the courtroom, Tmiri replied that he
    did not. However, he testified that he had seen “the
    Doctor” more than twenty times and described his physical
    characteristics: “He’s dark skin, he’s got a mustache, black
    hair, kind of straight, and I think he’s got a little scar on his
    face.” Tmiri was also unable to identify Thomas, despite
    the fact that both defendants were seated at the defense
    table. Later in his testimony, however, Tmiri explained
    16                           Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821
    that he had broken his glasses prior to the trial and could
    not even make out the facial features of the prosecutor who
    was questioning him.
    Toward the end of Tmiri’s testimony, the prosecutor
    requested permission from the court for Tmiri to leave the
    witness stand and move closer to the people in the court-
    room to determine whether he recognized anyone.
    Navar’s counsel consulted with Thomas’s counsel, but
    neither objected to the procedure. With the court’s
    consent, Tmiri left the stand and identified both Navar and
    Thomas. Navar contends that this procedure violated his
    right to due process by improperly suggesting to Tmiri that
    he identify Navar.
    First, we must determine whether the in-court identifica-
    tion procedure was so suggestive that it likely produced an
    unreliable identification. In the courtroom, a defendant
    does not have a constitutional right to the same type of
    identification procedure used in a police line-up, and the
    manner of an in-court identification is typically left to the
    trial court’s discretion. United States v. Davies, 
    768 F.2d 893
    ,
    903-04 (7th Cir. 1985). Navar’s argument boils down to
    two allegedly suggestive circumstances: first, that Navar
    was seated at the defense table; and second, that the
    prosecutor’s request for Tmiri to move closer to the
    audience—after Tmiri had already stated that he could not
    identify Navar—suggested that “the Doctor” was in fact in
    the courtroom.
    As to the first, we have indicated on multiple occasions
    that a defendant’s mere presence at the defense table is not
    enough to establish a violation of due process. United
    Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821                             17
    States v. Bush, 
    749 F.2d 1227
    , 1232 (7th Cir. 1984); accord
    Johnson v. McCaughtry, 
    92 F.3d 585
    , 597 (7th Cir. 1996);
    
    Rodriguez, 63 F.3d at 556
    ; United States ex rel. Haywood v.
    O’Leary, 
    827 F.2d 52
    , 59 (7th Cir. 1987). Nothing here
    requires us to deviate from that general rule. Similarly,
    simply increasing a witness’s proximity to the individuals
    in the courtroom, without more, does not suggest to a
    witness whom he should identify. As we have stated, “[t]o
    satisfy the first prong of our analysis, the defendant must
    show both that the identification procedure was suggestive
    and that such suggestiveness was unnecessary.” 
    Hawkins, 499 F.3d at 707
    . Because Tmiri testified that he could not
    see, permitting him to move forward was a necessary step
    for him to make any identification. Even the sequence of
    the questioning itself was necessary, for no one in the
    courtroom was aware that Tmiri could not see without his
    glasses until after he was initially unable to identify Navar
    and Thomas. Nothing about the sequence of the questions
    suggested to Tmiri whom he should identify or that Navar
    was in fact present.
    Even if we determined that the procedure at trial was
    unduly suggestive, it was sufficiently reliable to prevent
    “ ‘a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidenti-
    fication.’ ” Neil v. Biggers, 
    409 U.S. 188
    , 198 (1972) (quoting
    
    Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384
    ). The Supreme Court has said that
    “reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility
    of identification testimony.” Manson v. Brathwaite, 
    432 U.S. 98
    , 114 (1977). In assessing whether an identification was
    reliable, a court should consider the following factors:
    (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at
    the time of the crime (or prior to the identification), (2) the
    18                          Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821
    witness’s degree of attention during such an opportunity,
    (3) the accuracy of the witness’s prior description of the
    criminal, if he made one, (4) the level of certainty demon-
    strated at the time of the identification, and (5) the time
    between the crime and the identification. See 
    id. at 114
    (citing 
    Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200
    ).
    After evaluating the totality of the circumstances and
    applying the Biggers factors, the circumstances in this case
    support the reliability of Tmiri’s identification. Tmiri
    testified that he knew Navar and had seen him over twenty
    times, providing him ample opportunity to view Navar
    prior to trial. Tmiri did not testify regarding his degree of
    attention during the times he saw Navar, nor did he
    provide a description of Navar prior to trial, but Tmiri did
    provide a detailed description of Navar prior to his visual
    identification of him. Navar does not contest the accuracy
    of this description, nor does he suggest that the description
    itself was the result of any suggestive circumstance. Tmiri
    exhibited no uncertainty at trial that Navar was in fact “the
    Doctor.” Regarding the last factor, the trial occurred
    approximately two years after Tmiri last interacted with
    Navar,1 but any concern over that length of time is dimin-
    ished by the strength of the other factors—particularly
    Tmiri’s familiarity with Navar and his specific description
    of him.
    1
    The record is not clear whether this was the last time Tmiri
    actually saw Navar. Although it may be possible that Tmiri
    saw Navar after that time, we use this time frame for the
    purposes of this analysis.
    Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821                            19
    Furthermore, Tmiri’s testimony and ultimate identifica-
    tion occurred in direct view of the jury, which observed
    and presumably weighed any arguably suggestive circum-
    stances. As we noted, our role is not to judge the accuracy
    of the identification, 
    Kosik, 814 F.2d at 1156
    , and such
    testimony should be kept from the jury only if it is so
    unreliable that it presents “a very substantial likelihood of
    irreparable misidentification,” 
    Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384
    .
    “Misidentification is ‘irreparable’ when the source of the
    error is so elusive that it cannot be demonstrated to a jury,
    which therefore will give excessive weight to the eyewit-
    ness testimony.” 
    Williams, 522 F.3d at 811
    . We have also
    noted that “[t]he deference shown the jury in weighing the
    reliability of potentially suggestive out-of-court identifica-
    tion would seem even more appropriate for in-court
    identifications where the jury is present and able to see
    first-hand the circumstances which may influence a
    witness.” 
    Bush, 749 F.2d at 1231
    . In circumstances such as
    these, where the in-court identification was not tainted by
    a previous out-of-court identification, the jury is in
    the unique position of observing the entire identification
    procedure, and it may weigh the accuracy of the identifica-
    tion accordingly. The jury’s conclusions are not our
    concern, so long as the procedure used to identify Navar
    was not unduly suggestive and produced a sufficiently
    reliable identification. The procedure used here did
    not violate Navar’s constitutional rights, and the district
    court did not err by permitting Tmiri’s in-court identifica-
    tion.
    20                          Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821
    2. Special Agent Tulshi’s Voice Identification
    Navar also asserts that the trial court erred when it
    permitted DEA Special Agent Tulshi to identify Navar’s
    voice on a recorded conversation between Navar and
    Herrera. Tulshi testified that on the day of Navar’s arrest,
    he listened to Call No. 331, which was a six-minute conver-
    sation in Spanish between Herrera and a man whose voice
    Tulshi did not yet recognize. Later that day, Tulshi, who
    speaks Spanish, participated in Navar’s arrest and post-
    arrest interviews and conversed with Navar. Tulshi
    testified that after hearing Navar speak, he recognized
    Navar’s voice as the second speaker on Call No. 331.
    Navar now contends that the identification (1) lacked
    foundation, particularly because the trial court had no
    basis for qualifying Tulshi as an expert witness, and
    (2) was unduly suggestive in violation of Navar’s constitu-
    tional right to due process.
    a. Foundation for Special Agent Tulshi’s Identification
    Although Navar’s brief is somewhat unclear, it appears
    that he claims that Special Agent Tulshi’s lack of training
    in voice identification should render his testimony inad-
    missible. Thus, we first review whether Tulshi properly
    authenticated his voice identification.
    Federal Rule of Evidence 901 governs the authentication
    of evidence as a precondition to admissibility, and subsec-
    tion (b) provides examples of acceptable methods of
    authentication or identification. According to the applica-
    ble illustration, a witness properly authenticates a voice,
    Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821                             21
    “whether heard firsthand or through mechanical or
    electronic transmission or recording, by opinion based
    upon hearing the voice at any time under circumstances
    connecting it with the alleged speaker.” Fed. R. Evid.
    901(b)(5) (emphasis added). The advisory committee
    commented on the illustration in Rule 901(b)(5), stating
    that because “aural voice identification is not a subject of
    expert testimony, the requisite familiarity may be acquired
    either before or after the particular speaking which is the
    subject of the identification.” 
    Id. advisory committee’s
    note (Subdivision (b), Example (5)) (emphasis added).
    In light of Rule 901, Navar’s contention that the court
    erred in admitting Special Agent Tulshi’s identification
    because he was not qualified as an expert is wholly
    meritless. Not only do the advisory committee notes to
    Rule 901(b) state that voice identification is “not a subject
    of expert testimony,” but this court has previously stated
    that expert testimony is not required to authenticate a
    voice identification. See United States v. Magana, 
    118 F.3d 1173
    , 1208 (7th Cir. 1997) (“ ‘As long as the basic require-
    ment of familiarity with the voice is met, lay opinion
    testimony is an acceptable means for establishing a
    speaker’s identity.’ ” (quoting United States v. Vega, 
    860 F.2d 779
    , 788 (7th Cir. 1988))); United States v. Degaglia, 
    913 F.2d 372
    , 375-76 (7th Cir. 1990).
    Further, Special Agent Tulshi properly established the
    requisite “minimal familiarity” with Navar’s voice to
    permit him to identify it on Call No. 331. See United States
    v. Mansoori, 
    304 F.3d 635
    , 665 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that
    a witness who heard defendants’ voices once during a
    22                            Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821
    court proceeding satisfied the “minimal familiarity”
    requirement); United States v. Saulter, 
    60 F.3d 270
    , 276 (7th
    Cir. 1995); 
    Degaglia, 913 F.2d at 376
    . Tulshi testified that he
    listened to a recorded phone conversation between Herrera
    and another speaker on the same day that he arrested
    Navar. Later that day, he spoke with Navar during his
    arrest and post-arrest interview, each of which connected
    Navar’s voice to his identity. Tulshi then testified at trial
    that based on hearing Navar’s voice in person, he recog-
    nized it as the same voice he heard on Call No. 331.
    Tulshi’s testimony falls squarely within the requirements
    of Rule 901(b)(5), and the trial court properly found that
    Tulshi authenticated his identification.
    b.   Suggestiveness of Special Agent Tulshi’s Voice Identifica-
    tion Procedure
    Navar also contends that Special Agent Tulshi’s testi-
    mony violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process
    because the voice identification was unduly suggestive. In
    addition to the testimony recounted above, Tulshi testified
    that he was asked to listen to Call No. 331 “in order to do
    a voice recognition.” The crux of Navar’s argument is that
    the government’s request, which came on the same day
    that Tulshi knew the authorities were going to arrest
    Navar, impermissibly suggested that the voice on the call
    was Navar’s.
    A witness’s voice identification is subject to the same due
    process analysis as other forms of identification. See United
    States v. Alvarez, 
    860 F.2d 801
    , 810 (7th Cir. 1988). As we
    Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821                             23
    previously 
    noted, supra
    pt. II.B.1., in determining the
    admissibility of identification testimony, “reliability is the
    linchpin,” 
    Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114
    , and an identification
    procedure is unduly suggestive if it “give[s] rise to ‘a very
    substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification,’ ”
    
    Degaglia, 913 F.2d at 376
    (quoting United States v. Carrasco,
    
    887 F.2d 794
    , 806 (7th Cir. 1989)). To assess the reliability
    of a voice identification, we apply the same factors articu-
    lated in Biggers, and we must weigh them against the
    “corruptive effect of the suggestive identification.”
    
    Alvarez, 860 F.2d at 810
    (quotations omitted).
    We disagree with Navar that the procedure used to
    identify his voice on Call No. 331 was so suggestive that it
    violated his constitutional rights. Navar presents nothing
    beyond the sequence of events to indicate that the process
    suggested to Tulshi that Navar was a participant on Call
    No. 331.
    But even if the identification procedure was suggestive,
    it was constitutionally reliable. See 
    Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199
    -
    
    200; supra
    pt. II.B.1. Applying the first Biggers factor,
    Special Agent Tulshi heard Navar’s voice in person on
    the day of his arrest, and he also had a clear opportunity
    to listen to the voice on Call No. 331—the call lasted six
    minutes and was a recording. Cf. Brown v. Harris, 
    666 F.2d 782
    , 787 (2d Cir. 1981) (“Witnesses who listen to a crime
    that has been ‘memorialized on tape,’ are in a position to
    offer uniquely reliable testimony. . . . [T]hey have the
    luxury of listening to the tape in an office, where they can
    devote their full attention to it.” (citations omitted)). As to
    the second factor, Tulshi testified that he listened to
    24                         Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821
    Call No. 331 with the express purpose of remembering the
    then-unidentified voice. Knowing that as a special agent
    his recollection would be subject to close scrutiny at trial,
    Tulshi devoted proper attention to the call, making him
    nothing like “a casual or passing observer.” 
    Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 115
    . Third, because Tulshi’s familiarity with Navar’s
    voice came from a recording of the telephone call, the
    accuracy of the voice is clear. Regarding the fourth factor,
    Tulshi expressed no uncertainty that, after hearing Navar’s
    voice during his arrest and post-arrest interview, the voice
    on Call No. 331 belonged to Navar. And last, the fifth
    factor also favors admissibility because Tulshi listened to
    Call No. 331 on the same day that he participated in
    Navar’s arrest.
    Therefore, each of the Biggers factors weighs in favor of
    upholding the admission of Tulshi’s testimony. Any
    remaining concerns regarding the accuracy of Tulshi’s
    recollection of the voice are relevant to the weight of the
    testimony, not its admissibility. After reviewing the
    circumstances of Special Agent Tulshi’s voice identifica-
    tion, we cannot say that there is a “ ‘very substantial
    likelihood of irreparable misidentification.’ ” 
    Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 116
    (quoting 
    Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384
    ).
    C. Law Enforcement Testimony Regarding Wiretap Procedure
    Navar’s next challenge is that the court should not have
    permitted a government agent to explain the process by
    which he obtained permission to wiretap Jesus Herrera’s
    telephone number. At trial, Special Agent Baumgartner
    testified that to receive permission to intercept telephone
    Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821                              25
    calls, he prepared an affidavit that included probable cause
    to believe that the particular phone was being used to
    conduct drug trafficking crimes. Baumgartner sent the
    affidavit to the United States Attorney’s office and the
    Department of Justice in Washington D.C., and after they
    approved it, he submitted it to the district court. Navar’s
    counsel objected to testimony regarding the district court’s
    approval of the wiretap, and he asserts on appeal that this
    evidence was prejudicial and violated his right to due
    process. We review the trial court’s evidentiary decision,
    over Navar’s objection, for an abuse of discretion. United
    States v. Owens, 
    424 F.3d 649
    , 653 (7th Cir. 2005).
    Navar is correct that in some circumstances, detailed
    testimony regarding the process by which the government
    procures a wiretap is improper and may merit a new trial.
    See, e.g., United States v. Cunningham, 
    462 F.3d 708
    (7th Cir.
    2006). In Cunningham, a government agent testified about
    the numerous levels of approval required to obtain a
    wiretap on the defendant’s telephone number, including a
    “very extensive” probable cause affidavit, review by the
    USAO and a “panel of attorneys” at the DOJ, and then
    approval by the district court. 
    Id. at 710-11.
    We held that
    this testimony was irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial
    because the “government witness was improperly vouch-
    ing for how good the evidence was.” 
    Id. at 713.
    Our
    concern in Cunningham was that the testimony permitted
    the jury to infer that the defendant was engaged in illegal
    activity before the wiretap because law enforcement,
    government attorneys, and a district judge each approved
    it. See id.; see also United States v. Bustamante, 
    493 F.3d 879
    ,
    888 (7th Cir. 2007).
    26                            Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821
    Unlike in Cunningham, however, the impermissible
    inference from this type of testimony is missing when the
    government places a wiretap on a phone belonging to
    someone other than the defendant. We addressed this
    issue squarely in Bustamante and noted that testimony
    regarding a wiretap on a co-conspirator’s telephone
    permitted a jury to infer that the co-conspirator was engaged
    in illegal activity before the 
    wiretap. 493 F.3d at 888
    .
    Because the defendants in that case never denied that the
    co-conspirator was a drug dealer, we held that the testi-
    mony did not damage or prejudice the defendants. 
    Id. We find
    the facts of this case analogous to those in
    Bustamante. Baumgartner testified about the wiretap on
    Herrera’s telephone number,2 and Herrera testified that the
    telephone number in question belonged to him, a fact
    Navar has never challenged. The testimony regarding the
    wiretap procedure was relevant to Herrera’s conduct and
    the likelihood that he was involved in illegal activity prior
    to the wiretap. Herrera was a known drug dealer, a fact
    that no party disputed. In fact, Navar’s trial strategy
    included painting Herrera as an active participant in the
    drug conspiracy who was now testifying against Navar to
    receive a lower sentence. Thus, the impermissible infer-
    ence that was the concern of Cunningham does not exist
    2
    Further, Baumgartner’s testimony about the wiretap approval
    process was cursory, less detailed, and less problematic than
    that which we found improper in Cunningham. 
    See 462 F.3d at 710-11
    . Although this distinction is not our basis for finding the
    testimony permissible, it supports our conclusion that the
    district court did not abuse its discretion.
    Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821                                 27
    here, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by
    permitting Special Agent Baumgartner’s testimony.3
    Despite the propriety of the district court’s decision in this
    case, we note that the government stated during oral
    argument that after Cunningham, it is no longer the DOJ’s
    practice to elicit such wiretap testimony.
    D. The District Court’s Limitation on Navar’s Cross-Exami-
    nation
    Next, Navar alleges that the trial court erred by restrict-
    ing his counsel’s cross-examination of Jesus Herrera. After
    Herrera acknowledged that he was testifying pursuant to
    a plea agreement, Navar’s counsel introduced the plea
    agreement into evidence and questioned Herrera exten-
    sively about the effect it could have on his sentence.
    Herrera conceded that he could obtain a reduced sentence
    if he was truthful. Not yet satisfied, Navar’s trial counsel
    then attempted to question Herrera about the Sentencing
    Guidelines, including who would determine whether his
    3
    Further, the district court did not permit endless questioning
    on this topic. Rather, it considered Navar’s objection and
    instructed the prosecutor to restrict the questioning to simply
    establishing the fact that government agents may not “willy-
    nilly tap phones.” After Baumgartner testified that he presented
    his affidavit to a district judge, the district court asked whether
    the prosecutor “intend[ed] to belabor this further,” and upon
    getting a negative response, stated “[t]here is no impropriety up
    to this point, but try to concisely end on this issue with this
    witness.”
    28                          Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821
    testimony was “truthful” and what that term means—the
    actual truth, or what the government wanted to hear.
    Navar now asserts that the court violated his right to
    confront Herrera by sustaining the government’s objections
    to this line of questioning.
    The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant an
    opportunity for effective cross-examination, but there is no
    guarantee of cross-examination “ ‘to whatever extent[] the
    defense might wish.’ ” United States v. Jackson, 
    540 F.3d 578
    ,
    591 (7th Cir. 2008) (alteration in original) (quoting Delaware
    v. Van Arsdall, 
    475 U.S. 673
    , 679 (1986)). A judge has broad
    discretion to place reasonable limits on cross-examination,
    based on concerns of, inter alia, confusion of the issues and
    relevance. United States v. Nelson, 
    39 F.3d 705
    , 708 (7th Cir.
    1994). Where a trial court’s limitation on cross-examina-
    tion directly implicates the “core values of the Confronta-
    tion Clause,” we review the limitation de novo; otherwise,
    we review for abuse of discretion. See United States v.
    Smith, 
    454 F.3d 707
    , 714 (7th Cir. 2006).
    One such core value is the ability to expose a witness’s
    motivation for testifying, his bias, or his possible incentives
    to lie. See id.; see also Van 
    Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 678-79
    . How-
    ever, once a trial court permits a defendant to expose a
    witness’s motivation, “it is of peripheral concern to the
    Sixth Amendment how much opportunity defense counsel
    gets to hammer that point home to the jury.” 
    Nelson, 39 F.3d at 708
    . The right to confrontation is not implicated
    where “limitations on cross-examination did not deny the
    defendants the opportunity to establish that the witnesses
    may have had a motive to lie; rather, the limitations denied
    Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821                           29
    them the opportunity to add extra detail to that motive.” 
    Id. That is
    precisely the case here. Because the district court
    did not prevent Navar’s counsel from establishing
    Herrera’s motivation for testifying, the court’s limitation
    did not implicate the Sixth Amendment right to confronta-
    tion, and we review for abuse of discretion.
    To determine whether the district court abused its
    discretion by limiting Navar’s cross-examination, we must
    determine whether “the jury had sufficient information to
    make a discriminating appraisal of the witness’s motives
    and biases.” United States v. De Gudino, 
    722 F.2d 1351
    , 1355
    (7th Cir. 1983). The jury in this case heard Herrera explain
    that he was testifying pursuant to a plea agreement, and
    that in exchange for his truthful testimony, the government
    would advocate for a lower sentence. The trial court
    permitted Navar’s counsel to question Herrera about his
    awareness of the Sentencing Guidelines and even allowed
    Herrera to testify that he was facing a potential sentence of
    235 to 297 months in prison when he entered the plea. Cf.
    
    Nelson, 39 F.3d at 708
    -09 (upholding district court’s refusal
    to allow cross-examination of two government witnesses
    regarding the potential penalties they faced without their
    plea bargains). Only when Navar’s counsel asked Herrera
    to speculate about what constituted “truthful” testimony
    or who made such a determination did the district judge
    limit the examination. The judge stated that the questions
    were confusing to the jury and were improper questions of
    law beyond the witness’s knowledge, both of which are
    permissible grounds for limiting cross-examination. The
    jury had more than enough information to appraise
    30                          Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821
    Herrera’s motive to lie, and the district court did not abuse
    its discretion.
    E. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
    Last, Navar asserts that he received ineffective assistance
    of counsel, based in large part on the way Navar’s trial
    counsel handled the issues that we have already ad-
    dressed. Such a claim is a mixed question of law and fact
    that we review de novo, with a strong presumption that the
    attorney performed effectively. Bednarski v. United States,
    
    481 F.3d 530
    , 535 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Fudge, 
    325 F.3d 910
    , 923 (7th Cir. 2003).
    The Sixth Amendment affords a criminal defendant the
    right to counsel, U.S. Const. amend. VI, and inherent in this
    right is that the defendant is entitled to the effective
    assistance of counsel, McMann v. Richardson, 
    397 U.S. 759
    ,
    771 n.14 (1970). But “effective” does not mean successful
    or without flaw. The important inquiry is “whether coun-
    sel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
    adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as
    having produced a just result.” Strickland v. Washington,
    
    466 U.S. 668
    , 686 (1984).
    To prevail on a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel,
    Navar must establish (1) that his attorney’s representation
    fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2)
    that there is a reasonable probability that, but for the
    ineffective assistance, the result of the proceedings would
    have been different. See 
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88
    ;
    
    Fudge, 325 F.3d at 923-24
    . Under the performance prong,
    Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821                              31
    we must determine if Navar’s counsel acted “outside the
    wide range of professionally competent assistance,”
    
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690
    , and we “maintain a strong
    presumption that the defendant received effective assis-
    tance,” Hardamon v. United States, 
    319 F.3d 943
    , 948 (7th
    Cir. 2003). It is not our role to second-guess counsel’s
    strategic decisions or “take up the role of the ‘Monday
    morning quarterback.’ ” Harris v. Reed, 
    894 F.2d 871
    , 877
    (7th Cir. 1990). Under the prejudice prong, a “reasonable
    probability” that the result would have been different is
    one “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”
    
    Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694
    .
    Navar faces the added difficulty of pursuing his ineffec-
    tive assistance claim on direct appeal. We typically do not
    review an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct
    review, United States v. Best, 
    426 F.3d 937
    , 944 (7th Cir.
    2005), but if we do, the defendant must rely on the trial
    record alone, because he lacks the ability to develop a
    factual record regarding the attorney’s trial conduct, see
    United States v. Taglia, 
    922 F.2d 413
    , 417 (7th Cir. 1991).
    Without record of an attorney’s motives, “every indulgence
    will be given to the possibility that a seeming lapse or error
    by defense counsel was in fact a tactical move, flawed only
    in hindsight.” 
    Id. at 417-18;
    see also United States v. Johnson-
    Wilder, 
    29 F.3d 1100
    , 1104 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[T]ypically the
    trial record will be silent about the reasons for actions taken
    by trial counsel.”). Navar chose to brief and argue his
    ineffective assistance claim in this appeal, and we believe
    the proper outcome is clear from this record. Thus, we will
    address his claim.
    32                           Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821
    Navar alleges that his counsel provided ineffective
    assistance in three ways: (1) by his confident statements
    regarding the burden of proof during his opening state-
    ment; (2) by failing to request that the district court instruct
    the jury concerning Herrera’s and Tmiri’s plea agreements
    at the time of their testimony; and (3) by failing to request
    a jury instruction for Special Agent Tulshi’s voice identifi-
    cation similar to those provided for an eyewitness identifi-
    cation. We analyze each of these alleged errors separately
    and find that none of them deprived Navar of his Sixth
    Amendment rights.
    1. Counsel’s Comments Regarding the Burden of Proof
    As outlined 
    above, supra
    pt. II.A., Navar’s counsel made
    a number of confident statements regarding the govern-
    ment’s burden of proof, which Navar now argues so
    tarnished the proceedings that his assistance was ineffec-
    tive. We have already determined that defense counsel’s
    statements did not shift the burden of proof in violation of
    Navar’s right to due process. For similar reasons, Navar’s
    counsel was not ineffective by making the statements, and
    Navar fails to satisfy either prong of the Strickland analysis.
    Making the statements in question was a tactical decision
    designed to persuade the jury of the strength of Navar’s
    case. The district court, the prosecutor, Thomas’s attorney,
    and Navar’s counsel himself each stated the proper burden
    of proof at various times throughout the trial. Nothing
    indicates that Navar’s counsel seriously intended to give
    up the benefit of the government’s burden of proof (nor
    could he), nor that the jury was confused on the issue.
    Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821                            33
    While the statements appear overconfident in light of the
    evidence implicating Navar, they were not objectively
    unreasonable, nor is there a probable likelihood that the
    outcome would have differed without the statements.
    2.   Failure to Request an Instruction Regarding Plea Agree-
    ments of Cooperating Witnesses
    Both Herrera and Tmiri testified against Navar pursuant
    to a plea agreement with the government. At the close of
    evidence, the district court instructed the jury using the
    Seventh Circuit’s Pattern Instruction 3.13, entitled “Wit-
    nesses Requiring Special Caution,” which specifically
    warned the jury that Herrera and Tmiri received the
    recommendation of a reduced sentence, that they were
    involved in the conspiracy for which Navar is on trial, and
    that they both pleaded guilty for that offense. Despite the
    fact that the district court delivered this limiting instruc-
    tion, Navar asserts that his trial counsel should have
    requested a similar instruction contemporaneously with
    the witnesses’ testimony.
    First, defense counsel’s assistance was not objectively
    unreasonable. Navar’s counsel may have wished to avoid
    emphasizing that Herrera and Tmiri were members of a
    large criminal drug conspiracy, where both witnesses were
    implicating his client as a higher-ranking member of the
    same organization. We can only speculate about his
    motivations, but we must presume they were strategic
    unless persuaded otherwise, and we are not.
    Second, Navar also fails to show prejudice. The district
    court properly instructed the jury at the end of trial, which
    34                          Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821
    we presume, without more, the jury understood and
    considered and was effective for its limiting purpose.
    Further, Navar’s counsel extensively cross-examined each
    witness regarding his plea agreement and the benefits each
    received, thereby explaining their bias to the jury. Counsel
    was not ineffective under Strickland.
    3. Failure to Submit a Voice Identification Instruction
    As a third basis for his ineffective assistance claim, Navar
    argues that his counsel acted unreasonably by failing to
    request a contemporaneous limiting instruction regarding
    Special Agent Tulshi’s voice identification. Noting that a
    trial court should instruct a jury when a witness makes a
    visual identification, Navar claims that a voice identifica-
    tion should be similarly treated and cites United States v.
    Telfaire, 
    469 F.2d 552
    (D.C. Cir. 1972).
    To be entitled to an instruction on a defense theory,
    Navar must demonstrate that (1) the proposed instruction
    correctly stated the law; (2) the theory advanced by the
    instruction was supported by the evidence; (3) the theory
    advanced was not part of the charge presented to the jury;
    and (4) the failure to include the instruction on the defen-
    dant’s theory denied the defendant a fair trial. 
    Magana, 118 F.3d at 1208
    .
    Navar’s argument is short, undeveloped, and incorrect.
    We have already upheld the reliability of Tulshi’s voice
    identification, and Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(5) states
    that a witness may identify a voice after hearing it at any
    time, under circumstances connecting it with the speaker.
    Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821                             35
    The admissibility of a visual identification, however, is
    based on “[w]hether the witness had an adequate opportu-
    nity to observe the offender at the time of the offense.”
    
    Telfaire, 469 F.2d at 558
    (emphasis added) (appending a
    model special instruction on identification). The two types
    of identification are distinct and treated differently. See
    
    Magana, 118 F.3d at 1208
    -09 (holding that a proposed
    instruction would erroneously instruct the jury where it
    stated that the reliability of a witness’s voice identification
    depends on the ability to hear the defendant’s voice at
    the time of the offense). Therefore, even if Navar’s counsel
    had proposed the desired instruction, the district court
    would have properly rejected it, as it is an incorrect
    statement of law. Further, Navar has pointed to nothing
    about the desired instruction, if given, that would have
    altered the trial’s outcome. Therefore, he has failed to
    establish prejudice resulting from his counsel’s decision
    not to request the instruction.
    III. G ERARDO R ECENDIZ—C OUNSEL’S M OTION FOR
    W ITHDRAWAL
    Finally, we address an Anders brief submitted by counsel
    for a co-defendant, Gerardo Recendiz. Recendiz was
    charged with participating in the same conspiracy to
    possess with the intent to deliver in excess of five kilo-
    grams of cocaine, as well as conspiracy to conduct
    financial transactions with the proceeds of unlawful
    activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). Recendiz
    pleaded guilty on July 12, 2005, and on March 6, 2006, after
    applying two downward adjustments, the trial court
    36                         Nos. 06-1754, 06-2380 & 06-2821
    sentenced him to 135 months in federal prison, the
    bottom of the range according to the Sentencing Guide-
    lines. He filed a timely notice of appeal on March 14, 2006.
    Recendiz’s attorney filed an Anders brief in support of his
    June 7, 2007, motion to withdraw as Recendiz’s appointed
    appellate counsel. See Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    (1967). Recendiz did not file a response. We have re-
    viewed counsel’s Anders brief and agree that there are no
    non-frivolous issues for appeal. The district court properly
    accepted Recendiz’s guilty plea, and Recendiz indicated
    that he did not wish to challenge his plea. The district
    court also properly calculated and considered the applica-
    ble Sentencing Guidelines range, did not clearly err in its
    factual findings, and imposed a reasonable sentence at the
    bottom of the range after considering the factors articu-
    lated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We therefore grant counsel’s
    motion to withdraw and dismiss Recendiz’s appeal.
    IV. C ONCLUSION
    For the above reasons, we reject each of Navar’s chal-
    lenges. Marco Thomas adopted only Navar’s argument
    regarding the opening statement, which fails for the same
    reasons. We therefore A FFIRM both defendants’ convictions.
    We agree with Recendiz’s counsel that no non-frivolous
    issues exist for appeal, and we therefore G RANT his motion
    to withdraw and D ISMISS Recendiz’s appeal.
    3-3-09