United States v. Devon Groves ( 2009 )


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  •                              In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 07-2227
    U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    D EVON G ROVES,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Indiana, South Bend Division.
    No. 06 CR 69—Robert L. Miller, Jr., Chief Judge.
    A RGUED JANUARY 25, 2008—D ECIDED M ARCH 17, 2009
    Before F LAUM, R OVNER, and S YKES, Circuit Judges.
    S YKES, Circuit Judge. A man fired multiple shots into
    an occupied South Bend, Indiana home, and eyewitnesses
    told police that Devon Groves was the shooter. After
    further investigation and consultation with a prosecutor,
    the lead investigator issued a “crime information bulle-
    tin” for Groves indicating he should be picked up if
    found; the prosecutor had given the go-ahead for the
    “pickup,” and the officer understood that the prosecutor
    2                                               No. 07-2227
    would be seeking an arrest warrant. About a month after
    the shooting, an anonymous tipster called 911 and re-
    ported that she had just seen Groves and he was “proba-
    bly” carrying a gun. The caller described Groves’s clothing,
    location, and the car he was in, and patrol units were
    dispatched to the area to look for him. The dispatcher
    passed along the information from the tip and also
    advised responding officers that Groves was wanted on
    a warrant.
    Corporal Christopher Slager soon saw Groves riding in
    a car that matched the description provided by the
    tipster. Slager initiated a traffic stop, ordered Groves and
    the other occupants out of the car, and saw a handgun
    under the seat where Groves had been sitting. Groves was
    charged under 
    18 U.S.C. § 922
    (g)(1) with being a felon
    in possession of a firearm and ammunition. He moved to
    suppress the gun. As it turned out, the dispatcher had
    been mistaken about the warrant; in fact, there was no
    warrant for Groves’s arrest, only the “crime information
    bulletin.” The district court denied the suppression
    motion, and a jury convicted Groves on both counts.
    On appeal, Groves renews his challenge to the ad-
    mission of the gun. We reject his arguments and affirm.
    Although an anonymous tip is generally insufficient to
    support an investigative stop, Florida v. J.L., 
    529 U.S. 266
    (2000), there was more supporting this stop than just
    an anonymous tip. Under United States v. Hensley, 
    469 U.S. 221
     (1985), police may conduct an investigative stop
    of a suspect based on a “wanted flyer” or “bulletin” like
    the one at issue in this case. The bulletin issued for Groves
    No. 07-2227                                                3
    was supported by ample reasonable suspicion that he
    was involved in the earlier shooting, and this in turn was
    sufficient to justify the stop. A complication is that the
    dispatcher told responding officers there was a warrant
    for Groves’s arrest, not just a pickup “bulletin.” But this
    mistake did not undermine the preexisting reasonable
    suspicion for the stop. Moreover, to the extent that the
    error had any effect on the validity of the stop, sup-
    pression was not required. The Supreme Court has just
    held that a negligent mistake by police personnel re-
    garding the existence of a warrant does not require ap-
    plication of the exclusionary rule. Herring v. United States,
    
    129 S. Ct. 695
     (2009).
    I. Background
    In the middle of the night on April 30, 2006, residents
    of a home on South Bendix Street in South Bend were
    awakened by a man trying to break the lock on their
    front door. They recognized the man as Devon Groves
    and called out to him. Groves ran from their front porch,
    and seconds later, a spray of gunshots tore through the
    home from the direction in which Groves had run, nearly
    hitting the home’s occupants.
    Corporal David Johnson, a gang investigator in the
    South Bend Police Department, was assigned to the case.
    After interviewing the eyewitnesses and conducting
    further investigation, Johnson and other officers met
    with a deputy county prosecutor, who indicated he
    would seek an arrest warrant for Groves. In the mean-
    time, however, the prosecutor authorized Johnson to
    4                                              No. 07-2227
    issue a “pickup” order for Groves. Technically called a
    “crime information bulletin,” these communications are
    disseminated throughout the South Bend Police Depart-
    ment and are available to all police personnel as well as
    outside law-enforcement agencies. The bulletin summa-
    rized Groves’s involvement in the shooting and provided
    his identifying information so officers could be on the
    lookout for him. The bulletin also indicated that the
    prosecutor had given “verbal authorization” for the
    pickup.
    About a month later, on June 1, 2006, South Bend police
    received an anonymous 911 call that provided infor-
    mation sufficient to immediately locate Groves. The
    caller indicated that “right now” Groves was standing
    outside a particular set of addresses on Elmer Street
    wearing a white shirt, black shorts, and a black hat, and
    was next to a black car with specialty rims, and “probably”
    had “a gun on him.” This information was immediately
    dispatched to patrol units over the police radio. The
    dispatch informed responding officers that there was a
    warrant for Groves’s arrest. Similar information was
    also transmitted to officers’ in-squad computers. Corporal
    Slager was within a few blocks of Groves’s reported
    location and was first to spot the vehicle matching the
    tip’s description; he saw a man matching Groves’s de-
    scription sitting in the back seat.
    Slager stopped the car. Groves initially failed to
    respond to several commands to show his hands, but
    Slager eventually removed Groves from the car and
    secured him in his cruiser without further incident. The
    No. 07-2227                                             5
    driver and another occupant were also ordered out of the
    car. Once they were secured, Slager returned to the car to
    conduct a protective sweep. Looking inside the open
    doors, Slager saw a handgun partially concealed under
    the driver’s seat directly in front of Groves’s position
    where he had been sitting in the back seat. Groves was
    arrested for possession of the handgun.
    Groves was eventually charged with two § 922(g)(1)
    offenses: possession of a firearm by a felon stemming from
    his possession of the gun on June 1 and possession of
    ammunition by a felon from the April 30 shooting inci-
    dent. Groves moved to suppress the gun. At some
    point after Groves’s arrest, it was determined that the
    dispatcher had been mistaken about the existence of a
    warrant; for some unknown reason, the prosecutor never
    obtained one. Groves argued that Slager had neither
    probable cause nor reasonable suspicion to stop the car
    because there was no warrant and the anonymous tip
    wasn’t enough by itself. The district court denied the
    motion, concluding that the anonymous tip provided
    enough information to supply reasonable suspicion and
    that Slager had relied in good faith on the dispatcher’s
    representation about the warrant.
    The case was then tried to a jury, which convicted
    Groves on both counts. He was sentenced to 240 months
    in prison (120 months on each count to run consecu-
    tively), above the applicable sentencing guidelines range
    of 151 to 188 months.
    6                                               No. 07-2227
    II. Discussion
    Groves appeals his conviction on the firearm count only,
    specifically challenging the district court’s denial of his
    motion to suppress the gun. He also challenges his sen-
    tence on both counts, which at 240 months total was
    considerably higher than the sentence recommended by
    the guidelines. We review the district court’s findings of
    fact on the suppression motion for clear error and its
    legal conclusions de novo. Ornelas v. United States, 
    517 U.S. 690
    , 699 (1996); see also United States v. McIntire, 
    516 F.3d 576
     (7th Cir. 2008) (distinguishing between warrant
    and no-warrant cases). We review the sentence for rea-
    sonableness. Gall v. United States, 
    128 S. Ct. 586
    , 747
    (2007); United States v. Wachowiak, 
    496 F.3d 744
    , 747 (7th
    Cir. 2007).
    Groves claims that Corporal Slager lacked the reason-
    able suspicion necessary for a lawful stop; there is no
    question that if the stop was lawful, the protective sweep
    of the car and the seizure of the gun were also lawful.
    Michigan v. Long, 
    463 U.S. 1032
    , 1049 (1983); United States
    v. Wimbush, 
    337 F.3d 947
    , 950 (7th Cir. 2003); United States
    v. Evans, 
    994 F.2d 317
    , 320-21 (7th Cir. 1993); United States
    v. Longmire, 
    761 F.2d 411
    , 419 (7th Cir. 1985). Groves’s
    argument rests on the mistake about the existence of a
    warrant and the general rule that anonymous tips, without
    more, are usually too lacking in indicia of reliability to
    provide reasonable suspicion to conduct a stop. J.L.,
    
    529 U.S. at 271
    .
    The district court held that the stop was lawful under
    J.L. because it provided “ample predictive information
    No. 07-2227                                                 7
    with which Officer Slager could test the anonymous
    informant’s knowledge and credibility.” This was true on
    the question of Groves’s identity (the caller’s information
    about Groves’s location, description, and car were con-
    firmed by the officer before he initiated the stop) but not
    necessarily true on the question of Groves’s criminal
    activity.
    J.L. involved a tip similar to the one before us: An
    anonymous caller told police that a young black male in
    a plaid shirt standing at a particular bus stop would
    have a gun. 
    Id. at 268
    . The Supreme Court held that an
    anonymous tip of this sort did not justify a stop, 
    id. at 274
    , because a tip must have “ ‘sufficient indicia of relia-
    bility’ ” to create reasonable suspicion, 
    id. at 270
     (quoting
    Alabama v. White, 
    496 U.S. 325
    , 327 (1990)). Reliability is
    present, for example, when the informant supplies suffi-
    cient predictive information about the suspect so that
    police can test an informant’s knowledge and credibility.
    Id. at 271-72; White, 
    496 U.S. at 332
    . But the tip in J.L. had
    none of this; it was purely descriptive in nature, lacking
    any basis from which to discern how the informant
    knew that the suspect was engaged in illegal activity.
    The Court held:
    An accurate description of a subject’s readily observ-
    able location and appearance is of course reliable in
    this limited sense: It will help the police correctly
    identify the person whom the tipster means to ac-
    cuse. Such a tip, however, does not show that the
    tipster has knowledge of concealed criminal activity.
    The reasonable suspicion here at issue requires that a
    8                                                 No. 07-2227
    tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in
    its tendency to identify a determinate person.
    J.L., 
    529 U.S. at 271
    .
    The same is true here. Any passerby spotting Groves
    standing next to the car could have reported his location
    (and other readily observable details) to the police. But
    standing beside a car is not illegal; what the police needed
    to know, and what they could not know based on this
    tip, was how the caller knew that Groves was carrying
    a gun. Without more, the anonymous tip in this case
    could not justify the stop. Davis v. Novy, 
    433 F.3d 926
    , 929
    (7th Cir. 2006); United States v. Johnson, 
    427 F.3d 1053
    , 1057
    (7th Cir. 2005).
    But there was more to justify reasonable suspicion here
    than just the anonymous tip that Groves was probably
    carrying a gun. The South Bend police bulletin stemming
    from the April 30 shooting was supported by ample
    reasonable suspicion and supplied a basis for the stop
    under the rationale of Hensley, 
    469 U.S. at 232-33
    . Hensley is
    a variation on the common-knowledge doctrine that allows
    an officer to rely on an adequately supported “wanted
    flyer” to justify a stop of a suspect even if the officer does
    not himself have reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop.
    The theory is that police may communicate “wanted fliers”
    and other orders to stop a suspect to the department at
    large, to officers in the field, and to other law-enforcement
    agencies provided the issuance of the order is itself sup-
    ported by reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify the stop.
    The analysis asks whether the officer issuing the flyer or
    bulletin had objectively reasonable suspicion to stop the
    No. 07-2227                                                 9
    suspect. Id.; United States v. Nafzger, 
    974 F.2d 906
    , 911 (7th
    Cir. 1992); United States v. Wheeler, 
    800 F.2d 100
    , 103 (7th
    Cir. 1986); Longmire, 
    761 F.2d at 416
    . If he did, then a stop
    carried out on the basis of the flyer or bulletin is lawful.
    Groves does not really dispute that Corporal Johnson
    had reasonable suspicion when he created the bulletin
    after investigating the April 30 shooting. Indeed, Johnson
    had probable cause to arrest Groves; eyewitnesses to the
    shooting identified him as the shooter, which provided
    probable cause to arrest him. See Lopez v. City of Chicago,
    
    464 F.3d 711
    , 714 (7th Cir. 2006) (Lopez “was arrested
    without a warrant, although with probable cause—an
    eyewitness identified him as the shooter.”). A problem
    arises because Corporal Slager was mistakenly told by
    the dispatcher that there was a warrant out for Groves’s
    arrest, not just a wanted bulletin. Slager testified that he
    did not recall if he had seen the bulletin about Groves
    when it was issued a month before; he thought, based on
    the radio dispatch and the readout on his in-squad com-
    puter, that there was a warrant for Groves’s arrest.
    The police dispatcher’s mistake in this regard does
    not invalidate the stop; that error did nothing to under-
    mine the preexisting reasonable suspicion that sup-
    ported the issuance of the bulletin. The bulletin bears a
    distribution list that includes the radio room, the squad
    room, the detective bureau, and other subdivisions and
    personnel within the South Bend Police Department, and
    Corporal Johnson testified that once issued, bulletins are
    routinely transmitted to the distribution list. It is unclear
    whether the bulletin was mistakenly entered into the
    10                                               No. 07-2227
    department’s system as a warrant or whether the dis-
    patcher mistook it for a warrant when communicating
    with officers in the field after the 911 call. But either way,
    there is no evidence that it was anything other than a
    mistake.
    Even assuming this error affected the validity of the
    stop, the gun need not have been suppressed. The
    Supreme Court has recently held that a negligent
    mistake by police personnel about the existence of a
    warrant does not require application of the exclusionary
    rule. Herring, 
    129 S. Ct. at 703
    . In Herring, a deputy sheriff
    initiated a stop-and-arrest of the defendant based on
    information communicated by the sheriff’s depart-
    ment’s warrant clerk that there was an outstanding war-
    rant in a neighboring county for the defendant’s arrest.
    This turned out to be wrong; the warrant had actually
    been withdrawn some months earlier, but the recall of the
    warrant had not been entered into the county’s database.
    The defendant sought suppression of the drugs and gun
    that were found in the search incident to his arrest. The
    Supreme Court held that suppression was not required; in
    this situation, the Court said, the deterrence rationale
    of the exclusionary rule was so attenuated that exclusion
    of the evidence was unjustified. 
    Id. at 702-03
    . Noting
    the absence of any evidence that the county had been
    reckless in maintaining its warrant system or that know-
    ingly false entries had been made, the Court reasoned
    that application of the exclusionary rule would produce
    no real deterrent effect on police misconduct and would
    be too costly to the truth-seeking and law-enforcement
    No. 07-2227                                               11
    objectives of the criminal justice system. 
    Id.
     “In light of
    our repeated holdings that the deterrent effect of sup-
    pression must be substantial and outweigh any harm to
    the justice system, we conclude that when police
    mistakes are the result of negligence such as that described
    here, rather than systemic error or reckless disregard
    of constitutional requirements, any marginal deterrence
    does not ‘pay its way.’ ” 
    Id. at 704
     (internal citation omit-
    ted).
    The police mistake at issue here is substantially similar
    to the one at issue in Herring. Accordingly, although we
    reject Groves’s claim that the dispatcher’s error
    invalidated the grounds for the stop, even if we were to
    assume the stop was invalid, suppression was not re-
    quired. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the
    South Bend Police Department recklessly disregarded
    constitutional requirements or that any police personnel
    knowingly falsified a warrant record. The suppression
    motion was properly denied.
    Groves also attacks his above-guidelines sentence
    as unreasonable. We disagree. The district court painstak-
    ingly considered both the guidelines range and the sen-
    tencing factors that properly inform the court’s exercise
    of post-Booker sentencing discretion under 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a). The court took note of the fact that although
    Groves stood convicted of gun- and ammunition-
    possession offenses, he had demonstrated a propensity to
    actually use firearms—firing multiple shots into an occu-
    pied home in the incident underlying the ammunition
    count, as well as other instances of brandishing and
    12                                            No. 07-2227
    threats to shoot that were reflected in his criminal back-
    ground. The court was also strongly influenced by the
    fact that these convictions were Groves’s third and fourth
    felony convictions in 12 years, and that although he
    was only 29 years old, he had accumulated a total of
    52 arrests, many firearm related. The court concluded
    that these factors, and the absence of any in mitigation,
    justified an above-guidelines sentence of 240 months.
    Groves has not persuaded us that this sentence is unrea-
    sonable. See Wachowiak, 
    496 F.3d at 749
     (nonguidelines
    sentence will be affirmed if adequately reasoned and
    objectively reasonable).
    A FFIRMED.
    3-17-09