United States v. Romero, Ricardo ( 2008 )


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  •                             In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 05-3681
    U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    R ICARDO R OMERO ,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Wisconsin.
    No. 04 CR 164—Barbara B. Crabb, Chief Judge.
    ____________
    On Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States
    ____________
    S UBMITTED F EBRUARY 29, 2008—D ECIDED JUNE 6, 2008
    ____________
    Before F LAUM, K ANNE, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
    K ANNE, Circuit Judge. The Supreme Court granted
    Ricardo Romero’s petition for writ of certiorari, vacated
    our judgment, and remanded the case to us for recon-
    sideration in light of Kimbrough v. United States, 
    128 S. Ct. 558
     (2007). Romero was sentenced to 151 months’ impris-
    onment after a jury found him guilty of one count of
    conspiring to distribute cocaine, see 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841
    (a)(1),
    846, one count of possessing five grams or more of co-
    2                                                   No. 05-3681
    caine base with intent to distribute, see 
    id.
     § 841(a)(1), and
    one count of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute,
    see id. At sentencing, Romero urged the district court to
    refrain from applying the 100-to-1 crack cocaine to powder
    cocaine ratio found in § 2D1.1 of the Sentencing Guide-
    lines, which subjects a crack-cocaine drug trafficker “to the
    same sentence as one dealing in 100 times more powder
    cocaine.” Kimbrough, 
    128 S. Ct. at 564
    . The district court
    applied the ratio and sentenced Romero to 151 months’
    imprisonment.
    On appeal, Romero challenged the sufficiency of the
    evidence at trial, the district court’s refusal to allow cross-
    examination of one witness regarding a prior incon-
    sistent statement, and the district court’s application of
    the 100-to-1 ratio. We affirmed. See United States v.
    Romero, 
    469 F.3d 1139
    , 1153 (7th Cir. 2006). The Supreme
    Court granted Romero’s petition for certiorari in light of
    Kimbrough, and vacated the judgment. Because Kimbrough
    affects only one of the three arguments Romero raised on
    appeal, our dispositions of the other issues are reinstated,
    
    id. at 1151-53
    , and our affirmance of Raul Romero’s sen-
    tence remains intact (Ricardo’s co-defendant and brother),
    
    id. at 1148-49
    . See Ohse v. Hughes, 
    863 F.2d 22
    , 24 (7th
    Cir. 1988) (“The Court’s decision in Ohse v. Hughes is
    reinstated except for the final section of the Court’s opin-
    ion which is designated “Miscellaneous.” The section
    designated “Miscellaneous” remains vacated pursuant to
    the Supreme Court’s memorandum decision . . . .” (internal
    citations omitted)).
    When the district court sentenced Romero in September
    2005, we had already held that defendants were not
    “entitled to a deviation from the statutory ratio.” United
    States v. Miller, 
    450 F.3d 270
    , 275 (7th Cir. 2006) (reciting the
    No. 05-3681                                                  3
    holding of United States v. Gipson, 
    425 F.3d 335
     (7th Cir.
    2005)). In Romero’s appeal, we explained that a “ ‘district
    judge is required to abide by the 100:1 crack cocaine to
    cocaine powder ratio when applying the Sentencing
    Guidelines to a defendant’s conduct.’ ” Romero, 
    469 F.3d at 1153
     (quoting United States v. Hankton, 
    463 F.3d 626
    ,
    629 (7th Cir. 2006)). Our stance was rejected in Kimbrough,
    in which the Supreme Court held that the cocaine guide-
    lines are like all other sentencing guidelines and thus “are
    advisory only.” 
    128 S. Ct. at 564
    .
    Because Romero preserved his challenge to the crack-
    cocaine ratio, we may simply vacate his sentence and
    remand to the district court for resentencing. See United
    States v. Padilla, No. 06-4370, slip op. at 12-16 (7th Cir.
    Mar. 31, 2008); but cf. United States v. Taylor, No. 06-4123,
    slip op. at 4-6 (7th Cir. Mar. 26, 2008) (outlining remand
    approach applicable in plain error context). The district
    court must resentence Romero in light of the non-manda-
    tory nature of the 100-to-1 ratio. See Kimbrough, 
    128 S. Ct. at 564
    . Even though we are vacating the sentence and
    Romero will be sentenced anew, the district court must
    apply the guidelines as they existed at the time of his first
    sentencing, see 
    18 U.S.C. § 3742
    (g); United States v. Sriram,
    
    482 F.3d 956
    , 961 (7th Cir. 2007), vacated, Sriram v. United
    States, 
    128 S. Ct. 1134
    , 1134 (2008), reinstated, United States
    v. Sriram, Nos. 05-2752 & 05-2802, slip op. at 2 (7th Cir.
    Apr. 23, 2008). But this time around, the district court
    will view those guidelines through the lens of Kimbrough.
    Romero’s sentence is V ACATED and the case is R EMANDED
    to the district court for resentencing.
    USCA-02-C-0072—6-6-08