Jerry Jones v. Harris Associates ( 2008 )


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  •                           In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 07-1624
    JERRY N. JONES, MARY F. JONES,
    and ARLINE WINERMAN,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    HARRIS ASSOCIATES L.P.,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ____________
    On Petition for Rehearing and
    Rehearing En Banc
    ____________
    DECIDED AUGUST 8, 2008
    ____________
    Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and KANNE and EVANS,
    Circuit Judges.
    PER CURIAM. The panel has voted unanimously to deny
    the petition for rehearing. A judge in active service
    called for a vote on the suggestion for rehearing en banc.
    A majority did not favor rehearing en banc, and the
    petition therefore is denied. Circuit Judge Ripple did not
    participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
    2                                                 No. 07-1624
    POSNER, Circuit Judge, with whom Circuit Judges
    ROVNER, WOOD, WILLIAMS, and TINDER join, dissenting
    from denial of rehearing en banc.
    This case merits the attention of the full court. The panel
    rejected the approach taken by the Second Circuit in
    Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Management, Inc., 
    694 F.2d 923
     (2d Cir. 1982), to deciding whether a mutual
    fund adviser has breached his fiduciary duty to the fund,
    the duty created by section 36(b) of the Investment Com-
    pany Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 et seq. Gartenberg permits a
    court to consider, as a factor in determining such a breach,
    whether the fee is “so disproportionately large that it
    bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered
    and could not have been the product of arm’s-length
    bargaining.” 
    694 F.2d at 928
    . The panel opinion states that
    it “now disapprove[s] the Gartenberg approach. . . . A
    fiduciary must make full disclosure and play no tricks but
    is not subject to a cap on compensation.” Jones v. Harris
    Associates L.P., 
    527 F.3d 627
    , 632 (7th Cir. 2008).
    The opinion says that this court had previously sug-
    gested that the Gartenberg approach “is wanting.” 
    Id.
     It cites
    Green v. Nuveen Advisory Corp., 
    295 F.3d 738
    , 743 n. 8 (7th
    Cir. 2002), for this proposition, but neither in footnote 8
    nor elsewhere in that opinion is there any suggestion that
    Gartenberg’s treatment of the issue of excessive fees is
    incorrect; Green was not an excessive-fee case. The panel
    cites another Green opinion, Green v. Fund Asset Manage-
    ment, L.P., 
    286 F.3d 682
     (3d Cir. 2002), as suggesting
    disagreement with Gartenberg, but again the amount of
    compensation was not at issue.
    Jones is the only appellate opinion noted in Westlaw as
    disagreeing with Gartenberg; there is a slew of positive
    citations. See, e.g., Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int’l, Inc.,
    No. 07-1624                                                   3
    
    248 F.3d 321
    , 326-27 (4th Cir. 2001); In re Salomon Smith
    Barney Mutual Fund Fees Litigation, 
    528 F. Supp. 2d 332
    , 336-
    37 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Gallus v. Ameriprise Financial, Inc., 
    497 F. Supp. 2d 974
    , 979 (D. Minn. 2007); Sins v. Janus Capital
    Management, LLC, 
    2006 WL 3746130
    , at *2 (D. Colo. Dec. 15,
    2006); Siemers v. Wells Fargo & Co., 
    2006 WL 2355411
    , at *15-
    16 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2006); Hunt v. Invesco Funds Group,
    Inc., 
    2006 WL 1581846
    , at *2 (S.D. Tex. June 5, 2006); Stegall
    v. Ladner, 
    394 F. Supp. 2d 358
    , 373-74 (D. Mass. 2005);
    Becherer v. Burt, 
    2003 WL 24260305
    , at *2 (S.D. Ill. Mar. 6,
    2003); Millenco L.P. v. MEVC Advisors, Inc., 
    2002 WL 31051604
    , at *3 (D. Del. Aug. 21, 2002). The Coates
    and Hubbard article that the panel cites, John C. Coates &
    R. Glenn Hubbard, “Competition in the Mutual Fund
    Industry: Evidence and Implications for Policy,” 
    33 J. Corp. L. 151
     (2007), expressly approves Gartenberg, while
    seeking to fine tune judicial interpretations of some
    Gartenberg dicta. In the section of the article captioned
    “Refinements to Gartenberg,” the authors state that “radical
    shifts in existing law, or for sweeping new laws and
    regulations, are unwise on the ground that the case has
    not been made that the existing framework for regulation
    of funds and advisory fees is intrinsically flawed.” Id. at
    213. It’s not as if Gartenberg has proved to be too hard on
    fund advisers. “Subsequent litigation [after Gartenberg]
    in excessive fee cases has resulted almost uniformly in
    judgments for the defendants . . . although there have
    been some notable settlements wherein defendants have
    agreed to prospective reduction in the fee schedule.” James
    D. Cox et al., Securities Regulation: Cases and Materials
    1211 (3d ed. 2001); see also James D. Cox & John W. Payne,
    “Mutual Fund Expense Disclosures: A Behavioral Perspec-
    tive,” 
    83 Wash. U. L.Q. 907
    , 923 (2005).
    4                                                No. 07-1624
    The panel bases its rejection of Gartenberg mainly on an
    economic analysis that is ripe for reexamination on the
    basis of growing indications that executive compensa-
    tion in large publicly traded firms often is excessive
    because of the feeble incentives of boards of directors to
    police compensation. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse
    Fried, Pay without Performance: The Unfilfilled Promise of
    Executive Compensation 23-44 (2004); Charles A. O’Reilly III
    & Brian G.M. Main, “It’s More Than Simple Economics,” 36
    Organizational Dynamics 1 (2007); Ivan E. Brick, Oded
    Palmon & John K. Wald, “CEO Compensation, Director
    Compensation, and Firm Performance: Evidence of
    Cronyism?,” 12 J. Corp. Finance 403 (2006); Arthur
    Levitt, Jr., “Corporate Culture and the Problem of Execu-
    tive Compensation,” 30 J. Corp. Law 749, 750 (2005); Gary
    Wilson, “How to Rein in the Imperial CEO,” Wall St. J., July
    9, 2008, p. A15; Joann S. Lublin, “Boards Flex Their
    Pay Muscles: Directors Are Increasingly Exercising More
    Clout in Setting CEO Compensation; and in Some Cases,
    the Boss Is Actually Feeling a Little Pain,” Wall St. J., Apr.
    14, 2008, p. R1; Ben Stein, “In the Boardroom, Every Back
    Gets Scratched,” N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 2008, p. B9. Directors
    are often CEOs of other companies and naturally think
    that CEOs should be well paid. And often they are picked
    by the CEO. Compensation consulting firms, which
    provide cover for generous compensation packages
    voted by boards of directors, have a conflict of interest
    because they are paid not only for their compensation
    advice but for other services to the firm—services for which
    they are hired by the officers whose compensation they
    advised on. Bebchuk & Fried, supra, at 37-39; Gretchen
    Morgenson, “How Big a Payday for the Pay Consultants?,”
    N.Y. Times, June 22, 2008, p. B1; Neil Weinberg, Michael
    Maiello & David K. Randall, “Paying for Failure,” Forbes,
    May 19, 2008, p. 114; Joann S. Lublin, “Conflict Concerns
    No. 07-1624                                               5
    Benefit Independent Pay Advisors,” Wall St. J., Dec. 10,
    2007, p. B3; Warren E. Buffet, “Letter to the Shareholders
    of Berkshire Hathaway, Inc.,” Feb. 27, 2004, p. 8,
    www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2003ltr.pdf (visited
    July 28, 2008).
    Competition in product and capital markets can’t be
    counted on to solve the problem because the same struc-
    ture of incentives operates on all large corporations and
    similar entities, including mutual funds. Mutual funds
    are a component of the financial services industry,
    where abuses have been rampant, as is more evident now
    than it was when Coates and Hubbard wrote their article.
    A business school professor at Northwestern University
    recently observed that “business connections can mitigate
    agency conflicts by facilitating efficient information
    transfers, but can also be channels for inefficient favorit-
    ism.” She found “evidence that connections among
    agents in [the mutual fund industry] foster favoritism, to
    the detriment of investors. Fund directors and advisory
    firms that manage the funds hire each other preferentially
    based on past interactions. When directors and the man-
    agement are more connected, advisors capture more
    rents and are monitored by the board less intensely. These
    findings support recent calls for more disclosure re-
    garding the negotiation of advisory contracts by fund
    boards.” Camelia M. Kuhnen, “Social Networks, Corporate
    Governance and Contracting in the Mutual Fund Industry”
    (Mar. 1, 2007), http://ssrn.com/abstract=849705 (visited
    July 28, 2008). The SEC’s Office of Economic Analysis (the
    principal adviser to the SEC on the economic aspects of
    regulatory issues) believes that mutual fund “boards
    with a greater proportion of independent directors are
    more likely to negotiate and approve lower fees, merge
    6                                                No. 07-1624
    poorly performing funds more quickly or provide greater
    investor protection from late-trading and market timing,”
    although “broad cross-sectional analysis reveals little
    consistent evidence that board composition is related to
    lower fees and higher returns for fund shareholders.”
    “OEA Memorandum: Literature Review on Independent
    Mutual Fund Chairs and Directors,” Dec. 29, 2006,
    www.404.gov/rules/proposed/s70304/oeamemo122906-
    litreview.pdf (visited July 28, 2008).
    A particular concern in this case is the adviser’s charging
    its captive funds more than twice what it charges inde-
    pendent funds. According to the figures in the panel
    opinion, the captives are charged one percent of the first
    $2 billion in assets while the independents are charged
    roughly one-half of one percent for the first $500 million
    and roughly one-third of one percent for everything above.
    The panel opinion throws out some suggestions on why
    this difference may be justified, but the suggestions are
    offered purely as speculation, rather than anything
    having an evidentiary or empirical basis. And there is
    no doubt that the captive funds are indeed captive. The
    Oakmark-Harris relationship matches the arrangement
    described in the Senate Report accompanying § 36(b): a
    fund “organized by its investment adviser which pro-
    vides it with almost all management services.” S. Rep. No.
    184, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1969), quoted in Green v. Fund
    Asset Management, L.P., 
    supra,
     
    286 F.3d at 685
    . Financial
    managers from Harris founded the Oakmark family of
    funds in 1991, and each year since then the Oakmark Board
    of Trustees has reselected Harris as the fund’s adviser.
    Harris manages the entire Oakmark portfolio, which
    consists of seven funds. The Oakmark prospectus describes
    the relationship this way: “Subject to the overall authority
    No. 07-1624                                               7
    of the board of trustees, [Harris Associates] furnishes
    continuous investment supervision and management to
    the Funds and also furnishes office space, equipment, and
    management personnel.” The Oakmark Funds, “Prospec-
    tus,” Jan. 28, 2008, p. 36, www.oakmark.com/fundlit/
    literature.asp?selected=Prospectus# (visited July 28, 2008).
    Recall Professor Kuhnen’s observation that “when directors
    and the management are more connected, advisors
    capture more rents and are monitored by the board less
    intensely.”
    The panel opinion says that the fact “that mutual funds
    are ‘captives’ of investment advisers does not curtail this
    competition. An adviser can’t make money from its captive
    fund if high fees drive investors away.” 
    527 F.3d at 632
    .
    That’s true; but will high fees drive investors away? “[T]he
    chief reason for substantial advisory fee level differences
    between equity pension fund portfolio managers and
    equity mutual fund portfolio managers is that advisory
    fees in the pension field are subject to a marketplace
    where arm’s-length bargaining occurs. As a rule, [mutual]
    fund shareholders neither benefit from arm’s-length
    bargaining nor from prices that approximate those that
    arm’s-length bargaining would yield were it the norm.”
    John P. Freeman & Stewart L. Brown, “Mutual Fund
    Advisory Fees: The Cost of Conflicts of Interest,” 
    26 J. Corp. L. 609
    , 634 (2001).
    The panel opinion acknowledges that the level of com-
    pensation of trustees could be “so unusual that a court
    will infer that deceit must have occurred, or that the
    persons responsible for [the] decision have abdicated.” 
    527 F.3d at 632
    . Compensation that is “so unusual” might not
    seem to differ materially from compensation that is “so
    disproportionately large.” But although one industry
    8                                               No. 07-1624
    commentator has suggested that “courts may . . . conclude
    that in fact what the Court of Appeals has done [in Jones] is
    merely articulate the Gartenberg standard in a different
    way,” “Seventh Circuit ‘Disapproves’ Gartenberg, But
    Is This New Approach Fundamentally Different?,” May 27,
    2008, www.bingham.com/Media.aspx?MediaID=7004
    (visited July 28, 2008), this misses an important difference
    between the Gartenberg approach and the panel’s approach.
    The panel’s “so unusual” standard is to be applied solely
    by comparing the adviser’s fee with the fees charged
    by other mutual fund advisers. Gartenberg’s “so dispropor-
    tionately large” standard is rightly not so limited. The
    governance structure that enables mutual fund advisers
    to charge exorbitant fees is industry-wide, so the panel’s
    comparability approach would if widely followed allow
    those fees to become the industry’s floor. And in this case
    there was an alternative comparison, rejected by the panel
    on the basis of airy speculation—comparison of the fees
    that Harris charges independent funds with the much
    higher fees that it charges the funds it controls.
    The panel opinion points out that courts do not
    review corporate salaries for excessiveness. That misses
    the point, which is that unreasonable compensation can
    be evidence of a breach of fiduciary duty.
    The opinion is recognized to have created a circuit split,
    although the panel did not acknowledge this or circulate its
    opinion to the full court in advance of publication, as is
    required when a panel creates a circuit split. See, e.g.,
    “Fund Alert: Seventh Circuit Rejects Gartenberg Approach
    to Determining the Appropriateness of Mutual Fund
    Management Fees,” May 2008, www.stradley.com/
    newsletters.php?action=view&id=347; “Investment
    Management Alert: Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
    No. 07-1624                                               9
    Rejects Gartenberg,” June 2, 2008, www.drinkerbiddle.com/
    files/Publication/f74b9bc2-9376-4b60-b732-
    0242868a873c/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/be9
    e677f-8b35-440a-8b53-022caedb13e0/Gartenberg.pdf;
    “Email Alerts: It’s Too Early to Disregard the Gartenberg
    Factors During Advisory Fee Renewals,” May 27, 2008,
    www.wilmerhale.com/publications/whPubsDetail.aspx
    ?publication=8329; “Appeals Court Rejects Mutual Fund
    Excessive Fee Claims, Adopting New Standard for Evalua-
    tion of Fees,” May 20, 2008, www.ropesgray.com/
    litigationalert/?PublicationTypes=0c16874b-f94e-4696-
    b607-de259b87a13f; “The Future of Gartenberg: A New
    Approach in Evaluating Investment Advisor Fees,” May
    2008, www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/
    919.pdf?wt.mc_ID=919.pdf. (All these web sites were
    visited on July 28, 2008.)
    The outcome of this case may be correct. The panel
    opinion gives some reasons why, though one of them is
    weak in its unelaborated form: that the funds managed by
    Harris have grown faster than the industry norm. One
    would need to know over what period they had grown
    faster to know whether other than random factors were
    at work. But the creation of a circuit split, the importance
    of the issue to the mutual fund industry, and the one-sided
    character of the panel’s analysis warrant our hearing
    the case en banc.
    8-8-08