United States v. Harris, Antone C. ( 2008 )


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  •                             In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 07-1315
    U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    A NTONE C. H ARRIS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
    No. 04 CR 91—Sarah Evans Barker, Judge.
    ____________
    A RGUED D ECEMBER 5, 2007— D ECIDED JULY 1, 2008
    ____________
    Before F LAUM, E VANS, and W ILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
    W ILLIAMS, Circuit Judge. This is the second appeal in
    the criminal prosecution of Antone Harris. Based on
    information provided by Detective Michael Forrest in a
    warrant affidavit, a magistrate judge issued a warrant to
    search Harris’s residence for cocaine and drug contraband,
    and the next day they seized several firearms, cocaine
    base, and paraphernalia commonly used to cook and
    package crack cocaine. A jury convicted Harris on one
    count of possession with intent to distribute more than
    fifty grams of a mixture containing cocaine base. The
    first time the case was here, we held that the district court
    2                                               No. 07-1315
    improperly denied Harris a hearing, pursuant to Franks v.
    Delaware, 
    438 U.S. 154
    (1978), when it found that the
    warrant affidavit contained false statements but relied on
    information in a supplemental affidavit to establish that
    probable cause existed for the warrant. We remanded
    the case, directing the district court to conduct a Franks
    hearing. See United States v. Harris, 
    464 F.3d 733
    (7th Cir.
    2006) (“Harris I”). The district court did so and found that
    the warrant affidavit did not contain any recklessly-made
    false statements which were material to the finding of
    probable cause and that probable cause existed for the
    search of Harris’s residence.
    Now, challenging this determination, Harris argues
    that the district court should not have reconsidered
    whether the affidavit contained false statements under
    the law of the case doctrine. Because the law of the case
    doctrine does not compel a district court to ignore evid-
    ence presented at a hearing that clarifies a prior misunder-
    standing, we find no error in the district court’s decision
    to reconsider one of its findings. We also find no error
    in the district court’s decision not to compel the govern-
    ment to disclose the identity of the confidential informant
    in this case, as the district court was entitled to credit
    the testimony of Detective Forrest that the confidential
    informant existed, and Harris has made no showing that
    such disclosure was essential to his defense. Therefore,
    we affirm the decision of the district court.
    I. BACKGROUND
    On April 19, 2004, a magistrate judge issued a warrant to
    search Harris’s residence at 2254 N. Goodlet Avenue (the
    “Goodlet residence”) for cocaine and drug contraband. The
    No. 07-1315                                                3
    warrant was based on the affidavit of Detective Forrest
    of the Indianapolis Police Department, which stated:
    This affiant bases his belief on the following infor-
    mation: that within the past seventy-two (72) hours
    of April 19, 2004 a confidential, credible and reli-
    able informant contacted this affiant and stated
    that within the past seventy-two (72) hours of
    April 19, 2004 he/she was personally in the resi-
    dence located at 2254 N. Goodlet Av., Indianapolis,
    Marion County, Indiana and observed in the
    possession of Antone Harris B/M and Trent
    Harris B/M, a substance said informant believed
    to be Cocaine, an extract of Coca. Said informant
    was further told by Antone Harris B/M and Trent
    Harris B/M that the substance they had in their
    possession was in fact Cocaine, and was for sale.
    Said informant further stated that both Antone
    Harris and Trent Harris told the CI that they in
    fact lived at the residence. This affiant had previ-
    ously received an anonymous tip from the Dope
    Hotline that both Antone Harris and Trent Harris
    were selling crack from this residence. This affiant
    has personally conducted surveillance on the
    residence located at 2254 N. Goodlet Av. and have
    [sic] observed both Antone Harris and Trent Harris
    coming and going from the residence. This affiant
    also checked recent police reports for that resi-
    dence and found that a report was made on 4-2-04
    by an animal control officer reference [sic] several
    dogs at this house. The person the officer talked to
    at the residence was Antone Harris B/M DOB 7-16-
    79 and Antone Harris listed his address as 2254
    N. Goodlet Av. A check of Antone Harris’s crimi-
    4                                               No. 07-1315
    nal history reveals that he has a C felony conviction
    for Possession of Cocaine and Trent Harris has a
    conviction for C felony Possession of Cocaine as
    well as an A felony conviction for Dealing Cocaine
    and a conviction for Dangerous Possession of a
    Firearm. The CI further stated to this affiant that
    several handguns are inside the residence and that
    both Antone Harris and Trent Harris always keep
    a firearm close to them when inside the residence.
    The police executed the warrant on April 20, 2004 (the
    day after it was issued) and seized cocaine base, several
    firearms, and paraphernalia commonly used to cook and
    package crack cocaine. Harris was charged with one count
    of possession with intent to distribute more than fifty
    grams of a mixture containing cocaine base, in violation of
    21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(A)(iii). Before trial,
    Harris filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized
    during the search, claiming that Detective Forrest’s war-
    rant affidavit contained materially false statements. In
    support of his motion, Harris submitted an affidavit from
    an Indiana Department of Corrections official verifying
    that Trent Harris was incarcerated during the time Detec-
    tive Forrest’s affidavit stated he was at the residence, and
    Harris submitted his own affidavit swearing he was not
    present at the residence within seventy-two hours of
    April 19, when the warrant was issued.
    In light of this information, the district court ordered
    the government to respond to the alleged misstatements
    in the warrant affidavit by filing a supplemental affidavit
    from Detective Forrest regarding his surveillance of the
    Harris residence. The supplemental affidavit was drafted
    sloppily and appears to have created even more con-
    fusion (more on this below) regarding the information
    No. 07-1315                                                5
    in the warrant affidavit. Based on this supplemental
    affidavit, in which Detective Forrest made statements that
    appeared to be inconsistent with the warrant affidavit, the
    district court found that Detective Forrest’s warrant
    affidavit contained three false and misleading statements
    and omissions: (1) the warrant affidavit erroneously
    identified Trent Harris as the second individual with
    Antone Harris; (2) the warrant contained misleading
    information regarding the date of the confidential infor-
    mant’s (“CI”) conversations with Antone Harris because
    the CI had only visited the Goodlet residence on April 12;
    and (3) the warrant failed to include the dates of the “Dope
    Hotline” tip and Detective Forrest’s surveillance of the
    residence. Harris 
    I, 464 F.3d at 736-37
    . The court also found
    those statements were made either intentionally or reck-
    lessly. Nevertheless, the district court determined that
    Harris was not entitled to a hearing because it con-
    cluded that the misstatements in the warrant affidavit
    were not material to the magistrate’s finding of probable
    cause. In making this determination, the district court
    relied on information in the supplemental affidavit to
    bolster a finding of probable cause.
    On appeal, we held that allowing the government to
    bolster the magistrate’s probable cause determination
    through post-hoc findings does not satisfy the Fourth
    Amendment concerns addressed in Franks. 
    Id. at 739.
    Having excised the information that the district court
    found to be false in Detective Forrest’s warrant affidavit,
    we found that the affidavit lacked a “temporal guidepost”
    that would prevent the CI’s observation that Harris and
    his brother were selling crack at the Goodlet residence
    from being stale. 
    Id. In other
    words, there was nothing
    to suggest that there was ongoing criminal activity at
    6                                                   No. 07-1315
    Harris’s residence at the time the warrant was issued. So
    we remanded the case to the district court and instructed
    the court to hold a Franks hearing to determine whether
    the search warrant was unconstitutional.
    Before holding the Franks hearing the district court
    raised the issue of whether the court should start at square
    one or apply law of the case principles. After hearing
    arguments from both sides, the district court declared
    it would start at square one to give Harris a full chance
    to challenge the evidence supporting probable cause, but
    to the extent that the evidence did not conflict with the
    court’s prior rulings, the court would apply law of the
    case principles. However, if new evidence cast a different
    light on the court’s findings, it stated it would reconsider
    those findings.
    At the hearing, Detective Forrest was the sole witness
    and was cross-examined by Harris’s counsel. Forrest
    testified that in March 2004, he was assigned to investigate
    the Goodlet residence based on an anonymous tip made to
    the Indianapolis “Dope Hotline.” He surveilled the resi-
    dence through March and April 2004 and observed Antone
    Harris and another individual (whom he believed to be
    Trent Harris, the brother of Antone Harris) coming and
    going from the residence.1 On April 9, Forrest was con-
    tacted by a CI about an unrelated investigation. Detective
    Forrest asked if he knew about the Goodlet residence
    and the CI said he was familiar with Antone and Trent
    1
    There appears to be no dispute that this second individual
    was not, in fact, Trent Harris since he was in jail at the time of
    the surveillance. The government submits that Detective For-
    rest misidentified the second individual and that the misiden-
    tification was inadvertent.
    No. 07-1315                                               7
    Harris. Detective Forrest asked the CI to see if anything
    was happening at the Goodlet residence. On April 12,
    the CI contacted Detective Forrest and told him that he
    (the CI) had been to the Goodlet residence and had ob-
    served large amounts of cocaine, crack, and guns. The CI
    also said they (referring to Antone and a person the CI
    believed to be Trent Harris) were “slinging dope.” Detec-
    tive Forrest understood this to mean they were selling
    crack. Detective Forrest ran the criminal histories of the
    Harris brothers and discovered that Antone Harris had a
    prior conviction for possession of cocaine. On April 18, the
    CI informed Detective Forrest that he had been back to
    the Goodlet residence and again had observed that the
    Harris brothers were selling cocaine. On April 19, Detec-
    tive Forrest prepared an affidavit in support of an ap-
    plication for a warrant to search the Goodlet residence
    and, the next morning, the police conducted the search.
    Based on Detective Forrest’s testimony, the district
    court found that Harris had not met his burden of demon-
    strating that the evidence in the warrant affidavit was
    insufficient to establish probable cause and held that the
    search of the Goodlet residence was constitutional. The
    district court explained that the testimony elicited at the
    Franks hearing clarified the sequence of events described
    in the warrant affidavit and demonstrated that the CI
    had visited the Goodlet residence and observed criminal
    activity on April 18, just one day prior to when Detective
    Forrest applied for a warrant. There was evidence the
    CI had acquired knowledge of the events he reported
    firsthand and provided credible detail. That, combined
    with the relatively short period of time between the CI’s
    observation of the events and Detective Forrest’s applica-
    tion for the search warrant, and the extent to which the
    8                                               No. 07-1315
    police corroborated the CI’s statements, supported a
    finding of probable cause at the time the warrant was
    issued. In light of this, the court found that the re-
    maining misstatements and omissions in the warrant
    affidavit (the misidentification of the second man as
    being Trent Harris and the omission of the dates of the
    hotline tip and Detective Forrest’s surveillance activities)
    were “minor” and denied Harris’s motion to suppress.
    The district court also denied Harris’s request to com-
    pel disclosure of the CI’s identity, stating that none of
    the evidence introduced at the hearing led the court to
    doubt that the contacts between the CI and Harris had
    occurred, and that its finding of probable cause could be
    reached without knowing the identity of the CI.
    II. ANALYSIS
    On appeal, Harris raises two issues regarding the Franks
    hearing. First, he argues that the district court should not
    have reconsidered its earlier ruling that the warrant
    affidavit contained misleading information regarding the
    date of the CI’s conversations and contacts with Antone
    Harris and the second individual. Second, he contends
    that the district court abused its discretion in refusing to
    conduct an ex parte hearing to verify the existence of the
    CI. We address each issue in turn.
    A. Law of the Case Doctrine
    In Franks, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth
    Amendment entitles a defendant to a hearing upon re-
    quest “where the defendant makes a substantial prelimi-
    nary showing that a false statement knowingly and inten-
    No. 07-1315                                               9
    tionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was
    included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if
    the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding
    of probable 
    cause.” 438 U.S. at 155-56
    . At a Franks hearing,
    to successfully demonstrate that a search warrant was
    unconstitutional such that the fruits of the search pursu-
    ant to the warrant must be suppressed, a defendant
    must show by preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the
    search warrant affidavit contained a false material state-
    ment or omitted a material fact; (2) the affiant omitted
    the material fact or made the false statement intentionally,
    or with reckless disregard for the truth; and (3) the false
    statement is material to the finding of probable cause.
    United States v. Lowe, 
    516 F.3d 580
    , 584 (7th Cir. 2008).
    Harris contends that the district court was bound by
    the law of the case doctrine to its initial finding that
    the warrant affidavit intentionally or recklessly mis-
    stated the date of the CI’s conversations with Antone
    Harris and the second individual about purchasing co-
    caine. Had the court not reconsidered this finding, it
    likely would not have been able to determine that there
    was probable cause for the search warrant and Harris’s
    motion to suppress would have been granted. Under the
    law of the case doctrine, a court generally should not
    reopen issues decided in earlier stages of the same litiga-
    tion. Agostini v. Felton, 
    521 U.S. 203
    , 236 (1997). However,
    the doctrine “authorizes such reconsideration [of a previ-
    ous ruling in the same litigation] if there is a compelling
    reason, such as a change in, or clarification of, law that
    makes clear that the earlier ruling was erroneous.”
    Santamarina v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 
    466 F.3d 570
    , 572 (7th
    Cir. 2006). We have reiterated that the law of the case
    doctrine is a discretionary doctrine that does not limit the
    10                                                No. 07-1315
    district court’s power to reopen what already has been
    decided. See Menzer v. United States, 
    200 F.3d 1000
    , 1004
    (7th Cir. 2000) (law of the case doctrine does not bar a
    trial court from revisiting its own evidentiary rulings);
    Avitia v. Metro. Club of Chicago, Inc., 
    49 F.3d 1219
    , 1227 (7th
    Cir. 1995) (the doctrine of the law of the case is “no
    more than a presumption, one whose strength varies
    with the circumstances; it is not a straitjacket.”).
    Here, the district court did precisely what we had
    directed it to do, which was conduct a Franks hearing
    and determine whether Harris could demonstrate, by a
    preponderance of the evidence, that the search warrant
    must be voided. It concluded that he could not. As part
    of its probable cause analysis, the district court con-
    sidered whether the CI’s information regarding the activi-
    ties in the Goodlet residence was stale at the time the
    warrant was issued. Harris 
    I, 464 F.3d at 739
    (emphasizing
    the need for a temporal guidepost allowing us to deter-
    mine whether the CI’s information was stale). Detective
    Forrest’s testimony that the CI visited the Goodlet resi-
    dence on April 18 and observed guns inside the residence,
    as well as Antone Harris and a second individual con-
    tinuing to sell cocaine, provided the requisite timeframe
    that we found lacking in the first appeal. The district
    court found this weighed in favor of a determination that
    there was probable cause for the search warrant.
    The court did have to reconsider one of its prior
    findings in order to reach this conclusion. Initially (prior
    to Harris’s first appeal) the court found that the warrant
    affidavit intentionally or recklessly misstated the date of
    the CI’s conversations with Harris about purchasing
    cocaine. That finding was based on an apparent discrep-
    ancy between the information in the warrant affidavit,
    No. 07-1315                                                     11
    which states that the CI observed criminal activity at the
    Goodlet residence within seventy-two hours of April 19,
    2004, and information in Detective Forrest’s supple-
    mental affidavit which stated that the CI observed crim-
    inal activity on April 12.2 In other words, the district
    court misunderstood the sequence of events and believed
    the CI had made only one visit to the Goodlet residence,
    on April 12, 2004. Based on this, the court erroneously
    found the warrant affidavit to be false as to the timing of
    the CI’s visit to the Goodlet residence. However, once the
    court heard the testimony of Detective Forrest (which
    clarified the information in his warrant affidavit and
    included an explanation for why his supplemental af-
    fidavit did not jibe with his warrant affidavit), the court
    reasonably found that the statement in the warrant af-
    fidavit regarding the date of the CI’s conversations with
    Harris was not misleading.3
    Harris contends that the district court should have
    been bound by its initial determination that the warrant
    2
    The court initially read the supplemental affidavit to imply
    that the CI had spoken to Antone Harris about purchasing drugs
    only on April 12, 2004, and “merely confirmed Antone Harris
    was continuing to sell narcotics at the Goodlet Avenue resi-
    dence” on April 18, 2004. United States v. Harris, No. IP 04-91-CR-
    01 B/F, 
    2005 WL 82152
    , at *3 n.3 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 4, 2005). Accord-
    ing to the district court, the supplemental affidavit was “dis-
    turbingly vague” and muddied the water as to the dates the
    CI visited the Goodlet residence and observed criminal activity.
    3
    It is worth noting as well that the district court did not rely
    on any additional information in the supplemental affidavit
    because Detective Forrest’s testimony clarified the warrant
    affidavit.
    12                                                 No. 07-1315
    affidavit contained misleading information as to the date
    of the CI’s conversations about purchasing cocaine with
    Antone Harris and the second individual in the
    Goodlet Avenue residence. But this would have forced
    the court to ignore evidence adduced at the hearing, a
    result that is neither necessary nor justified. “The only
    sensible thing for a trial court to do is to set itself right as
    soon as possible when convinced that the law of the case
    is erroneous.” Champaign-Urbana News Agency, Inc. v. J. L.
    Cummins News Co., Inc., 
    632 F.2d 680
    , 683 (7th Cir. 1980).
    Having been directed to conduct a Franks hearing, it
    was well within the district court’s power to start fresh
    and consider whether the warrant affidavit contained
    false statements in light of Detective Forrest’s testimony,
    even if that meant reconsidering its prior findings based
    on what the evidence at the hearing revealed. So the
    district court did not abuse its discretion when it deter-
    mined that it was not bound by the law of the case doc-
    trine from reconsidering whether the statements in the
    warrant affidavit were materially false.
    B. Disclosure of the Confidential Informant
    Harris moved the district court to compel the govern-
    ment to disclose the identity of and produce the CI,
    asserting that there is, in fact, no CI and that Detective
    Forrest fabricated the CI’s existence. Because the CI’s
    observations provided the basis for probable cause,
    Harris argues that the district court abused its discretion
    in refusing to conduct an in camera, ex parte hearing to
    determine whether the CI actually existed. We review a
    district court’s denial of a motion for disclosure of the
    identify of a confidential informant for abuse of discre-
    tion and will affirm if any reasonable person could agree
    No. 07-1315                                                 13
    with the district court’s decision. United States v. Jefferson,
    
    252 F.3d 937
    , 940 (7th Cir. 2001).
    The government has a limited privilege to withhold
    the identity of a confidential informant from a criminal
    defendant. Roviaro v. United States, 
    353 U.S. 53
    , 59-60 (1957).
    This privilege gives way if the defendant proves that the
    disclosure of the informant’s identity “is relevant and
    helpful” to his defense “or is essential to a fair determina-
    tion of a cause.” 
    Id. at 60-61;
    Jefferson, 252 F.3d at 941
    . To
    determine whether the government is required to dis-
    close the identity of the informant, the court must balance
    “the public interest in protecting the flow of information
    against the individual’s right to prepare his defense.”
    
    Roviaro, 353 U.S. at 62
    . This depends “on the particular
    circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the
    crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible sig-
    nificance of the informer’s testimony, and other relevant
    factors.” 
    Id. We have
    held that the role of the confidential informant
    is an important factor to consider when determining
    whether that informant’s identity need be disclosed.
    See 
    Jefferson, 252 F.3d at 942
    ; United States v. Bender, 
    5 F.3d 267
    , 270 (7th Cir. 1993). When the confidential infor-
    mant is a mere “tipster”—someone whose only role was
    to provide the police with the relevant information that
    served as the foundation for obtaining a search war-
    rant—rather than a “transactional witness” who partici-
    pated in the crime charged against the defendant or
    witnessed the event in question, disclosure will not be
    required. See 
    Jefferson, 252 F.3d at 942
    (affirming denial
    of motion for disclosure when confidential informant
    was a tipster who provided information that led to a
    search warrant but was not present when the warrant
    14                                              No. 07-1315
    was executed); 
    Bender, 5 F.3d at 270
    (same); United States
    v. Andrus, 
    775 F.2d 825
    , 842 (7th Cir. 1985) (“When the
    informant is a mere ‘tipster,’ rather than a participant or
    an eyewitness to the event in question, disclosure will
    not be required.”). In Roviaro, disclosure was required
    where the confidential informant was the sole partic-
    ipant, other than the defendant, in the transaction charged
    against the 
    defendant. 353 U.S. at 64
    . The informant’s
    testimony was found to be “highly relevant” because he
    not only was nearest to the defendant during the alleged
    criminal transaction, but he also had helped to set up the
    criminal occurrence and played a prominent part in it.
    
    Id. at 63-64.
      In contrast, the CI here played no part in the transac-
    tion charged against Harris. Though the CI’s reports that
    Harris was selling cocaine in the Goodlet residence and
    that there were guns in the residence led to the acquisi-
    tion of a search warrant for the home, those activities
    were not part of the charges against Harris, which were
    based on his possession of crack cocaine on April 20, 2004.
    See, e.g., 
    Bender, 5 F.3d at 270
    (noting that the criminal
    activity the informant witnessed did not form the basis of
    the charges against defendant). Furthermore, the CI
    did not actively participate in the investigation by, for
    example, purchasing cocaine from Harris, and the CI was
    not present when the warrant was executed. Because
    the CI’s only role was to provide information that served
    as the basis for obtaining the search warrant, there is no
    reason to believe that the CI would testify at trial in such
    a way that would refute or cast doubt on whether Harris
    was in possession of crack cocaine on April 20, 2004. The
    CI is therefore a “tipster” whose identity need not be
    disclosed.
    No. 07-1315                                                15
    Although disclosure of the CI might have been helpful
    to Harris at the Franks hearing (rather than at trial), Harris
    has not demonstrated that he possessed a “genuine need
    of informant disclosure that outweighs the public’s inter-
    est [in protecting the free flow of information].” 
    Id. Ac- cording
    to Harris, disclosure of the CI’s identity—or lack
    thereof—would have proven that Detective Forrest was
    lying in his warrant affidavit. That is, if the court had
    summoned the CI, the CI would not have appeared,
    which would have proven that Detective Forrest lied in
    his warrant affidavit when he stated that he relied on
    the information provided by the CI. But Harris was given
    the opportunity to suggest that Detective Forrest was
    lying at the Franks hearing, when Detective Forrest was
    subject to cross-examination, and the district court found
    no reason to question his credibility. Cf. 
    id. at 269-70
    (confidential informant’s testimony had no particular
    significance to defendant’s case because there were
    other available witnesses who could have corroborated
    defendant’s story). Furthermore, though he was not
    compelled to do so, Harris could have chosen to testify on
    his own behalf at the Franks hearing to dispute the infor-
    mation in the warrant affidavit.
    Assuming Harris is correct that the CI does not exist,
    nothing would demonstrate that better than if the gov-
    ernment were unable to produce the CI to the district
    court. Furthermore, there is some merit to Harris’s argu-
    ment that an in camera hearing (where the CI’s identity
    would have been disclosed only to the court) would
    have served both the interests of the government, by
    preserving the CI’s anonymity, as well as the interests
    of Harris in receiving a fair hearing. Indeed, the district
    court would have been justified in conducting such a
    16                                              No. 07-1315
    hearing. However, a district court is not compelled to
    hold such a hearing, especially when, as here, the court,
    having heard the evidence, saw no reason to doubt that
    the CI existed. Our inquiry asks not how we would have
    ruled had we been considering the case in the first
    place but rather whether any reasonable person could
    agree with the district court. 
    Id. at 269.
    In addition, there
    are policy reasons that counsel against compelling dis-
    closure of the CI here. It is reasonable to assume that a
    CI might be reluctant to appear before a district court
    judge and discuss his interactions with an alleged drug
    dealer, notwithstanding any assertions by the court or
    the officer regarding the informant’s immunity. This
    reluctance might prevent the CI from participating in
    future investigations. We have recognized this to be a
    compelling reason to avoid disclosure unless necessary.
    See 
    id. at 270
    (noting that not many people want to be-
    come police informants and that disclosure can compro-
    mise an informant’s safety as well as other investigations).
    Therefore, even if disclosure of the CI would have been
    helpful to Harris at the Franks hearing, Harris has not
    demonstrated that such disclosure was so necessary
    that this presumption must give way. The district court
    did not abuse its discretion in denying Harris’s motion
    for disclosure and production of the CI.
    We note further that because Harris’s sentence of 240
    months reflects the statutory mandatory minimum, there
    is no need to remand this case to the district court pursu-
    ant to Kimbrough v. United States, 
    128 S. Ct. 558
    (2007).
    Compare United States v. Taylor, ___ F.3d ___, 
    2008 WL 782739
    , at *2 (7th Cir. Mar. 26, 2008).
    No. 07-1315                                           17
    III. CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
    court is A FFIRMED.
    USCA-02-C-0072—7-1-08