United States v. Arceo, Edgar ( 2008 )


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  •                               In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 07-3296
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    EDGAR ARCEO,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 99 CR 596—David H. Coar, Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED APRIL 14, 2008—DECIDED JULY 28, 2008
    ____________
    Before FLAUM, EVANS, and TINDER, Circuit Judges.
    TINDER, Circuit Judge. Edgar Arceo and a co-defendant
    were charged with a conspiracy to possess with intent
    to distribute and to distribute a controlled substance in
    violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    . More than six years later
    Arceo was arrested. He moved to dismiss the indictment
    based on an alleged violation of his constitutional right
    to a speedy trial. His motion was denied. Arceo then
    pled guilty to the conspiracy charge, conditioning his
    plea on the right to appeal the denial of his motion to
    dismiss. The district court sentenced Arceo to 108 months’
    imprisonment followed by a term of supervised release.
    2                                                 No. 07-3296
    Arceo appeals. While he raises three issues, his main
    argument is that his right to a speedy trial was violated.
    He also challenges his sentence, arguing that the obstruc-
    tion of justice adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 was not
    appropriate and that the district court did not ade-
    quately consider his cooperation with the government.
    After a brief presentation of the facts, we turn to Arceo’s
    arguments.
    I. Background
    On August 11, 1999, Arceo was arrested in a parking lot
    in Aurora, Illinois, after delivering approximately 5 kilo-
    grams of cocaine to a confidential informant who was
    working with the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”).
    Immediately after his arrest, Arceo was interviewed by
    agents. He waived his Miranda rights and agreed to
    cooperate with law enforcement. He identified his
    source of supply of cocaine, Jose Salazar-Felix, and
    agreed to show the agents where he got the cocaine. The
    agents accompanied Arceo to a residence in Palatine,
    resulting in Salazar-Felix’s arrest and eventual prosecu-
    tion. Arceo subsequently was transported to the Palatine,
    Illinois, Police Department for processing.
    Both at the time of his arrest in the parking lot and
    again while at the Palatine Police Department, Arceo was
    advised by the DEA Task Force Officer Lou Dominguez
    and other agents that they did not know when he
    would be charged, but that he would, in fact, be charged
    at a later time after his cooperation ended.1 Arceo was
    1
    Arceo argues that he was not told that he definitely would be
    indicted, but only that it was a possibility. However, he did
    (continued...)
    No. 07-3296                                                  3
    released from custody in order to continue his coopera-
    tion. He identified his source of marijuana, Jesus
    Rodriguez-Medina, and arrangements were made for a
    meeting. Law enforcement and Arceo agreed to contact
    each other the next day.
    For two days Arceo cooperated with law enforcement.
    He arranged for a marijuana transaction on August 12
    with Rodriguez-Medina. Arceo did meet with Rodriguez-
    Medina, who was arrested. Law enforcement and Arceo
    agreed to meet the next day. On August 13, however,
    when Officer Dominguez called Arceo to arrange to meet,
    he was unable to reach him. Other agents likewise tried
    to contact Arceo but did not succeed. As a result the
    agents went looking for Arceo at his residence. They
    were unable to find him and determined he had moved
    out. After the usual law-enforcement checks in the North-
    ern District of Illinois, Arceo still did not turn up.
    On November 4, 1999, Arceo and Rodriguez-Medina
    were charged in a one-count indictment with a cocaine
    and marijuana conspiracy. A minute order was entered
    that day, stating: “The government will seek to have the
    defendant detained without bond . . . as to Edgar Arceo,
    1
    (...continued)
    not present any testimony, not even his own, or any other
    evidence to support his assertion. Arceo also claims that
    Officer Dominguez testified at the hearing on the motion to
    dismiss that Arceo was told that he “may” be charged. The
    transcript of that hearing contradicts this claim. For example,
    on direct examination Officer Dominguez stated that “we
    told him [Arceo] that we didn’t know when we would be
    charging him, but that we would charge him at a later time
    after his cooperation was done.”
    4                                              No. 07-3296
    granted. Enter order.” An arraignment notice was entered
    the next day. The docket does not show that an arrest
    warrant was issued for Arceo. Between November 1999
    and July 2000, there were a number of court pro-
    ceedings involving Rodriguez-Medina but no docket
    entries reflect any activity as to Arceo. On July 27, 2000,
    Arceo’s case was reassigned to the fugitive calendar.
    In early 2001, Officer Dominguez discovered that no
    arrest warrant had been issued for Arceo. So on April 4,
    2001, he contacted the Assistant United States Attorney
    (“AUSA”) assigned to the case in an effort to obtain an
    arrest warrant. No warrant was issued, so Officer
    Dominguez contacted the AUSA once again in 2001 and
    still later in 2002, before he stopped working as a DEA
    task officer. The agent who took over this case made two
    attempts in 2003 to have an arrest warrant issued for
    Arceo. None was issued until December 15, 2005, how-
    ever. On December 20, that warrant, along with a
    second warrant issued December 19, were quashed for
    reasons not indicated in the record, and a third bench
    warrant was issued.
    On April 4, 2006, Arceo was arrested in the Middle
    District of Pennsylvania. He was living there under the
    assumed identity of Rowdy Sepulvida, which he admit-
    ted he purchased from a friend.
    A detention hearing was held on April 5, 2006, in Penn-
    sylvania, at which Arceo’s wife of twelve years, Maria
    Arceo, testified. She stated that in August 1999 she and
    her husband left Chicago for Mexico “because of the
    problem” in Chicago (without any details about the
    nature of the problem) and that they lived in Mexico for
    about three years. According to Maria, it was her hus-
    band’s idea to go to Mexico. She testified that she be-
    No. 07-3296                                                     5
    lieved her husband knew he was wanted in Chicago.
    Maria said that they returned to the United States in
    2002 and lived in Spring Grove, Pennsylvania, near her
    family. She also said it was about that time that Arceo
    began using the Rowdy Sepulvida name. She explained
    that Arceo could not use his own name because of the
    problem he had in Chicago.2
    Prior to trial Arceo moved to dismiss the indictment. The
    district court held a hearing on the motion. The court
    considered the transcript of Maria’s testimony at the
    detention hearing and the testimony of former Task Force
    Officer Dominguez about Arceo’s arrest, cooperation,
    and flight, and then denied the motion to dismiss. The
    court found that Arceo was aware he had been arrested
    and that criminal charges would be filed, yet chose to
    remove himself from the United States, later returning to
    another jurisdiction under an assumed name until his
    arrest. The court indicated that the government may not
    have done “as much as it could have” but concluded
    that Arceo’s attempt to avoid arrest and prosecution
    outweighed any negligence by the government.
    On April 2, 2007, Arceo pled guilty pursuant to a plea
    agreement to a conspiracy to possess with intent to distrib-
    ute and to distribute a controlled substance, in violation
    of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    . His plea was conditioned on his right
    to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. The dis-
    2
    On redirect, however, Maria claimed that she had no idea
    what the problem in Chicago was and that Arceo started
    using Sepulvida’s name just so he could work. We have no
    basis for concluding that the district court erred in disbelieving
    this testimony, which was more favorable to Arceo than
    Maria’s initial testimony.
    6                                                  No. 07-3296
    trict court accepted his conditional plea and entered a
    judgment against him.
    At sentencing the district court heard arguments re-
    lating to adjustments for obstruction of justice under
    U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 and acceptance of responsibility, and con-
    sidered the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) sentencing factors, specifi-
    cally including Arceo’s family history and circum-
    stances, his lack of criminal history since 1999, and his
    cooperation with the government immediately fol-
    lowing his arrest. The court sentenced him to 108 months’
    imprisonment, at the bottom of the guidelines range. Arceo
    appeals.
    II. Sixth Amendment Right to A Speedy Trial
    Arceo’s first and principal argument is that the district
    court erred in denying his motion to dismiss because
    he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to a
    speedy trial. The government responds that there was
    no error because Arceo’s own conduct in evading law
    enforcement outweighs any government conduct con-
    tributing to the six-year and eight-month delay fol-
    lowing his initial arrest. We review a speedy trial claim
    de novo and review the district court’s factual findings
    for clear error. See United States v. King, 
    338 F.3d 794
    , 797
    (7th Cir. 2003) (stating explicitly the standard of review
    for a Speedy Trial Act claim and applying the same
    standard to a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim); see
    also United States v. Sutcliffe, 
    505 F.3d 944
    , 956 (9th Cir.
    2007) (stating explicitly the standard of review for a
    constitutional speedy trial claim); United States v. Brown,
    
    498 F.3d 523
    , 530 (6th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 
    128 S. Ct. 674
    (2007).
    No. 07-3296                                                    7
    The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial is triggered
    by an arrest, indictment, or some other official accusation.
    Doggett v. United States, 
    505 U.S. 647
    , 655 (1992); United
    States v. White, 
    443 F.3d 582
    , 589 (7th Cir. 2006). In deter-
    mining whether a defendant has been deprived of this
    speedy trial right, we consider and weigh the conduct of
    the government and the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 
    407 U.S. 514
    , 530 (1972). In doing so we assess “whether
    delay before trial was uncommonly long, whether the
    government or the criminal defendant is more to blame
    for that delay, whether, in due course, the defendant
    asserted his right to a speedy trial, and whether he suf-
    fered prejudice as the delay’s result.” Doggett, 
    505 U.S. at 651
    ; see also White, 
    443 F.3d at 589
    .
    The length of the delay acts as a triggering mechanism.
    Unless the delay is presumptively prejudicial, we need
    not consider the other factors. Barker, 
    407 U.S. at 530
    ;
    White, 
    443 F.3d at 589
    . A delay approaching one year is
    presumptively prejudicial. United States v. Oriedo, 
    498 F.3d 593
    , 597 (7th Cir. 2007); White, 
    443 F.3d at 589-90
    .
    Here, more than six and one-half years passed from the
    time of Arceo’s arrest in August 1999 to his plea in
    April 2007. This extraordinary delay stretches well be-
    yond the minimum needed to trigger a further speedy
    trial analysis. See Doggett, 
    505 U.S. at 652
    . This lengthy
    delay weighs in favor of Arceo.
    The second factor is the reason for the delay, and it is this
    factor that is at the heart of Arceo’s claim. Different
    weights should be given to different reasons for delay:
    “A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to
    hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against
    the government. A more neutral reason such as
    negligence . . . should be weighted less heavily . . . .” Barker,
    8                                             No. 07-3296
    
    407 U.S. at 531
    . Arceo contends the delay is attributable
    to the government’s negligence. The government argues
    that the principal reason for the delay was Arceo’s in-
    tentional attempt to evade law enforcement.
    Here there were a few reasons for the delay. For one,
    when Arceo was indicted on November 4, 1999, a minute
    entry reflects that an order for Arceo’s arrest and deten-
    tion would be issued but, for some inexplicable rea-
    son—the government suggests a clerical error in the
    clerk’s office—none was entered. From the best we can
    glean from the record, for several months no one noticed
    that an arrest warrant had not been issued. Then on
    July 27, 2000, this case was reassigned to the fugitive
    calendar, which implies that someone in the clerk’s
    office and/or court staff believed there was an out-
    standing warrant for Arceo’s arrest. Nothing in the
    record before us suggests that the delay caused by this
    error is attributable to the government. This error seems
    to have contributed to over one year’s worth of the delay
    as it was not until early 2001 that the fact that no arrest
    warrant had been issued was first discovered.
    It was in early 2001 that Officer Dominguez discovered
    that no arrest warrant had been issued, so he contacted
    the AUSA assigned to the case in an effort to obtain an
    arrest warrant. In total in the next few years, the DEA
    agents made five attempts to have an arrest warrant
    issued, without success until December 15, 2005. That
    warrant was later quashed and ultimately a warrant
    issued on December 19, 2005. The government’s apparent
    inaction in response to repeated notification that no
    warrant had been issued seems negligent. This negligence
    contributed to the delay from April 2001 through Decem-
    ber 15, 2005, approximately four years and eight months.
    No. 07-3296                                                9
    However, Arceo has offered nothing to suggest that the
    government acted intentionally in causing this delay.
    Thus, while we consider the reason for this part of the
    total delay, we do not weight it heavily against the gov-
    ernment. See Barker, 
    407 U.S. at 531
    .
    But most of the blame for the delay lies with Arceo
    himself. Arceo intentionally fled to Mexico for three
    years, and returned to the United States, but not to the
    Chicago area. He returned instead to another jurisdic-
    tion hundreds of miles away in Pennsylvania, where he
    lived under an assumed name. His actions support the
    conclusion that he was hiding from authorities in a cal-
    culated effort to avoid arrest and prosecution. Arceo
    likens his case to Doggett, in which the Supreme Court
    held that an eight and one-half year delay between the
    defendant’s indictment and arrest violated his speedy
    trial rights. Doggett was indicted with others for a drug
    conspiracy. Doggett, 
    505 U.S. at 648
    . When law enforce-
    ment attempted to arrest him, they learned that he had
    left the country a few days before. The DEA attempted
    to catch Doggett on his return to the United States, but
    these efforts ceased with time. Approximately two and
    one-half years after his indictment, Doggett returned to the
    United States, where he lived openly under his own name.
    He later was found pursuant to a mass credit check on
    several thousand persons subject to outstanding arrest
    warrants. 
    Id. at 649-50
    . The Court deferred to the lower
    court’s finding that the delay was attributable to the
    government’s negligence. 
    Id. at 652-53
    .
    Two facts easily distinguish this case from Doggett: First,
    Doggett “lived openly under his own name” upon his
    return to the United States. 
    Id. at 649
    . Thus, the Court
    observed that for six years, the government investigators
    10                                            No. 07-3296
    made no serious effort to find Doggett, but had they
    done so “they could have found him within minutes.” 
    Id. at 653
    . Here, in contrast, Arceo was living under an
    assumed name: he was in hiding. It cannot be said that
    law enforcement could have quickly and easily found
    him within minutes if only they had made an effort.
    While Arceo was arrested relatively quickly—three and
    one-half months—after the December 2005 arrest warrant
    was issued, this was due in part, no doubt, to good in-
    vestigative work and perhaps some good luck. Another
    significant difference is that Doggett had no knowledge
    of the charges against him until his arrest. 
    Id. at 653-54
    .
    While Arceo may have been unaware of the indictment
    against him until his April 2006 arrest, the district court
    found that when Arceo fled in August 1999, he was
    aware that criminal charges were forthcoming. This
    finding is well-supported by the record. Both at the time
    of his arrest in the parking lot and again while at the
    police department, Arceo was advised by Officer
    Dominguez and other agents that he would be charged,
    though they did not know when the charges would be filed.
    Thus, the district court’s finding in this regard is not
    erroneous.
    Arceo makes much of testimony by Officer Dominguez
    about conversations with Arceo “as to when he would be
    charged with a crime” and whether the officer told
    Arceo on August 12 that he was going to be charged, to
    which Officer Dominguez responded “no” and “I don’t
    recall.” This testimony does not contradict the officer’s
    testimony that he and others had discussed with Arceo
    several times on August 11 that he would be charged
    following his cooperation. Arceo argues that he was
    using an assumed name simply for employment pur-
    No. 07-3296                                                 11
    poses, but the district court could reasonably reject this
    explanation. While the government may have acted
    negligently, Arceo acted intentionally and he therefore
    bears more blame for the delay. Thus, the reason for
    the delay weighs in favor of the government.
    The third factor is somewhat neutral. Arceo was not
    informed that the indictment had been returned against
    him until his arrest. See 
    id. at 653-54
     (stating that if defen-
    dant knew of his indictment for years before he was
    arrested, the third factor “would be weighed heavily
    against him,” but where he was not aware of the indict-
    ment prior to his arrest, he “is not to be taxed for
    invoking his speedy trial right only after his arrest”). And
    Arceo did move to dismiss the indictment, asserting
    his speedy trial rights. But Arceo had been arrested and
    knew that he would be charged following his coopera-
    tion. Upon fleeing to Mexico, he was no longer cooperat-
    ing, so he was on notice that charges would soon follow.
    The fact that Arceo moved to dismiss the indictment for
    a speedy trial violation cuts in his favor; however, the
    fact that he knew that charges were certain but fled
    the jurisdiction to avoid prosecution cuts against him.
    The fourth factor is prejudice to the defendant. Arceo
    does not claim that he suffered any particularized preju-
    dice caused by the delay. He argues that the extra-
    ordinary length of the delay suffices to establish prejudice.
    Proof of particular prejudice is not necessary in every
    case; in some cases of excessive delay prejudice may be
    presumed. 
    Id. at 655-56
    ; Oriedo, 
    498 F.3d at 600
    . Yet this
    presumed prejudice is not sufficient to carry a speedy
    trial claim “absent a strong showing on the other Barker
    factors.” Oriedo, 
    498 F.3d at 600
    . Again, Arceo likens his
    case to Doggett where the presumptive prejudice caused
    12                                              No. 07-3296
    by the delay was sufficient to warrant relief for a
    speedy trial violation. But there, Doggett could not be
    blamed for the delay; but for the government’s egregious
    negligence, he would have been prosecuted six years
    earlier than he was. Doggett, 
    505 U.S. at 657-58
    . Here, in
    sharp contrast, Arceo is at fault. He acted intentionally
    and deliberately in attempting to avoid arrest and prosecu-
    tion. This conduct weighs heavily against him and out-
    weighs the government’s negligence. Considering all of
    the circumstances including the absence of any partic-
    ularized prejudice to Arceo, we conclude that the district
    court did not err in concluding that Arceo had not
    shown a deprivation of his constitutional speedy trial right.
    III. Obstruction of Justice
    Arceo’s next challenge is to the district court’s applica-
    tion of the obstruction of justice adjustment under U.S.S.G.
    § 3C1.1. We review an obstruction of justice finding
    for clear error, giving deference to the district court’s
    application of the guidelines to the facts. United States v.
    King, 
    506 F.3d 532
    , 535 (7th Cir. 2007) (per curiam); United
    States v. Porter, 
    145 F.3d 897
    , 902 (7th Cir. 1998). The
    pertinent question under § 3C1.1 is “ ‘whether the defen-
    dant’s conduct evidences a willful intent to obstruct
    justice.’ ” Porter, 
    145 F.3d at 903
     (quoting United States v.
    Draves, 
    103 F.3d 1328
    , 1338 (7th Cir. 1997)). While the
    application note to § 3C1.1 states that “avoiding or
    fleeing from arrest” generally will not warrant an ob-
    struction of justice enhancement, U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt.
    n.5(d); see Porter, 
    145 F.3d at 903
    , our cases draw a line
    between “ ‘panicked, instinctive flight,’ ” which does not
    warrant an enhancement, and “ ‘calculated evasion,’ ”
    which does. Porter, 
    145 F.3d at 903
     (quoting Draves, 
    103 F.3d at 1337
    ).
    No. 07-3296                                               13
    Arceo engaged in conduct that clearly supports the
    obstruction of justice finding. See King, 
    506 F.3d at 535
    (concluding challenge to obstruction of justice finding
    would be frivolous where defendant while on pretrial
    release absconded for two months, obtained a driver’s
    license using a stolen social security number, and used
    that false identity to buy a car); Porter, 
    145 F.3d at
    903-
    04 (concluding obstruction of justice enhancement war-
    ranted where defendant, though not yet arrested, knew
    an indictment against him was imminent and none-
    theless fled the jurisdiction and changed his identity).
    Arceo knew he would be charged with a crime; yet he
    fled the jurisdiction, living in Mexico for several years and
    later returning to the United States, relocating to distant
    Pennsylvania under an assumed name.
    Arceo argues that it is not clear that he fled the juris-
    diction because he knew he would be charged with a
    crime. He claims that he only knew that he might be
    charged. The record belies this claim. While Officer
    Dominguez did not tell Arceo specifically when he would
    be charged and did not discuss with him on August 12
    whether he would be charged at all, it is undisputed
    that Arceo was told several times on August 11, both
    when he was arrested and while he was being processed
    at the police station, that he would in fact be charged.
    Nothing in the record suggests that these assertions
    were ever retracted. Arceo suggests that he had reason to
    believe he might not be charged because of his sub-
    stantial assistance to law enforcement over two days, but
    he points to nothing in the record—nothing said by
    Officer Dominguez, another DEA agent, or any other law
    enforcement or government agent—to make such a belief
    reasonable. Arceo also suggests that he left Chicago
    14                                                 No. 07-3296
    because of fear of retaliation from the individuals who
    were arrested because of his cooperation. But again he
    offers no evidence to substantiate this assertion. We agree
    that Arceo’s conduct was a calculated effort to evade
    prosecution, and we find no error in the district court’s
    obstruction of justice finding.
    IV. Substantial Cooperation
    The third issue is whether the within-guidelines sen-
    tence was reasonable given Arceo’s substantial coopera-
    tion with the government. We review a sentence for
    reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard.
    United States v. Omole, 
    523 F.3d 691
    , 696 (7th Cir. 2008)
    (citing Gall v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 
    128 S. Ct. 586
    , 597
    (2007)). A properly calculated within-guidelines sen-
    tence is presumed reasonable. 
    Id.
     (citing Rita v. United
    States, --- U.S. ----, 
    127 S. Ct. 2456
    , 2462-63 (2007)). But this
    presumption may be rebutted by a showing that the
    sentence is unreasonable when considered against the
    § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Harvey, 
    516 F.3d 553
    ,
    556 (7th Cir. 2008).
    Arceo does not argue that the district court erred in
    calculating the applicable guidelines range. Nor does he
    dispute that he had an opportunity to identify the § 3553(a)
    factors that might warrant a non-guidelines sentence. The
    record shows that he did. The record also reflects the
    district court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors.
    Arceo’s objection is more pointed. He contends that his
    sentence was unreasonable because it did not adequately
    account for his substantial cooperation with law enforce-
    ment. In his view, he should have received a below-
    guidelines sentence.
    No. 07-3296                                                      15
    The district court did account for Arceo’s cooperation
    though. The court sentenced him at the low end of the
    guidelines range (108-135 months) instead of the mid-
    range—where the judge said he typically sentences de-
    fendants—based in large measure on Arceo’s cooperation.
    Thus, Arceo received 108 months instead of 122. We
    think this effective 14-month reduction adequately ac-
    counts for Arceo’s cooperation. While the court could
    have relied on Arceo’s cooperation as a basis for going
    below the guidelines range, it was not required to do so.
    Neither fairness nor the requirement that a sentence be
    no greater than necessary compels the conclusion that a
    sentence at the very bottom of the guidelines range was
    unreasonable. The 108-month sentence adequately ac-
    counts for Arceo’s cooperation along with the other facts
    and circumstances of the case. This case exemplifies
    what sentencing discretion is all about. See United States
    v. Willis, 
    523 F.3d 762
    , 770 (7th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he district
    court has substantial discretion in choosing a rea-
    sonable sentence.”).3
    3
    Arceo also suggests that his cooperation would justify a
    U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 motion and the government’s explanation for
    not making the motion—“office policy”—was a “whim.” “[W]e
    may review the government’s refusal to move for a departure
    based on substantial assistance only for unconstitutional
    motive.” United States v. Bosque, 
    312 F.3d 313
    , 318 (7th Cir. 2002).
    Arceo does not argue that the government’s decision not to
    make a § 5K1.1 motion was based on an unconstitutional motive.
    Moreover, although Arceo initially cooperated with law
    enforcement, providing valuable information which led to the
    arrest and convictions of Rodriguez-Medina and Salazar-Felix,
    a short while later he fled the jurisdiction. His flight left
    (continued...)
    16                                             No. 07-3296
    Arceo has not shown that his sentence at the very bot-
    tom of the guidelines range was unreasonable. Accord-
    ingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse
    its discretion in imposing Arceo’s sentence.
    V. Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, Arceo’s conviction and sen-
    tence are AFFIRMED.
    3
    (...continued)
    him unable to follow through with his initial cooperation by
    testifying, if necessary, at Rodriguez-Medina’s and Salazar-
    Felix’s trials. From the government’s perspective, Arceo’s
    deliberate flight made him unqualified for a § 5K1.1 motion.
    That determination does not appear to be the product of an
    unconstitutional motive.
    USCA-02-C-0072—7-28-08