Daphne Bilal v. Rotec Industries Inc , 326 F. App'x 949 ( 2009 )


Menu:
  •                                       UNPUBLISHED ORDER
    Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Argued January 16, 2009
    Decided June 12, 2009
    Before
    WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge
    JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge
    DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge
    DAPHNE BILAL,
    Appeal from the United States
    Plaintiff-Appellant,             District Court for the Northern
    District of Illinois
    No. 06-2143
    No. 03 C 9220
    ROTEC INDUSTRIES, INC. and
    ROBERT OURY                                               Charles P. Kocoras,
    Judge.
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ORDER
    Daphne Bilal appeals the district court’s dismissal of her Title VII retaliation claim and the
    entry of summary judgment against her with regard to her Title VII sex discrimination claims.
    For the reasons explained below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
    I.        Background
    In July 2001, Daphne Bilal was hired as a receptionist at Rotec Industries, Inc., a construction
    No. 08-2371                                                                                Page 2
    equipment manufacturing company located in Elmhurst, Illinois. Defendant Robert Oury was
    the Chief Executive Officer of Rotec while Bilal was working at the company. According to
    Bilal, Oury sexually harassed her throughout her employment at Rotec. In late October 2002,
    Bilal accused her immediate supervisor, Chesterine Lombardo, of throwing a newspaper at
    her, which Lombardo denied. In a meeting about the incident, at which Bilal, Lombardo, and
    Oury were present, Bilal and Lombardo got into an argument, and Bilal was fired, supposedly
    for insubordination.1
    Bilal filed a complaint with the EEOC, was issued a right-to-sue letter, and filed a five-count
    complaint in the district court. Bilal’s complaint alleged that Rotec and Oury had created a
    hostile work environment and had engaged in discrimination and retaliation against her on
    the basis of her gender in violation of Title VII. The complaint also contained state law claims
    against Oury for battery, assault, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
    The complaint painted a vivid picture of the sexual harassment and abuse Bilal had
    allegedly endured. Bilal stated that shortly after she was hired at Rotec, Oury made sexual
    comments about her “ass” and what he would do with her “ass” if given an opportunity.
    Oury allegedly called her a “useless tease” and told her “he knows exactly what to do with a
    tease.” Bilal claimed that he also referred to her, at one point, as his “beautiful, black, long-
    legged stallion.” The complaint stated that Oury told Bilal, quite bluntly, that if she had sex
    with him it would make her job better. According to Bilal, Oury invited her to dinner and
    drinks on numerous occasions (which she declined).
    Bilal also alleged that Oury touched her sexually without her consent on three occasions.
    Bilal stated that Oury touched her thigh and caressed her buttocks while Bilal informed him
    of a phone call. She also claimed that on another occasion Oury walked behind her desk and
    rubbed his genitalia through his clothing against her arm. Finally, in a particularly bizarre
    incident, Bilal claimed that Oury once took a chocolate out of his mouth and placed it in Bilal’s
    mouth while she was speaking.
    On June 3, 2004, the district court dismissed the retaliation claim because Bilal had failed
    to allege retaliation in her EEOC complaint. The parties proceeded with discovery on the other
    claims and defendants deposed Bilal. During her deposition, Bilal testified to many of the
    1
    There appears to be some dispute about who fired Bilal. Plaintiff claims that Oury fired
    her; defendants claim that Oury gave Lombardo authority to terminate plaintiff. See D.E. 83 ¶ 23.
    However, whether it was Oury or Lombardo who actually fired Bilal does not appear to be material.
    No. 08-2371                                                                               Page 3
    incidents alleged in her complaint. She testified that Oury called her inappropriate sexual
    names, made numerous insulting comments, and touched her in an offensive and sexual
    manner on several occasions. According to Bilal’s testimony, Oury twice rubbed his genitals
    against her, once touched her upper thigh, and once touched her buttocks with his hand. She
    also recounted that Oury once took a piece of chocolate from his own mouth and placed it in
    hers.
    After the close of discovery, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s
    remaining Title VII claims. Surprisingly, and without apparent cause, despite the numerous
    allegations of harassment in her complaint and deposition testimony, in her brief in opposition
    to summary judgment, Bilal presented only a cursory argument (comprising one paragraph)
    regarding her hostile work environment claim. Indeed, the district court found (and our own
    investigation confirms) that her Local Rule 56.1 filings provided evidence of only a few of the
    incidents in her complaint and deposition testimony. (Northern District of Illinois Local Rule
    56.1 requires a party opposing summary judgment to file a statement of facts that require the
    denial of summary judgment, including references to the affidavits, parts of the record, and
    other supporting materials relied upon.) Specifically, she presented evidence that Oury invited
    her to watch the Chicago marathon with him (a non-business event) and called her a “fox.”
    She provided evidence that Oury made inappropriate comments to her, once stating that her
    job would be easier if she had sex with him and once saying that he wished she would quit her
    job at Rotec so that he could “have” her and “nobody would have anything to say.” Finally,
    she substantiated her claim that at one point, Oury took a piece of chocolate from his mouth
    and put it into Bilal’s mouth while she was speaking. Summary judgment filings also revealed
    that Bilal testified that Oury’s harassment did not affect her ability to do her work and that at
    the time she was fired she did not want to lose her job (though she had trepidation about
    working with Oury).
    In analyzing the summary judgment issues, the district court considered only the parties’
    briefs and those portions of the record cited in the parties’ Local Rule 56.1 statements of fact.
    On March 24, 2006, the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants. The
    district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law
    claims and dismissed the case. Bilal appeals.
    II. Discussion
    A. Dismissal of the Retaliation Claim
    The district court dismissed Bilal’s retaliation claim because she did not indicate on her
    EEOC form (either by checking the appropriate box or by describing such conduct in her
    narrative-form allegations) that she was pursuing such a claim. Bilal argues that the
    No. 08-2371                                                                                Page 4
    defendants were privy to communications “between the EEOC, its investigators, and Daphne
    [Bilal],” that should have put them on notice of a retaliation claim and that the district court
    thus erred in dismissing the claim. We review a district court’s decision to dismiss de novo,
    looking to see whether relief is possible under any set of facts consistent with the allegations
    set forth in the complaint. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs & Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment v.
    Union Pac. R.R. Co., 
    522 F.3d 746
    , 750 (7th Cir. 2008).
    “‘Generally a plaintiff may not bring claims under Title VII that were not originally brought
    among the charges to the EEOC.’” Peters v. Renaissance Hotel Operating Co., 
    307 F.3d 535
    , 550
    (7th Cir. 2002) (quoting Harper v. Godfrey Co., 
    45 F.3d 143
    , 147-48 (7th Cir. 1995)). This rule
    affords an opportunity for the EEOC to settle the dispute between the employee and employer
    and also puts the employer on notice of the charge against it. 
    Id.
     In analyzing whether
    allegations in a complaint were among the charges brought before the EEOC, we look to the
    substance of the charges, not merely whether a particular box was checked on the EEOC form.
    See Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hospital Ins., Inc., 
    538 F.2d 164
    , 168 (7th Cir. 1976) (en banc)
    (holding that “the failure to place a check mark in the correct box” is not necessarily a “fatal
    error”).
    On her EEOC form, Bilal checked the box indicating a claim of sex discrimination, but did
    not check the box indicating a claim of retaliation. Bilal’s description of the charges she wished
    to bring likewise contained no allegation of retaliation:
    I am a former employee of Rotec Industries, Inc. and a woman.
    I worked in the Elmhurst, Illinois office. I have been subjected
    to unwanted touches and sexual comments by the owner and
    CEO of Rotec.
    Since August, 2001, on a continuous basis until my termination
    on October 30, 2002, I have been harassed, and subjected to a
    hostile work environment on account of my sex. I have been
    treated differently than non-woman employees.
    The actions of Rotec violate my rights under Title VII of the Civil
    Rights Act.
    This description – which clearly states a complaint for discrimination and hostile work
    environment – does not give notice of a retaliation claim. It does not mention any grievances
    lodged with her employer or an agency that could reasonably be understood as statutorily
    protected activity. It contains no hint that such complaints caused her termination. Drawing
    No. 08-2371                                                                                Page 5
    all reasonable inferences in favor of Bilal, the only part of her charge that even partially
    presents an element of retaliation is the mention of her termination in the second paragraph
    of her statement. But, as the district court recognized, termination can occur for any number
    of reasons, most of which are perfectly legal. Thus, we find that Bilal’s EEOC complaint was
    insufficient to put Rotec or the EEOC on notice that Bilal was claiming retaliation.
    Bilal argues that defendants’ knowledge of certain communications between Bilal and the
    EEOC put defendants on notice of the retaliation charge. But Bilal does not describe the
    context or content of these supposed communications and they do not appear to be a part of
    the record on appeal. Moreover, considering these supposed communications would have
    required the district court to consider facts outside of Bilal’s complaint, a step that would have
    been improper when deciding a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Jacobs v. City of Chicago, 
    215 F.3d 758
    , 765-66 (7th Cir. 2000).
    Because Bilal’s EEOC complaint failed to give the EEOC or defendants notice that she was
    pursuing a retaliation claim, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of that claim.
    B. Denial of Leave to File a Second Amended Complaint
    Bilal requested leave to file a second amended complaint on June 16, 2004, after the district
    court dismissed her retaliation claim. The district court denied leave. Bilal claims that she
    could have added relevant facts to substantiate her claim of retaliation. We review a district
    court’s denial of a request for leave to amend for an abuse of discretion. See Indiana Funeral
    Dirs. Ins. Trust v. Trustmark Ins. Corp., 
    347 F.3d 652
    , 655 (7th Cir. 2003).
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) states that leave to amend a pleading shall be freely
    given “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). The rule also expressly grants a
    plaintiff an opportunity to amend her complaint “once as a matter of course before being
    served with a responsive pleading.” Id.; Camp v. Gregory, 
    67 F.3d 1286
    , 1289 (7th Cir. 1995).
    Here, the district court’s denial of leave was not an abuse of discretion because the district
    court had already allowed Bilal to amend her complaint once, and, more importantly, it does
    not appear that any amendment could have cured the deficiency of the retaliation claim
    discussed above: that is, Bilal’s failure to indicate that she was pursuing a retaliation claim in
    her EEOC complaint.
    We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of leave to amend.
    No. 08-2371                                                                                Page 6
    C. Denial of Motion to Compel
    During discovery, Oury was deposed but refused to answer certain questions. Bilal moved
    to compel Oury to answer questions regarding his consensual sexual relationships. In its
    decision, the district court first took note that Bilal made little or no effort to resolve the
    situation without court intervention, which alone justified denial of the motion. See Fed. R.
    Civ. P. 37(a)(2)(B) (2005) (requiring movant to provide a statement that he “has in good faith
    conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to make the discovery in an
    effort to secure the information or material without court action”). As to the merits, the court
    denied the motion, finding that defendants had met their discovery obligations. Although her
    argument on appeal is a bit murky, Bilal appears to argue that the district court erred in
    denying her motion to compel. We review a decision of a district court denying a motion to
    compel for abuse of discretion. See Gile v. United Airlines Inc., 
    95 F.3d 492
    , 495 (7th Cir. 1996).
    As an initial matter, the district court was correct that denial of the motion to compel was
    justified by Bilal’s failure to comply with then-Rule 37(a)(2)(B). See Kalis v. Colgate-Palmolive
    Co., 
    231 F.3d 1049
    , 1059 (7th Cir. 2000) (because movant’s motion did not include a Rule 37(a)
    certification, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to compel).
    The district court was also correct on the merits. The district court found that Bilal’s questions
    about Oury’s sexual relationships were overbroad because they contained no time limitations
    and could have elicited information about his sex life stretching back 38 years or more. Oury
    proposed that his answers be limited to the ten years prior to Bilal’s suit (including six years
    pre-dating Bilal’s employment at Rotec), a limitation the district court found to be reasonable.
    Bilal argues, in extremely summary fashion, that the district court should have granted her
    motion to compel and should not have imposed its “abritrar[y]” time limits. However,
    although discovery is broad, it is not boundless, and the remoteness in time of the requested
    information was a legitimate factor for the district court to take into account. Such limitation
    was not an abuse of discretion.
    D. Grant of Summary Judgment to Defendants
    Summary judgment is appropriate only if “there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
    moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We review the
    district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, construing all facts and inferences in the
    light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Clancy v. Geithner, 
    559 F.3d 595
     (7th Cir. 2009).
    1. Hostile Work Environment
    The district court found that the evidence presented by Bilal in response to summary
    No. 08-2371                                                                                   Page 7
    judgment did not meet this circuit’s threshold for finding a workplace “hostile.” After
    reviewing the evidence presented by the plaintiff, we find that we have no choice but to affirm.
    At the outset, we note what should be apparent from our recitation of the facts: that Bilal’s
    attorney appears to have advanced her case with a less than adequate performance. As
    recounted above, although counsel alleged numerous incidents of harassment in the
    complaint, and although Bilal testified to many of those incidents (and others) at her
    deposition, counsel failed to provide evidence of most of those incidents in Bilal’s summary
    judgment filings. The district court, acting under Local Rule 56.1, confined its analysis to those
    few listed incidents and found that they were insufficient to create a hostile work environment.
    Unwisely, indeed inexplicably, Bilal’s attorney did not seek to supplement his opposition brief
    or statement of facts after the district court’s ruling.
    In this court, Bilal’s briefs describe numerous alleged incidents of harassment not
    considered by the district court, but do not challenge the district court’s determination that
    only a few incidents were properly presented under Local Rule 56.1. However, even if Bilal
    had challenged on appeal the district court’s confinement of its consideration to these
    incidents, it would have been to no avail. Our own review of the summary judgment filings
    confirms that the district court did not err, let alone abuse its discretion, when it found that
    Bilal had presented only limited incidents of harassment under Local Rule 56.1. We have
    consistently upheld district courts’ discretion to require strict compliance with that rule, see
    Cracco v. Vitran Express, Inc., 
    559 F.3d 625
    , 632 (7th Cir. 2009); Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp.,
    
    24 F.3d 918
    , 922 (7th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases), and have also held that district courts are not
    obliged to go beyond parties’ Rule 56.1 statements by conducting their own investigation of
    the record, see Cracco, 
    559 F.3d at 632
     ("[N]either appellate courts nor district courts are obliged
    in our adversary system to scour the record looking for factual disputes.") (citing Greer v. Bd.
    of Educ., 
    267 F.3d 723
    , 727 (7th Cir. 2001)). District courts’ discretion to limit their consideration
    to parties’ Local Rule 56.1 submissions is especially important in employment discrimination
    cases, which are by their nature "extremely fact-intensive." 
    Id.
    In short, it is lamentable that what appears to have been a robust claim for hostile work
    environment was so significantly weakened by the inadequate response to the summary
    judgment motion of the defendants. However, we find no error in the district court’s
    limitation of the analysis and thus proceed to review this claim in light of only the incidents
    plaintiff presented to the district court.
    Hostile or abusive work environments are forms of sex discrimination actionable under
    Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 
    477 U.S. 57
     (1986).
    No. 08-2371                                                                                 Page 8
    To prevail on her claim for hostile work environment, Bilal must show: “‘(1) she was subjected
    to unwelcome sexual harassment in the form of sexual advances, requests for sexual favors or
    other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature; (2) the harassment was based on [the
    individual’s] sex; (3) the sexual harassment had the effect of unreasonably interfering with the
    plaintiff’s work performance in creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive working
    environment that affected seriously the psychological well-being of the plaintiff; and (4) there
    is a basis for employer liability.’” Hall v. Bodine Elec. Co., 
    276 F.3d 345
    , 355 (7th Cir. 2002);
    (quoting Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 
    163 F.3d 1027
    , 1032 (7th Cir. 1998) (citations
    omitted)).
    Bilal’s evidence in response to summary judgment established the first, second, and fourth
    elements. Whether the incidents satisfied the third requirement – that the sexual behavior
    “had the effect of unreasonably interfering with the plaintiff’s work performance in creating
    an intimidating, hostile or offensive working environment that affected seriously the
    psychological well-being of the plaintiff” – is a closer question.
    Not all workplace conduct that may be described as harassment is actionable under Title
    VII. In considering whether a defendant’s conduct rendered a workplace hostile we look to
    whether the treatment was so “severe or pervasive” as to alter the conditions of the victim’s
    employment in a significant way. See Vinson, 
    477 U.S. at 67
    . Whether the environment was
    so hostile as to be actionable depends on the totality of the circumstances including the nature
    of the harassment and the context in which it occurred. 
    Id. at 69
    ; Lapka v. Chertoff, 
    517 F.3d 974
    ,
    982 (7th Cir. 2008) (courts should evaluate a plaintiff’s claim of hostile work environment in
    light of the “particular facts and circumstances” of the case) (citations omitted).
    Here, of the five alleged incidents presented to the district court, two occurrences were
    relatively innocuous. Oury’s statement that Bilal was a “fox,” while inappropriate for the
    workplace, is not the type of offensive conduct that typically underlies a successful hostile
    work environment claim. See Kampmier v. Emeritus Corp., 
    472 F.3d 930
    , 941 (7th Cir. 2007)
    (“[O]ccasional vulgar banter, tinged with sexual innuendo of coarse or boorish workers
    generally does not create a work environment that a reasonable person would find
    intolerable.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Likewise, Oury’s invitation to
    Bilal to join him while watching the Chicago marathon cannot, without more, be considered
    harassment. However, the remaining three incidents are more serious in nature. As recounted
    above, Oury once stated that Bilal’s job would be easier if she had sex with him and on another
    occasion he told her that he wished she would quit her job at Rotec so that he could “have”
    her. In a third quite troubling incident, Oury took a piece of chocolate from his mouth and
    placed it in Bilal’s mouth while she was speaking.
    No. 08-2371                                                                                  Page 9
    However, while these three incidents would unquestionably be found offensive, we are
    unable to conclude that the district court was in error in determining that they are not
    sufficient to sustain a claim for hostile work environment under this circuit’s case law. First,
    we note that the objectionable incidents were set apart over the course of her employment,
    which lasted over fourteen months. Bilal simply did not present, in her opposition to
    summary judgment, evidence of the sustained series of sexual or intimidating conduct that
    was referenced in her complaint and deposition testimony. See Saxton v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co.,
    
    10 F.3d 526
    , 533, 537 (7th Cir. 1993) (“[R]elatively isolated instances of non-severe misconduct
    will not support a hostile environment claim”).
    Second, under the case law of this circuit, we are unable to conclude that these three alleged
    incidents, which we are unfortunately limited to on appeal, were, standing alone, so severe
    that they created a hostile working environment. Hall, 
    276 F.3d at 355
    . As noted, Oury’s
    verbal comments, though clearly boorish and unprofessional, were not the type of humiliating
    or threatening statements that could be considered severe in isolation. See Harris v. Forklift Sys.,
    
    510 U.S. 17
    , 23 (1993) (courts should consider whether a statement is “physically threatening
    or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance”).
    The most disturbing of the events plaintiff presented, the “chocolate incident,” likewise
    does not rise to the level that a finder of fact could label Bilal’s work environment hostile on
    that basis alone. We have stated that “[p]hysical harassment lies along a continuum just as
    verbal harassment does.” Hostetler v. Quality Dining, Inc., 
    218 F.3d 798
    , 808 (7th Cir. 2000). At
    one end of the spectrum are forms of physical contact which, although unwelcome and
    uncomfortable for the person touched, are relatively minor. 
    Id.
     (giving as examples “a hand
    on the shoulder, a brief hug, or a peck on the cheek”). But even cruder or more intimate
    physical acts, such as a hand on the thigh, a kiss on the lips, or a pinch of the buttocks – may
    be considered insufficiently abusive to be described as “severe” when they occur in isolation.
    
    Id.
     (collecting cases); see also Patton v. Keystone RV Co., 
    455 F.3d 812
    , 817 (7th Cir. 2006) (noting
    that we have held “middle-of-the-continuum physical contact . . . [to be] insufficient in
    isolation to constitute a hostile environment”) (collecting cases). At the other end of the
    spectrum lie forced physical contact and touching of sexual body parts, which may be
    sufficient, even in isolation, to support a claim of hostile work environment. See, e.g., Worth
    v. Tyer, 
    276 F.3d 249
    , 268 (7th Cir. 2001) (touching the “breast near the nipple for several
    seconds” is severe enough to constitute a hostile environment by itself); Patton, 
    455 F.3d at 817
    (defendant groping under plaintiff’s shorts and touching her underwear “might be sufficient
    alone to create an abusive working environment”).
    When placed in this context, we are forced to conclude that Oury’s alleged act of taking a
    chocolate out of his mouth and placing it in Bilal’s, while bizarre and disgusting, was
    No. 08-2371                                                                                   Page 10
    “middle-of-the-continuum” physical contact which, because it occurred in relative isolation,
    cannot be regarded as severe under the existing case law. See, e.g., McPherson v. City of
    Waukegan, 
    379 F.3d 430
    , 434, 439 (7th Cir. 2004) (supervisor pulling back plaintiff’s shirt to see
    the type of bra she was wearing was insufficient to constitute hostile work environment
    because of the relative isolation of the incident); Adusumilli v. City of Chicago, 
    164 F.3d 353
    ,
    361-62 (7th Cir. 1998) (“four isolated incidents in which a co-worker briefly touched her arm,
    fingers, or buttocks” was insufficient); Koelsch v. Beltone Elecs. Corp., 
    46 F.3d 705
    , 706-08 (7th Cir.
    1995) (one incident in which supervisor rubbed foot against plaintiff’s leg and another where
    he grabbed plaintiff’s buttocks was insufficient); Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 
    990 F.2d 333
    ,
    337 (7th Cir. 1993) (assuming, despite contradictory deposition testimony, that two attempts
    by a supervisor to kiss the plaintiff were insufficient). Bilal’s testimony, that despite Oury’s
    inappropriate conduct, she was able to do her job effectively and had no desire to leave her job
    at the time she was terminated, lends some support to our conclusion that these three
    incidents were not sufficiently severe so as to alter the conditions of her employment and
    create an abusive working environment. In short, because our review of Oury’s conduct is
    limited to these three incidents, we are unable to find that it was sufficient to sustain Bilal’s
    hostile work environment claim.
    As the Supreme Court has recognized, whether a work environment is hostile is not
    susceptible to a mathematically precise test. Harris, 
    510 U.S. at 22
    . This was a most troubling
    case and we emphasize that our decision should not in any way be interpreted as dismissing
    what, if true, can only be regarded as offensive behavior. We suggest only that if Bilal had
    presented additional evidence of harassment, (indeed, if her attorney had included even a
    portion of the incidents she testified about at deposition in her Local Rule 56.1 statement), she
    likely would have avoided summary judgment and preserved her case for the jury. Despite
    the concern expressed above, we are not permitted to compensate for Bilal’s attorney’s
    inadequate performance or set aside the directions given and constraints imposed by the law
    of this circuit. Because Bilal’s cognizable evidence did not meet the standard set by our
    precedent, we have no choice but to affirm the district court.
    2.      Termination of Bilal’s Employment
    The district court ruled that Bilal failed to present sufficient evidence that she was
    terminated on the basis of her gender under either the direct or indirect methods of proving
    discrimination. Bilal contests this ruling and claims she should prevail under either method.
    For the direct method, Bilal must show either through direct or circumstantial evidence that
    impermissible consideration of her gender motivated her termination. See Adams v. Wal-Mart
    Stores, Inc., 
    324 F.3d 935
    , 938-39 (7th Cir. 2003). Where there is no direct evidence of an
    No. 08-2371                                                                              Page 11
    employer’s discriminatory animus, a “convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that points
    directly to a discriminatory reason for the employer’s action” may suffice. Sartor v. Spherion
    Corp., 
    388 F.3d 275
    , 278 (7th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Bilal
    argues that she has satisfied the direct method of proof because “the record reflects that Oury
    stated to her that he could make her problems go away at work, if she complied with his sexual
    advances – and then terminated Daphne after she rebuffed him.” But this is not evidence that
    “points directly” to a discriminatory reason for Bilal’s termination. Sartor, 
    388 F.3d at 278
    .
    Without more to tie Bilal’s rejection of Oury to her firing, there is insufficient direct evidence
    that discriminatory animus motivated his termination.
    Bilal also fails to establish that genuine issues of material fact exist under the indirect
    method established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 
    411 U.S. 792
    , 802, (1973). Under that
    test, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. See Traylor v. Brown, 
    295 F.3d 783
    , 788 (7th Cir.2002). With the prima facie case established, the burden shifts to the
    employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge. O’Neal v. City
    of Chicago, 
    392 F.3d 909
    , 911 (7th Cir. 2004). The plaintiff can then present evidence that the
    reason is pretextual. 
    Id.
     In order to make her prima facie case, Bilal must show that: (1) she
    was a member of a protected class; (2) she was performing his job satisfactorily; (3) she
    experienced an adverse employment action; and (4) similarly situated individuals were treated
    more favorably. Traylor, 
    295 F.3d at 788
    .
    Here, even assuming that Bilal could satisfy the first three prongs of the prima facie test,2
    she has failed to satisfy the fourth prong. In order to satisfy the fourth part of the prima facie
    case, a plaintiff must show that similarly situated individuals were treated more favorably
    than she was. Bilal claims that Rotec employees Larry Bey and Edward Roman were similarly
    situated individuals who were treated more favorably. However, other than identifying
    Roman as a Human Resources representative and purchasing manager, Bilal presents nothing
    in her appellate brief (and presented nothing in her summary judgment brief or Rule 56.1
    statement below) to show why these employees were similarly situated or how they were
    treated more favorably. Thus, the district court correctly granted summary judgment to
    2
    We have some doubt as to whether Bilal could have satisfied the second prong, as she
    admitted that she engaged in an argument with her supervisor, Chesterine Lombardo
    immediately before she was terminated. See Stringel v. Methodist Hosp., 
    89 F.3d 415
    , 418 (7th
    Cir. 1996) (insubordination is a legitimate reason for discharge). But we need not consider this
    issue at length since Bilal has clearly failed to meet her burden of showing similarly situated
    individuals were treated more favorably.
    No. 08-2371                                                                        Page 12
    defendants on the discrimination claim.
    III. Conclusion
    For the reasons explained above, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-2143

Citation Numbers: 326 F. App'x 949

Judges: Bauer, Flaum, Wood

Filed Date: 6/12/2009

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024

Authorities (32)

71-fair-emplpraccas-bna-559-68-empl-prac-dec-p-44213-45-fed-r , 89 F.3d 415 ( 1996 )

Lesley A. PARKINS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CIVIL ... , 163 F.3d 1027 ( 1998 )

Carolyn D. Sartor v. Spherion Corporation , 388 F.3d 275 ( 2004 )

Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. , 114 S. Ct. 367 ( 1993 )

Sandra L. Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp. , 24 F.3d 918 ( 1994 )

Cynthia D. Traylor v. Kirk Brown , 295 F.3d 783 ( 2002 )

Fannie B. Kalis v. Colgate-Palmolive Company, Millen True ... , 231 F.3d 1049 ( 2000 )

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 93 S. Ct. 1817 ( 1973 )

willie-jacobs-and-linda-siller-v-city-of-chicago-a-municipal-corporation , 215 F.3d 758 ( 2000 )

Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson , 106 S. Ct. 2399 ( 1986 )

Lapka v. Chertoff , 517 F.3d 974 ( 2008 )

Gregory Harper v. Godfrey Company and D.B. Barcom, ... , 45 F.3d 143 ( 1995 )

Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers & Trainmen General ... , 522 F.3d 746 ( 2008 )

Ann M. Hostetler v. Quality Dining, Inc. , 218 F.3d 798 ( 2000 )

Bonita L. Weiss v. Coca-Cola Bottling Company of Chicago ... , 990 F.2d 333 ( 1993 )

Brinda Adams v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 324 F.3d 935 ( 2003 )

Shannon Kampmier v. Emeritus Corporation , 472 F.3d 930 ( 2007 )

Indiana Funeral Directors Insurance Trust v. Trustmark ... , 347 F.3d 652 ( 2003 )

Siobhan R. Koelsch v. Beltone Electronics Corporation , 46 F.3d 705 ( 1995 )

Elnora Camp, as Administrator of the Estate of Anthony ... , 67 F.3d 1286 ( 1995 )

View All Authorities »