Zinoviy Krasilych v. Eric Holder, Jr. ( 2009 )


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  •                              In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 09-1026
    Z INOVIY K RASILYCH,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    E RIC H. H OLDER, JR., Attorney General
    of the United States,
    Respondent.
    Petition for Review of an
    Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals.
    No. A 077 656 426
    S UBMITTED S EPTEMBER 16, 2009 Œ —D ECIDED S EPTEMBER 29, 2009
    Before F LAUM, E VANS, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
    P ER C URIAM. The Department of Homeland Security
    initiated removal proceedings against Zinoviy Krasilych,
    a Ukranian citizen, for remaining in the United States
    Œ
    On May 12, 2009, we granted a motion from Petitioner
    Zinoviy Krasilych to waive oral argument. Thus, the petition
    for review is submitted on the briefs and the record. See F ED .
    R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2).
    2                                               No. 09-1026
    past the expiration of his visa. Krasilych denied that his
    presence was unlawful, but an immigration judge (“IJ”)
    concluded otherwise and ordered Krasilych removed to
    the Ukraine. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)
    upheld that decision. Krasilych petitions this court for
    review, and we deny the petition.
    Krasilych entered the United States on a three-month
    tourist visa in June 1998 and overstayed. More than two
    years later, on October 11, 2000, Krasilych visited a store-
    front called “G.S. Golden Travel” on Chicago’s Belmont
    Avenue for a meeting with officer Clarence Robinson,
    an immigration employee. Krasilych was accompanied
    by Jan Mikas, the man who arranged the meeting (and
    whom, Krasilych says, he believed was a lawyer). With
    Robinson’s help, Krasilych completed an INS form I-485,
    the application to adjust status to lawful permanent
    resident. At the close of the meeting, Robinson marked
    Krasilych’s Ukranian passport with an authentic I-551
    stamp, which typically serves as temporary proof that
    an applicant has been approved for permanent-resident
    status and is awaiting a permanent-resident card (com-
    monly known as a “green card”). See Sharkey v. Quarantillo,
    
    541 F.3d 75
    , 80 n.4 (2d Cir. 2008). The stamp on Krasilych’s
    passport reads: “Processed for I-551. Temporary Evi-
    dence of Lawful Admission for Permanent Residence.
    Valid Until 10/11/2001. Employment Authorized.” Robin-
    son told Krasilych that, if asked by authorities, he should
    say his application for adjustment of status was granted
    because his brother is a United States citizen. Krasilych
    does not have a brother, and he told the officer so
    but nevertheless accepted the stamp.
    No. 09-1026                                              3
    About a year later Krasilych received from immigra-
    tion authorities in Lincoln, Nebraska, a letter stating
    that his application for permanent residence was being
    processed, but he never received a green card. Nor did
    he ever get an updated I-551 stamp in his passport even
    after the existing stamp expired in October 2001. In fact,
    he heard nothing more from immigration authorities
    until September 29, 2005, almost five years later, when
    Special Agent Randy Beckwith from Immigration and
    Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) served him with a Notice
    to Appear for removal proceedings, charging him with
    remaining in the country longer than permitted, see 8
    U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B). At a hearing before the IJ, Krasilych
    admitted through counsel that he is a Ukrainian citizen
    and had entered the United States in June 1998 with
    permission to remain for only three months. But Krasilych
    denied that he was in the country unlawfully and,
    pointing to the temporary I-551 stamp on his passport,
    insisted that he had become a lawful permanent resident.
    What Krasilych didn’t yet know was that his Belmont
    Avenue meeting with Robinson had ensnared him in
    “Operation Durango,” a three-year undercover investiga-
    tion coordinated by immigration authorities, the FBI,
    and the Social Security Administration, targeting the
    fraudulent procurement of immigration benefits. At
    Krasilych’s removal hearing in April 2007, Special Agent
    Beckwith—who was responsible for issuing Notices to
    Appear and locating suspects from the investiga-
    tion—testified that investigators had opened storefront
    “travel agencies” where aliens went, either on their own
    initiative or with help from a crooked middleman like
    4                                              No. 09-1026
    Jan Mikas, to meet with corrupt immigration employees
    who could be paid off for genuine documentation. See
    generally United States v. Wantuch, 
    525 F.3d 505
    , 508 (7th
    Cir. 2008) (describing “Operation Golden Schemes,”
    another undercover investigation operating from the
    same “G.S. Golden Travel” storefront); Skorusa v.
    Gonzales, 
    482 F.3d 939
    , 940-41 (7th Cir. 2007) (describing
    Operation Durango). The immigration employees at
    the storefronts, however, were actually undercover
    agents, and in virtually all cases, Beckwith testified, the
    alien had no legitimate basis for lawful status, and so
    the undercover agent would give the alien a cover
    story—usually that he or she had a sponsoring sibling—to
    use in the event that authorities questioned the alien
    about his or her status. The I-551 stamp placed on the
    alien’s passport was real; an identical stamp would have
    been used if the alien had obtained status through legiti-
    mate means, and, according to Beckwith, some aliens
    caught up in Operation Durango had even left the
    country and returned using their stamped passports
    to gain readmission. Beckwith added, though, that im-
    migration authorities had tolerated the use of these fraud-
    ulently obtained I-551 stamps only long enough to “pro-
    vide a legitimacy to the operation”; authorities had
    never actually issued a green card or processed an ap-
    plication for permanent residence from an alien
    involved in the investigation.
    Also testifying at the removal hearing was Clarence
    Robinson, the undercover agent who played the role of
    corrupt green-card adjudicator during Operation
    Durango. Robinson testified that aliens, believing they
    No. 09-1026                                             5
    were “bypassing the system” and procuring a genuine
    green card, would typically pay him $5,000 at the con-
    clusion of an interview. Robinson recalled that near the
    end of his meeting with Krasilych and Mikas, they had
    briefly left the room, and, when they returned, Mikas had
    handed over $5,000 in currency. It is unclear from the
    record whether criminal charges were ever lodged
    against Krasilych, but Mikas pleaded guilty and was
    sentenced in 2004 on federal charges—stemming from
    the events of October 11, 2000—of bribing a public
    official and conspiracy to defraud the United States.
    Krasilych asked the IJ to exclude any evidence
    gathered during Operation Durango. Citing our decision
    in Pieniazek v. Gonzales, 
    449 F.3d 792
     (7th Cir. 2006),
    Krasilych argued that, in order to submit evidence
    from Operation Durango, the government was required
    to prove that the investigation had complied with the
    Attorney General’s Guidelines on INS Undercover Opera-
    tions. These guidelines specify, among other things,
    how and by whom a proposed undercover investigation
    must be approved. See United States Attorneys’ Manual,
    tit. 9, §§ 1901-1906. Although the government had sub-
    mitted a signature sheet from the Operation Durango
    proposal evidencing prior approval by the local and
    regional directors of the former INS, Krasilych demanded
    that the entire proposal be produced and, if not, that the
    evidence be suppressed. Without that evidence, Krasilych
    argued, there was no proof that the I-551 stamp on
    his passport had been fraudulently obtained and that
    he was not in fact a lawful permanent resident. But
    even with the evidence, he argued, he had never given
    6                                                No. 09-1026
    money directly to Robinson, so the stamp had been
    applied “gratuitously” and was thus a legitimate
    conferral of permanent-resident status.
    The IJ rejected Krasilych’s arguments. First, the IJ
    explained, he was satisfied that the Attorney General’s
    guidelines had been followed, but, even if they had not,
    Krasilych was not entitled to have any evidence sup-
    pressed. And, in any event, the IJ continued, an I-551
    stamp in a passport does not make a lawful permanent
    resident of someone who, like Krasilych, was never even
    eligible for that status. The IJ thus concluded that
    Krasilych was not lawfully present and, because Krasilych
    had not requested any form of relief, ordered him re-
    moved. The BIA agreed with the IJ’s reasoning and dis-
    missed Krasilych’s appeal.
    Where, as here, the BIA issues its own opinion and
    does not expressly adopt the IJ’s findings, we review the
    BIA’s decision. See Xiao v. Mukasey, 
    547 F.3d 712
    , 717 (7th
    Cir. 2008). We review the agency’s legal conclusions
    de novo, Sankoh v. Mukasey, 
    539 F.3d 456
    , 465 (7th Cir.
    2008), and we will uphold the agency’s factual deter-
    minations so long as they are supported by substantial
    evidence, Krishnapillai v. Holder, 
    563 F.3d 606
    , 615 (7th Cir.
    2009).
    In his petition for review, Krasilych renews his
    argument that the evidence from the undercover inves-
    tigation should have been excluded from his removal
    proceedings. As he argued before the IJ and the BIA,
    Krasilych insists that we held in Pieniazek that evidence
    gathered from Operation Durango must be suppressed if
    No. 09-1026                                               7
    the government does not prove that the investigation
    adhered to the Attorney General’s Guidelines for INS
    Undercover Operations. This is a mischaracterization of
    our holding. Pieniazek involved an alien who, like
    Krasilych, had become involved in Operation Durango,
    and the government had used evidence gathered
    during that operation to support a charge of removability.
    
    449 F.3d at 793
    . At the time of his removal hearing, the
    alien had a request pending with DHS under the
    Freedom of Information Act for information about Opera-
    tion Durango; with this information, he, like Krasilych,
    hoped to establish that the Attorney General’s guidelines
    had not been followed and to argue, consequently, that the
    evidence gathered through the investigation should be
    suppressed. 
    Id.
     He sought a continuance to await the
    requested information, but the IJ denied the request,
    reasoning that the Attorney General’s guidelines no
    longer had any force because the former INS was now
    part of the Department of Homeland Security and was
    no longer under the Attorney General’s control. 
    Id. at 794
    .
    We concluded, however, that the guidelines were still
    relevant to undercover investigations and therefore
    remanded the case in light of the IJ’s flawed reasoning.
    
    Id.
     But we expressed no opinion about whether the guide-
    lines were legally enforceable or, if so, whether failure to
    follow them would require exclusion of evidence. These
    questions, we recognized, were for the BIA to address
    in the first instance.
    Nor would we have taken the position Krasilych sug-
    gests. The Attorney General’s guidelines are internal
    rules that have no legal force. Unlike regulations, which
    8                                                No. 09-1026
    are adopted after notice and comment, internal rules do
    not bind an agency: “if all the Attorney General has
    done is to tell his staff how he wants to exercise his discre-
    tion—language that brings his subordinates’ acts in line
    with his wishes but does not reduce his discretion to do
    otherwise—then there is no substantive rule enforceable in
    any forum.” Miller v. Henman, 
    804 F.2d 421
    , 424 (7th Cir.
    1986); cf. Fano v. O’Neill, 
    806 F.2d 1262
    , 1264 (5th Cir.
    1987) (explaining that INS Operations Instructions are
    nonbinding because they “do not purport to be anything
    other than internal house-keeping measures”); Kwon v.
    INS, 
    646 F.2d 909
    , 918-19 (5th Cir. 1981) (concluding
    that internal INS procedures “furnish only general guid-
    ance for service employees” and do not have the force
    of law).
    But even assuming that the guidelines are enforceable
    and were not followed in Operation Durango, the BIA
    was still correct in approving the IJ’s decision to deny
    Krasilych’s request to exclude evidence because the
    exclusionary rule generally does not apply in removal
    proceedings. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 
    468 U.S. 1032
    ,
    1050-51 (1984); Mireles v. Gonzales, 
    433 F.3d 965
    , 967 (7th
    Cir. 2006); Martinez-Camargo v. INS, 
    282 F.3d 487
    , 492 (7th
    Cir. 2002). In Lopez-Mendoza, the Court left open the
    possibility that the exclusionary rule may apply where
    there have been “egregious violations of Fourth Amend-
    ment or other liberties that might transgress notions of
    fundamental fairness and undermine the probative
    value of the evidence obtained.” 
    468 U.S. at 1050-51
    ;
    see also Martinez-Camargo, 
    282 F.3d at 492
    . Hoping to fit
    No. 09-1026                                               9
    into this exception, Krasilych blithely asserts that “Fourth
    Amendment violations” in Operation Durango were
    “widespread and egregious.” What the Fourth Amend-
    ment, which prohibits unreasonable searches and
    seizures, has to do with Krasilych’s involvement in Opera-
    tion Durango escapes us, and he has not even come
    close to identifying an “egregious violation” of any
    other liberty.
    We turn finally to Krasilych’s argument that the tempo-
    rary I-551 stamp on his passport conferred lawful perma-
    nent resident status. The stamp used by Robinson to
    mark Krasilych’s passport was “authentic” in the
    sense that the same stamp would have been used if the
    government had approved a bona fide application for
    permanent residence. When used legitimately, the stamp
    is a symbol that immigration authorities have favorably
    adjudicated an application to adjust status, and in the
    absence of “countervailing evidence” the stamp itself can
    be used to verify a claim of permanent residence. See
    
    8 C.F.R. § 103.2
    (b)(17); Sharkey, 
    541 F.3d at
    80 n.5. But
    Krasilych’s application was never adjudicated (it would
    have been denied if it was), and the “countervailing
    evidence” makes clear that the stamp—which expired of
    its own accord in 2001—was placed in his passport only
    to give Operation Durango’s fraudulent-document
    scheme the appearance of legitimacy. The stamp, then,
    is symbolic of nothing.
    Because the agency’s determination of removability
    is supported by substantial evidence, and Krasilych
    did not apply for relief from removal, the order of
    10                                     No. 09-1026
    removal must stand. Accordingly, the petition for
    review is D ENIED.
    9-29-09