Dan Helcher v. Dearborn County, Indiana, Boar ( 2010 )


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  •                              In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 07-3949
    D AN H ELCHER, et al.,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    D EARBORN C OUNTY, INDIANA
    B OARD OF Z ONING A PPEALS, et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Indiana, New Albany Division.
    No. 4:06-CV-00102-SEB-WGH—Sarah Evans Barker, Judge.
    A RGUED O CTOBER 31, 2008—D ECIDED F EBRUARY 9, 2010
    Before F LAUM, R OVNER and W OOD , Circuit Judges.
    R OVNER, Circuit Judge. Cincinnati Bell Wireless, LLC
    (“Bell”) applied for a conditional use permit to construct
    a wireless communication facility (essentially, a cellphone
    tower) on property owned by Dan and Merry Helcher
    2                                                    No. 07-3949
    in Dearborn County, Indiana.1 When the local Board of
    Zoning Appeals (“Zoning Board” or “Board”) denied the
    application, Bell sued the Board and its members for
    violating various provisions of the Telecommunications
    Act of 1996, 
    47 U.S.C. § 332
    (c). The district court granted
    summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and
    Bell appeals. We affirm.
    I.
    Bell, a wireless service provider, wanted to close a gap
    in cellphone signal coverage on a stretch of Jamison Road
    in Dearborn County, Indiana (“County”). The company
    sought to build a cellphone tower on the Helchers’ land,
    a parcel zoned “Agricultural” under the Dearborn
    County Zoning Ordinance (“Ordinance”). Section 315 of
    Article 3 of the Ordinance required that Bell obtain a
    conditional use permit from the Zoning Board in order to
    build the tower at that site. R. 23, Ex. 1, at 1019. Article 15
    of the Ordinance regulates the placement, construction
    and modification of cellphone towers in order to mini-
    mize their “negative impact on the character and environ-
    ment of the County and to protect the health, safety
    and welfare of the public.” R. 23, Ex. 2, at 1023. Article 9
    of the Ordinance governs the use of land zoned Agri-
    cultural and allows non-agricultural uses (including
    the construction of telecommunications towers) under
    1
    For the sake of brevity, we will refer to the plaintiffs collec-
    tively as “Bell.” Their interests in the appeal are, for the
    most part, aligned.
    No. 07-3949                                                    3
    certain circumstances.2 The County employed two con-
    sultants to assist the Zoning Board in making decisions
    related to cellphone towers. Dick Comi of the Center for
    Municipal Solutions (“CMS”) and Ron Ebelhar of H.C.
    Nutting Company (“Nutting”) worked for approxi-
    mately twenty months with Bell in preparing the ap-
    plication for a permit to build the tower. CMS and
    Nutting had assisted the Zoning Board in reviewing
    twelve previous conditional use permit applications
    relating to wireless facilities.
    As required under the Ordinance, Bell engaged in a pre-
    application meeting with Ebelhar to discuss the pro-
    posed tower. At that August 11, 2004 meeting, Ebelhar
    identified eighteen requirements that Bell needed to
    address in order for its application to comply with the
    Ordinance. The plaintiffs claimed to work diligently to
    meet all of the relevant requirements, and on February 9,
    2005, they submitted their application to Comi and
    Ebelhar for review. Comi responded on February 25, 2005,
    with a letter detailing fifteen insufficiencies with the
    application. Some of the items were simple documentary
    requirements such as signatures from land owners, and
    some concerns were more substantive calls for addi-
    tional calculations, assessments, and reports. Bell pro-
    vided supplemental information to the consultants
    2
    The text of Article 9 was not included in the record on appeal,
    but was included in the County’s appendix. The Ordinance in its
    entirety may be viewed at www.dearborncounty.org/planning/
    Official_Documents.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).
    4                                                No. 07-3949
    many times over the next several months in order to
    address the concerns raised in Comi’s letter. Bell also
    made substantive changes to the plan, such as reducing
    the height of the tower from 250 to 190 feet, in order to
    eliminate the need to comply with the Federal Aviation
    Administration’s requirements for lighting the tower.
    The revised plan also moved the tower further from
    the property line to comply with setback requirements.
    The consultants asked Bell to demonstrate that it could
    not “co-locate” the transmitters, that is, use already
    existing towers to provide coverage for Jamison Road.
    Bell investigated four existing wireless tower structures
    and rejected all of them as inadequate to provide the
    needed coverage. On January 23, 2006, Comi sent a letter
    to the County’s Plan Commission stating that the con-
    sultants had completed their review of the application
    and recommended granting the conditional use permit
    to construct the tower on the Helchers’ property.
    The Zoning Board met on March 14, 2006 to consider the
    application. Ebelhar reported the findings of his review
    of the application and opined that Bell and the Helchers
    had met the requirements necessary to construct the
    tower, and that the Zoning Board should grant the per-
    mit. In every prior permit application for wireless coverage
    reviewed by the consultants, the cellphone carrier had been
    required to co-locate its transmitters on existing structures.
    This was the first instance since the inception of the
    Ordinance in which the consultants recommended that the
    Zoning Board allow construction of a new tower. A Board
    member asked Ebelhar about the visual impact of the
    tower, and he stated that it was the least intrusive tower
    No. 07-3949                                            5
    possible that would provide the needed service. Another
    Board member asked for clarification on who had per-
    formed the technical studies to determine whether the
    tower was necessary and Ebelhar confirmed that Bell had
    done the work and that Ebelhar’s company had reviewed
    those studies.
    A number of landowners who opposed the building
    of the tower spoke at the meeting to express their con-
    cerns about the visual impact of the tower and its detri-
    mental effect on property values. A real estate appraiser
    addressed property values and concerns regarding poten-
    tial hazards to children presented by the proposed
    tower. A community planner opined at the hearing that
    the plaintiffs had not met the requirements of the Ordi-
    nance because they had not provided a Visual Impact
    Assessment as required by paragraph 23 of Section 1512
    of the Ordinance. The Zoning Board also considered a
    report filed by Wireless Applications Corporation, a
    consulting firm hired by two landowners, Karen and
    David Cody. The report conceded that the proposed
    tower would provide the desired coverage on Jamison
    Road but suggested that other sites could deliver
    superior service with a smaller impact on the sur-
    rounding community. An engineer from Bell rebutted
    that claim by noting that the tower height was necessary
    to provide adequate coverage and that Bell had reviewed
    and rejected as inadequate four alternate sites for the
    tower.
    After the testimony, Zoning Board member Patricia
    Baker moved to deny the application for a special use
    6                                               No. 07-3949
    permit. By a vote of three to one, the Zoning Board denied
    the application. At the May 2006 meeting of the Zoning
    Board, many disputes arose during the process to
    approve the minutes of the March meeting. Members of
    the Zoning Board, representatives of Bell and the Helchers,
    and objecting landowners all suggested numerous revi-
    sions to the minutes. Unable to agree on many points, the
    Board tabled approval of the minutes until the next
    meeting. In early June 2006, the plaintiffs asked the
    Board not to approve the revised minutes and also re-
    quested that the Board reconsider its decision to deny
    the permit application. At the June meeting, the Board
    approved the minutes as revised (“Minutes”) and denied
    the plaintiffs’ request to reconsider the denial of the
    permit application.
    The next month, Bell and the Helchers filed a com-
    plaint against the Board and its individual members,
    alleging several violations of the Telecommunications
    Act of 1996, 
    47 U.S.C. § 332
    (c) (the “Act”). Count I alleged
    that the Board’s decision was not based on substantial
    evidence contained in a written record, as required by 
    47 U.S.C. § 332
    (c)(7)(B)(iii). Count II asserted that the ap-
    proved Minutes of the March 14, 2006 Zoning Board
    meeting did not constitute a sufficient written decision as
    required by 
    47 U.S.C. § 332
    (c)(7)(B)(iii). In Count III, the
    plaintiffs contended that the Zoning Board’s decision
    unreasonably discriminated against Bell, in violation of
    
    47 U.S.C. § 332
    (c)(7)(B)(i)(I). Count IV maintained that the
    Zoning Board’s decision had the effect of denying the
    provision of wireless communication services, in viola-
    No. 07-3949                                               7
    tion of 
    47 U.S.C. § 332
    (c)(7)(B)(i)(II). Counts V though IX,
    which are not at issue in this appeal, alleged violations
    of the Constitution and the civil rights of the applicants.
    The district court granted the defendants’ motion for
    partial summary judgment on the first four counts of
    the complaint. Helcher v. Dearborn County, 
    500 F.Supp.2d 1100
     (S.D. Ind. 2007). The court rejected the plaintiffs’
    claim that the Zoning Board Minutes were an inaccurate
    recording of what went on during the meeting and that
    the Minutes were not adequate to meet the Act’s require-
    ment that the decision be “in writing.” The court found
    that a written decision was adequate so long as it
    informed the applicant of the local government’s
    decision denying the application. In this instance, the
    court found, the meeting Minutes fulfilled this require-
    ment because the Minutes enabled the court to efficiently
    judge the Board’s findings and conclusions against the
    record. The court also noted that the Minutes supplied
    the reasons underlying the Zoning Board’s decision
    by noting the sections of the Ordinance which the appli-
    cants failed to satisfy. The court found that the Minutes
    allowed for meaningful judicial review of the decision,
    and that no more was required by the Telecommunica-
    tions Act. The court also found that the Zoning Board’s
    decision was supported by substantial evidence, that
    the denial of the permit did not effectively prohibit the
    provision of wireless service, and that the Zoning Board
    did not unreasonably discriminate among wireless
    service providers. Bell appeals.
    8                                               No. 07-3949
    II.
    On appeal, Bell argues that the Zoning Board’s decision
    does not comply with the “in writing” requirement of the
    Telecommunications Act, that the Board’s decision is not
    supported by substantial evidence, that the denial of the
    permit effectively prohibits Bell from providing wireless
    communication services, and that the Zoning Board’s
    decision unreasonably discriminated among wireless
    providers, all in violation of 
    47 U.S.C. § 332
    (c)(7). Before
    we address the merits of the arguments, we are obliged
    to address our jurisdiction. The defendants sought and
    the district court granted partial summary judgment in
    favor of the defendants on Counts I through IV of the
    complaint. As we mentioned above, the plaintiffs pled
    an additional five counts (Counts V through IX) alleging
    violations of the Constitution and of their civil rights.
    After the court entered its order granting partial sum-
    mary judgment, the parties filed a “Joint Motion for Final
    Judgment.” R. 47. In that motion, the parties expressed
    a “desire to [a]ppeal the Entry without the need to
    litigate their remaining claims at this time.” R. 47, at 1.
    The plaintiffs agreed to dismiss without prejudice the
    remaining counts in exchange for a promise from the
    defendants to waive any statute of limitations defense
    if the plaintiffs later moved to reinstate those claims.
    The district court then entered a judgment dismissing
    Counts V through IX without prejudice and dismissing
    Counts I through IV with prejudice for the reasons
    stated in the court’s earlier order granting partial sum-
    mary judgment. The court stated that its earlier order
    No. 07-3949                                                9
    was “now made a final and appealable Judgment there
    being no just cause for delay in its entry.” R. 49, at 1.
    On appeal, both parties asserted that we have jurisdic-
    tion under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    , which allows us to decide
    appeals of “all final decisions of the district courts of the
    United States[.]” The parties’ agreement that “a judicial
    determination is a final decision (and thus appealable
    under Section 1291), does not make it so.” ITOFCA, Inc. v.
    MegaTrans Logistics, Inc., 
    235 F.3d 360
    , 363 (7th Cir. 2000).
    We have an independent obligation to determine our
    jurisdiction. 
    Id.
     Whether a decision is final for the pur-
    poses of Section 1291 depends on whether the decision by
    the district court ends the litigation on the merits and
    leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judg-
    ment. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 
    437 U.S. 463
    , 467 (1978);
    ITOFCA, 
    235 F.3d at 363
    . In this case, the court and the
    parties expressly reserved to the plaintiffs the right to
    reinstate Counts V through IX after the appeal. Thus,
    the judgment did not resolve the litigation on the merits,
    and Section 1291 may not supply jurisdiction.
    Although the district court did not expressly invoke
    Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), the court’s
    language tracks that rule, which allows entry of a final
    judgment on fewer than all of the claims “only if the
    court expressly determines that there is no just reason
    for delay. Otherwise, any order or other decision, how-
    ever designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the
    claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the
    parties does not end the action as to any of the claims
    or parties and may be revised at any time before the
    10                                                 No. 07-3949
    entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all
    the parties’ rights and liabilities.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
    We need not determine whether the judgment was prop-
    erly entered under Rule 54, however, because after we
    raised this issue at oral argument, the parties entered a
    joint stipulation dismissing Counts V though IX with
    prejudice. That stipulation “wind[s] up the litigation
    and eliminat[es] the bar to our jurisdiction.” JTC Petroleum
    Co. v. Piasa Motor Fuels, Inc., 
    190 F.3d 775
    , 776-77 (7th
    Cir. 1999). We proceed then to the merits of the appeal.
    A.
    The Act requires that “[a]ny decision by a State or
    local government or instrumentality thereof to deny a
    request to place, construct, or modify personal wireless
    service facilities shall be in writing and supported by
    substantial evidence contained in a written record.” 
    47 U.S.C. § 332
    (c)(7)(B)(iii). Bell and the Helchers contend
    that the Zoning Board’s decision does not comply
    with the Act’s requirement that the decision must be “in
    writing.” What is necessary for an adequate writing
    under the Telecommunications Act is an issue of first
    impression in our circuit.3 There are differing views
    among the circuits as to what constitutes an adequate
    3
    Although the Seventh Circuit has yet to rule on the “in
    writing” requirement, our own Judge Cudahy considered the
    question when sitting by designation on the Ninth Circuit.
    See MetroPCS, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 
    400 F.3d 715
    , 721-23 (9th Cir. 2005) (Cudahy, J., writing for the panel).
    We are greatly aided by his analysis.
    No. 07-3949                                               11
    writing. See MetroPCS, Inc. v. City and County of San Fran-
    cisco, 
    400 F.3d 715
    , 721-23 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting the
    circuit split on the issue); New Par v. City of Saginaw, 
    301 F.3d 390
    , 395 (6th Cir. 2002) (collecting the views of
    several courts); Southwestern Bell Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Todd,
    
    244 F.3d 51
     59 (1st Cir. 2001) (noting the broad range of
    interpretations of the “in writing” requirement in the
    district and circuit courts). Some courts require that local
    governments explicate the reasons for their decisions and
    link their conclusions to specific evidence in the record.
    Omnipoint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Planning & Zoning Comm’n
    of Wallingford, 
    83 F.Supp.2d 306
    , 309 (D. Conn. 2000) (“[a]
    local zoning authority must issue a decision in writing
    setting forth the reasons for the decision and linking
    its conclusions to evidence in the record”); Illinois RSA
    No. 3, Inc. v. County of Peoria, 
    963 F. Supp. 732
    , 743 (C.D.
    Ill. 1997) (the terms “in writing” and “written record”
    “plainly require the state or local governments to issue
    decisions regarding personal wireless service facilities
    in written form, stating the reasons for the decision,
    and providing written evidence or a written record of
    the proceedings that led to the government entity’s deci-
    sion”). On the other end of the spectrum is the Fourth
    Circuit, which accepted as adequate a stamp of the
    word “DENIED” on a zoning permit application. AT&T
    Wireless PCS, Inc. v. Winston-Salem Zoning Bd. of Adjust-
    ment, 
    172 F.3d 307
    , 312-13 (4th Cir. 1999) (writing the
    word “denied” on the face of an application to build
    a wireless communications tower is adequate to meet the
    “in writing” requirement); AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City
    Council of Virginia Beach, 
    155 F.3d 423
    , 429-30 (4th Cir.
    12                                             No. 07-3949
    1998) (finding that the “in writing” requirement was met
    by both the condensed minutes of a council meeting
    considering an application for a permit to build a tele-
    communications tower, and by the word “denied”
    stamped on a letter from the planning commission des-
    cribing the application). In the latter case, the Fourth
    Circuit specifically rejected the contention that the
    writing must include a statement of “findings and con-
    clusions, and the reason or basis therefor.” Virginia
    Beach, 
    155 F.3d at 430
    .
    In the middle are courts that strike a balance between
    a dubious, literal reading of the Act and a pragmatic,
    policy-based approach. The purpose of the “in writing”
    requirement is to allow for meaningful judicial review
    of local government actions relating to telecommunica-
    tions towers. USCOC of Greater Missouri v. City of
    Ferguson, MO, 
    583 F.3d 1035
    , 1041 (8th Cir. 2009) (holding
    that the central concern of the “in writing” requirement
    is to enable effective judicial review of local government
    action); MetroPCS, 
    400 F.3d at 722
     (Cudahy, J., sitting
    by designation) (same); New Par, 
    301 F.3d at 395-96
    (same); Todd, 
    244 F.3d at 60
     (same). The First Circuit
    found that there was no textual basis for requiring
    formal findings of fact and conclusions of law. Todd, 
    244 F.3d at 59
    . The court noted that local zoning boards are
    primarily staffed by laypersons and it would not be
    realistic to expect highly detailed findings of fact and
    conclusions of law. 
    Id.
     On the other hand, the Todd court
    remarked, permitting local zoning boards to issue
    denials that offered no reasons for the decision would
    frustrate meaningful judicial review. Todd, 
    244 F.3d at 60
    .
    No. 07-3949                                               13
    The First Circuit therefore concluded that the written
    decision “must contain a sufficient explanation of the
    reasons for the permit denial to allow a reviewing court
    to evaluate the evidence in the record supporting
    those reasons.” Todd, 
    244 F.3d at 60
    . The Sixth Circuit
    followed suit in New Par, requiring that a decision of a
    local government denying a request to place, construct
    or modify a wireless tower must describe the reasons for
    the denial and contain a sufficient explanation of those
    reasons to allow a reviewing court to evaluate the
    evidence in the record that supports those reasons. New
    Par, 
    301 F.3d at 395-96
    . See also Sprint Spectrum, L.P. v.
    Platte County, MO, 
    578 F.3d 727
    , 732 (8th Cir. 2009) (as-
    suming without deciding that the correct standard for
    the “in writing” requirement is the one expressed in
    MetroPCS, New Par, and Todd).
    We join the First, Sixth and Ninth Circuits, the major-
    ity of the courts that have reached this issue. The “in
    writing” requirement is met so long as the written decision
    contains a sufficient explanation of the reasons for the
    permit denial to allow a reviewing court to evaluate the
    evidence in the record supporting those reasons. This
    standard is not unlike our Circuit Rule 50, which
    requires district judges to provide reasons for decisions
    that resolve any claim on the merits or terminate the
    litigation. Circuit Rule 50 “serves three functions: to
    create the mental discipline that an obligation to state
    reasons produces, to assure the parties that the court has
    considered the important arguments, and to enable a
    reviewing court to know the reasons for the judgment.”
    DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 
    901 F.2d 624
    , 626 (7th Cir. 1990). As
    14                                                    No. 07-3949
    we discussed above, the primary purpose of the “in
    writing” requirement for the Telecommunications Act is
    to allow for meaningful judicial review of the decisions
    of local governments. Keeping in mind that local zoning
    boards typically are not populated with lawyers much
    less judges, we cannot expect something akin to a
    judicial opinion. Therefore, a decision “in writing” is
    adequate if it provides an explanation that allows us, in
    combination with the written record, to determine if
    the decision is supported by substantial evidence.4
    With that standard in mind, we turn to the decision
    issued by the Zoning Board. The “writing” issued by the
    Board is the seventeen-page “Zoning Board of Appeals
    Minutes” for the March 14, 2006 meeting (the same Min-
    utes we referenced earlier). Because the contents of the
    Minutes will also be relevant to whether the decision
    was supported by substantial evidence, a question we
    consider below, we will recount the Minutes in some
    4
    Not every failure to meet the standard set in Circuit Rule
    50 requires remand. See United States v. Forman, 
    553 F.3d 585
    ,
    590-91 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    129 S. Ct. 1924
     and 
    129 S. Ct. 2817
    (2009) (noncompliance with Circuit Rule 50 does not always
    prevent judicial review because the district court’s reasoning
    may be apparent from the record); Stoller v. Pure Fishing Inc.,
    
    528 F.3d 478
    , 480 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    129 S. Ct. 609
     (2008)
    (no remand for compliance with Circuit Rule 50 is necessary
    when the district court’s reasoning is clear from both the
    record and the court’s brief statement). Similarly, not every
    failure to meet the standard we have set for the “in writing”
    requirement will require reversal or remand.
    No. 07-3949                                             15
    detail. The discussion of Bell’s application began with
    the Zoning Board’s Enforcement Officer describing the
    Helchers’ land and setting forth the criteria to be used
    to evaluate the requested permit (including Articles 3 and
    15 of the Ordinance). The Enforcement Officer also re-
    viewed a Staff Report and Site Plan (both of which were
    attached to the Minutes and included in the record), and
    presented the results of a balloon test at the property.
    Ebelhar, the consultant hired by the Zoning Board, then
    presented his recommendation that the permit be ap-
    proved. Ebelhar opined that the applicants had met the
    criteria for constructing the tower, and that the tower
    was needed to close a gap in coverage. Steve Carr, a
    representative of Bell, then testified that co-location was
    not possible in this instance, that the tower would be
    safe, that little traffic would be generated by the tower,
    that there was no way to hide the structure from view, that
    the site would not encroach on private property, and that
    the tower would operate within FCC requirements. In
    response to questions from Board members, Carr also
    testified that the site was chosen because it was
    high enough to overcome issues with tree foliage and
    winding roads, that other sites were not adequate, that
    the tower presented no health-related risks linked to
    tower transmissions, and that the reduced 190-foot
    height of the tower would be adequate even though a 220-
    foot tower would be optimal. Another Bell representative
    confirmed that Jamison Road coverage was the primary
    objective of the tower, and that this road was heavily
    traveled.
    16                                            No. 07-3949
    The Minutes next detailed the objections of David and
    Karen Cody, residents of a subdivision situated adjacent
    to the area where the proposed tower would be con-
    structed. The attorney for the Codys submitted a written
    statement and introduced a community planner and
    professional property appraiser, both of whom testified
    later in the hearing. The Codys, through their attorney,
    did not dispute the quality of the signal on Jamison Road,
    the structural integrity of the proposed tower, or the
    fact that the Helchers’ property had no particular
    historical significance. The Codys’ attorney instead con-
    tested the qualifications of Nutting to study, review and
    report on technical issues such as propagation maps. She
    also asserted that the Act required a wireless provider
    to demonstrate that the gap in coverage existed not for
    one provider but for all providers. She contended that
    the Act required wireless providers to prove that they
    are filling gaps in the least intrusive manner by looking
    at all alternatives and ruling out other options. She also
    noted that the Act allowed local governments to
    regulate the placement of towers, taking into account
    construction, location, aesthetic requirements, visual
    judgments and the effect on property values. The Codys,
    representing a large number of residents in the area of
    the proposed tower, presented photographs of several
    properties, showing what the tower would look like
    from many nearby residences. They opined that the
    tower would be in the most visually intrusive location
    possible, and presented software-enhanced photographs
    based on those taken during Bell’s balloon test, modi-
    fied to show a scaled, graphical representation of the
    No. 07-3949                                            17
    proposed tower. After the Codys expressed their fear that
    their property value would decrease significantly, eight
    other residents spoke about their fears that the tower
    would reduce their property values, change the character
    of the neighborhood, and be visually intrusive. The
    residents also questioned the necessity for the tower,
    whether co-location had been adequately considered,
    and whether the loss in property values would also
    result in a loss to the county tax base.
    The Codys’ attorney then proffered additional objec-
    tions to the issuance of the permit. First, she asserted
    that Bell had failed to submit a completed application
    prior to the agenda deadline for the meeting. Second, she
    maintained that the Zoning Board should not accept new
    information submitted by the applicant at the meeting.
    Third, she noted that although Bell had adequate time
    to complete its application and supply all information
    required by the Ordinance, the company had failed to do
    so. She alleged that the application was inaccurate or
    incomplete on its face because the property owners
    had not signed it, because the proposed lease between
    the Helchers and Bell was not signed by Bell and thus
    Bell had no property interest in the area, and because
    Bell’s agent signed as “Applicant” in violation of the
    certification on the face of the application. She asserted
    that the application did not meet the requirements and
    purposes of Article 15. In particular, aesthetic consider-
    ations had been largely ignored. Bell had not responded
    to a request for information from the County’s agent
    about the necessity of the tower, in violation of Para-
    graph 1 of Section 1512. Moreover, the application failed
    18                                            No. 07-3949
    to meet the requirement of Section 1512, Paragraph 7,
    requiring the applicant to show the location of the
    nearest resident. The application also failed to conform
    to Section 1512, Paragraph 21, which required a written
    report demonstrating meaningful efforts to secure
    shared use of towers or the use of alternative buildings
    or structures.
    She noted that the application did not explain why an
    agricultural site was needed, given that Section 1514 of
    the Ordinance required applicants to demonstrate why
    seven other categories of property were inadequate
    before agricultural land could be employed for this pur-
    pose. She also remarked that Section 1514 required the
    applicant to prove that the cell tower was not harmful
    to the nature and character of the neighborhood or com-
    munity, and stated that the residents’ objections demon-
    strated that the applicants had not met this provision.
    The Codys’ attorney also presented the report of Wire-
    less Applications Corporation, a consulting firm con-
    tacted by the Codys. Wireless Applications reviewed
    Bell’s application and concluded that the Helchers’ prop-
    erty did not serve the best interest of the community.
    The consultant suggested alternate sites for the tower
    and also recommended that the tower height could be
    reduced to 150 feet with a negligible difference in
    signal coverage.
    The certified real estate appraiser introduced by the
    Codys’ lawyer testified that, in his opinion, the proposed
    tower would negatively impact property values, al-
    though he conceded he could not predict the degree
    of impact. The community planner then testified that the
    No. 07-3949                                            19
    applicants failed to meet the standards in Article 15,
    Section 1512, Paragraph 23, which required the ap-
    plicants to submit an environmental impact assessment,
    including a visual impact assessment that analyzed the
    visual effect on adjoining properties. In fact, the visual
    impact assessment submitted did not acknowledge that
    the tower would be visible from residential areas but
    instead indicated it was adjacent to undeveloped
    wooded land.
    At the end of all testimony, each of the five members
    of the Zoning Board spoke about the application. The
    Chair, Jim Deaton, remarked that the application did not
    comply with Article 3, Section 315, items (b) and (d),
    which concerned the effect of the tower on the appear-
    ance and character of the surrounding area, as well as
    the normal and orderly development and improvement
    of surrounding property. Board member Jake Hoog con-
    curred with the Chair’s assessment that the applica-
    tion did not comply with Article 3, Section 315(b). Board
    member Patricia Baker agreed that the placement of the
    tower would impede the development and improvement
    of surrounding properties in violation of Section 315(d).
    Board member Mike Hall questioned whether Bell had
    in fact considered other areas for placement of the tower.
    The final Board member, Jane Ohlmansiek, asserted
    that, although the tower would not adversely affect
    the surrounding area in some respects, it would not be
    harmonious to the existing development of surrounding
    properties. She also opined that the applicants had not
    presented an adequate visual impact study to the Zoning
    Board.
    20                                               No. 07-3949
    At the conclusion of all discussion, Zoning Board mem-
    ber Baker moved to deny the application for the condi-
    tional use permit to construct the tower at the Helchers’
    property because of the applicants’ noncompliance
    with Article 3, Sections 315(b) and 315(d); and Article 15,
    Section 1514, subparagraph 5 of the Ordinance:
    Ms. Baker then made a motion to deny the applica-
    tion for the Conditional Use request to establish a
    wireless telecommunications facility on Losekamp
    Road as a result of the Applicant’s noncompliance
    with the following ordinances: Article 3, Section 315,
    Item b, which states that the facility will be designed,
    constructed, operated, and maintained so as to be
    harmonious and appropriate in appearance with
    the existing or intended character of the general
    vicinity and which shall not change the essential
    character of the area; Article 3, Section 315, Item d,
    which states that the facility will not impede the
    normal and orderly development and improvement
    of the surrounding property for uses permitted in
    the district; and Article 15, Section 1514, Sub 5 in
    which the Applicant conflicted with the provisions of
    the Zoning Ordinance by failing to adequately illus-
    trate that all other hilltops and potential sites in
    the area had been investigated.
    R. 23, Ex. 28, at 1706. Three members of the Board voted
    in favor of the motion and one opposed it. The Chair did
    not vote because the Board’s rules permit the Chair to
    vote only to break a tie. The motion passed and the
    permit was denied.
    No. 07-3949                                               21
    The question is whether the Minutes, which we have
    just summarized, present an adequate basis for judicial
    review of the Board’s decision. We find that the Minutes
    are sufficient for that purpose. Our task on appeal is to
    determine whether substantial evidence in the record
    supports the Board’s decision. 
    47 U.S.C. § 332
    (c)(7)(B)(iii).
    The Minutes clearly delineate the issues that arose with
    the application, the evidence that was presented by
    both the applicants and by the residents to the Zoning
    Board, the concerns of the applicants and residents of
    the area, and the concerns of the Board members. The
    Minutes also cite the specific provisions of the Ordinance
    that the majority of the voting members found were not
    met by the application. The Minutes thus provide an
    explanation that allows us, in combination with the
    written record, to determine if the decision is supported
    by substantial evidence. See MetroPCS, 
    400 F.3d at 722
    ;
    Todd, 
    244 F.3d at 60
    . In fact, the Minutes provide a great
    deal of detail about the evidence and the applicable
    Ordinance provisions. See Platte County, 
    578 F.3d at 732
    (finding a written decision adequately explained that
    it was rejecting a proposed tower for aesthetic reasons
    where the decision explained that the local government
    objected to the tower because its size, location and rela-
    tionship to the surrounding screening and landscape
    were such that the tower would dominate the immediate
    neighborhood so as to prevent development and use
    of neighboring property); MetroPCS, 
    400 F.3d at 723
    (affirming that a decision met the “in writing” requirement
    when it summarized the facts of the dispute, recounted
    the proceedings, articulated the reasons for rejecting
    22                                              No. 07-3949
    an application and explained the evidentiary basis for
    the ruling); New Par, 
    301 F.3d at 396
     (finding a decision
    did not meet the “in writing” requirement when it
    did not contain any explanation of the reasons for the
    denial but simply stated the request was denied “based on
    the facts presented and the Board’s determination”); Todd,
    
    244 F.3d at 60
     (finding adequate a written decision that
    “offers little explanation and few facts” because the
    reasons were stated with sufficient clarity to permit an
    assessment of the evidence in the record supporting
    the reasons). On the threshold question of whether the
    Minutes met the “in writing” requirement, we con-
    clude that the Minutes met the standard we set forth
    above.
    B.
    Bell and the Helchers next contend that the Zoning
    Board’s decision denying their application for a con-
    ditional use permit was not supported by substantial
    evidence. Recall that the Telecommunications Act
    requires that “[a]ny decision by a State or local govern-
    ment or instrumentality thereof to deny a request to
    place, construct, or modify personal wireless service
    facilities shall be in writing and supported by substantial
    evidence contained in a written record.” 
    47 U.S.C. § 332
    (c)(7)(B)(iii). The substantial evidence standard is
    highly deferential to the local government making the
    decision. VoiceStream Minneapolis, Inc. v. St. Croix County,
    
    342 F.3d 818
    , 830 (7th Cir. 2003). We apply the same test
    for substantial evidence under the Telecommunications
    No. 07-3949                                               23
    Act that we apply in our review of the decisions of admin-
    istrative agencies. PrimeCo Personal Commc’ns, L.P. v. City
    of Mequon, 
    352 F.3d 1147
    , 1148 (7th Cir. 2003); VoiceStream,
    
    342 F.3d at 830
    . Substantial evidence is “such relevant
    evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
    to support a conclusion.” VoiceStream, 
    342 F.3d at 830
    (quoting Aegerter v. City of Delafield, WI, 
    174 F.3d 886
    , 889
    (7th Cir. 1999)). The party seeking to overturn the local
    zoning board’s decision has the burden of proving that
    the decision is not supported by substantial evidence.
    VoiceStream, 
    342 F.3d at 830
    . We have found that there is
    no practical difference between the substantial evidence
    standard and the clear error standard, and so the relevant
    question is whether the Zoning Board clearly erred in
    refusing to issue the permit. PrimeCo, 
    352 F.3d at 1149
    . The
    Zoning Board rejected the plaintiffs’ application for
    a conditional use permit because the application did not
    comport with three provisions of the Ordinance.
    In particular, the Zoning Board found that the applica-
    tion did not satisfy Article 3, Sections 315(b) and (d),
    and Article 15, Section 1514(5). We will examine, in
    turn, what evidence in the record supported the Board’s
    decision as to each of these provisions.
    1.
    Section 315(b) states that the Board has the power to
    authorize a conditional use permit so long as the condi-
    tional use “[w]ill be designed, constructed, operated, and
    maintained so as to be harmonious and appropriate in
    appearance with the existing or intended character of
    24                                               No. 07-3949
    the general vicinity and shall not change the essential
    character of the same area.” R. 1, Ex. B, at 9. Although
    local governments are entitled to weigh the aesthetic
    effect of a wireless tower in deciding whether to permit
    its construction, generalized aesthetic concerns are not
    alone sufficient to justify a denial of a permit. PrimeCo, 
    352 F.3d at 1150
    . See also VoiceStream, 
    342 F.3d at 831
     (because
    few people would argue that telecommunications towers
    are aesthetically pleasing, a local zoning board’s aesthetic
    judgment must be grounded in the specifics of the case).
    A blanket opposition to poles, for example, would not
    be sufficient evidence for denying the construction of a
    wireless facility disguised as a pole. 
    Id.
     A reasonable
    decision whether to approve a permit to construct a
    cellphone tower requires the local government to
    balance the contribution the tower would make to the
    availability of cellphone service against the detriments
    the tower presents to the surrounding community.
    PrimeCo, 
    352 F.3d at 1149
    . The complaints made by
    local residents in this case are representative of the
    downsides towers present. They often are perceived as
    unsightly and are blamed for reducing property values.
    Although the statute prohibits as a consideration
    the fear of adverse health effects of electromagnetic
    radiation from the towers, a local government may con-
    sider other safety factors, such as the harm to the environ-
    ment, the obstruction of vision, and the risk of a tower
    falling due to wind or ice. PrimeCo, 
    352 F.3d at 1149
    .
    Bell again points to the experts’ opinion that there was
    no less visually intrusive location on which to place the
    tower as an indication that the Board’s findings
    No. 07-3949                                           25
    under Section 315(b) were not supported by substantial
    evidence. Bell discounts the photo simulations presented
    by the Codys and other residents as “generalized” objec-
    tions to towers. Bell conducted a “balloon test” at the
    proposed site and provided photographs to the Board. A
    large helium balloon was floated to the height of the
    proposed tower and photographs were taken at various
    distances and angles. The Codys then used those photo-
    graphs to extrapolate views of the tower from their prop-
    erty and from other nearby residences and farms. The
    Codys presented these photo mock-ups to demonstrate
    to the Board that the tower was not harmonious in charac-
    ter to the surrounding area. Many of the nearby home-
    owners also wrote letters to the Board protesting the
    impact of such a structure on the scenery and on their
    property values. Bell and the Helchers provided photos
    taken largely from public roads but the Codys and other
    nearby residents presented views of the tower and the
    balloon test from farms and residences nearby. R. 23, at
    1465, 1491-1495, 1501-1563. In the Codys’ altered photos,
    the tower rises up like a nineteen-story Martian machine
    from H.G. Wells’ “War of the Worlds,” marring a land-
    scape of forests and farms. The tower is not in any way
    disguised to resemble a more palatable structure, but
    stands out alone as an industrial blemish on an other-
    wise bucolic landscape. It is remarkably out of scale to
    any surrounding structures. Of course, Bell argues that
    the height is necessary given the topography of the
    county, and also contends that the company reduced the
    height of the tower as much as possible without
    degrading the signal.
    26                                              No. 07-3949
    The photographic representations of the tower as
    viewed from the property of the Codys and other neigh-
    bors, accompanied by the objections of many residents
    who purchased land and built homes in this area specifi-
    cally because of the natural views, provided the Zoning
    Board with substantial evidence to reject the permit as non-
    conforming with Section 315(b). The Zoning Board
    weighed the value of closing a signal gap for one wire-
    less provider along a stretch of road against the aesthetic
    effect this tower would have on this largely rural
    setting and found that this tower at this location was not
    harmonious with the appearance or intended character
    of the area.
    As we discuss below, Bell had not satisfied the Board
    that it had adequately considered placing the tower on
    land zoned for manufacturing, business, or for high-
    way interchanges. It is not surprising that a 190-foot
    industrial-looking tower would not be harmonious with
    an agricultural setting, and that is likely one of the rea-
    sons that the Ordinance insists that wireless providers
    consider seven other categories of zoned property
    before resorting to placement on agricultural land. Bell
    compares the Board’s rejection of the permit to the
    city’s rejection in PrimeCo. But in PrimeCo, the citizens
    objected to placement of a tower disguised as a flagpole
    in an area where industrialized land uses were
    permitted, and where there was no evidence that the
    height of the pole (70 feet in that instance) was out of
    character for the area. Moreover, the city had suggested
    instead disguising the tower as a light pole and moving
    it to a different location, even though there was no evi-
    No. 07-3949                                             27
    dence that a light pole was any less unsightly than the
    proposed flag pole and no evidence that the light pole
    would be less visible than the flag pole. PrimeCo, 
    352 F.3d at 1150-51
    .
    The circumstances here more closely resemble those
    of VoiceStream, where the local government denied a
    permit to build a tower near a scenic river way. We noted
    that the county’s determination that the proposed tower
    would adversely affect the aesthetic harmony of the
    river way was grounded in the specifics of the case and
    was not based on conjecture or speculation. Rather it
    was based on an on-site investigation and a map
    prepared from the wireless carrier’s crane test, docu-
    menting how visible the tower would be from various
    nearby locations. VoiceStream, 
    342 F.3d at 832
    . Persons
    who viewed the crane test, which was similar to the
    balloon test in the instant case, testified to the negative
    impact the tower would have. This testimony and the
    map prepared from the crane test provided substantial
    evidence to support the county’s decision to deny the
    permit for the tower. 
    Id.
     Although the Helchers’ property
    is admittedly not on a National Scenic Riverway, it is in
    a picturesque rural area where a 190-foot structure
    would rise high above the tree line, completely out of
    character with any other natural or man-made structure
    in the vicinity.5 We conclude therefore that substantial
    5
    We note that the Helchers own and operate a commercial
    storage building on their property, and are authorized to
    (continued...)
    28                                                 No. 07-3949
    evidence supported the Board’s decision to reject the
    permit on this ground. See Sprint PCS Assets, L.L.C. v. City
    of Palos Verdes Estates, 
    583 F.3d 716
    , 726 (9th Cir. 2009)
    (holding that a board’s decision to reject a permit on
    aesthetic grounds was supported by substantial evidence
    where the evidence included propagation maps, mock-ups
    of the proposed tower, a report on the aesthetic values
    at stake, public commentary and a presentation from the
    wireless carrier); Platte County, 
    578 F.3d at 733
     (finding
    that a visit to the proposed tower site, an aerial map
    indicating surrounding homes and the residential
    character of the area, letters from three nearby residents,
    and simulated pictures of the proposed 153-foot tower
    supplied substantial evidence to support a decision
    rejecting a tower for aesthetic reasons); T-Mobile USA, Inc.
    v. City of Anacortes, 
    572 F.3d 987
    , 994 (9th Cir. 2009) (ob-
    jections by residents that a monopole would have a
    detrimental impact on surrounding residential property,
    that the pole would not be completely screened, and
    that it would interfere with scenic views provided sub-
    stantial evidence supporting a denial of a permit to build
    the pole); Omnipoint, 430 F.3d at 534 (holding that a
    local zoning board has discretion to rely on the aesthetic
    objections raised by neighbors who know the local
    terrain and the sight lines of their own homes, and may
    5
    (...continued)
    build up to twenty-two storage spaces, each eleven feet by
    eleven feet in size. A relatively small commercial storage
    building of limited height is far less visible to neighbors than
    a 190-foot tower.
    No. 07-3949                                             29
    reject aesthetic opinions of experts whose study included
    only views from public areas and not from residents’
    property).
    2.
    Section 315(d) similarly empowers the Board to issue
    a conditional use permit if the use “[w]ill not impede
    the normal and orderly development and improvement
    of the surrounding property for uses permitted in the
    district.” R. 1, Ex. B, at 9. The Codys testified that they
    halted construction on an addition to their home when
    they learned that the tower might be built nearby. A real
    estate appraiser testified that the tower would have a
    detrimental effect on land values, although he could not
    offer any specific measure of the predicted downward
    trend. This is the thinnest part of the county’s case, and
    this factor alone may not have provided substantial
    evidence for the decision to deny the permit. We need not
    decide what would be needed to meet the substantial
    evidence standard in this instance, though, because
    the county’s conclusion that the tower would be incom-
    patible with the appearance and character of the area
    and its conclusion that the plaintiffs had failed to ade-
    quately investigate other kinds of zoned land were sup-
    ported by substantial evidence.
    3.
    Section 1514(5) provides that the County may disap-
    prove an application that, among other things, “[c]onflicts
    30                                               No. 07-3949
    with the provisions of this Ordinance.” R. 23, Ex. 2, at
    1033. Section 1514 supplies a list of nine categories of
    property on which wireless transmitters may be placed, in
    the order of the County’s preference. The County prefers,
    in order from most to least favored, that transmitters
    be placed (1) on existing towers or structures without
    increasing the existing height of those towers or struc-
    tures; (2) on property zoned Manufacturing Three; (3)
    on property zoned Manufacturing Two; (4) on property
    zoned Manufacturing One; (5) on property zoned
    Highway Interchange; (6) on property zoned General
    Business; (7) on property zoned Restricted Business;
    (8) on property zoned Agricultural; and (9) on property
    zoned Residential. R. 23, Ex. 2, at 1032. The Helchers’
    property was zoned Agricultural, second to the last on
    the County’s list of preferences. Only residential neigh-
    borhood placement is more offensive to the County’s
    stated values than the location selected by the plaintiffs
    here. Section 1514 requires applicants seeking to place
    towers on lower priority land (such as Agricultural
    land) to submit a detailed explanation as to why a higher
    priority site was not selected. R. 23, Ex. 2, at 1032-33.
    Although Bell arguably has explained why co-location
    was not possible in this instance, the company has not
    provided a detailed explanation regarding land categories
    (2) through (7) above.6 As the district court noted, the
    6
    The application considers each possible co-location site and
    explains why it is inadequate to provide coverage for Jamison
    (continued...)
    No. 07-3949                                                  31
    plaintiffs did not explain why a transmitter could not be
    constructed on property zoned Manufacturing One, Two
    or Three; Highway Interchange; General Business or
    Restricted Business. Instead, the plaintiffs simply
    recited boilerplate claims in their application for each
    of these preferred categories of zoned property:
    Within or in reasonable proximity of the search area
    where new antennae is [sic] required to provide
    complete and competitive coverage there exists no
    property zoned [zoning designations (2) through (7)]
    that accommodates the RF engineering requirements
    of the proposed Cincinnati Bell Wireless network
    expansion.
    R. 23, Ex. 10, at 1309-10. As the district court noted, these
    “generic, nonspecific statements are unsupported by
    any explanation, evidence of investigation, or other
    description indicating that credence is to be granted to
    Plaintiffs’ claims that all other sites were adequately
    investigated.” Helcher, 
    500 F.Supp.2d at 1117
    .
    Bell and the Helchers continue to rely on these unsup-
    ported statements on appeal. Bell characterizes its
    conclusory statements as “uncontradicted evidence” that
    Bell “has investigated all feasible alternate locations,” and
    faults the Board for failing to offer alternate sites. Appel-
    lant’s Brief at 21. This is nothing more than an attempt
    6
    (...continued)
    Road. The Board rejected the application, in part, because
    Bell failed to show that six other preferred categories of zoned
    property could not be used.
    32                                              No. 07-3949
    to reverse the burden of finding alternate sites onto the
    Zoning Board and its officers, a burden the Ordinance
    places squarely on the applicant for a conditional use
    permit. Bell also argues that the district court and the
    Zoning Board ignored the numerous propagation maps
    and RF data provided by Bell, contending that these
    documents identified the area in which the tower must
    be placed to provide adequate coverage. According to
    Bell, the Board’s experts knew from those maps and
    documents which locations should be investigated, and
    neither the Board nor the court had the expertise
    required to evaluate the maps and data. At the Zoning
    Board meeting, a Bell representative addressing this
    question offered the following testimony to support the
    company’s compliance with Section 1514:
    The other area with which to review a wireless com-
    munications tower request is your checklist of certain
    zoning classifications. Rather than going through
    that long process of explaining all that, I will simply
    refer to Tab 13 that we submitted, and also reiterate
    the fact that Cincinnati Bell Wireless would not be
    here unless there was a definite need for this facility
    to be located here. We take every angle and every
    avenue to co-locate on existing structures of height
    whether it be water tower, existing cell tower,
    rooftops, whatever. If we can utilize and enhance our
    network by not having to go through a long zoning
    process, we’re going to go through that process be-
    cause it’s all about servicing the customer, because it
    is a customer-based business. So, I would just refer to
    chapter—Section 13 that we submitted in writing
    No. 07-3949                                               33
    and ask that you list that as the findings established
    with Article 15, Section 1514.
    R. 23, Ex. 29, at 1721, Tr. at 58. Tab 13 is simply the docu-
    ment containing the conclusory statements that no
    land zoned in the preferred categories would accom-
    modate the engineering needs of the proposed tower. In
    that document and in other documents, Bell made a good
    case for ruling out co-location on existing towers or
    structures, but Bell has yet to point to anything specific
    showing the company even considered much less ruled
    out land in the other categories. Without pointing to
    zoning maps or an overlay of zoning maps and propaga-
    tion maps, for example, the company essentially argues,
    “Trust us; we looked.” Bell’s argument amounts to a
    claim that the Board and the district court were required
    to rubber-stamp the experts’ conclusory statements that
    no land zoned in the other six categories would have
    satisfied the technical specifications. Neither the Board
    nor the court were required to accept unsupported opin-
    ions. Given that the only “evidence” that Bell satisfied
    Section 1514 consists of Bell’s conclusory statements, we
    conclude that the Board’s decision rejecting the permit
    for noncompliance with Section 1514 is supported by
    substantial evidence.
    C.
    Bell contends that the Board’s rejection of its applica-
    tion effectively prohibits Bell from providing wireless
    communications services. Bell also argues that the
    Board’s denial unreasonably discriminates between wire-
    34                                              No. 07-3949
    less providers. Neither of these arguments has merit. Our
    review of the prohibition-of-service claim is de novo.
    VoiceStream, 
    342 F.3d at 833
     (whether a particular zoning
    decision violates the Act’s anti-prohibition clause is a
    question that a district court determines without
    deference to the local zoning board, and an appellate
    court’s review of a grant of summary judgment on this
    issue is de novo). We considered the meaning of the anti-
    prohibition clause in VoiceStream and concluded that “so
    long as the service provider has not investigated thor-
    oughly the possibility of other viable alternatives, the
    denial of an individual permit does not ‘prohibit or
    have the effect of prohibiting the provision of personal
    wireless services.’ 
    47 U.S.C. § 332
    (c)(7)(B)(i)(II).” Voice-
    Stream, 
    342 F.3d at 834-35
    . In VoiceStream, we joined the
    First Circuit in holding that a provider carries a heavy
    burden of demonstrating not just that the application
    has been rejected but that further reasonable efforts are
    so likely to be fruitless that it is a waste of time even to
    try. VoiceStream, 
    342 F.3d at
    834 (citing Second Generation
    Props., L.P. v. Town of Pelham, 
    313 F.3d 620
    , 629 (1st Cir.
    2002)). “Under this standard, the provider must show
    that its ‘existing application is the only feasible plan’
    and that ‘there are no other potential solutions to the
    purported problem.’ ” VoiceStream, 
    342 F.3d at
    834 (citing
    Town of Pelham, 
    313 F.3d at 630, 635
    ). As we noted above,
    Bell did not demonstrate to the Board’s satisfaction that
    it had investigated not only co-location but also six
    other categories of zoned land before applying to place
    the tower on the Helchers’ agricultural property. That
    failure to satisfy Section 1514 of the Ordinance demon-
    No. 07-3949                                              35
    strated that the applicants did not meet the standard set
    under VoiceStream for a prohibition-of-service claim.
    Finally, Bell has failed to demonstrate that the Board
    unreasonably discriminated among providers by denying
    the permit. The Act provides:
    The regulation of the placement, construction, and
    modification of personal wireless service facilities
    by any State or local government or instrumentality
    thereof . . . shall not unreasonably discriminate
    among providers of functionally equivalent services[.]
    
    47 U.S.C. § 332
    (c)(7)(B). We have yet to address what is
    needed to make out a claim under this provision of the
    Act. Bell contends that the Board’s denial of its permit
    application left Bell unable to provide viable competition
    to other carriers in Dearborn County. But Bell has not
    alleged, much less presented evidence, that the Zoning
    Board treated any other carrier more favorably. There is
    no allegation, for example, that other carriers were
    allowed to construct towers on land zoned agricultural.
    The only evidence in the record regarding the Board’s
    treatment of other carriers is the undisputed statement
    from the Board’s expert, Ebelhar, that every other carrier
    that applied for a permit to build a new wireless tower
    in Dearborn County since the Ordinance went into effect
    had been required to co-locate on an already existing
    tower. R. 23, Ex. 29, at 1718, Tr. at 46. It is difficult to
    see how Bell can make a claim that these other carriers
    were treated more favorably when none had been
    allowed to build a new tower since the inception of the
    Ordinance.
    36                                              No. 07-3949
    Courts interpreting this provision require the plaintiff
    to demonstrate that the carriers are functionally equiva-
    lent, that the local government treated another carrier
    more favorably, and also that the favorable treatment
    was unreasonable. See Ogden Fire Co. No. 1 v. Upper
    Chichester Twp., 
    504 F.3d 370
    , 392 (3d Cir. 2007) (re-
    quiring complaining wireless carriers to demonstrate that
    another carrier provides functionally equivalent services,
    and that the other carrier is similarly situated, i.e., that
    the structure, placement or cumulative impact of the
    existing facilities makes them as or more intrusive than
    the proposed facility); Sprint Spectrum L.P. v. Willoth, 
    176 F.3d 630
    , 638-39 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the Act
    contemplates that some discrimination between providers
    is allowed so long as it is reasonable); Virginia Beach,
    
    155 F.3d at 426-28
     (finding that the Act contemplates
    some discrimination among providers but prohibits only
    unreasonable discrimination). Discrimination based on
    aesthetics and compatibility with the character of the area
    has been held reasonable. Willoth, 
    176 F.3d at 639
    ; Virginia
    Beach, 
    155 F.3d at 427
    . Bell has not identified any other
    carrier to use as a comparator much less a functionally
    equivalent one. Nor has Bell demonstrated that it was
    treated less favorably nor that any differing treatment
    was unreasonable. Under any formulation of the statute,
    Bell’s claim of unreasonable discrimination fails. The
    district court correctly entered judgment in favor of the
    Zoning Board and its members on this claim.
    A FFIRMED.
    2-9-10