Carrera-Valdez, A. v. Perryman, Brian ( 2000 )


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  • In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 99-1497
    Angel Carrera-Valdez,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.
    Brian Perryman, District Director,
    Immigration and Naturalization Service,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Wisconsin.
    No. 98-C-0687-S--John C. Shabaz, Chief Judge.
    Submitted March 27, 2000--Decided May 2, 2000
    Before Coffey, Easterbrook, and Evans, Circuit Judges.
    Easterbrook, Circuit Judge. Angel Carrera-Valdez
    came to the United States in 1980 during the
    Mariel boatlift exodus from Cuba. Many of the new
    arrivals had been convicted of crimes in Cuba,
    which opened its prisons for those willing to
    emigrate. Carrera is one of these convicts:
    shortly before leaving Cuba, he had been
    sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment for robbery.
    After arriving in the United States, Carrera was
    released on parole pending a decision concerning
    his immigration status, and he commenced a new
    criminal career, from which four convictions have
    resulted: auto theft, assault, and two (a year
    apart) for distributing cocaine. Each conviction
    has been followed by the revocation of Carrera’s
    immigration parole, and after a time he has been
    re-released, only to commit a new crime and come
    back to federal custody. (On one occasion Carrera
    escaped from custody, committed a new crime, and
    was recaptured. Oddly he was not prosecuted for
    the escape.) In 1990 a final administrative order
    excluded Carrera from the United States on the
    basis of his criminal record, see 8 U.S.C.
    sec.1182(a), but Cuba has refused to accept his
    return. He has been in federal prison since 1995
    because the INS, having concluded that he is
    incorrigible, has refused to parole him into the
    general population yet again.
    Now being held at Oxford, Wisconsin, Carrera
    asked the district court to issue a writ of
    habeas corpus requiring his release until Cuba
    takes him back. But the court concluded that it
    lacked jurisdiction and dismissed Carrera’s
    petition, relying on 8 U.S.C. sec.1252(g), which
    was added to the Immigration and Nationality Act
    in 1996. Two opinions issued after the district
    court’s decision establish that this was
    mistaken, and that 28 U.S.C. sec.2241 authorizes
    a district court to consider Carrera’s petition.
    Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination
    Committee, 
    525 U.S. 471
    (1999); Parra v.
    Perryman, 
    172 F.3d 954
    (7th Cir. 1999). The INS
    does not defend the district court’s decision;
    instead, it contends here (as it did in the
    district court) that the petition fails on the
    merits.
    Section 1252(g), which applies to older
    exclusion orders (while other features of the
    1996 legislation, such as sec.1252(b)(9), do
    not), forecloses review of "the decision or
    action by the Attorney General to commence
    proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal
    orders against any alien under this chapter."
    Carrera did not ask the district court to block
    the commencement or adjudication of a case, nor
    did he protest the execution of a removal order.
    Just like Parra, Carrera wants review of his
    placement pending his transfer to another nation,
    and nothing in sec.1252(g) precludes review of
    the decision to confine Carrera until then. But
    just as in Parra it is unnecessary to remand,
    because release, the relief the alien seeks, is
    not available.
    Former sec.236(e) of the Immigration and
    Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. sec.1226(e) (1994 ed.),
    applies to persons who, like Carrera, were
    subject to an order of exclusion when the new
    legislation took full effect on April 1, 1997.
    Under sec.236(e) an excludable alien who has
    committed an aggravated felony (a class that
    includes Carrera) must be taken into custody, and
    the Attorney General "shall not release such
    felon from custody" unless the Attorney General
    determines not only (1) that the alien’s native
    land has "denie[d] or unduly delay[ed] acceptance
    of the return" (sec.236(e)(2), incorporating 8
    U.S.C. sec.1253(g)) but also (2) "that the alien
    will not pose a danger to the safety of other
    persons or to property" (sec.236(e)(3)(C)) if
    released. Carrera satisfies condition (1), but
    the Attorney General has determined that he does
    not satisfy condition (2). He is entitled to a
    writ of habeas corpus only if the second
    condition violates the Constitution. (A court
    might in principle issue the writ after
    concluding that the Attorney General’s procedures
    for making this determination are defective, and
    Carrera advances such an argument. But his
    convictions, which are not subject to collateral
    attack here, see Custis v. United States, 
    511 U.S. 485
    (1994), support the decision, and we
    therefore need not determine what procedures are
    called for when the excludable alien has not been
    convicted of a crime following his arrival in the
    United States.)
    Almost fifty years ago, the Supreme Court held
    that an excludable alien may be detained
    indefinitely when his country of origin will not
    accept his return. Shaughnessy v. United States
    ex rel. Mezei, 
    345 U.S. 206
    (1953). Several
    Justices in more recent years have expressed
    unease with that decision, but it is conclusive
    in the courts of appeals. It is therefore not
    surprising that at least five appellate courts
    have rejected constitutional challenges, similar
    to Carrera’s, brought by others who arrived on
    the Mariel boatlift. See Guzman v. Tippy, 
    130 F.3d 64
    (2d Cir. 1997); Palma v. Verdeyen, 
    676 F.2d 100
    (4th Cir. 1982); Gisbert v. Attorney
    General, 
    988 F.2d 1437
    , amended, 
    997 F.2d 1122
    (5th Cir. 1993); Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison, 
    44 F.3d 1441
    (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc); Garcia-Mir
    v. Meese, 
    788 F.2d 1446
    (11th Cir. 1986). See
    also Chi Thon Ngo v. INS, 
    192 F.3d 390
    (3d Cir.
    1999). The only arguably contrary decision,
    Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 
    654 F.2d 1382
    (10th Cir. 1981), has not garnered adherents and
    is of doubtful vitality in its own circuit. Duy
    Dac Ho v. Greene, 
    204 F.3d 1045
    (10th Cir. 2000).
    Given Shaughnessy there is little point in
    elaborate discussion by an inferior court.
    Carrera is not constitutionally entitled to
    release.
    Carrera advances some additional arguments, such
    as a contention that the Attorney General did not
    follow the Administrative Procedure Act when
    promulgating the regulations under which Mariel
    Cubans may apply for parole, see 8 C.F.R.
    sec.212.12, and that the United States violated
    a supposed contract under which he would become
    a citizen five years after arriving. Arguments of
    the former kind are not appropriate under
    sec.2241, and the latter is untenable:
    citizenship depends on abiding by the laws of the
    United States, which Carrera has not done. A
    demand for citizenship, moreover, is squarely
    foreclosed by sec.1252(g): In this respect, at
    least, the jurisdictional dismissal was correct,
    because Carrera’s quest for citizenship amounts
    to a collateral attack on the 1990 exclusion
    order.
    The judgment of the district court is vacated,
    and the case is remanded with instructions to
    dismiss the petition for want of jurisdiction to
    the extent Carrera seeks citizenship, and
    otherwise to deny the petition on the merits.