United States v. Lazzerick Alexander ( 2009 )


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  •                             In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 07-3718
    U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    L AZZERICK M. A LEXANDER,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Wisconsin.
    No. 07 CR 71—John C. Shabaz, Judge.
    A RGUED S EPTEMBER 4, 2008—D ECIDED JULY 21, 2009
    Before M ANION, W OOD , and T INDER, Circuit Judges.
    T INDER, Circuit Judge. Lazzerick M. Alexander was
    convicted, following his guilty plea, of possession of
    two firearms and ammunition by a convicted felon in
    violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The district court sen-
    tenced him to 225 months’ imprisonment. Alexander
    appeals from the district court’s judgment, arguing that
    the court erred in denying his motion to suppress evi-
    dence. We affirm.
    2                                               No. 07-3718
    I. The Searches
    In April 2007, Kathy Bastian, the manager of the
    Country Meadows apartment complex at 6804 Schroeder
    Road in Madison, Wisconsin, received an anonymous
    telephone call about a person staying with one of her
    tenants in the apartment complex. The caller, in notable
    detail, told Bastien that a man named Lazzerick
    Alexander, date of birth 10/24/80, was living with a
    Donelle or Vaniece Harris at 6804 Schroeder Road, Apt. 1.
    He described Alexander as an African American man of
    smaller build, approximately 5 feet 8 inches tall, 165
    pounds, and he said that Alexander drove a white
    Buick Riviera with Wisconsin license plate number 909-
    LRS. The caller also told Bastien that Alexander was
    selling crack cocaine out of Apt. 1, charging $100 for eight-
    balls, $350 for half ounces, and $700 for one ounce. The
    caller said that Alexander cooked the crack in the apart-
    ment. The caller also told Bastien that he had heard
    that Alexander kept a gun hidden underneath the hood
    of the Buick Riviera. He advised her that Alexander
    was involved in a stabbing in Madison and currently
    was on probation or parole. Bastian called the cops and
    gave them the information she had received.
    On April 16, 2007, Officer Daniel Nale of the Madison
    Police Department (“MPD”) and other MPD officers
    were planning to arrest Alexander on the basis of an
    outstanding warrant for a parole violation. While planning
    for the arrest, Officer Nale heard over the city air channel
    that police dispatch was sending two officers to 6804
    Schroeder Road to stand by as a vehicle—a white Buick
    No. 07-3718                                              3
    Riviera—was repossessed. Because the description of the
    vehicle matched the tipster’s description of the vehicle
    Alexander drove, Nale asked to be added to the call.
    Officer Nale contacted Bryan Bowman, the agent of
    Ultimate Repossessors Incorporated who was going to
    repossess the vehicle. Bowman told Officer Nale that
    he had information that the vehicle was registered in a
    female’s name in Marshall, but a male was using the
    vehicle and staying at 6804 Schroeder Road Apt. 1.
    Officer Nale asked Bowman why he wanted the police
    to stand by, and Bowman advised that he heard from
    the registered owner of the vehicle (Jennifer Fjelstad)
    that the person who had the vehicle might react
    violently to its repossession. Officer Nale told Bowman
    about his concern that weapons may be in the car and
    asked him to wait and see if the police could find the
    vehicle first. Bowman agreed.
    That evening, officers waited for Alexander at the
    Country Meadows parking lot. Officer Nale observed a
    white Buick Riviera with Wisconsin license plate 909-LRS
    turn into the parking lot. Nale pulled the vehicle over.
    He approached and observed Alexander sitting in the
    front passenger seat. Officers Dustin Clark and Matt
    Schroedl arrived and arrested Alexander based on the
    outstanding warrant for his arrest. Sergeant Kosovac
    arrived as well. Officer Nale placed the driver, identified
    as Antwan Richmond, in handcuffs.
    Officer Nale testified at the suppression hearing that
    he said something to Alexander about the car and Alexan-
    der responded that it was not his car. Alexander claimed
    4                                             No. 07-3718
    that the car belonged to Richmond, or Richmond’s girl-
    friend, “or whatever.” Nale added that Alexander
    repeated three or four times that it wasn’t his car. Simi-
    larly, Officer Schroedl testified that during the course
    of Alexander’s arrest, Alexander stated that the vehicle
    did not belong to him, but belonged to Antwan. Officer
    Schroedl’s report states that as he was walking Alexander
    back to his squad car, Alexander made reference to
    “my car,” but when Schroedl asked whether he was
    referring to the Buick Riviera, Alexander stated, “No,
    that’s Antwan’s car.” Subsequently, Schroedl placed
    Alexander in the back seat of his squad car. Nale’s arrest
    report estimates that Alexander and Richmond were
    arrested at approximately 8:20 p.m.
    Once Alexander and Richmond had been removed
    from the Riviera and arrested, Officer Nale called
    Bowman who was waiting at a nearby gas station and
    told him to come over. When Bowman and another indi-
    vidual arrived, Officer Nale identified Bowman based
    on a Wisconsin driver’s license. Officer Nale asked Bow-
    man if the Buick Riviera was the vehicle he was sup-
    posed to repossess, and Bowman answered that it ap-
    peared to be, but he would need to confirm the VIN
    to make sure. After Bowman confirmed the VIN with
    his paperwork, at approximately 8:28 p.m., Officer Nale
    turned the vehicle over to Bowman, indicating that the
    officers were done with it and had arrested two persons
    out of it. Bowman took possession of the Buick Riviera.
    Officer Nale then asked him to consent to a search the
    vehicle; Bowman gave his consent.
    No. 07-3718                                                5
    Officer Nale subsequently searched the vehicle. He
    opened the hood to the engine compartment and, at
    approximately, 8:33 p.m., found a brown cloth sack, which
    he pulled out of the engine compartment. Officer Nale
    could tell that the bag contained something heavy, like
    a handgun. He and Officer Schroedl opened the bag,
    discovering a handgun. Alexander was in Schroedl’s
    squad car during the search of the Buick Riviera.
    Shortly thereafter, Office Schroedl and two other officers,
    including Officer Jeffrey Felt and his canine partner,
    Gilden, went to Vaniece Harris’s apartment at 6804
    Schroeder Road, Apt. 1. Officer Felt had Gilden conduct
    a sniff of the doorway to Apt. 1. The dog didn’t alert.
    Officer Schroedl knocked on the door, Harris answered
    and gave Schroedl and another officer permission to
    enter. The officers told Harris that Alexander had been
    arrested. Harris informed the officers that Alexander
    lived in the apartment. The officers reported that they
    had information that Alexander was cooking crack
    cocaine in the apartment and asked Harris if they
    could search the apartment. Harris declined to consent,
    indicating the officers would need a search warrant. With
    that, the officers exited the apartment.
    The officers had the dog conduct a second sniff at Har-
    ris’s apartment door. This time he sat—an alert for
    drugs. As a result, Officer Schroedl again knocked on
    the door. When Harris opened it, he and two other
    officers entered without asking for permission. Officer
    Schroedl testified that they wanted to secure the apart-
    ment to ensure that no evidence, especially drugs, was
    6                                             No. 07-3718
    destroyed. Officer Schroedl advised Harris that the dog
    had alerted to the presence of narcotics and, based on
    that and the information that Alexander was cooking
    crack cocaine in the apartment, they had probable cause
    and would apply for a search warrant. Harris asked
    how long that would take, and Officer Schroedl explained
    that it would take approximately two hours to draft a
    warrant application which would then have to be
    reviewed and approved by a judge. He advised Harris
    that they would stay until a search warrant was ob-
    tained. Officer Schroedl also informed her that she
    could consent to a search and it wouldn’t take as much
    time. Harris said she would consent to a search of the
    apartment. When presented with the consent to search
    form, however, she said she didn’t want to sign the
    form. Sergeant Linda Kosovac told Harris that they
    needed her to sign the form, and Harris responded that
    they would have to get a search warrant.
    As a result, Sgt. Kosovac instructed Officer Schroedl to
    leave and begin drafting the search warrant application.
    He left to do so and the other officers remained in the
    apartment. Harris telephoned Alexander’s mother to
    tell her what had been happening. Sgt. Kosovac advised
    Harris they would stay there until the search warrant
    came back and that she was free to move about. The
    officers maintained a normal conversational tone; they
    did not yell at or threaten Harris. Nor did they place her
    in handcuffs.
    After again talking on the telephone with Alexander’s
    mother, Harris told the officers that she would sign the
    No. 07-3718                                             7
    consent form and they could go ahead and search. Harris
    testified that she had changed her mind: It was late at
    night, she had to be at work the next day, and she was
    very tired. Harris signed the form. Thereafter, the
    officers searched the apartment and found a handgun
    and ammunition.
    Alexander moved to suppress the evidence found
    during the vehicle and apartment searches. After a
    hearing, the magistrate judge recommended that the
    motion be denied. He determined that Alexander had no
    expectation of privacy in the vehicle because he had
    denied that it was his and therefore could not challenge
    the search. The magistrate judge also concluded that
    the searching officers reasonably relied on Bowman’s
    apparent authority to consent to the search. And the
    magistrate judge reasoned that once the officers found
    the bag under the hood of the car, they had probable
    cause to believe it contained a gun and could, pursuant
    to the automobile exception to the warrant requirement,
    open the bag and seize the gun. The magistrate judge
    also found that the officers lawfully re-entered Harris’s
    apartment and had probable cause to search the apart-
    ment. In addition, he concluded that the inevitable dis-
    covery doctrine applied. In the alternative, he con-
    cluded that Harris had consented voluntarily to the
    search of the apartment.
    The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s recom-
    mendations and denied Alexander’s motion to suppress
    evidence. Alexander pled guilty, reserving his right to
    appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The district
    8                                               No. 07-3718
    court accepted his plea, imposed sentence, and entered
    a judgment of conviction. A timely appeal followed.
    II. Analysis of Challenges to the Denial of the
    Motion to Suppress
    Alexander appeals the district court’s denial of his
    motion to suppress. He asserts that the court erred in
    refusing to suppress the evidence seized from the
    Buick Riviera because he had a possessory interest in the
    vehicle which he had not abandoned. He also claims
    that Bowman’s consent to search was ineffective given
    the extensive police involvement in the repossession
    and that the police erroneously relied on Bowman’s
    consent. Alexander next argues that the court erred in
    refusing to suppress the evidence obtained from Harris’s
    apartment because neither probable cause to search nor
    exigent circumstances existed. Lastly, he claims that
    Harris’s consent was not voluntarily given.
    When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress
    evidence obtained during a warrantless search, we
    review legal conclusions de novo and factual findings
    for clear error. United States v. Sims, 
    551 F.3d 640
    , 643
    (7th Cir. 2008). Mixed questions of law and fact are re-
    viewed de novo. United States v. Fiasche, 
    520 F.3d 694
    , 697
    (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    129 S. Ct. 281
    (2008). The essence
    of Alexander’s dispute with the rulings on the motions
    to suppress is with the conclusions rather than the under-
    lying facts. So our discussion will focus on the district
    court’s application of the law to the facts.
    No. 07-3718                                                9
    A. Search of the Vehicle
    Alexander first argues that the district court erred in
    refusing to suppress the evidence obtained from the
    search of the Buick Riviera. A defendant who objects to
    a search as violating his Fourth Amendment rights bears
    the burden of proving that he had a legitimate expectation
    of privacy in the area searched. United States v. Yang,
    
    478 F.3d 832
    , 835 (7th Cir. 2007). A person cannot have
    a reasonable expectation of privacy in abandoned
    property, United States v. Pitts, 
    322 F.3d 449
    , 455-56 (7th
    Cir. 2003), unless the abandonment results from police
    misconduct, United States v. McDonald, 
    100 F.3d 1320
    , 1328
    (7th Cir. 1996). “To demonstrate abandonment, the gov-
    ernment must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
    that the defendant’s voluntary words or actions would
    lead a reasonable person in the searching officer’s position
    to believe that the defendant relinquished his property
    interests in the item to be searched.” 
    Pitts, 322 F.3d at 456
    (citation omitted). The test is an objective one: We
    consider only “the external manifestations of the defen-
    dant’s intent as judged by a reasonable person
    possessing the same knowledge available to the” searching
    officer. 
    Id. Alexander contends
    that the district court erroneously
    found that he had abandoned the Riviera because the
    government failed to establish that he denied ownership
    of the vehicle prior to the search. Though the district court
    did not make a specific finding as to when Alexander
    denied owning the vehicle, the record establishes that
    he began denying that the car was his prior to the search.
    10                                              No. 07-3718
    Officer Schroedl’s report states that as he was walking
    Alexander back to his squad car, Alexander referred to
    the Buick Riviera, saying that it wasn’t his and it was
    “Antwan’s car.” The record also establishes that
    Alexander repeatedly said that it wasn’t his car and, more
    importantly, that Alexander already had been placed in
    the squad car by the time the search of the vehicle oc-
    curred. Thus, the record supports the finding that Alexan-
    der denied ownership of the vehicle prior to the search;
    it does not support a finding that his denials were made
    as a result of the search of the vehicle.1
    Alexander submits that not every disclaimer of owner-
    ship signifies relinquishment of a legitimate expectation
    of privacy. United States v. Ellis, 
    499 F.3d 686
    (7th Cir.
    2007), on which he relies, is unhelpful to him. In that case,
    although Ellis denied living in the home when officers
    asked him to consent to a search of the home, he later
    asserted that he lived there and the government agreed.
    
    Id. at 688-89.
    Here, in contrast, Alexander was merely a
    passenger in the vehicle, the officers knew at the time
    of the search that the vehicle was titled in another
    person’s name, and Alexander denied that the vehicle
    was his prior to the search.
    Even assuming that Alexander had an ownership or
    possessory interest in the Buick Riviera, in deciding
    whether he abandoned that interest, we look to “the
    external manifestations of [his] intent as judged by a
    1
    In any event, as discussed below, the search was lawful
    based on Bowman’s apparent authority to consent.
    No. 07-3718                                              11
    reasonable person possessing the same knowledge avail-
    able to the” searching officers. 
    Pitts, 322 F.3d at 456
    . The
    officers knew that the Buick was titled in Feljstad’s
    name and that Alexander had disclaimed that the
    vehicle was his. That is enough to establish abandonment
    despite the officers’ belief that the Buick Riviera was
    Alexander’s. Anyway, the officers had no knowledge at
    the time of the search that Alexander claimed to be the
    true owner of the Buick by virtue of making the pay-
    ments on it, as Alexander later claimed in an affidavit
    filed with the district court. A reasonable person in the
    searching officers’ position would believe that Alexander
    relinquished his property interests in the Riviera. There-
    fore, Alexander abandoned the vehicle and his Fourth
    Amendment rights were not violated by the vehicle search.
    And, as we shall see, the search of the Buick Riviera
    was also lawful on another basis—Bowman’s consent.
    Alexander first contends that Bowman’s consent to
    search was ineffective based on the extensive police
    involvement in the repossession. In Alexander’s view,
    the police did not merely assist in the repossession, but
    rather, repossessed the vehicle for Bowman, using his
    desire to repossess the Buick as a pretext to avoid the
    warrant requirement. The record establishes that Officer
    Nale had been planning to arrest Alexander before
    learning that Bowman intended to repossess the vehicle.
    And the officers stopped the Buick Riviera and arrested
    Alexander and Richmond before turning the vehicle
    over to Bowman. While the officers’ stop and arrests
    made Bowman’s job much easier and less risky, the two
    events—the stop and arrests on the one hand, and the
    12                                             No. 07-3718
    repossession on the other—were not one. Viewed in
    this way, the officers were not actively involved in the
    repossession.
    Alexander also challenges the district court’s conclu-
    sion that Bowman had apparent authority to consent to
    the search of the Buick. Apparent authority to consent to
    a search exists “when the facts available to an officer at
    the time of a search would allow a person of reasonable
    caution to believe that the consenting party had authority
    over the premises.” United States v. Ryerson, 
    545 F.3d 483
    , 489 (7th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). The court
    considers what the officers knew at the time they sought
    consent, not facts that came to light after the search
    began. United States v. Groves, 
    470 F.3d 311
    , 319 (7th Cir.
    2006). An officer has “a duty to inquire further as to a
    third party’s authority to consent to a search, if the sur-
    rounding circumstances make that person’s authority
    questionable.” United States v. Goins, 
    437 F.3d 644
    , 648
    (7th Cir. 2006).
    Alexander claims that the officers lacked sufficient
    facts to reasonably believe that Bowman had authority to
    consent. Bowman did not present any verification of his
    identity as an agent of Ultimate Repossessors, such as a
    business card or company identification, and the record
    does not reflect that any of the officers knew him from
    prior repossessions. Nor did Bowman actually share any
    paperwork, such as the order to repossess, with the
    officers.
    However, other facts known to the officers at the time
    would permit them to reasonably believe that Bowman
    No. 07-3718                                             13
    had authority over the Buick Riviera. Officer Nale had
    heard that dispatch was sending officers to stand by
    with a repossessor while he tried to repossess a vehicle.
    Officer Nale added himself to the call and contacted the
    repossessor, inquiring why he wanted the police to
    stand by. Bowman told Nale that the registered owner
    had told Bowman that the person who had the car might
    react violently to its repossession. After Officer Nale
    stopped the Buick Riviera and arrested Alexander, he
    called Bowman who came to the scene within a minute
    or so. Officer Nale identified Bowman based on his state
    driver’s license, thus confirming that he was the person
    Nale had contacted earlier regarding the repossession.
    Bowman told Nale that the Buick Riviera looked like the
    vehicle he was supposed to repossess, but he needed to
    check the VIN. According to Officer Nale, Bowman
    showed him his clipboard and Nale glanced at it. Bowman
    confirmed the VIN with his paperwork and indicated
    that the car was the one he was there to repossess. Officer
    Nale testified that he had assured himself that Bowman
    was who he claimed to be and that he had authority
    to consent to the search of the vehicle, which was based
    on the fact he was repossessing the vehicle.
    It is not surprising that Bowman arrived without any
    keys to the Buick Riviera. One would not necessarily
    expect the repossessor to have keys to the vehicle to be
    repossessed; the persons who drove the vehicle would
    be more likely to have the keys. Nor is it surprising
    that Bowman arrived without a tow truck at hand. He
    did not know, after all, the exact location where the
    14                                                No. 07-3718
    vehicle would be found and repossessed. It would only
    make sense to first locate and repossess the vehicle and
    then call for a tow truck. A repossessor cruising a neigh-
    borhood in a tow truck might not be as successful at
    locating wanted vehicles as one who arrives in a
    less noticeable form of transportation. Besides, the
    repossessor may not know what type of tow truck was
    needed until the location and condition of the vehicle
    are known.
    Alexander argues that the officers’ reliance on Bowman’s
    consent was unreasonable because the repossession
    violated state law. Wisconsin law authorizes a merchant
    to repossess collateral provided that the merchant
    does not commit a breach of the peace. Wis. Stat. Ann.
    § 425.206(2)(a). According to Alexander, the statute
    prohibits repossession when resistance by the debtor or
    a third party merely threatens a breach of the peace. For
    authority he relies on Hollibush v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 
    508 N.W.2d 449
    (Wis. Ct. App. 1993). But Hollibush does not
    stand for the proposition that the mere fear of resistance
    by the debtor is a breach of the peace. Instead, Hollibush
    held that the creditor’s agent breached the peace by
    repossessing the debtor’s vehicle when the debtor or her
    fiancé told the agent not to repossess the vehicle. 
    Id. at 455.
    Similarly, the other case relied on by Alexander also
    involved repossession in the face of the debtor’s objec-
    tion, which was found to be a breach of the peace. See
    First & Farmers Bank of Somerset, Inc. v. Henderson, 
    763 S.W.2d 137
    , 140 (Ky. Ct. App. 1988). Here, neither Fjelstad,
    Alexander, nor, for that matter, Richmond, objected to the
    repossession. Besides, the concern here is whether the
    No. 07-3718                                                15
    officers could have reasonably believed that the
    repossessor had authority to give consent. Evaluation of
    the reasonableness of their belief in the context of the
    Fourth Amendment is not dependent on every nuance
    of Wisconsin repossession law. The facts known by these
    officers were sufficient to support a reasonable belief
    that Bowman had such authority.
    The next challenge made by Alexander is that Bowman
    lacked authority to consent to the search of closed con-
    tainers within the vehicle. We need not address whether
    the scope of Bowman’s authority included closed contain-
    ers, however. Once Officer Nale opened the hood and
    discovered the brown bag inside the engine compart-
    ment, together with the informant’s tip that Alexander
    kept a gun hidden under the hood, the officers had proba-
    ble cause to believe that the bag contained a gun, which
    was contraband when possessed by Alexander, a known
    convicted felon. See United States v. Scott, 
    516 F.3d 587
    , 589
    (7th Cir. 2008) (“Probable cause to search exists ‘where
    the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to war-
    rant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that
    contraband or evidence of a crime will be found.’ ” (quot-
    ing Ornelas v. United States, 
    517 U.S. 690
    , 696 (1996))). And,
    under the automobile exception to the warrant require-
    ment, they were authorized to open the bag and seize the
    handgun. United States v. Ross, 
    456 U.S. 798
    , 820-22 (1982)
    (permissible scope of search includes containers and
    packages found inside vehicle); United States v. Johnson,
    
    383 F.3d 538
    , 546 (7th Cir. 2004) (stating that scope of
    a permissible search extends to the trunk of the vehicle
    including any containers therein); United States v. Young,
    16                                                  No. 07-3718
    
    38 F.3d 338
    , 340 (7th Cir. 1994) (“A search of an auto-
    mobile based on probable cause lawfully extends to all
    parts of the vehicle in which contraband or evidence
    could be concealed, including closed compartments
    and trunks.”).
    We conclude that the warrantless search of the Buick
    Riviera and the bag found in the engine compartment
    was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Accord-
    ingly, the district court correctly denied Alexander’s
    motion to suppress the gun seized during that search.2
    B. Entry and Search of the Apartment
    Alexander challenges the district court’s refusal to
    suppress the handgun and ammunition obtained from
    the search of the apartment. He maintains that the
    officers’ re-entry into the apartment was unlawful, that
    the officers lacked probable cause to search the apart-
    ment, and that Harris’s consent to search was not volun-
    tarily given.
    Alexander argues that exigent circumstances did not
    justify the re-entry into the apartment and subsequent
    seizure of evidence. The presence (or not) of exigent
    circumstances in this case is beside the point. In Segura v.
    2
    We need not rely on the search incident to arrest exception,
    so Arizona v. Gant, 
    129 S. Ct. 1710
    (2009), has no direct bearing
    on this case—except that we note that the Supreme Court
    continues to recognize the automobile exception to the
    warrant requirement. 
    Id. at 1721.
    No. 07-3718                                                17
    United States, 
    468 U.S. 796
    (1984), the Supreme Court held
    that an illegal entry upon the premises did not require
    the suppression of evidence later discovered pursuant to
    a valid search warrant issued on the basis of information
    wholly unconnected to the illegal entry. 
    Id. at 813-14.
    The illegality of the entry is irrelevant to the admissibility
    of evidence obtained through an independent source.
    
    Id. The Court
    also held that officers who have probable
    cause may enter and secure the premises from within
    to preserve the status quo while a search warrant is
    obtained without violating the Fourth Amendment’s
    prohibition of unreasonable seizures. 
    Id. at 810.
      Thus, whether the officers’ re-entry into Harris’s apart-
    ment was illegal is irrelevant. None of the information
    which would support the issuance of a search war-
    rant was based on anything the officers learned from
    their re-entry into the apartment. They did not conduct
    a search of the apartment immediately upon re-entering.
    Instead, they entered to secure the premises to prevent
    the destruction of evidence while they sought to obtain
    a search warrant. This they could lawfully do, provided
    they had probable cause.
    So, we turn to that question. “Probable cause to search
    exists ‘where the known facts and circumstances are
    sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the
    belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
    found.’ ” 
    Scott, 516 F.3d at 589
    (quoting Ornelas v. United
    States, 
    517 U.S. 690
    , 696 (1996)). The probable cause deter-
    mination asks whether “given the totality of the circum-
    stances, there is a fair probability that contraband or
    18                                              No. 07-3718
    evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.”
    
    Id. (quotation omitted).
       According to Alexander, the highly detailed tip pro-
    vided to the police was corroborated only by illegally
    obtained evidence, namely, the handgun found in the
    Buick Riviera and, without that, the officers lacked proba-
    ble cause to search the apartment. Police corroboration
    of an informant’s tip is valuable in determining the reli-
    ability of the tip and, ultimately, in establishing probable
    cause. United States v. Wiley, 
    475 F.3d 908
    , 916 (7th Cir.
    2007); United States v. Olson, 
    408 F.3d 366
    , 372 (7th Cir.
    2005). Alexander is right that the discovery of the hand-
    gun corroborated the tip. But he is wrong to believe this
    poses a problem. As addressed above, the gun was not
    illegally obtained.
    Alexander also challenges the district court’s con-
    clusion that the dog’s alert provided probable cause to
    search. He disputes whether the dog was sufficiently
    reliable based on his failure to alert initially to the door-
    way. It may be that the dog’s alert on the second try would
    be insufficient, by itself, to establish probable cause. Yet
    probable cause is based on the totality of the circum-
    stances. Probable cause to search the apartment existed
    independent of the dog’s positive alert. The dog’s alert
    merely provided another circumstance supporting the
    reasonable belief that the apartment contained drugs.
    Because the officers had probable cause to search the
    apartment, they lawfully could enter the apartment to
    secure it and maintain the status quo while obtaining
    a search warrant.
    No. 07-3718                                              19
    Moreover, a warrant to search the apartment would
    have been issued. Thus, the search was lawful notwith-
    standing Harris’s consent. Under the inevitable dis-
    covery doctrine, the exclusionary rule is inapplicable
    where the government establishes by a preponderance of
    the evidence “that the information ultimately or
    inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.”
    Nix v. Williams, 
    467 U.S. 431
    , 444 (1984); see also United
    States v. Tejada, 
    524 F.3d 809
    , 813 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating
    in the context of a warrantless search that the inevitable
    discovery doctrine applies where the government estab-
    lishes “that a warrant would certainly . . . have been
    issued had it been applied for”). The government has
    met that burden here.
    As we said, the officers had probable cause to search the
    apartment. In addition, they had begun the process of
    obtaining a search warrant. Sgt. Kosovac directed Officer
    Schroedl to return to the police station to draft a search
    warrant application and Schroedl already had left to
    do that very thing. A warrant surely would have been
    issued had he completed the process of applying for
    one. And there is no reason to believe that he wouldn’t
    have done so in the absence of Harris’s consent to
    search. Therefore, the handgun and ammunition were
    admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine.
    Furthermore, Harris did give her consent to search.
    Though Harris’s consent is irrelevant given the
    inevitable discovery doctrine, we will consider whether
    her consent was voluntary as this would provide an
    independent basis for upholding the apartment search.
    20                                               No. 07-3718
    The voluntariness of a consent to search is a factual
    determination, which we review for clear error. United
    States v. Johnson, 
    495 F.3d 536
    , 541 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
    
    128 S. Ct. 725
    (2007). The government bears the burden of
    proving voluntariness. 
    Id. In determining
    the voluntari-
    ness, we consider the totality of the circumstances, in-
    cluding such factors as:
    (1) the person’s age, intelligence, and education,
    (2) whether [s]he was advised of h[er] constitutional
    rights, (3) how long [s]he was detained before [s]he
    gave h[er] consent, (4) whether h[er] consent was
    immediate, or was prompted by repeated requests
    by the authorities, (5) whether any physical coercion
    was used, and (6) whether the individual was in
    police custody when [s]he gave h[er] consent.
    
    Id. at 542
    (quotation omitted).
    Alexander identifies several factors to support his
    claim that Harris’s consent was not voluntary: she was
    22 years old; her only prior interaction with the police
    had been related to traffic violations; she did not consent
    immediately but only after the officers persisted; at least
    three officers were present; she believed the officers
    would tear the place apart if she refused to consent; they
    advised her that if she refused consent and any contra-
    band was found, she would be arrested; and they repre-
    sented that they would obtain a search warrant. As to
    these last two points, an officer’s factually accurate state-
    ment that the police will take lawful investigative action
    in the absence of cooperation is not coercive conduct. See
    United States v. Miller, 
    450 F.3d 270
    , 272-73 (7th Cir. 2006),
    No. 07-3718                                                   21
    abrogated on other grounds by Kimbrough v. United States,
    
    552 U.S. 85
    (2007). There is no reason to doubt that the
    officers would have obtained a search warrant had
    they applied for one, and they could have arrested
    Harris upon discovering contraband in her apartment.
    Both the magistrate judge and district judge con-
    sidered the relevant factors and determined that
    Harris’s consent was voluntarily given. The findings,
    based on Harris’s own testimony, that Harris “is intelli-
    gent, articulate, and strong-willed” and “refused to
    consent until she decided, on her own, that it was in her
    best interest” are not clearly erroneous. Harris chose to
    change her mind and voluntarily gave her consent to
    search. The district court did not err in finding that
    her consent was voluntary.
    That doesn’t end our inquiry, though, as Alexander
    claims that the officers’ illegal entry into the apartment
    tainted Harris’s consent. Even assuming that the officers’
    re-entry was illegal, suppression would not be required.
    Where “consent is obtained pursuant to an illegal entry,
    the burden of persuasion is on the government to demon-
    strate that the consent was not tainted by the illegal
    entry.” United States v. Robeles-Ortega, 
    348 F.3d 679
    , 683 (7th
    Cir. 2003) (citation omitted). The government may make
    this showing by establishing that “the consent was ob-
    tained by means sufficiently distinguishable from that
    illegal . . . entry so as to be purged of the primary taint.” 
    Id. Factors we
    consider in determining whether an illegal
    entry tainted consent include: “(1) the temporal proximity
    of the illegal entry and the consent, (2) the presence of
    22                                            No. 07-3718
    intervening circumstances, and, particularly, (3) the
    purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” 
    Id. at 681.
    The district court did not apply these factors
    because it believed that the re-entry was legal. Our ap-
    plication leads us to the conclusion that the re-entry did
    not taint Harris’s consent.
    The temporal proximity of the alleged illegal re-entry
    and Harris’s consent is unclear, but the record reveals
    that the consent did not follow right on the heels of the
    officers’ re-entry. There was enough time between the re-
    entry and Harris’s consent for the following to occur: the
    officers explained the warrant application process to
    Harris and requested her consent, which was refused;
    Sgt. Kosovac retrieved a written consent form from her
    squad car and returned to the apartment to review it
    with Harris; Harris verbally consented but then refused
    to sign the form; Officer Schroedl left to prepare a
    warrant application; Harris phoned Alexander’s mother
    to discuss the situation at which point Harris decided to
    consent to search; and Sgt. Kosovac reviewed the
    written consent form with Harris. These facts reflect not
    only the passage of time but also intervening circum-
    stances—Harris’s call to Alexander’s mother and subse-
    quent decision to execute the consent form. As for the
    third factor, the purpose of re-entry was to secure
    the premises and maintain the status quo. The officers
    did not search the apartment and did not discover any
    evidence to use to coerce Harris’s consent. Nor is there
    any suggestion that they used force or violence to en-
    ter—they knocked on the door and, when Harris
    opened it, they entered without seeking her permission.
    No. 07-3718                                              23
    Alexander submits that the re-entry was calculated to
    surprise and confuse Harris, but the manner of the
    entry does not bear this claim out. Indeed, the re-entry
    was prompted by the dog’s alert on the second try.
    Our consideration of the relevant factors leads to the
    conclusion that the re-entry did not taint Harris’s consent.
    For all of these reasons, we conclude that the district
    court properly refused to suppress the handgun and
    ammunition found in Harris’s apartment.
    III. Conclusion
    We A FFIRM the district court’s judgment.
    7-21-09