Emery, Gillian v. Gallo, Frank ( 2009 )


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  •                            In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 08-1315
    IN RE:
    F RANK G ALLO,
    Debtor-Appellee.
    A PPEAL OF:
    G ILLIAN A. E MERY
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of Illinois.
    No. 2:07-cv-02182-MPM-DGB—Michael P. McCuskey, Chief Judge.
    A RGUED A PRIL 7, 2009—D ECIDED JULY 20, 2009
    Before P OSNER, R IPPLE and W OOD , Circuit Judges.
    R IPPLE, Circuit Judge. Frank Gallo initiated a bankruptcy
    proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court for
    the Central District of Illinois under 11 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.
    His former wife, Gillian Emery, filed a proof of claim
    2                                                   No. 08-1315
    with the bankruptcy court for slander of title.1 See 11
    U.S.C. § 553. Mr. Gallo later filed a motion under 11
    U.S.C. § 542(b), seeking an order requiring Ms. Emery to
    pay the bankruptcy trustee the amount that she owed
    under an Illinois marriage dissolution judgment. The
    bankruptcy court entered an order denying Ms. Emery’s
    proof of claim and directing her to pay $125,062.97 to
    the bankruptcy trustee; the district court later affirmed.
    For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the
    judgment of the district court.
    I
    BACKGROUND
    A.
    In 2002, Frank Gallo and Gillian Emery initiated a
    divorce proceeding in the Circuit Court of the Sixth
    Judicial Circuit, Champaign County, Illinois (“Illinois
    circuit court”). During this time, Mr. Gallo also had a
    bankruptcy action pending under Chapter 13 of the
    Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq. On July 27,
    2004, the Illinois circuit court entered a dissolution order
    awarding Ms. Emery property on Sanibel Island, Florida
    (“the Sanibel Property”). The order specified that
    Ms. Emery was to receive the property “free and clear
    of any interest [of Mr. Gallo].” R.3, Ex. 7 at 11. The parties
    1
    This tort is also referred to as “disparagement of title.” Palm
    Devs., Inc. v. Ridgdill & Sons, Inc., No. 2:08-cv-322-FtM-DNF,
    
    2009 WL 513027
    , at *4 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 27, 2009).
    No. 08-1315                                                         3
    stipulated that, at the time of the Illinois circuit court’s
    order, the Sanibel Property had a value of $310,000. R.3,
    Ex. 7 at 3. The court further directed Ms. Emery to pay
    the bankruptcy trustee a total of $125,062.97.2
    Mr. Gallo transferred his interest in the Sanibel
    Property to Ms. Emery, but Ms. Emery failed to make any
    payments to the bankruptcy trustee as required by the
    Illinois circuit court’s dissolution order. Consequently,
    on November 29, 2004, Mr. Gallo’s attorney filed a
    lis pendens notice against the Sanibel Property.3
    2
    Specifically, the court ordered Ms. Emery to pay the bank-
    ruptcy trustee: (1) $27,087.50 for dissipated art work;
    (2) $43,388.15 for the balance due on a loan; (3) approximately
    $41,144 for obligations owed to the Internal Revenue Service;
    (4) $7,393.32 in marital credit card debt; and (5) $6,050 for the
    value of a boat retained by Ms. Emery. The bankruptcy court
    granted relief from the automatic stay in the bankruptcy
    proceeding to allow the Illinois circuit court to enter judg-
    ment regarding the distribution of marital assets and liabilities.
    The bankruptcy proceeding was later dismissed voluntarily by
    Mr. Gallo just prior to the filing of his present bankruptcy
    petition.
    3
    Under Florida law, the acts of Mr. Gallo’s attorney are
    imputed to Mr. Gallo. See Traylor v. State, 
    596 So. 2d 957
    , 979
    (Fla. 1992) (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
    (“Florida law, for example, has long been settled that the acts
    of an attorney are imputed to the client so completely that the
    attorney legally is the alter ego of the client except in extreme
    circumstances . . . .”); State v. Daniels, 
    826 So. 2d 1045
    , 1047 (Fla.
    Dist. Ct. App. 2002) (citing Traylor concurrence). The bankruptcy
    (continued...)
    4                                                 No. 08-1315
    Ms. Emery entered into negotiations with a property
    developer, Adam Menkus. She claims that he offered her
    $710,000 to purchase the Sanibel Property, but that the
    sale fell through when the parties discovered the
    lis pendens filed by Mr. Gallo. On February 23, 2005,
    Ms. Emery received a $350,000 loan, secured by a
    mortgage on the Sanibel Property; she used the
    proceeds toward the purchase of a home worth $705,000.
    On June 29, 2005, Ms. Emery obtained a default judg-
    ment from the Circuit Court of the Twentieth Judicial
    Circuit for Lee County, Florida (“Florida circuit court”),
    quieting title to the Sanibel Property and discharging
    the lis pendens. On September 16, 2005, Ms. Emery sold
    the Sanibel Property for $490,000.
    B.
    On June 30, 2005, Mr. Gallo filed the present action, a
    second Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding. A major part
    of the funding of Mr. Gallo’s Chapter 13 plan relied upon
    Ms. Emery’s payment of the funds that the Illinois
    circuit court had ordered her to pay Mr. Gallo.
    In this proceeding, Ms. Emery filed a proof of claim for
    slander of title under Florida law. See 11 U.S.C. § 553. The
    3
    (...continued)
    court therefore found that, although Mr. Gallo did not have
    knowledge that his attorney was filing a lis pendens notice,
    there was no evidence that the attorney acted outside the
    scope of his implied authority. In re Frank Gallo, No. 05-92345
    (Bankr. C.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2007).
    No. 08-1315                                              5
    basis for this claim was the lis pendens notice filed by
    Mr. Gallo; Ms. Emery claimed that the filing of the
    lis pendens notice resulted in her losing the opportunity
    to sell her property to Menkus. Mr. Gallo sought an order
    that would direct Ms. Emery to pay the amount that
    she owed the estate under the Illinois circuit court’s
    dissolution judgment. See 11 U.S.C. § 542(b). Ms. Emery
    attempted to reduce the amount she owed by the
    amount of damage she sustained from the alleged
    slander of title. In its subsequent ruling, the bankruptcy
    court denied Ms. Emery’s proof of claim and granted
    the turnover order requested by Mr. Gallo. The district
    court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order. Ms. Emery
    filed this timely appeal.
    II
    DISCUSSION
    We review factual findings of the bankruptcy court
    for clear error and review conclusions of law de novo.
    In re Bonnett, 
    895 F.2d 1155
    , 1157 (7th Cir. 1989).
    The ultimate issue that we must decide is whether the
    bankruptcy court and the district court were correct in
    holding that Ms. Emery’s obligation to pay the Chapter 13
    trustee under the terms of the Illinois circuit court
    order should not be offset by the allowance of her proof
    of claim for slander of title against Mr. Gallo. To resolve
    this contention, we must address two issues raised by
    Ms. Emery: (1) whether she has a valid claim for slander
    of title and (2) whether the bankruptcy court erred in
    6                                                     No. 08-1315
    ordering the turnover despite her alleged inability to pay
    the amount in question.
    A.
    Ms. Emery submits that Mr. Gallo committed slander
    of title by improperly filing the lis pendens notice. The
    notice was false, she claims, because Mr. Gallo does not
    have a cognizable claim to the Sanibel Property based on
    the money judgment from the Illinois circuit court. She
    observes that the court awarded her the Sanibel Property
    “free and clear of any interest [of Mr. Gallo]” and that
    the Florida circuit court quieted title.4 R.3, Ex. 7 at 11.
    Ms. Emery contends that Mr. Gallo did not establish that
    he acted in good faith in filing the lis pendens notice
    because he presented no evidence regarding his motive
    4
    Ms. Emery claims that these two decisions bind this court.
    However, the Illinois circuit court did not address what the
    status of the Sanibel Property would be if Ms. Emery failed to
    comply with the dissolution order. The Florida circuit court
    decision does not have preclusive effect on this court because
    it was a default judgment. See Meyer v. Rigdon, 
    36 F.3d 1375
    ,
    1379 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that “a default judgment is
    normally not given preclusive effect under the collateral
    estoppel doctrine because no issue has been actually litigated”)
    (citation and quotation marks omitted). These cases do not
    address the issue before us, which is whether Mr. Gallo commit-
    ted the tort of slander of title at the time his attorney filed the
    lis pendens. As we shall demonstrate in the text that follows,
    the fact that Ms. Emery had clear title before the filing of the
    lis pendens and after the Florida circuit court’s quiet-title action
    is not analytically relevant to our resolution of that issue.
    No. 08-1315                                                7
    for doing so and because he lacked a bona fide claim to
    the Sanibel Property. Specifically, Ms. Emery main-
    tains that Mr. Gallo filed the lis pendens without legal
    justification because, at the time of filing, there was no
    ongoing litigation regarding the Sanibel Property. She
    further contends that she suffered damages because
    Menkus would have paid her $710,000 for the Sanibel
    Property if it had not been subject to a lis pendens.
    We must decide whether Mr. Gallo committed slander
    of title when he filed a lis pendens against the Sanibel
    Property. To establish a claim for slander or disparage-
    ment of title under Florida law,5 a party must show the
    following:
    (1) A falsehood (2) has been published, or communi-
    cated to a third person (3) when the defen-
    dant-publisher knows or reasonably should know that
    it will likely result in inducing others not to deal with
    the plaintiff and (4) in fact, the falsehood does play a
    material and substantial part in inducing others not to
    deal with the plaintiff; and (5) special damages are
    proximately caused as a result of the published false-
    hood.
    Palm Devs., Inc. v. Ridgdill & Sons, Inc., No.
    2:08-cv-322-FtM-DNF, 
    2009 WL 513027
    , at *4 (M.D. Fla.
    Feb. 27, 2009) (quoting McAllister v. Breakers Seville Ass’n,
    
    981 So. 2d 566
    , 573 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008)). If Ms.
    Emery establishes these elements, the burden would
    5
    The parties do not dispute that Florida law governs
    Ms. Emery’s slander of title claim.
    8                                                 No. 08-1315
    shift to Mr. Gallo to raise an affirmative defense of privi-
    lege, such as good faith. See Residential Cmtys. of Am. v.
    Escondido Cmty. Ass’n, 
    645 So. 2d 149
    , 150 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
    App. 1994). If Mr. Gallo, in turn, meets his burden, the
    burden then would shift back to Ms. Emery to prove
    actual malice. See 
    id. Whether Mr.
    Gallo acted in good faith
    is a question of fact. See Allington Towers Condo. N. v.
    Allington Towers N., 
    415 So. 2d 118
    , 119 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
    1982).
    We first must consider whether the lis pendens consti-
    tutes a falsehood. The Supreme Court of Florida has
    said that “[t]he purpose of a notice of lis pendens is to
    alert creditors, prospective purchasers and others to the
    fact that the title to a particular piece of real property
    is involved in litigation.” S & T Builders v. Globe Props.,
    
    944 So. 2d 302
    , 303 n.1 (Fla. 2006) (citation and quotation
    marks omitted); see also Fla. Stat. § 48.23 (2008). Lis pendens
    “protect[s] the plaintiff from intervening liens that
    could impair any property rights claimed and also from
    possible extinguishment of the plaintiff’s unrecorded
    equitable lien.” Chiusolo v. Kennedy, 
    614 So. 2d 491
    , 492
    (Fla. 1993). It is proper where “the proponent can estab-
    lish a fair nexus between the apparent legal or equitable
    ownership of the property and the dispute embodied in
    the lawsuit.” 
    Id. Ms. Emery
    maintains that the lis pendens notice was
    false because Mr. Gallo did not have an equitable
    interest in the Sanibel Property. The transfer of the
    Sanibel Property, as well as the payment to the bank-
    ruptcy trustee, both were governed by the same
    No. 08-1315                                                      9
    dissolution order. At the time the Illinois circuit court
    entered this order, it noted that the allocation of marital
    property was “unequal” and favored Ms. Emery, but
    noted that “the inequity of the distribution” would be
    “somewhat offset” by the payments Ms. Emery would
    make to the bankruptcy trustee to fund Mr. Gallo’s Chap-
    ter 13 Plan of Reorganization in the then-pending bank-
    ruptcy, R.3, Ex. 7 at 14; the payment to the trustee
    was necessary to make the distribution of assets more
    equitable. The money that Ms. Emery owed Mr. Gallo,
    therefore, was very clearly related to the award of the
    Sanibel Property. By November 2004, Mr. Gallo had
    complied with the order by transferring his interest in
    the Sanibel Property to Ms. Emery; however, Ms. Emery
    had not satisfied her responsibilities under the order
    because she had failed to pay the bankruptcy trustee
    $125,062.97. Mr. Gallo has an equitable interest in the
    Sanibel Property and could have sought a lien on it in a
    Florida state court as a remedy for Ms. Emery’s non-
    compliance with the dissolution judgment. See Wolk v.
    Leak, 
    70 So. 2d 498
    , 501 (Fla. 1954) (affirming circuit
    court’s decision to place an equitable lien on the former
    husband’s property where the former husband owed
    alimony and child support under an Ohio divorce decree).6
    6
    An out-of-state court does not have in rem jurisdiction over
    property in Florida, although it may place a constructive trust
    on such property. Hirchert v. Hirchert Family Trust, 
    988 So. 2d 63
    ,
    65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). Because “[t]he imposition of an
    equitable lien is considered an in rem action,” an Illinois court
    (continued...)
    10                                                      No. 08-1315
    Ms. Emery also submits that Mr. Gallo filed the
    lis pendens at a time when the Sanibel Property was not
    the subject of litigation. She maintains that, under
    Florida law, a lis pendens may not be filed in such circum-
    stances. The bankruptcy court took the view that “it
    was altogether possible that litigation could have en-
    sued” in the Illinois circuit court, and that Mr. Gallo
    could have sought to rescind the transfer of title of the
    Sanibel Property. In re Gallo, No. 05-92345 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
    Aug. 29, 2007).
    As we have noted, the purpose of lis pendens is to
    alert others to the fact that the title to a piece of real
    property is the subject of litigation. See S & T 
    Builders, 944 So. 2d at 303
    n.1. Furthermore, Florida Statute
    § 48.23(1)(a) (2008) states:
    No action in any of the state or federal courts in this
    state operates as a lis pendens on any real or personal
    property involved therein or to be affected thereby
    6
    (...continued)
    would not have authority to place an equitable lien on Florida
    property. In re Scott, 
    347 B.R. 917
    , 919 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006).
    However, the Illinois circuit court could render a judgment
    affecting indirectly the Sanibel Property because it had juris-
    diction over both the parties to the dissolution and the
    property settlement action in Illinois, see Iannazzo v. Stanson, 
    927 So. 2d 1005
    , 1007 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). See also Fall v. Eastin,
    
    215 U.S. 1
    , 8 (1909) (“A court of equity, having authority to act
    upon the person, may indirectly act upon real estate in an-
    other state, through the instrumentality of this authority over
    the person.”).
    No. 08-1315                                                    11
    until a notice of the commencement of the action is
    recorded in the office of the clerk of the circuit court
    of the county where the property is, which notice
    contains the names of the parties, the time of institu-
    tion of the action, the name of the court in which it
    is pending, a description of the property involved or
    to be affected, and a statement of the relief sought as
    to the property.7
    We do not believe that this language allows for a lis
    pendens notice to be filed based on the mere possi-
    bility of future litigation. See generally 51 Am. Jur. 2d
    Lis Pendens § 50 (observing that in some states, “a notice
    of lis pendens filed before the commencement of the
    action is a nullity”). Moreover, there are apparently
    substantial constraints under Florida law as to when
    property can be considered sufficiently related to the
    underlying litigation to be the proper subject of a
    lis pendens notice. It appears to be established that a
    lis pendens notice can be issued to give notice of the
    7
    This subsection has been amended, effective July 1, 2009. It
    now reads:
    (1)(a) An action in any of the state or federal courts in this
    state operates as a lis pendens on any real or personal
    property involved therein or to be affected thereby only if
    a notice of lis pendens is recorded in the official records
    of the county where the property is located and such notice
    has not expired pursuant to subsection (2) or been with-
    drawn or discharged.
    Fla. Stat. § 48.23 (West July 1, 2009).
    12                                               No. 08-1315
    pendency of an action for dissolution of a marriage and
    equitable division of property. See Seligman v. N. Am.
    Mortgage Co., 
    781 So. 2d 1159
    , 1163 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001)
    (holding that wife’s notice of lis pendens on marital
    property was properly filed and gave the wife priority
    over a subsequently filed mortgage). It is less clear, how-
    ever, that a lis pendens is the proper device for a spouse
    to give notice to third parties of intent to enforce an
    equity payment against other marital property awarded
    with clear title to the other spouse. See Brown v. Brown, 
    732 So. 2d 1169
    , 1171 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (“And while
    the appellant failed to make the full equity payment
    specified in the agreement, a lis pendens does not
    pertain upon a payment which is merely related to but
    which does not affect the alienability of the subject prop-
    erty.”). The rule articulated in Brown seems to apply
    when the action seeks to enforce a foreign judgment
    against property in Florida. See Tortu v. Tortu, 
    430 So. 2d 531
    , 532 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (“[A] complaint which
    will not support a claim against the specific property at
    issue cannot provide a basis for tying it up by filing of
    notice of lis pendens.”) (citations and quotation marks
    omitted).
    However, even if we assume that the notice of lis
    pendens was filed in error, that conclusion does not
    establish slander of title. See Allington 
    Towers, 415 So. 2d at 119
    . Slander of title is subject to an affirmative defense
    of good faith. 
    Id. Mr. Gallo
    asserted such a defense when
    he claimed that he had a credible equitable right in the
    Sanibel Property, a right he was attempting to enforce
    in the Illinois circuit court and subject to satisfaction
    No. 08-1315                                                      13
    through a lien on the Sanibel Property. Cf. Residential
    Communities of 
    Am., 645 So. 2d at 150
    (holding that
    appellee did not act with actual malice because, although
    it did not have authority to unilaterally enact an amend-
    ment to a condominium declaration, it had a good faith
    belief that it acted permissibly). There is, moreover, no
    evidence that he acted with actual malice when he filed
    the notice.8 We believe that the bankruptcy court was
    on solid ground, after hearing the witnesses and
    evaluating the evidence, to determine that Mr. Gallo’s
    good faith had been established and that there was no
    showing of malice on his part.
    8
    In commenting on the scope of the privilege created by a good
    faith defense to a slander of title action, one Florida court
    relied upon Prosser’s Law of Torts:
    A rival claimant to the property disparaged, in his capacity
    as such, is recognized as privileged to assert a bona fide
    claim by any appropriate means of publication . . . [.] The
    privilege is uniformly held, however, to be a qualified one,
    and it is defeated if the defendant’s motive is shown to be
    solely a desire to do harm, or if it is found that he did not
    honestly believe his statements to be true, or that the
    publication of the statement was excessive. A few cases
    have gone further and have said that he must have reason-
    able grounds for believing his disparaging words to be
    the truth; but the better view, which is now more generally
    accepted, is that a genuine belief in their truth is sufficient,
    however unfounded or unreasonable it may be.
    Allington Towers Condo. N. v. Allington Towers N., 
    415 So. 2d 118
    ,
    119-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (quoting W. Prosser, Law
    of Torts, § 128 (4th ed. 1971)) (alteration in original).
    14                                                  No. 08-1315
    The bankruptcy court also concluded that Ms. Emery
    has not carried her burden of establishing, by a preponder-
    ance of the evidence, that she has suffered damages
    from the statement in the lis pendens notice. On this
    record, we believe that the bankruptcy court’s determina-
    tion must be sustained. Ms. Emery claims that Menkus
    offered her $710,000 for the sale of her home, but that this
    opportunity was lost because of Mr. Gallo’s false state-
    ment that the Sanibel Property was subject to ongoing
    litigation. As the bankruptcy court noted, however, she
    has not been able to produce a written contract with
    respect to that transaction.9 Furthermore, the evidence
    9
    At trial, Ms. Emery testified that there was a written contract,
    although at her deposition she had testified that she did not
    remember a written contract. At trial she testified as follows:
    BY MR. BADDLEY:
    Q. And you don’t remember there being a contract
    with Mr. Menkes, do you?
    A. I remember actually there was a contract, but I
    couldn’t find it.
    Q. Okay, well, I’m going to read from page 34, beginning
    on line 25—line 23.
    “Did you sign a contract?
    A. We didn’t use real estate agents.”
    And then I said,
    “My question is whether he signed a contract,”
    And you answered:
    (continued...)
    No. 08-1315                                               15
    in the record suggests strongly that any such offer
    would have been far in excess of the Sanibel Property’s
    value. Ms. Emery sold it in September 2005 for $490,000.
    The record shows that, in February of that year, Ms. Emery
    had secured a mortgage of $350,000 on the Sanibel
    Property despite the lis pendens notice. The district court
    aptly characterized Ms. Emery’s proof of damages as
    “unconvincing,” and we agree with the district court’s
    conclusion that the decision of the bankruptcy court
    must be sustained.
    We also see no basis for awarding attorneys’ fees to
    Ms. Emery for her action to quiet title in the Florida
    courts. Since she has not established a prima facie case
    for slander of title in this bankruptcy action, she certainly
    cannot establish a right to attorneys’ fees on the basis
    of this litigation. Nor do we believe that the default
    judgment to quiet title in the Florida circuit court can
    be deemed a basis for her seeking attorneys’ fees here.
    She has offered no proof that the Florida court awarded
    those fees. Moreover, her damages would be limited to
    the amount of a surety bond and the record contains no
    evidence of the existence of such a bond or its amount.
    See S & T 
    Builders, 944 So. 2d at 305-06
    .
    9
    (...continued)
    “I don’t remember a contract.”
    Did I read that correctly?
    A. You remem—yes, you read it correctly.
    Tr. of Hearing on Debtor’s Motion for Turnover at 32.
    16                                              No. 08-1315
    B.
    Ms. Emery also submits that the bankruptcy court erred
    in granting Mr. Gallo’s motion for turnover because the
    court failed to establish that she was able to make the
    payment. Ms. Emery maintains that she has no tangible
    funds available and that the real estate she owns in
    Florida is exempt from creditors under the Florida home-
    stead exemption.
    The bankruptcy court properly granted Mr. Gallo’s
    motion for turnover. It is undisputed that the Illinois
    circuit court’s dissolution judgment is a valid final order.
    See 11 U.S.C. § 542(b) (“an entity that owes a debt that
    is property of the estate and that is matured, payable
    on demand, or payable on order, shall pay such debt to, or
    on the order of, the trustee”). Moreover, Ms. Emery has
    failed to establish that the bankruptcy court had any
    obligation to ensure her ability to pay the judgment
    before granting the turnover motion. If the bankruptcy
    court later attempts to hold Ms. Emery in civil contempt
    for failing to comply with its order, then Ms. Emery can
    put forth evidence that she attempted to comply with
    the order, but lacked the financial resources to do so.
    See Am. Fletcher Mortgage Co. v. Bass, 
    688 F.2d 513
    , 517
    (7th Cir. 1982) (“The district court may find a defendant
    in civil contempt if he has not been reasonably diligent
    and energetic in attempting to accomplish what was
    ordered.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
    Ms. Emery’s attempt to raise the homestead exemption
    is premature. At this time, the bankruptcy court has not
    attempted to place a lien on Ms. Emery’s home or to
    No. 08-1315                                                       17
    force her to sell her home to satisfy the turnover order.1 0
    Consequently, whether the homestead exemption is
    applicable to Ms. Emery is an issue that is not yet ripe
    for review.11
    10
    See Orange Brevard Plumbing & Heating Co. v. La Croix, 
    137 So. 2d
    201, 204 (Fla. 1962) (noting that the Florida Constitution
    homestead exemption’s “design and purpose is to benefit the
    debtor by securing to him his homestead beyond all liability
    from forced sale under process of any court”); Rossano v.
    Britesmile, Inc., 
    919 So. 2d 551
    , 552 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
    (“[T]he proceeds of a voluntary sale of a homestead to be
    exempt from the claims of creditors just as the homestead itself
    is exempt if, and only if, the vendor shows, by a preponderance
    of the evidence an abiding good faith intention prior to and at
    the time of the sale of the homestead to reinvest the proceeds
    thereof in another homestead within a reasonable time.”)
    (citations and quotation marks omitted). But see Palm Beach
    Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Fishbein, 
    619 So. 2d 267
    , 270 (Fla. 1993)
    (noting that the homestead exemption should not be applied
    where the homeowner acted fraudulently).
    11
    See Wis. Cent., Ltd. v. Shannon, 
    539 F.3d 751
    , 759 (7th Cir. 2008)
    (observing that ripeness “is predicated on the central percep-
    tion . . . that courts should not render decisions absent a
    genuine need to resolve a real dispute” and further noting that
    “[c]ases are unripe when the parties point only to hypothetical,
    speculative, or illusory disputes as opposed to actual, concrete
    conflicts”) (citations and quotation marks omitted) (alterations
    in original).
    18                                           No. 08-1315
    Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
    court is affirmed.
    A FFIRMED
    7-20-09