Angie Ortega v. Eric Holder, Jr. ( 2010 )


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  •                               In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 08-3642
    A NGIE O RTEGA,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    E RIC H. H OLDER, JR., Attorney
    General of the United States,
    et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 1:08-cv-01121—Blanche M. Manning, Judge.
    A RGUED A PRIL 15, 2009—D ECIDED JANUARY 15, 2010
    Before F LAUM, R IPPLE and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
    R IPPLE, Circuit Judge. Angie Ortega brought this action
    for a declaration of nationality pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
    § 1503(a). The Government moved to dismiss the
    complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The
    district court granted the motion, and Ms. Ortega ap-
    pealed. For the reasons set forth in the following opinion,
    2                                               No. 08-3642
    we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand
    for further proceedings.
    I
    BACKGROUND
    The Government commenced removal proceedings
    against Ms. Ortega in September 2001; during the pro-
    ceedings, Ms. Ortega claimed as a defense her status as a
    national of the United States. On April 12, 2002, while
    removal proceedings were pending, Ms. Ortega filed a
    Form N-600 Application for Certificate of Citizenship. The
    Chicago office of the former Immigration and Naturaliza-
    tion Service (“INS”) denied the application twelve days
    later, without a hearing. Ms. Ortega appealed the denial of
    her application to the Office of Administrative Appeals
    (“AAO”).
    On May 7, 2002—the day after Ms. Ortega filed her
    administrative appeal with the AAO—the Immigration
    Judge (“IJ”) terminated the removal proceedings with
    prejudice. The IJ determined that she had “established
    that she acquired U.S. Citizenship through her [United
    States citizen] father Alfredo Ortega pursuant to 301(g)” of
    the Immigration and Nationality Act. R.1, Ex. 2. The
    Government did not appeal the IJ’s decision.
    On February 28, 2003, the AAO denied Ms. Ortega’s
    administrative appeal with respect to her application for a
    certificate of citizenship. On March 28, 2003, Ms. Ortega’s
    counsel filed a motion to reconsider and to reopen with
    the AAO, which brought to the AAO’s attention the
    evidence presented to, and ruling of, the IJ. The AAO,
    No. 08-3642                                              3
    however, returned Ms. Ortega’s fee and motion on
    April 14, 2003, and directed her to submit her request to
    the local district office that made the original decision.
    Ms. Ortega re-filed her motion with the local district
    office on April 22, 2003; with this motion, she included a
    letter explaining that she originally had submitted her
    filing within the thirty-day window provided in 8 C.F.R.
    § 103.5, but mistakenly had sent it directly to the AAO.
    Over four years later, on August 17, 2007, the AAO
    denied Ms. Ortega’s motion as untimely. See R.14, Ex. C. In
    rejecting Ms. Ortega’s motion, the AAO first noted the
    requirement, under 8 C.F.R. § 103.5, to file a motion
    within thirty days. It then observed that, “[b]y the appli-
    cant’s counsel’s own admission, the instant motion
    was sent erroneously to the AAO on March 28, 2003, and
    was not properly filed with the Chicago district office
    until April 23, 2003, almost two months after the
    issuance of the AAO’s decision.” R.79. The AAO deter-
    mined that the motion Ms. Ortega had filed was not a
    motion to reopen; according to the AAO, the motion did
    not state new facts to be proved because the pro-
    ceedings before the Immigration Court predated the
    AAO’s decision in this matter. The AAO continued,
    stating:
    The instant motion is instead, at best, a motion to
    reconsider. A motion to reconsider must state the
    reasons for reconsideration and be supported by
    any pertinent precedent decisions to establish
    that the decision was based on an incorrect ap-
    plication of law or policy. A motion to reconsider
    a decision on an application or petition must, when
    4                                                No. 08-3642
    filed, also establish that the decision was incorrect
    based on the evidence of record at the time of the
    initial decision. Whereas 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(i)
    provides that a late motion to reopen may be ex-
    cused in the discretion of CIS where it is demon-
    strated that the delay was reasonable and was
    beyond the control of the applicant or petitioner,
    the regulations do not provide any discretion to
    accept an untimely motion to reconsider. As the
    instant motion constitutes, at best, a motion to
    reconsider, the AAO cannot consider whether the
    delay in filing it was reasonable or beyond the
    applicant’s control. The motion must therefore
    be rejected as untimely.
    R.14, Ex. C at 2 (citations omitted).
    Ms. Ortega then instituted this action in the United
    States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on
    February 22, 2008. The complaint sought a declaration of
    nationality pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a), which is set
    out in its entirety in the following discussion. The Gov-
    ernment moved to dismiss the action on the ground that
    the court was without jurisdiction to grant relief under
    § 1503(a). See R.11 at 3. It argued that,
    [s]ince the Plaintiff first asserted her claim to
    citizenship during her removal proceedings, her
    status as a national arose “by reason of, or in
    connection with” removal proceedings. Thus,
    under the plain language of the statute, th[e Dis-
    trict] Court d[id] not have jurisdiction to consider
    Plaintiff’s claim of citizenship in this case.
    
    Id. at 3
    (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a)).
    No. 08-3642                                                  5
    The district court granted the Government’s motion.
    Relying on the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
    Fifth Circuit in Rios-Valenzuela v. Department of Homeland
    Security, 
    506 F.3d 393
    (5th Cir. 2008), the district court held
    that Ms. Ortega had raised her claim of citizenship in
    removal proceedings prior to the time that she filed her
    application for citizenship. Consequently, “the issue
    of plaintiff’s citizenship ‘arose by reason of, or in connec-
    tion with’ her removal proceeding.” R.25 at 3 (quoting
    8 U.S.C. § 1503(a)).
    Ms. Ortega timely appealed.
    II
    DISCUSSION
    Our disposition of Ms. Ortega’s appeal depends upon
    the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a). Therefore we start, as
    we must, with the language of the statute. See Autry v.
    Nw. Premium Servs., Inc., 
    144 F.3d 1037
    , 1040 (7th Cir.
    1998) (observing that the “starting point in any case
    involving the meaning of a statute[] is the language of
    the statute itself” (internal quotation marks and citations
    omitted)). Section 1503(a) of Title 8 states:
    If any person who is within the United States
    claims a right or privilege as a national of the
    United States and is denied such right or privilege
    by any department or independent agency, or
    official thereof, upon the ground that he is not a
    national of the United States, such person may
    institute an action under the provisions of section
    6                                                   No. 08-3642
    2201 of Title 28 against the head of such depart-
    ment or independent agency for a judgment de-
    claring him to be a national of the United States,
    except that no such action may be instituted in any case
    if the issue of such person’s status as a national of the
    United States (1) arose by reason of, or in connection
    with any removal proceeding under the provisions of
    this chapter or any other act, or (2) is in issue in any
    such removal proceeding. An action under this
    subsection may be instituted only within five
    years after the final administrative denial of such
    right or privilege and shall be filed in the district
    court of the United States for the district in which
    such person resides or claims a residence, and
    jurisdiction over such officials in such cases is
    conferred upon those courts.
    8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (emphasis added).
    A.
    The Government maintains that the “plain meaning” of
    § 1503(a)(1) requires dismissal of Ms. Ortega’s claim. It
    first observes that it was “[o]nly upon initiation of
    removal proceedings” that Ms. Ortega “assert[ed] citizen-
    ship.” Appellee’s Br. 5. “Accordingly,” the Government
    concludes, “it is beyond question that Ortega’s status
    ‘arose by reason of, or in connection with [her] removal
    proceeding.’ ” 
    Id. The Government
    also notes that its position finds
    support in case law, specifically the Fifth Circuit’s decision
    No. 08-3642                                                7
    in Rios-Valenzuela, 
    506 F.3d 393
    . In that case, Rios, like
    Ms. Ortega, had filed an application for citizenship
    while removal proceedings were still pending. As in
    Ms. Ortega’s case, Rios’s application was denied by
    the District Director. And in both cases, after removal
    proceedings were terminated, the AAO denied the peti-
    tioners’ appeals of the denial of their applications. When
    Rios subsequently instituted an action under § 1503(a), the
    district court dismissed the complaint for lack of juris-
    diction, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Fifth Circuit
    concluded that the “text of the statute” supported the
    Government’s position that the district court lacked
    jurisdiction. 
    Id. at 3
    98. It explained that
    “[t]he exception applies to claims of nationality
    raised in removal proceedings.” It is the context of
    how the particular issue of citizenship arose rather
    than the mere timing of events that determines the
    applicability of § 1503(a)(1). The exception pre-
    cludes jurisdiction over Rios’s citizenship claim
    because his claim “arose by reason of, or in connec-
    tion with” his removal proceeding: the issue of
    Rios’s citizenship that forms the basis of his claim
    here originates, at the least, in connection with
    the removal proceedings.
    The N-600 application process is, as Rios
    argues, a proceeding separate from the removal
    proceedings. But § 1503(a)(1) does not apply
    depending on whether the proceedings are sepa-
    rate; rather, it applies when the particular citizen-
    ship issue “arose” in the removal proceeding. That
    8                                                  No. 08-3642
    is, the exception focuses on the proceeding in which the
    particular claim to citizenship originates, not the
    proceeding in which it is being pursued.
    
    Id. (footnote omitted;
    quoting Said v. Eddy, 
    87 F. Supp. 2d 937
    , 941 (D. Alaska 2000); emphasis added).
    The Government does not believe that its interpreta-
    tion of § 1503(a) forever bars an individual, who first
    raises a claim of citizenship in the context of
    removal, from obtaining a judicial declaration of citizen-
    ship. According to the Government, once the removal pro-
    ceedings—during which the plaintiff raised a claim of
    citizenship—have terminated, any future action for a
    declaration of citizenship would not “arise” from those re-
    moval proceedings. Appellee’s Br. 11. After the termination
    of those initial proceedings, therefore, the individual
    could re-file his application for a certificate of citizenship
    and, if denied, could institute an action under § 1503(a)
    without encountering a statutory bar to jurisdic-
    tion. Again, the Government turns to Rios-Valenzuela to
    support its position. In Rios-Valenzuela, the court rejected
    Rios’s claim that the Government’s “construction of the
    exception means that jurisdiction under § 1503(a) is
    always precluded when citizenship first arises in a
    removal proceeding”; it explained:
    [W]e do not read the exception as forever hanging
    an albatross around the neck of those who first
    raise citizenship as a defense in a removal pro-
    ceeding. So long as a citizenship claim finds its
    genesis outside of the context of removal pro-
    ceedings, the exception is no bar to jurisdiction;
    No. 08-3642                                                  9
    thus, for example, once removal proceedings
    have run their full course and terminated, any
    future citizenship claim would not arise in those
    removal proceedings. The Government concedes
    this, explaining that “[i]f Rios-Valenzuela were
    to again apply for citizenship at some future time,
    when no removal proceedings have been initiated,
    and the claim is denied, then, according to Said,
    he would have a right to seek declaratory judg-
    ment.” This narrower reading is consistent with
    the concern that the federal courts not be used as
    tools to frustrate and interfere with removal pro-
    ceedings.
    
    Rios-Valenzuela, 506 F.3d at 399
    .
    B.
    1. Statutory structure and language
    Our efforts to discern § 1503(a)(1)’s meaning must start,
    of course, with the words that Congress employed. We
    shall give the words of a statute their “ordinary meaning
    unless the context counsels otherwise.” United States v.
    Webber, 
    536 F.3d 584
    , 593 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing McCarthy
    v. Bronson, 
    500 U.S. 136
    , 139 (1991)). If the plain wording
    of the statute is clear, our work is at an end. See 
    id. (citing BedRoc,
    Ltd. v. United States, 
    541 U.S. 176
    , 183 (2004) (noting
    that the task of statutory interpretation “ends there [if]
    the text is unambiguous”)). However, in interpreting
    the wording of a statute, we must consider not only the
    words of the statute, but also the statute’s structure:
    10                                                No. 08-3642
    “Context, not just literal text, will often lead a court to
    Congress’ intent in respect to a particular statute.” 
    Id. (quoting City
    of Rancho Palos Verdes v. Abrams, 
    544 U.S. 113
    , 127 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring)). Similarly, we
    must take into account the relationship of the statute to
    other provisions of the code. Congress does not legislate
    in a vacuum. We must assume that Congress is cognizant
    of other statutory provisions and expects its new enact-
    ments to work in harmony with existing provisions.
    We begin with the opening sentence of § 1503(a), which
    states in relevant part: “If any person . . . claims a right or
    privilege as a national of the United States and is
    denied such right or privilege by any department or
    independent agency, . . . upon the ground that he is not
    a national of the United States, such person may institute
    an action under the provisions of section 2201 of
    Title 28 . . . declaring him to be a national of the United
    States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a). Thus, § 1503(a) first provides in-
    dividuals, who have been denied a benefit of citizenship,
    with a means of challenging the adverse administrative
    action in court. Specifically, the individual may bring
    a declaratory judgment action under 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
    The right to bring such an action, however, is not guaran-
    teed to every individual who has been aggrieved by an
    agency action. The language of the statute continues:
    “except that no such action may be instituted in any case
    if the issue of such person’s status as a national of the
    United States (1) arose by reason of, or in connection with
    any removal proceeding under the provisions of this
    chapter or any other act, or (2) is in issue in any such
    No. 08-3642                                                 11
    removal proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a). Taking the
    exceptions in reverse order, an individual may not
    institute a § 1503(a) action if nationality is “in issue,” that
    is, being disputed, in an ongoing removal proceeding.
    Additionally, an individual may not institute a § 1503(a)
    action if “the issue of nationality,” that is, the parties’
    dispute concerning nationality, arose by reason of or in
    connection with a removal proceeding.
    Taken together, the exceptions set forth in subsections
    (a)(2) and (a)(1) are designed to protect removal pro-
    ceedings from judicial interference and preserve 8 U.S.C.
    § 1252 as the exclusive means of challenging a final
    order of removal. A party may not frustrate the Gov-
    ernment’s effort to remove him by instituting an action
    under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a) while proceedings are ongoing.
    Similarly, a party may not use § 1503(a) to frustrate Con-
    gress’s effort to channel all appeals from removal pro-
    ceedings—including those in which the alien raised
    claims of nationality—through 8 U.S.C. § 1252.
    When we look to the detailed procedure that Congress
    instituted for review of removal proceedings, it is even
    more clear that the jurisdictional exception in § 1503(a)
    was directed only at those individuals whose claims of
    nationality were being or had been litigated fully in
    removal proceedings. First, Congress channeled all
    appeals from final orders of removal to the courts of
    appeals by way of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). Second, Congress
    established a specific procedure for reviewing claims of
    nationality raised in the context of removal proceedings.
    Section 1252(b)(5)(B) of Title 8 provides:
    12                                               No. 08-3642
    If the petitioner claims to be a national of the
    United States and the court of appeals finds that a
    genuine issue of material fact about the petitioner’s
    nationality is presented, the court shall transfer
    the proceeding to the district court of the United
    States for the judicial district in which the peti-
    tioner resides for a new hearing on the nationality
    claim and a decision on that claim as if an action
    had been brought in the district court under 2201 of
    Title 28.
    
    Id. (emphasis added).
    Thus, an individual whose claim
    of nationality is rejected in the context of removal pro-
    ceedings, and whose claim also involves a genuine and
    material factual dispute, is provided the same mechanism
    for redress set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a)—a declaratory
    judgment action.
    In sum, the language of § 1503(a)(1), read within the
    context of § 1503(a) and also read in conjunction with
    related provisions of Title 8, makes it clear that Congress
    intended individuals to pursue one of two routes to
    establish claims for nationality. Generally, a person may
    file an administrative application for a certificate of
    citizenship, which, if denied, could be pursued by way
    of an action under 8 U.S.C. § 1503(a). However, if the
    question of nationality first arises in the context of a
    removal proceeding, the person must pursue his claims
    through those proceedings, culminating either with a
    declaration or denial of nationality.
    No. 08-3642                                                 13
    2. The Operation of the Statutory Scheme
    In enacting § 1503(a), Congress focused on the need to
    protect the smooth operation of removal proceedings. It
    also provided, however, that any individual whose
    claim of citizenship was not recognized in administrative
    proceedings eventually could seek an adjudication from
    the district court on that claim. However, this statutory
    scheme, while satisfying Congress’s primary focus of
    protecting removal proceedings, did not anticipate the
    possibility that an individual in removal proceedings,
    whose claim of citizenship was accepted by the IJ,
    would not be able to obtain complete relief through the
    removal route. If an IJ were to credit an individual’s
    defense of citizenship and, therefore, were to lift the
    threat of removal, the individual would not obtain a
    final order of removal—a prerequisite for pursuing
    review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and, consequently, for
    obtaining a judicial declaration of that citizenship. There
    certainly is nothing in the language of the statute or in
    the legislative history of § 1503(a) that would justify the
    conclusion that Congress meant to leave an individual,
    with more than a colorable claim of nationality, in legal
    limbo—able to remain in this Country, but without any
    means of establishing her nationality. Congress’s
    solicitude in providing all others with a means of ob-
    taining a certificate of citizenship either through the
    general application process or through the removal
    process evinces Congress’s concern that individuals be
    able to settle, definitively, the issue of citizenship. Indeed,
    it would be disrespectful to impute to Congress a desire
    to leave someone in Ms. Ortega’s situation permanently
    out in the cold.
    14                                                No. 08-3642
    Because Congress gave no explicit statutory direction
    and because there is nothing in the statute to lead us to
    conclude that Congress desired individuals like
    Ms. Ortega to be without any remedy, we believe that the
    appropriate course—and one suggested by both the
    Government and the Fifth Circuit—is simply to have
    her begin the process of establishing her nationality
    anew. At oral argument, the Government assured us that
    there was no impediment to Ms. Ortega’s filing a new
    application for citizenship. It explicitly repeated that
    assertion in its supplemental submission.
    The Government’s representation is not totally accu-
    rate. The regulations do not prohibit a second application
    for citizenship; however, as we read them, they do limit the
    circumstances under which a second application will be
    considered. With respect to denial of an application for a
    certificate of citizenship, the regulations provide:
    If it is the decision of the district director to deny
    the application for a Certificate of Citizenship, the
    applicant shall be furnished the reasons for denial
    and advised of the right to appeal in accordance
    with the provisions of 8 CFR 103.3(a). After an
    application for a Certificate of Citizenship has
    been denied and the appeal time has run, a
    second application submitted by the same individual
    shall be rejected and the applicant instructed to
    submit a motion for reopening or reconsideration in
    accordance with 8 CFR 103.5. The motion shall be
    accompanied by the rejected application and the
    fee specified in 8 CFR 103.7 reduced by the amount
    No. 08-3642                                                 15
    of the fee paid with the rejected application. A
    decision shall be issued with notification of appeal
    rights in all Certificate of Citizenship cases, in-
    cluding any case denied due to the applicant’s
    failure to prosecute the application.
    8 C.F.R. § 341.6 (emphasis added). For its part, 8 C.F.R.
    § 103.5 provides that motions to reconsider must
    “establish that the decision was based on an incorrect
    application of law or Service policy,” 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(3),
    and must be made within thirty days of the decision
    that the motion seeks to reconsider, 
    id. § 103.5(a)(1)(i).
    Motions to reopen must state “new facts to be provided
    in the reopened proceedings,” 
    id. § 103.5(a)(2),
    and must
    be made within thirty days, 
    id. § 103.5(a)(1)(i);
    however,
    the immigration authorities may excuse, in their discre-
    tion, an untimely motion to reopen “where it is demon-
    strated that the delay was reasonable and was beyond
    the control of the applicant or petitioner,” 
    id. We believe
    that an individual, such as Ms. Ortega, who
    is armed with an order of an IJ terminating removal
    proceedings in her favor, certainly will make at least a
    prima facie showing that both her change of status (as non-
    removable) and the termination of removal proceedings
    constitute new facts for purposes of a motion to reopen.
    Cf. Johnson v. United States, 
    544 U.S. 295
    , 302 (2005) (holding
    that the vacatur of an underlying state-court judgment is
    a fact, the discovery of which triggers the running of the
    16                                                  No. 08-3642
    statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2255). 1 Although
    such an individual still must rely on the agency’s discre-
    tion to reopen such proceedings, we have to believe
    that the agency will exercise this discretion judiciously
    and with an eye to accomplishing Congress’s purpose in
    enacting § 1503(a) and § 1252(b). See FCC v. Schreiber, 
    381 U.S. 279
    , 296 (1965) (noting “the presumption to which
    administrative agencies are entitled—that they will act
    properly and according to law”); Rhoa-Zamora v. INS, 
    971 F.2d 26
    , 34 (7th Cir. 1992) (observing that “agency action
    is entitled to a presumption of regularity” (internal quota-
    tion marks and citations omitted)).
    3. Application to Ms. Ortega
    The citizenship claim that Ms. Ortega pursued in her
    original application for a certificate of citizenship
    1
    Given this authority, the AAO’s determination that Ms.
    Ortega’s motion is “at best” a motion to reconsider is problem-
    atic. R.14, Ex. C at 2. According to the Government’s own
    submission, whether an individual is in removal proceedings
    at the time she files a N-600 application is a jurisdictional fact
    for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1503, that is, the termination of
    proceedings is a fact bearing on the applicant’s eligibility for
    ultimate relief in the district court. It follows, therefore, that
    the applicant’s effort to bring this fact to the agency’s atten-
    tion should be characterized as a motion to reopen—the
    mechanism by which an individual brings new facts before
    the agency—as opposed to a motion to reconsider, which is
    focused on errors of law.
    No. 08-3642                                                    17
    arose as a result of or in connection with her removal pro-
    ceedings. Thus, § 1503(a)(1) prevents her from challenging
    the administrative denial of that application by way of
    a declaratory judgment action. Instead, Ms. Ortega was
    required to re-file her application as a motion to reopen
    or a motion to reconsider;2 this action, in essence, would
    have separated her administrative action from her
    prior removal proceedings and eliminated the jurisdic-
    tional bar to any court action created by way of
    § 1503(a)(1).
    On further review of Ms. Ortega’s administrative file,
    however, we have ascertained that Ms. Ortega in fact
    has accomplished this necessary step. As we have dis-
    cussed in some detail, 8 C.F.R. § 341.6 requires that any
    subsequent application for citizenship be filed as a
    motion to reconsider or to reopen. In this case, Ms. Ortega
    did file a motion to reconsider or to reopen after the
    AAO denied her appeal and after her removal proceedings
    had been terminated. Indeed, her motion for reopening or
    reconsideration explicitly alerted the AAO to the fact
    that removal proceedings had been terminated in her
    favor. The filing of this motion, by the Government’s
    concession and consistent with the Fifth Circuit’s decision
    in Rios-Valenzuela, removed the “albatross” of the prior
    2
    See 8 C.F.R. § 341.6 (“After an application for a Certificate of
    Citizenship has been denied and the appeal time has run, a
    second application submitted by the same individual shall
    be rejected and the applicant instructed to submit a motion
    for reopening or reconsideration in accordance with 8 CFR
    103.5.”).
    18                                              No. 08-3642
    removal proceedings from Ms. Ortega’s neck and took
    her outside of the exception set forth in § 1503(a)(1).
    Because Ms. Ortega’s motion to reopen or reconsider
    is, by the Government’s own regulation, the correct
    substitute for a second application for a certificate of
    citizenship, Ms. Ortega’s motion satisfied the Govern-
    ment’s requirement that she reinstitute an administrative
    action after the termination of removal proceedings.
    Having done so, and having been denied administrative
    relief, there is no longer a jurisdictional impediment to
    her instituting a declaratory judgment action under
    § 1503(a) because the action that she is challenging is not
    tainted by its connection to removal proceedings.
    Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
    court dismissing Ms. Ortega’s complaint for lack of subject
    matter jurisdiction is reversed, and the case is remanded
    for further proceedings.
    R EVERSED AND R EMANDED
    1-15-10