Maria Gonzalez-Balderas v. Eric Holder, Jr. ( 2010 )


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  •                           In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 09-1890
    M ARIA E. G ONZALEZ-B ALDERAS,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    E RIC H. H OLDER, JR., Attorney General
    of the United States,
    Respondent.
    Petition to Review an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals.
    No. A 077 490 772
    S UBMITTED F EBRUARY 10, 2010—D ECIDED M ARCH 5, 2010
    Before P OSNER, T INDER, and H AMILTON, Circuit Judges.
    P OSNER , Circuit Judge.  The petitioner, a Mexican
    citizen, entered the United States illegally by the use
    of someone else’s documentation and was promptly
    removed. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Her removal made
    her ineligible to seek readmission to the United States
    for five years unless she obtained permission to
    reapply for permission earlier. §§ 1182(a)(9)(A)(i), (iii).
    2                                                No. 09-1890
    Rather than either wait or ask for permission to
    reapply, she snuck back into the United States a month
    later. This meant that she was forbidden to reapply for
    permission to enter for ten years. § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(II)(ii).
    Still, here she was, undetected, and the following year
    her husband, a lawful permanent resident of the United
    States (since then he has become a citizen), whom she
    had married shortly after her second illegal entry, filed
    a visa petition on her behalf. The petition was granted,
    and later she filed an application to adjust her status,
    on the basis of her husband’s status, to that of a lawful
    permanent resident. § 1255(i)(1).
    Upon discovering that she had reentered the country
    illegally after being removed, the Department of Home-
    land Security, though it could have removed her sum-
    marily, § 1231(a)(5), instead merely denied her applica-
    tion for adjustment of status and scheduled a
    new removal hearing. At that hearing which she asked
    the immigration judge to permit her to reapply for ad-
    mission retroactive to the date of her reentry. Her
    authority was 8 C.F.R. § 212.2(i)(2), which states that an
    adjustment of status can be ordered retroactively. Were
    that provision applicable to her notwithstanding the
    statute, she could apply for adjustment of status without
    waiting ten years from her second removal. But the
    immigration judge, seconded by the Board of Immigration
    Appeals, ruled on the authority of In re Torres-Garcia, 23
    I. & N. Dec. 866 (BIA 2006), that an application for retroac-
    tive relief (which the Board calls “nunc pro tunc”—“now
    for then”—relief, a term that properly refers, rather, to cor-
    recting a mistake, Central Laborers’ Pension, Welfare &
    No. 09-1890                                                3
    Annuity Funds v. Griffee, 
    198 F.3d 642
    , 644 (7th Cir. 1999);
    King v. Ionization Int’l, Inc., 
    825 F.2d 1180
    , 1188 (7th Cir.
    1987)) cannot be granted when the effect would be to lift
    the ten-year bar.
    Retroactive relief is a tool long employed by the immigra-
    tion authorities, based on what they believe to be implied
    statutory authority to provide relief from the harsh provi-
    sions of the immigration laws in sympathetic cases. See,
    e.g., Patel v. Gonzales, 
    432 F.3d 685
    , 693 (6th Cir. 2005);
    Edwards v. INS, 
    393 F.3d 299
    , 308-09 (2d Cir. 2004).
    This case conceivably is one. The petitioner is 51 years old
    and has three children, one a U.S. citizen and the others
    lawful permanent residents, and apart from her illegal
    entries she has been law-abiding. But the Board ruled
    that the regulation cannot contravene the statute that
    bars a removed alien from reapplying for admission for
    ten years.
    The statute is clear and the Board’s ruling correct—and
    anyway the Board acted within its authority in interpreting
    its own regulation not to permit the statute to be circum-
    vented. The circuits in which the Board’s ruling has
    been challenged have upheld it. Delgado v. Mukasey, 
    516 F.3d 65
    , 73 (2d Cir. 2008); Gonzales v. DHS, 
    508 F.3d 1227
    ,
    1241-42 (9th Cir. 2007). We now join them, elevating
    dicta in Lemus-Losa v. Holder, 
    576 F.3d 752
    , 760 (7th
    Cir. 2009), to a holding.
    Another aspect of this case requires comment. Because
    the petitioner was barred from receiving a waiver of
    inadmissibility, she could not apply for an adjustment of
    status. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(2)(A). But rather than say that,
    the immigration judge “pretermitted” the application.
    4                                              No. 09-1890
    This word is used by the immigration court and the
    Board of Immigration Appeals whenever an alien is found
    ineligible to apply for some form of relief. E.g., Singh v.
    Gonzales, 
    468 F.3d 135
    , 136 n. 1 (2d Cir. 2006); Afful v.
    Ashcroft, 
    380 F.3d 1
    , 6 (1st Cir. 2004). The common dictio-
    nary meanings of “pretermit” are to leave undone, to
    neglect, to omit, to overlook intentionally, to let pass
    without mention or notice, to interrupt or terminate,
    to suspend indefinitely. Singh v. 
    Gonzales, supra
    , 468 F.3d
    at 136 n. 1. It might seem that because the petitioner’s
    application for adjustment of status is premature and
    will remain so until the ten years are up, it is the last
    meaning of pretermit—to suspend indefinitely—that is
    the one the Board intends. It is the sense in which the
    word is used in the only regulation of the Board that
    we’ve found that uses it. 8 C.F.R. § 240.21(c)(1).
    That would mean that the petitioner’s application for
    adjustment of status would be put in the freezer until she
    became eligible to apply in ten years. But that is not
    correct. To obtain legal residence in the United
    States, she must, when she becomes eligible to apply
    for permission to reapply for admission, 8 U.S.C.
    § 1182(a)(9)(C)(ii), apply for that permission. If
    permission to enter is granted, she can then reapply
    for adjustment of status—but not before. To say that
    her application for adjustment of status has been
    “pretermitted” is therefore unnecessarily vague; her
    application has been dismissed.
    A further oddity is that her application for adjustment
    of status was denied by the Department of Homeland
    No. 09-1890                                              5
    Security when she was discovered to have entered the
    country illegally for a second time. Denied—but later
    pretermitted. The reason that both the Department and
    the immigration judge rejected an application by her
    to adjust her status is that an alien whose applica-
    tion for adjustment of status has been denied by the
    Department may renew the application before the im-
    migration judge when the alien is placed in removal pro-
    ceedings. 8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(5)(ii). That is what happened
    here. But why the identical application was said to be
    “denied” by the Department but “pretermitted” by the
    immigration judge remains a mystery, though not one
    that can help the petitioner.
    She presents other grounds for relief, but they have
    insufficient merit to warrant discussion. The petition
    for review is
    D ENIED.
    3-5-10