United States v. Ondray Pulley ( 2010 )


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  •                               In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 08-3363
    U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    O NDRAY P ULLEY,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 06-CR-937—Virginia M. Kendall, Judge.
    A RGUED N OVEMBER 4, 2009—D ECIDED F EBRUARY 17, 2010
    Before C UDAHY, FLAUM, and E VANS, Circuit Judges.
    C UDAHY, Circuit Judge. Ondray Pulley pleaded guilty
    to one count of wire fraud related to a scheme to
    defraud the United Airlines Employees’ Credit Union
    (UAECU). He was sentenced to 87 months’ imprisonment
    and ordered to pay restitution. Pulley now appeals,
    arguing that the government’s lack of candor at his co-
    defendant’s sentencing proceedings caused the district
    court to make significant procedural errors at Pulley’s
    2                                              No. 08-3363
    sentencing. Specifically, he contends that the district
    court, having determined at the sentencing of his co-
    defendant Anthony Anderson that Anderson was
    credible, did not want to reverse this determination. In
    Pulley’s opinion, the district court was therefore forced
    into making an impossible finding at Pulley’s sentencing
    that both Pulley and Anderson were accurately testi-
    fying even though their stories conflicted. Pulley also
    challenges the district court’s sentence as unreasonable.
    We affirm because the district court did not commit
    procedural error in the course of Pulley’s sentencing
    proceedings, and it appropriately considered the relevant
    § 3553(a) factors. It also did not err in sentencing Pulley
    at the high end of the applicable Guidelines range.
    I. Background
    Pulley defrauded credit unions for many years. The
    scheme unfolded as follows. First, Pulley and Anderson
    obtained the personal identifying information (social
    security number and the like) of a Chicagoland area
    United Airlines employee and opened an account at the
    credit union UAECU. Next, Pulley used several other
    victims’ identifying information to add joint owners to
    the account. After securing counterfeit checks, Pulley
    and Anderson deposited money into the account,
    procured debit cards in the victims’ names, and trans-
    ferred money drawn from the victims’ actual bank ac-
    counts into the fraudulent UAECU account. Then,
    Pulley and Anderson flew to Las Vegas (using pro-
    ceeds from the account) to cash in on their scheme. They
    No. 08-3363                                            3
    advanced themselves more than $100,000 while visiting
    various posh Las Vegas hotels and casinos, ate a few
    meals and divided the proceeds—Anderson received well
    less than half. The two were indicted in connection
    with this scheme on December 13, 2006 on several mail
    and wire fraud counts, and Anderson was also indicted
    for a fraud on the Members’ Advantage Credit Union
    (Members’ Advantage). Whether Pulley was involved
    in the Members’ Advantage scheme became a factual
    dispute addressed in a long series of evidentiary sen-
    tencing hearings.
    By April 2007, Anderson had agreed to cooperate
    with the government and met with government repre-
    sentatives several times throughout the year. Pulley’s
    case continued toward trial, and the government
    planned to have Anderson testify against him. Anderson
    eventually entered his plea in July (after several sched-
    uling conflicts).
    Anderson was sentenced on November 13, 2007. At
    sentencing, the government explained that, despite his
    significant criminal history, Anderson’s life appeared to
    be on the right track, and the government had not had
    any difficulties with him. After noting his extensive
    criminal history, the district court granted the govern-
    ment’s § 5K1.1 motion based on Anderson’s cooperation,
    his successful efforts to reform himself after suffering
    from a serious medical condition while serving a
    prior prison term, and on his prompt and forthright
    cooperation in the government’s investigation. Signifi-
    cantly for this appeal, the government did not mention
    4                                                   No. 08-3363
    to the district court the dispute regarding Pulley’s in-
    volvement in the Members’ Advantage scheme, an
    issue that called into question Anderson’s credibility, or
    inform the court that it knew that Anderson had pur-
    portedly attempted to contact a witness. As of the date
    of Anderson’s sentencing hearing, the district court had
    already received written filings prepared for Pulley’s
    sentencing hearing detailing the dispute in question. At
    the close of Anderson’s sentencing hearing, the district
    court accepted the parties’ agreed-upon sentence of
    38 months’ imprisonment as well as restitution, jointly
    and severally with Pulley, in the amount of $190,000,
    including amounts due to both UAECU and Members’
    Advantage. Thirty-eight months was below the ap-
    plicable Guidelines range of 57 to 71 months.
    Pulley had entered his plea of guilty on July 5, 2007.
    His sentencing was originally scheduled for October 3,
    2007, before Anderson’s, but was continued on multiple
    occasions, initially at Pulley’s request.1 Prior to sen-
    tencing, Pulley filed objections to the presentence in-
    vestigation report taking responsibility for a fraudulent
    scheme at Affinity Credit Union (Affinity) and denying
    his involvement in the Members’ Advantage scheme. The
    Affinity scheme had not been noted in the presen-
    tence report and therefore was not part of the applicable
    Guidelines range calculations. Without these amend-
    ments, Pulley’s advisory Guidelines range was 57-71
    1
    Typically, in the Northern District of Illinois, the cooperating
    co-defendant is sentenced second.
    No. 08-3363                                              5
    months. Including the Affinity loss ($150,000) and ex-
    cluding the Members’ Advantage loss ($120,000), the loss
    amount from the UAECU scheme and other relevant
    conduct totaled slightly over $400,000. Pulley’s amend-
    ments raised his offense level two points and his sen-
    tencing range to 70-87 months.
    At Pulley’s first sentencing hearing (where he was not
    present, for unknown reasons), on November 14, the
    district court highlighted the factual conflict between
    the government and Pulley regarding his participation
    in the Members’ Advantage scheme. The district court
    reset the sentencing and allowed several more hearings
    to permit the parties to present witnesses—including
    Pulley and Anderson—regarding this issue. At the close
    of the hearings, the district court determined that the
    government had not met its burden to prove that Pulley
    participated in the Members’ Advantage scheme given
    the lack of hard evidence and the difference between
    methods employed in that scheme and those used in
    Pulley’s earlier schemes. It also found, however, that
    Anderson’s testimony, implicating Pulley in the Members’
    Advantage scheme, was credible based in large part on
    the consequences of any possible perjury—including the
    possible revocation of Anderson’s plea deal. The
    district court reconciled its decision to find credible two
    witnesses’ conflicting stories by explaining that it was
    plausible that two con men with a long history together,
    like Anderson and Pulley, could have gotten confused
    6                                                    No. 08-3363
    about events that occurred many years in the past.2 Con-
    sistent with these findings, the district court amended
    the restitution order entered at Anderson’s sentencing to
    rescind Pulley’s joint liability. Further, the court declined
    to accept the government’s position that Pulley should
    be denied credit for acceptance of responsibility and
    instead receive a two-level increase for obstruction of
    justice for failure to admit his participation in the Mem-
    bers’ Advantage scheme. Pulley was then sentenced to
    87 months.
    II. Standard of Review
    Whether the district court followed proper sentencing
    procedure is a legal question reviewed de novo. United
    States v. Smith, 
    562 F.3d 866
    , 872 (7th Cir. 2009). Factual
    findings are reviewed for clear error. United States v.
    Heckel, 
    570 F.3d 791
    , 793 (7th Cir. 2009). Likewise, we
    defer to a district court’s determination of witness credi-
    bility, which can virtually never be clear error. United
    States v. Acosta, 
    534 F.3d 574
    , 584 (7th Cir. 2008). The
    substantive reasonableness of a sentence is reviewed for
    an abuse of discretion and a correctly calculated, within-
    Guidelines sentence is entitled to a presumption of rea-
    sonableness. See Rita v. United States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    , 347
    2
    Pulley characterizes the district court’s findings of Pulley’s
    and Anderson’s credibility as declaring a “tie.” The district court
    does not use this language, and this characterization does not
    fully reflect the district court’s reasons for finding both wit-
    nesses credible despite their conflicting stories.
    No. 08-3363                                                  7
    (2007); United States v. Scott, 
    555 F.3d 605
    , 608 (7th Cir.
    2009).
    III. Discussion
    1.   The district court approached the sentencing hear-
    ing with an open mind.
    A district court judge must approach a sentencing
    hearing with an open mind and rely on meaningful
    consideration of the evidence presented at the hearing. See
    United States v. Pless, 
    982 F.2d 1118
    , 1129-30 (7th Cir. 1992).
    Likewise, the defendant has a due process right to be
    sentenced on the basis of accurate information. See United
    States v. England, 
    555 F.3d 616
    , 622 (7th Cir. 2009); United
    States v. Jones, 
    454 F.3d 642
    , 652 (7th Cir. 2006). Thus, if
    the defendant establishes that the sentencing court relied
    on critical, inaccurate information when announcing
    the sentence, a defendant may be granted the remedy
    of resentencing. See 
    Jones, 454 F.3d at 652
    ; Simonson v.
    Hepp, 
    549 F.3d 1101
    , 1107 (7th Cir. 2008) (discussing
    sentencing in the habeas context). Evidentiary standards
    are, however, relaxed at sentencing, and a sentencing
    court may permissibly rely on information that has
    “sufficient indicia of reliability to support its probable
    accuracy.” See United States v. Rollins, 
    544 F.3d 820
    , 838
    (7th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted).
    Even a district court’s unqualified statements about its
    understanding of a defendant’s role in the conduct at
    issue do not necessarily create reversible error, unless
    the district court indicates that it has made up its mind
    8                                               No. 08-3363
    prior to receiving evidence. Compare Pless (holding
    that the district court need not bring a tabula rasa to
    issues fully aired at trial and relevant to sentencing
    and, therefore, its strong statements before sentencing
    did not deny the defendant a fair hearing) with
    United States v. Schroeder, 
    536 F.3d 746
    , 753 (7th Cir.
    2008) (holding that the defendant was denied a fair sen-
    tencing hearing because the district court announced
    its conclusion as to a relevant loss before receiving the
    defendant’s evidence and appeared not to consider the
    defense’s arguments).
    Pulley contends his case is more like Schroeder than
    like Pless. We disagree. In the present case the district
    court not only identified the factual conflict at the outset
    of Pulley’s sentencing, but it held exhaustive hearings
    and heard Anderson’s and Pulley’s testimonies to explore
    the disputed facts. In the end, the district court found
    Anderson credible not because it had already done so at
    his sentencing, but because it found that his story was
    essentially internally consistent and that he had no
    motive to lie. The district court amply demonstrated
    that it approached Pulley’s sentencing with an open mind.
    Pulley also contends that there was overwhelming
    evidence that he did not participate in the Members’
    Advantage scheme, implying that the district court was
    wrong to find Anderson credible. As we noted above, a
    district court’s credibility determinations are rarely
    overturned and, in the present case, where the district
    court provided sufficient reasons to find Anderson credi-
    ble, we cannot agree that the district court erred.
    No. 08-3363                                            9
    2.   Pulley has not provided sufficient evidence of
    the government’s breach of its duty of candor to
    require resentencing.
    Pulley further argues that the government breached its
    duty of candor and therefore the case should be re-
    manded. He notes that, at Anderson’s sentencing, the
    government did not raise or deny a factual conflict as to
    Pulley’s participation in the Members’ Advantage
    scheme even though, at Anderson’s sentencing, the
    district court found Pulley jointly liable for Anderson’s
    fraud in that scheme. Also, the government did not
    inform the court that Anderson had purportedly at-
    tempted to contact a witness.
    It was, however, the government’s consistent position
    at both sentencing hearings that Pulley participated in
    the Members’ Advantage scheme, based, in part, on
    Anderson’s testimony. Again, the district court found
    that the government had not met its burden to prove
    that Pulley participated in the Members’ Advantage
    scheme. While the district court chose not to accept the
    government’s version of events, that finding does not
    imply that the government’s position was based on
    known falsehoods, and Pulley has not provided evidence
    sufficient to prove that the court’s findings were clear
    error or, more importantly, that it relied on the govern-
    ment’s version of events in sentencing him.
    In addition, Pulley contends that the government
    breached its duty of candor by suggesting that Pulley
    10                                                 No. 08-3363
    only accepted responsibility for schemes for which the
    government had hard evidence. Again, however, whether
    Pulley only admitted schemes for which there was hard
    evidence is a fact that the district court had adequate
    opportunity to explore throughout the hearings and
    therefore, whether or not the government breached its
    duty of candor, the district court did not blindly rely on
    the government’s purported contentions in sentencing
    Pulley. In addition, whether Anderson contacted a wit-
    ness is relevant to his sentencing, not Pulley’s, and
    Pulley has not demonstrated that, even if the govern-
    ment should have brought out this fact at Anderson’s
    sentencing hearings, this error infected his own sen-
    tencing. As discussed below, the district court properly
    sentenced Pulley based on an individualized considera-
    tion of the relevant statutory factors, not on irrelevant facts.
    Likewise, other courts have determined that a breach of
    candor at a cooperating defendant’s sentencing is
    unlikely to affect the outcome of the other defendant’s trial
    when the information comes out at trial and relevant
    witnesses are subject to cross-examination. United States
    v. Casas, 
    425 F.3d 23
    , 40-41 n.21 (1st Cir. 2005) (declining
    to apply the exclusionary rule to testimony by the cooper-
    ating defendant at the complaining defendant’s trial).
    Given the hearings that the district court conducted, and
    the factors the district court actually relied upon during
    sentencing, Pulley has not met his burden to prove
    that, even if the government breached its duty of candor,
    the sentencing court relied on impermissible factors
    in sentencing him.
    No. 08-3363                                                11
    3.   The district court’s sentencing procedure is sound
    and the sentence is substantively reasonable.
    Pulley also argues that the sentencing court erred by
    failing to address his arguments related to consideration
    of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and by imposing an
    unreasonably high sentence.
    We note that the district court properly calculated the
    applicable Guidelines range. Once the district court
    determined that there was insufficient evidence of
    Pulley’s participation in the Members’ Advantage scheme,
    the court determined the offense level based on a base-
    offense level of 7, an enhancement of 14 based on a loss
    amount of more than $400,000 but less than $1 million, see
    U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 (2006), and a 2-level enhancement for
    unlawful use of another’s identification, see U.S.S.G.
    § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C)(i). The district court subtracted 3 levels
    for acceptance of responsibility and a timely plea, see
    U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a)-(b), for a total offense level of 20. That
    level, combined with an undisputed category VI criminal
    history, produced a Guidelines imprisonment range of
    70 to 87 months, with a statutory maximum of 30 years.
    See 18 U.S.C. § 1343. The district court sentenced Pulley
    to the high end of the Guidelines range.
    Pulley argues that the district court procedurally erred
    by failing to consider several of his meritorious argu-
    ments. Specifically, Pulley contends that the district court
    failed to consider his difficult upbringing, his extraordi-
    nary acceptance of responsibility and the unwarranted
    disparity between his sentence and Anderson’s. We
    12                                                 No. 08-3363
    disagree.3 To comport with proper sentencing procedure,
    the district court must review the § 3553(a) factors and
    provide a record for us to review but it need not explicitly
    articulate conclusions with respect to each factor. See
    United States v. Panaigua-Verdugo, 
    537 F.3d 722
    , 728 (7th
    Cir. 2008). The court is not required to consider every
    “stock” argument, but it must address the defendant’s
    principal arguments. See United States v. Villegas-Miranda,
    
    579 F.3d 798
    , 801 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Young,
    
    590 F.3d 467
    , 474 (7th Cir. 2009) (explaining that a
    district court may pass over, without discussion, argu-
    ments that are made as a matter of routine); United States
    v. Cunningham, 
    429 F.3d 673
    , 679 (7th Cir. 2005). “A
    short explanation will suffice where the context and
    record make clear the reasoning underlying the district
    court’s conclusion.” United States v. 
    Schroeder, 536 F.3d at 755
    (citing 
    Rita, 551 U.S. at 358
    ). We conclude that
    the district court adequately considered Pulley’s
    principal arguments.
    It addressed Pulley’s criminal history and re-
    viewed the sentencing report that revealed his difficult
    3
    Pulley also contends that the district court should have taken
    into account the circumstances of his criminal history category
    because his criminal history score was barely a category VI. As
    the district court is required to consider a defendant’s history
    and characteristics, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), and the district
    court fulfilled this requirement, there is no separate need to
    address the defendant’s position within a particular history
    category separately from the individualized assessment of the
    defendant.
    No. 08-3363                                               13
    upbringing. At sentencing, the district court applauded
    Pulley for his ability to avoid drug abuse despite having
    close relatives with dependency issues. Given that the
    district court was aware of Pulley’s difficult history,
    heard his arguments that he did not believe his past
    caused him to commit his crimes and then proceeded to
    address Pulley’s sentence in the context of the § 3553(a)
    factors, the district court did not err in failing to provide
    a lengthy explanation for its decision that Pulley’s
    history and characteristics did not merit him a lower
    sentence.
    The district court also adequately provided reasons for
    rejecting Pulley’s purportedly extraordinary acceptance
    of responsibility. Pre-Booker, a district court could depart
    from a guideline range for extraordinary acceptance
    of responsibility, for example, if the defendant, against
    his penal interest, provided significant, useful infor-
    mation to the government. See United States v. Nguyen,
    
    212 F. Supp. 2d 1008
    , 1031 (N.D. Iowa 2002) (defendant
    helped exonerate an innocent co-defendant); United
    States v. Rothberg, 
    222 F. Supp. 2d 1009
    , 1016-19 (N.D. Ill.
    2002) (defendant significantly cooperated even though
    there was initially no offer of a § 5K1.1). On the other
    hand, if the defendant initially denies specific conduct
    and the district court determines that it occurred as
    testified to, the defendant cannot claim that he took
    responsibility for his actions. See United States v.
    Mancillas, 
    183 F.3d 682
    , 711 (7th Cir. 1999).
    By August 2007, Pulley admitted his role in the
    Affinity scheme. Although the Affinity scheme was not
    included as relevant conduct in the presentence investi-
    14                                              No. 08-3363
    gation report, the government was aware of the scheme
    (it was listed in the government’s Version of Events, filed
    in late July 2007) and aware that the scheme involved
    several phony accounts opened under names Pulley
    had used in previous schemes. At sentencing, the
    district court declined to find that Pulley had extraordi-
    narily accepted responsibility and noted that Pulley had
    a long criminal history involving fraud and, based on
    the evidence it received, concluded that Pulley had not
    “learned his lesson. ”The district court provided a suffi-
    cient explanation of its decision to reject the defendant’s
    arguments regarding his extraordinary acceptance of
    responsibility and likewise did not abuse its discretion
    in deciding that his conduct did not rise to the level of
    extraordinary acceptance.
    In addition, Pulley contends that the similarities
    between him and Anderson suggest that Pulley’s sen-
    tence should have been closer to Anderson’s 38 months.
    While Pulley properly contends that § 3553(a)(6) does not
    allow unwarranted sentencing disparities between co-
    defendants, see, e.g., United States v. Statham, 
    581 F.3d 548
    , 556 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Bartlett, 
    567 F.3d 901
    , 908, 909 (7th Cir. 2009), warranted disparities are
    allowed. Moreover, a district court that sentences
    within the Guidelines necessarily gives weight and con-
    sideration to avoiding unwarranted disparities. See
    
    Bartlett, 567 F.3d at 908
    (citing Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 54 (2007)). The two defendants began cooperating
    at different times and, while the court determined
    that Anderson had changed his lifestyle after his illness,
    it concluded that Pulley had not similarly benefitted
    No. 08-3363                                                      15
    from his previous incarcerations. The district court ade-
    quately considered Pulley’s arguments regarding unwar-
    ranted sentencing disparities and did not abuse its dis-
    cretion in rejecting them as bases for a lower sentence.
    See 
    Statham, 581 F.3d at 556
    (holding that a co-defendant
    differed from the defendant for sentencing purposes
    because the co-defendant cooperated, pleaded and had
    a less extensive criminal history).
    As noted above, if the district court provides an
    adequate statement of reasons, consistent with § 3553(a),
    for believing that the sentence is appropriate, and it is
    within the Guidelines range, we presume the sentence
    is substantively reasonable. See 
    Rita, 551 U.S. at 347
    ;
    United States v. Turner, 
    569 F.3d 637
    , 640 (7th Cir. 2009).4
    4
    Although neither party raised this point, we note that the
    Statement of Reasons provides an incorrect lower bound to the
    sentencing range and should be amended to accurately reflect
    the range that was discussed during sentencing once the
    district court made its determination as to the disputed facts.
    Although we rarely exercise our powers to correct clerical
    errors, see United States v. Bonner, 
    522 F.3d 804
    , 808-09 (7th Cir.
    2008), we have done so in the past, see United States v. Boyd,
    
    208 F.3d 638
    , 649 (7th Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 
    531 U.S. 1135
    (2001), and we see no need to go through the exercise
    of remanding to allow the district court to direct its clerk to
    correct the sentencing range. We therefore direct the clerk to
    amend the Statement of Reasons to adequately reflect that the
    applicable range was 70 to 87 months. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
    1(a)(1) (“These rules govern the procedure in all criminal
    proceedings in . . . the United States courts of appeals”), 1(b)(2)-
    (continued...)
    16                                                  No. 08-3363
    Given the district court’s careful consideration of
    Pulley’s arguments and its articulation of a sentence
    based on the § 3553(a) factors, we have no reason to
    conclude that it abused its discretion by rejecting several
    of Pulley’s arguments and sentencing him to the high
    end of the applicable guideline range. The district court
    is therefore
    A FFIRMED.
    4
    (...continued)
    (3) (“court” is defined to include a federal appeals court
    judge), 36 (“After giving notice it considers appropriate, the
    court may at any time correct a clerical error in judgment, order,
    or other part of the record. . .”).
    2-17-10