Steven Thorogood v. Sears, Roebuck & Company ( 2010 )


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  •                               In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 09-3005
    S TEVEN J. T HOROGOOD ,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    S EARS, R OEBUCK AND C OMPANY,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 06 cv 1999—Harry D. Leinenweber, Judge.
    S UBMITTED JANUARY 6, 2010—D ECIDED F EBRUARY 12, 2010
    Before P OSNER, K ANNE, and E VANS, Circuit Judges.
    P OSNER, Circuit Judge. This appeal is a sequel to an
    earlier appeal by the plaintiff that we decided against
    him. See 
    547 F.3d 742
     (7th Cir. 2008). The plaintiff, a
    Tennessean, had bought a Kenmore-brand clothes dryer
    from Sears Roebuck (Kenmore is a Sears brand name). The
    words “stainless steel” were imprinted on the dryer, but
    part of the dryer’s drum was made of another material.
    He filed a class action suit in an Illinois state court on
    2                                               No. 09-3005
    behalf of himself and the other purchasers, scattered
    across 28 states plus the District of Columbia, of the half
    million or so Kenmore dryers represented in the
    labeling and advertising of the dryers as containing
    stainless steel drums. The suit claimed that the repre-
    sentation that the dryer contained a stainless steel drum
    violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act, Tenn.
    Code. §§ 47-18-101 et seq., and similarly worded state
    consumer protection statutes in the states of the other
    members of the class. The suit was removed to federal
    district court under the Class Action Fairness Act, 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1332
    (d), 1453, 1711-1715, and the district judge
    certified the class. We accepted the defendant’s appeal
    from the order of class certification, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f),
    and reversed, ordering the class decertified.
    We called the suit “a notably weak candidate for class
    treatment. Apart from the usual negatives, there are no
    positives: not only do common issues of law or fact not
    predominate over the issues particular to each purchase
    and purchaser of a ‘stainless steel’ Kenmore dryer, as
    Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
    requires, but there are no common issues of law or fact, so
    there would be no economies from class action treat-
    ment.” 
    547 F.3d at 746-47
     (emphasis in original). Because
    there is no “reason to believe that there is a single under-
    standing of the significance of labeling or advertising
    clothes dryers as containing a ‘stainless steel drum,’ ” 
    id. at 748
    , evaluation of the class members’ claims would
    require individual hearings; each class member would
    have to testify to what he understood by such a label or
    advertisement. We also expressed great skepticism of
    the merits of the plaintiff’s individual claim.
    No. 09-3005                                                  3
    With the case on remand reduced to that claim, and the
    parties in agreement that the maximum damages that the
    plaintiff could recover under Tennessee law were $3,000,
    the defendant made an offer of judgment under Rule 68
    of $20,000 inclusive of attorneys’ fees. The district judge,
    believing that the plaintiff should receive no attorneys’
    fees (the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act makes an
    award of attorneys’ fees in a suit under the Act discre-
    tionary, Tenn. Code § 47-18-109(e)(1); see also Tenn. Sup.
    Ct. R. 8; Killingsworth v. Ted Russell Ford, Inc., 
    104 S.W.3d 530
    , 533-37 (Tenn. App. 2002)), dismissed the suit for
    want of subject-matter jurisdiction. The offer exceeded
    the amount in controversy and so the case was moot.
    Greisz v. Household Bank (Illinois), N.A., 
    176 F.3d 1012
    , 1014-
    15 (7th Cir. 1999); Rand v. Monsanto Co., 
    926 F.2d 596
    , 597-
    98 (7th Cir. 1991); O’Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enterprises, Inc.,
    
    575 F.3d 567
    , 576 (6th Cir. 2009).
    The plaintiff argues that the district court lost jurisdic-
    tion under the Class Action Fairness Act when we decerti-
    fied the class, and so the case should have been
    remanded to the state court in which it began, as in any
    other case that is improperly removed. That contention
    was rejected in Cunningham Charter Corp. v. Learjet, Inc.,
    No. 09-8042, 
    2010 WL 199627
     (7th Cir. Jan. 22, 2010),
    which did recognize an exception for cases in which the
    claim that the suit can be maintained as a class action
    is frivolous—but the claim in this case was not (quite)
    frivolous.
    The plaintiff argues in the alternative that the district
    court was wrong to think him entitled to no award of
    4                                                  No. 09-3005
    attorneys’ fees. (Notice that if the judge was right, the
    offer of judgment gave the plaintiff a $17,000 windfall.)
    The plaintiff incurred attorneys’ fees of $246,000 and even
    though they exceeded the value of the relief he received
    by a factor of 82, he contends that the fees were a worth-
    while investment and the defendant should be required
    to reimburse him for them. The defendant offered him
    a sum equal to the maximum damages (and more) that
    he could have obtained for his individual claim after
    the district court rejected the defendant’s motion for
    summary judgment based on the statute of limitations
    and on other grounds, and he argues that his theory of
    liability was therefore vindicated and its vindication
    will help other purchasers of “stainless steel” Kenmores
    should they file individual suits.
    The award of attorneys’ fee in excess—even far in
    excess—of the relief a plaintiff obtained can be rea-
    sonable if the suit conferred value above and beyond that
    relief. City of Riverside v. Rivera, 
    477 U.S. 561
    , 574-80 (1986)
    (plurality opinion); Molnar v. Booth, 
    229 F.3d 593
    , 605
    (7th Cir. 2000); Hyde v. Small, 
    123 F.3d 583
    , 585-86 (7th Cir.
    1997); Lowry ex rel. Crow v. Watson Chapel School District,
    
    540 F.3d 752
    , 764-65 (8th Cir. 2008). That is the federal
    rule and the rule in Tennessee as well. E.g., Keith v.
    Howerton, 
    165 S.W.3d 248
    , 251-53 (Tenn. App. 2004);
    Killingsworth v. Ted Russell Ford, Inc., supra, 104 S.W.3d
    at 534-37. But ordinarily it must be relief ordered by a
    court rather than relief provided by a settlement. That is
    the usual federal rule, Buckhannon Board & Care Home, Inc.
    v. West Virginia Dept. of Health & Human Resources, 
    532 U.S. 598
    , 604-05 and n. 7 (2001); Bingham v. New Berlin
    No. 09-3005                                                5
    School District, 
    550 F.3d 601
    , 602-03 (7th Cir. 2008) (for an
    exception, however, see Cornucopia Institute v. U.S. Dept. of
    Agriculture, 
    560 F.3d 673
    , 677 (7th Cir. 2009)), and again
    it is the Tennessee rule as well; the Tennessee Con-
    sumer Protection Act expressly requires “a finding that
    a provision of [the Act] has been violated” for attoneys’
    fees to be awarded. Tenn. Code § 47-18-109(e)(1).
    The relief that the plaintiff received was not ordered
    by a court. The district judge ruled that as a matter of
    law the plaintiff could not recover damages in excess of
    $3,000 and that he was not entitled to any award of attor-
    neys’ fees. The defendant’s offer was thus far in excess
    of the plaintiff’s maximum entitlement. It is true that a
    defendant cannot defeat a valid claim of attorneys’ fees
    by making an offer of judgment that covers merely the
    plaintiff’s damages and arguing that therefore the case
    is moot. In order to moot the case, the offer must include
    a reasonable attorney’s fee, Marek v. Chesny, 
    473 U.S. 1
    , 5-
    7, 9 (1985); O’Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enterprises, Inc., supra,
    
    575 F.3d at 575-76
    ; see Thompson v. Southern Farm Bureau
    Casualty Ins. Co., 
    520 F.3d 902
    , 904 (8th Cir. 2008) (per
    curiam) (although it need not do so explicitly, Marek
    v. Chesny, 
    supra,
     
    473 U.S. at 5-7
    ), if as in this case the
    entitlement to such a fee is a part of the plaintiff’s claim.
    But the district judge was within his discretion in
    deciding that no fee should be awarded. The plaintiff’s
    individual claim, as we indicated in our previous
    opinion, was notably weak, his understanding of Sears’s
    “stainless steel” representation being almost certainly
    unreasonable. 
    547 F.3d at 747
    . The defendant’s offer of
    $20,000 was intended to get rid of a nuisance claim. The
    6                                               No. 09-3005
    making of the offer was not a vindication of the plain-
    tiff’s theory of liability, an acknowledgment that it had
    some potential merit.
    Furthermore, the $246,000 in fees that the plaintiff seeks
    to be reimbursed for were incurred in attempting to
    maintain the suit as a class action; no sane person
    incurs fees in that amount to prosecute a claim worth
    at most $3,000. The plaintiff’s effort to exalt his meager
    claim into a sprawling nationwide class action was a
    flop. Sears should not have to bear the entire cost of the
    flop. See O’Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enterprises, Inc., supra,
    
    575 F.3d at 576
    ; Barfield v. New York City Health &
    Hospitals Corp., 
    537 F.3d 132
    , 152-53 (2d Cir. 2008).
    The plaintiff could not be permitted to litigate a claim
    for $3,000 tops (no attorneys’ fee) when the defendant
    was offering him $20,000. He didn’t have to accept the
    offer, but he couldn’t turn it down and continue litigating,
    except that he could (and did) appeal.
    In the remote event that, no offer of judgment being
    made, the plaintiff would have gone on to win $3,000
    at trial, the district court might have awarded him some-
    thing more than $17,000 in attorneys’ fees. “One purpose
    of allowing an award of attorneys’ fees to a prevailing
    plaintiff is to disable defendants from inflicting with
    impunity small losses on the people whom they wrong.”
    Orth v. Wisconsin State Employees Union Counsel 24, 
    546 F.3d 868
    , 875 (7th Cir. 2008); see also Fletcher v. City of
    Fort Wayne, 
    162 F.3d 975
    , 976 (7th Cir. 1998) (citation
    omitted) (“a plaintiff with a small claim who achieves a
    complete recovery is entitled to fees, because civil rights
    No. 09-3005                                               7
    laws entitle victims of petty violations to relief.
    The cumulative effect of minor transgressions is con-
    siderable, yet they would not be deterred if fees were
    unavailable”). Maybe no competent lawyer would
    handle a suit worth at most $3,000 for as little as $17,000,
    especially since, given the weakness of the claim, its
    expected value was much less. But the defendant’s offer
    of $20,000 cannot be taken as an acknowledgment that
    the plaintiff was entitled to any award of attorneys’ fees,
    let alone an acknowledgement of the merits of the plain-
    tiff’s claim; the offer as we said was intended to terminate
    a nuisance suit costly to defend against.
    Anyway the plaintiff doesn’t argue that his “success” in
    obtaining relief on his individual claim justified an attor-
    ney’s fee of more than $17,000. He stakes his all on the
    proposition that his efforts conferred a benefit on the
    class worth at least $246,000. The district judge did not
    abuse his discretion in assessing the benefit to the class
    that we resoundingly ordered be decertified at $0.
    A FFIRMED.
    2-12-10