Kevin Sroga v. Ronald Huberman ( 2013 )


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  •                                 In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 12-1525
    K EVIN R. S ROGA,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    R ONALD H UBERMAN, et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 11 C 2124—Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.
    S UBMITTED F EBRUARY 14, 2013 Œ —D ECIDED JULY 10, 2013
    Before P OSNER, W OOD , and T INDER, Circuit Judges.
    P ER C URIAM.   Kevin Sroga, a former teacher for
    Chicago Public Schools, appeals the dismissal of his
    Œ
    The appellees were not served with process in the district
    court and are not participating in this appeal. After examining
    the appellant’s brief and the record, we have concluded that
    the case is appropriate for summary disposition. Thus the
    appeal is submitted on the appellant’s brief and the record.
    See F ED . R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
    2                                               No. 12-1525
    retaliation suit for want of prosecution. See F ED. R. C IV .
    P. 41(b). Sroga brought a sprawling, 54-page complaint
    under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     against employees of Chicago
    Public Schools and the Chicago Board of Education (in-
    cluding its then-Chief Executive Officer Ronald Huber-
    man), alleging loosely that they all played a part in
    getting him fired from his job as an “automotive educa-
    tion” instructor at Farragut Career Academy. The dis-
    trict court dismissed the complaint for violating Federal
    Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2); the court explained
    that “the morass of irrelevant and tangential allegations”
    made it “impossible” to evaluate the complaint, but
    the order allowed a reasonable period for the submis-
    sion of a Rule-8-compliant amended complaint.
    Sroga responded by timely filing an amended com-
    plaint asserting various constitutional and tort-law
    claims against certain officials and investigators at the
    school. For instance, he alleged that school officials
    wrongly reassigned him from his classroom to an ad-
    ministrative role after being internally investigated for
    an encounter he had with a female student. He says
    he was then suspended and later fired for this. He also
    asserts, with regard to his role in a hit-and-run incident
    involving a police vehicle, that a school investigator lied
    to him about the possible inculpatory consequences
    of answers he gave in an internal investigation.
    After a five month lag with no indication of whether
    Sroga would be permitted to proceed on his amended
    complaint, the district court dismissed most of Sroga’s
    claims as legally deficient, but it did allow two to
    No. 12-1525                                            3
    continue: one for retaliatory discharge against Huberman,
    and the other for indemnification against the Chicago
    Board of Education. In the docket entry for that order,
    the court scheduled a status hearing two months later
    and warned Sroga that if he failed to appear, “the Court
    may dismiss the case for want of prosecution.” That
    same day, the U.S. Marshal’s Office mailed Sroga a
    letter requesting information about how to serve the
    summonses. Sroga did not respond, and thirty days
    later the Marshal’s Office returned the summonses to
    the court unexecuted.
    When Sroga did not appear for his status hearing
    either, the court summarily dismissed his suit. Sroga
    moved to vacate the judgment under Federal Rule of
    Civil Procedure 60(b), asserting that he “was unaware
    that the District Court had made any rulings into this
    cause or had set any status dates” because he was
    working out of town on a short-term assignment and
    did not receive any mailing or notification about the
    scheduled status hearing. At a hearing on his motion,
    Sroga told the court that his mailing address was his
    parents’ address, and that he told them to notify him
    when he received any mail related to his case. When
    the district court informed Sroga that he had failed to
    respond to two mailings—its dismissal order setting a
    status hearing date, and then the letter from the
    Marshal’s Office—Sroga conjectured that his mother
    might have deliberately kept his mail from him because
    she was “tired” of his frequent litigation in other mat-
    ters. The court was “not persuaded” by Sroga’s assertions
    4                                               No. 12-1525
    and denied the motion to vacate, as well as Sroga’s later
    motion to reconsider.
    On appeal Sroga argues that the district court abused
    its discretion by dismissing his suit because he never
    received notice of the scheduled status hearing. He
    also contends that he did not demonstrate a record of
    delay or contumacious conduct, and he asserts that the
    district court should have considered lesser sanctions
    before dismissing the suit, especially in light of his pro se
    status.
    The dismissal of a suit for want of prosecution is over-
    turned only when there is an abuse of discretion, but as
    we recently explained, a district court commits a legal
    error when it dismisses a suit “immediately after the
    first problem, without exploring other options or saying
    why they would not be fruitful.” See Johnson v. Chi. Bd. of
    Educ., Nos. 12-3588, 12-3906, 
    2013 WL 2475761
     at *1 (7th
    Cir. June 10, 2013). The facts of Johnson are remarkably
    similar to those here; in both cases the district court
    warned that failure to appear at an initial status
    hearing could warrant dismissal, and in both, the court
    explained its dismissal tersely: “Status hearing held on
    12/5/11. No one appears. This Court’s order of 10/4/11 . . .
    indicated that if the plaintiff fails to appear for the
    12/5/11 status hearing, the Court may dismiss the case
    for want of prosecution. The plaintiff failed to appear
    for the 12/5/11 status hearing. Therefore, this case is
    dismissed for want of prosecution.”
    The district court dismissed Sroga’s case too abruptly
    and without consideration of “essential factor[s],” such
    No. 12-1525                                              5
    as the frequency and egregiousness of the plaintiff’s
    failure to comply with deadlines, the effect of delay on
    the court’s calendar, and the prejudice resulting to the
    defendants. Kruger v. Apfel, 
    214 F.3d 784
    , 786-87 (2000);
    see Kasalo v. Harris & Harris, Ltd., 
    656 F.3d 557
    , 561 (7th
    Cir. 2011). The warning given by the district court was
    an important (though not always necessary) factor that
    we consider when reviewing its decision, see Fischer v.
    Cingular Wireless, LLC, 
    446 F.3d 663
    , 665–66 (7th
    Cir. 2006), but we require more than just a standalone
    warning to ensure that the punishment “fit[s] the crime,”
    Johnson, 
    2013 WL 2475761
     at *1. In his postjudgment
    motion Sroga offered a plausible reason why he did not
    receive the court’s warning. He indicated that his
    indigent status limited his ability to gain access to the
    internet to follow the court’s electronic docket. He
    claimed that he had been diligently following his case
    through the use of a court-supplied computer station in
    the Chicago federal courthouse because he had no
    other means of accessing the court’s docket. But that
    method of keeping track of his case ended with his
    absence from the Chicago area on an out-of-town work
    assignment. He also noted that his mother, whose resi-
    dence he used for his mailing address, is not fond of
    his involvement in litigation, and that she may have
    prevented him from receiving mailings from the court
    during the period he was away from Chicago. If true,
    these reasons suggest that Sroga was not intentionally
    delaying proceedings or disobeying court orders. The
    district judge was not persuaded by Sroga’s excuses,
    saying “we’re not talking about you missing one thing;
    6                                              No. 12-1525
    we’re talking about you missing like three or four things,”
    without explaining why he doubted Sroga’s explana-
    tion. But Sroga’s absence (and possible meddling from
    his mother) accounted for both instances of unreceived
    mail, which in turn led to what was actually just one
    missed deadline. Furthermore, Sroga did have a history
    of compliance with other deadlines in this and prior
    litigation. Generally a single missed deadline or status
    hearing does not support dismissal for want of prosecu-
    tion. See, e.g., Johnson, 
    2013 WL 2475761
     at *1; McInnis
    v. Duncan, 
    697 F.3d 661
    , 664 (7th Cir. 2012); Kruger v.
    Apfel, 
    214 F.3d 784
    , 787 (7th Cir. 2000). Additionally, the
    defendants had not been served before the case was
    dismissed, so they suffered no apparent prejudice from
    the delay. We conclude that further proceedings are
    necessary to ensure that Sroga’s claims are resolved
    properly.
    R EVERSED and R EMANDED.
    7-10-13
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 12-1525

Judges: PerCuriam

Filed Date: 7/10/2013

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024