United States v. Trudelle, Angela K. ( 2005 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED ORDER
    Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Submitted June 2, 2005*
    Decided June 3, 2005
    Before
    Hon. WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge
    Hon. ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
    Hon. TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge
    No. 04-3449
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       Appeal from the United States
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                         District Court for the Western
    District of Wisconsin
    v.
    No. 04-CR-53-S-01
    ANGELA K. TRUDELLE,
    Defendant-Appellant.                        John C. Shabaz,
    Judge.
    ORDER
    Pursuant to a written agreement, Angela Trudelle pleaded guilty to one
    count of conspiracy to distribute at least 500 grams methamphetamine. See 21
    U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1). After crediting Trudelle for the 17 months already served
    on a state conviction arising from the conspiracy, the district court imposed a term
    of 119 months to run concurrent with the remainder of her state sentence. Trudelle
    now challenges the calculation of her criminal history score. Having concluded that
    the district court incorrectly calculated Trudelle’s criminal history score, we vacate
    her sentence and remand to the district court.
    *
    After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral
    argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.
    See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    No. 04-3449                                                                    Page 2
    Trudelle’s conspiracy ran from August 2001 to April 2003 and encompassed
    three state convictions all for methamphetamine offenses. The first state offense
    occurred in October 2002, when Trudelle was arrested in Wisconsin for possession
    of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and released on bond. Before that
    charge was resolved, she left for Minnesota and was caught there with
    methamphetamine in November 2002. Upon conviction for this second offense, the
    Minnesota court sentenced Trudelle to five days in jail and three years’ probation.
    And once back in Wisconsin she was also convicted of what the parties describe as
    “bail jumping.” Trudelle was still on probation for the Minnesota offense when she
    was arrested yet again in Wisconsin for possession of methamphetamine in April
    2003. In August 2003 she was sentenced to 10 years’ probation on this last offense,
    and at the same time she was sentenced for her October 2002 offense to 30 months’
    imprisonment. Trudelle began serving this Wisconsin sentence before the federal
    prosecution commenced.
    In calculating Trudelle’s criminal history, the probation officer assigned her
    zero criminal-history points for the three state drug convictions because, as both the
    government and Trudelle agreed, all three are for conduct that was part of the
    conspiracy prosecuted in federal court. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, cmt. n.1 (explaining
    that prior convictions arising from same conduct underlying current federal
    prosecution are ignored in scoring defendant’s criminal history). But reasoning
    that bail jumping is distinct from drug trafficking and thus not relevant conduct for
    the conspiracy charge, the probation officer assigned 1 criminal-history point for
    that conviction. And since Trudelle engaged in acts relating to the conspiracy while
    on probation for her November 2002 offense committed in Minnesota, the probation
    officer added 2 more points under § 4A1.1(d) on the theory that the conspiracy was
    committed while Trudelle was under a “criminal justice sentence,” i.e., probation.
    These 3 points resulted in a Criminal History Category of II and made Trudelle
    ineligible for relief under the “safety valve.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) (should
    defendant meet five criteria, including having no more than 1 criminal-history
    point, court may impose sentence without regard to statutory mandatory minimum
    penalties); U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 (same); U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(7) (providing two-level
    decrease in offense level for drug offenders who satisfy § 3553(f) criteria). This
    criminal history calculation, coupled with the total offense level of 31 proposed by
    the probation officer, yielded an imprisonment range of 121 to 151 months.
    The government endorsed the probation officer’s recommendations at
    sentencing, but Trudelle posed several objections. First she argued that her
    conviction for bail jumping should not lead to even 1 criminal history point because,
    she said, it too arose from conduct comprising the federal conspiracy just like her
    other three state offenses. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2, cmt. n.1. Likewise, Trudelle
    argued, she should not be given 2 criminal history points for committing the
    conspiracy while on probation for her Minnesota conviction because under the
    No. 04-3449                                                                     Page 3
    guidelines these points can be assessed only when the offense of conviction was
    committed while under a “criminal justice sentence,” which by definition excludes
    prior offenses like her Minnesota case that do not result in criminal history points.
    See 
    id. § 4A1.1(d),
    cmt. n.4. It followed, Trudelle explained, that her criminal
    history score was really zero, and so she was eligible for relief under the safety
    valve. Finally, Trudelle objected to being sentenced under the guidelines in light of
    Blakely v. Washington, 
    124 S. Ct. 2531
    (2004), and our then-recent decision in
    United States v. Booker, 
    375 F.3d 508
    (7th Cir. 2004).
    The district court rejected Trudelle’s objections to the criminal history points,
    but sustained her Booker challenge and, consequently, proceeded as though the
    guidelines were advisory. The district court selected 136 months as an appropriate
    term but reduced that number to 119 to account for the time Trudelle already had
    served on her 30-month Wisconsin sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b). Section
    5G1.3(b) authorized the court to impose a term below the otherwise-applicable 10-
    year minimum mandatory term as necessary to account for the state time. See 21
    U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii); United States v. Ross, 
    219 F.3d 592
    , 594-95 (7th Cir.
    2000). Had Trudelle prevailed on just her objection to the 2 criminal history points
    imposed by the court under § 4A1.1(d), a sentence as low as 70 months would have
    been within the guideline range.
    And indeed, as the government candidly concedes, Trudelle should have
    prevailed at least with respect to those criminal history points. When calculating
    the criminal history score, the guidelines allow for 2 points to be added “if the
    defendant committed the instant offense while under any criminal justice sentence,
    including probation.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d). The guidelines define a “criminal justice
    sentence” as a sentence countable under § 4A1.2. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1, cmt. n.4. Here
    the district court did not count the sentence imposed for the Minnesota conviction
    because that offense was committed as part of the conspiracy prosecuted in federal
    court. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(1) & cmt. n.1 (excluding from definition of “prior
    sentence” countable under § 4A1.1 any sentence impose based on conduct that is
    part of instant offense); United States v. Garecht, 
    183 F.3d 671
    , 674 (7th Cir. 1999).
    And given that the district court did not count the Minnesota conviction, Trudelle’s
    commission of the federal conspiracy while on probation for her Minnesota
    conviction should not have resulted in the assessment of any points under
    § 4A1.1(d). Correcting this error reduces Trudelle’s criminal history score to 1,
    making her eligible for the safety valve. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). We need not
    address whether imposing the additional 1 point for bail jumping was also error
    because that additional point has no further impact on Trudelle’s sentence.
    Although after United States v. Booker, 
    125 S. Ct. 738
    (2005), the sentencing
    guidelines are advisory rather than mandatory, we have held that an incorrect
    application of the guidelines still requires resentencing. See United States v. Scott,
    No. 04-3449                                                                  Page 4
    
    405 F.3d 615
    , 617 (7th Cir. 2005). In the post-Booker era the guidelines “continue
    to inform the district courts,” so a sentencing judge must calculate the range
    accurately and explain its reasons if it imposes a sentence outside that range.
    United States v. George, 
    403 F.3d 470
    , 472-73 (7th Cir. 2005).
    Accordingly, we REMAND for resentencing in accordance with this order.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 04-3449

Judges: Bauer, Rovner, Evans

Filed Date: 6/3/2005

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024