United States v. Michael Vallone , 698 F.3d 416 ( 2012 )


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  •                               In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    U NITED STATES OF A MERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    M ICHAEL A. V ALLONE, W ILLIAM S. C OVER,
    M ICHAEL T. D OWD , R OBERT W. H OPPER,
    T IMOTHY S. D UNN, and E DWARD B ARTOLI,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 04 CR 372—Charles R. Norgle, Sr., Judge.
    A RGUED M AY 3, 2011—D ECIDED S EPTEMBER 28, 2012
    2                    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    Before R OVNER and W ILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and
    Y OUNG, District Judge.Œ
    R OVNER, Circuit Judge. At the conclusion of an eleven-
    week trial, a jury convicted defendants Michael A. Vallone,
    William S. Cover, Michael T. Dowd, Robert W. Hopper,
    Timothy S. Dunn, and Edward Bartoli of conspiring to
    defraud the United States by impeding and impairing
    the functions of the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) and
    to commit offenses against the United States, along
    with related fraud and tax offenses. They were sen-
    tenced to prison terms ranging from 120 to 223 months.
    The defendants appeal their convictions and sentences.
    We affirm.
    I.
    This is the latest in a series of cases arising out of abusive
    trusts promoted by The Aegis Company (“Aegis”) and
    its sister company, Heritage Assurance Group (“Heri-
    tage”), both based in Palos Hills, Illinois. See United
    States v. Wasson, 
    679 F.3d 938
     (7th Cir. 2012); United States
    v. Hills, 
    618 F.3d 619
     (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
    131 S. Ct. 2958
    , 
    132 S. Ct. 130
     (2011); United States v. Patridge, 
    507 F.3d 1092
     (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Baxter, 217
    F. App’x 557 (7th Cir. 2007); Muhich v. C.I.R., 
    238 F.3d 860
     (7th Cir. 2001); Bartoli v. Richmond, 
    215 F.3d 1329
    ,
    Œ
    The Honorable Richard L. Young, Chief Judge of the
    Southern District of Indiana, sitting by designation.
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                    3
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    
    2000 WL 687155
     (7th Cir. 2000); see also United States
    v. Richardson, 
    681 F.3d 736
     (6th Cir. 2012); United States
    v. Welti, 446 F. App’x 784 (6th Cir. 2012); United States v.
    Ellefsen, 
    655 F.3d 769
     (8th Cir. 2011); Richardson v. C.I.R.,
    
    509 F.3d 736
     (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Diesel,
    238 F. App’x 398 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Tiner, 152
    F. App’x 891 (11th Cir. 2005).
    Heritage was formed in 1990 by Michael Richmond as
    the Illinois offshoot of a like-named California firm.
    Defendants Michael Vallone and Robert Hopper joined
    the staff of Heritage shortly thereafter. Defendant
    Edward Bartoli, an attorney with degrees from both
    Notre Dame and Harvard, later became affiliated with
    Heritage as its legal counsel. Heritage was in the
    business of selling living trusts for estate planning
    purposes. These trusts were marketed to customers
    through a network of cooperating insurance agents.
    In 1993, Bartoli put forward the idea of a package of
    business, family, and charitable trusts that could be
    marketed to customers as a means of both estate planning
    and income tax minimization. Bartoli thought that such
    a package could command a price of $25,000 or more.
    Vallone and Hopper were amenable to the idea and
    joined Bartoli in bringing his idea to fruition. They began
    to promote the concept of a multi-trust system at training
    sessions that Heritage sponsored for its cooperating
    insurance agents, and eventually began to sell some
    trust packages to Heritage clients. By early 1994,
    however, Vallone and Hopper had fallen out with Rich-
    mond and forced him out of Heritage, accusing him
    4                  Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    of embezzlement. Along with Bartoli, they decided to
    form a new company, Aegis, to take over marketing of
    the multi-trust system. Aegis was formed later that
    same year, and it began to sell multi-trust systems as a
    way for high-income individuals to minimize their
    income taxes. Aegis and Heritage continued to share
    the same building in Palos Hills, a Chicago suburb, as
    their headquarters.
    Although the Aegis system of trusts was portrayed as a
    legitimate, sophisticated means of tax minimization
    grounded in the common law, the system was in essence
    a sham, designed solely to conceal a trust purchaser’s
    assets and income from the IRS, thereby reducing his
    apparent tax liability and defrauding the United States
    of revenue to which it was entitled. Pursuant to the
    Aegis system, “customers appeared to sell their assets
    to several trusts when, in fact, customers never really
    ceded control of their assets.” Hills, 
    618 F.3d at 624
    .
    The trusts were marketed to and implemented for
    customers across the United States through a network of
    corrupt promoters, managers, attorneys, and accountants.
    Although prospective customers who bothered to seek
    independent advice as to the legitimacy of the Aegis
    system were routinely warned of its flaws, greed led
    many to overlook the system’s “too good to be true”
    attributes. Between 1994 and 2003, some 650 individuals
    purchased Aegis trust packages, at prices ranging
    from $10,000 to $50,000 or more. The diverse clientele
    included real estate brokers, doctors, public officials, and
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                5
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    a variety of small-business owners. Among the pur-
    chasers was a co-founder of the Hooters restaurants
    chain, Lynn “L.D.” Stewart, who himself was later
    charged with tax evasion, although the charges were
    dismissed after his trial resulted in a hung jury. (Others
    were not so lucky; some Aegis clients were convicted
    and sent to prison.) The thousands of false income tax
    returns that were filed based on the use of the Aegis
    trusts are estimated to have cost the federal govern-
    ment more than $60 million in tax revenue.
    The defendants in this case include the progenitors of
    the Aegis trust along with some of its major promoters.
    Vallone was the executive director of Aegis; Bartoli, who
    came up with the idea of the trust system, was the
    firm’s first legal director until 1996, and continued to
    help manage Aegis thereafter; and Hopper served as the
    firm’s managing director. In 1995, these three, along
    with Timothy Shawn Dunn, created Aegis Manage-
    ment Company (“Aegis Management”) to provide trust
    management services and tax advice to individuals who
    purchased the Aegis trusts. Dunn, a certified financial
    planner, was a promoter as well as a manager of Aegis
    trusts; he became the executive director of Aegis Manage-
    ment. William Cover, like Dunn, was a promoter and
    manager of Aegis trusts. He served as the president of
    Sigma Resource Management, Inc. and later held the
    controlling interest in Sigma Resource Management, LLC
    (collectively,“Sigma”), which also provided manage-
    ment services to purchasers of Aegis trusts. Vallone and
    Michael Dowd served as directors and officers of Sigma.
    6                  Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    Dowd came to work at the Palos Hills offices of Heritage
    and Aegis in 1997, after earning a degree in business
    finance. In addition to assisting the Aegis principals,
    Dowd provided management services to trust pur-
    chasers through both Aegis and Sigma. David Parker,
    a New York attorney, served as the legal director of
    Aegis Management. He assisted in the promotion and
    management of Aegis trusts as well as the defense of the
    trust system from government inquiries. John Stambulis,
    an Illinois attorney, worked in the Palos Hills office
    of Aegis, and assisted with the creation and defense of
    Aegis trusts. Both Parker and Stambulis would later
    plead guilty and testify against the remaining defendants
    at trial.
    The Aegis trusts were typically marketed to wealthy,
    self-employed individuals whose income could not be
    easily traced through the W-2 forms that are issued to
    ordinary taxpayers. Aegis representatives, including the
    defendants, conducted seminars promoting the Aegis
    trusts in cities around the country. Attendance at these
    seminars was by invitation only, and guests were
    charged between $150 and $500 to participate. Attendees
    were told at such seminars that use of the Aegis trust
    system would reduce if not eliminate their federal
    income taxes. They were often given materials that pur-
    ported to document the legitimacy of the system with
    seemingly thorough and impressive citations to the
    various legal authorities that supported the trusts. But as
    one lawyer wrote to a client who sought his advice as
    to the legitimacy of the system:
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                  7
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    This material is full of errors, irrelevancies and
    partial truths followed by non sequiturs. I know that
    I must resist the temptation to follow every line or
    I could spend the rest of my life on this. I will concen-
    trate on how, even if it were 99 percent correct, the
    claimed tax effects fail. In doing so, I’m not implying
    that that 99 percent is correct. I’m just skipping
    over the errors.
    Gov’t Ex. Dunn Office 32, R. 962 Tr. 3395. Those persons
    who purchased packages of one or more trusts were
    also encouraged to purchase trust management services
    from Aegis Management or Sigma, for which they would
    pay thousands of dollars annually on top of the $10,000
    to $50,000 they paid for the trusts themselves. These
    management services included advice and counsel
    on using the trusts to conceal income and assets from
    the IRS.
    The typical Aegis system comprised multiple domestic
    trusts, including a business trust, an asset management
    trust, and a charitable trust. (As we shall explain in a
    moment, foreign trusts were also used in many
    instances to further conceal an individual’s assets and
    income.) The centerpiece of the system was the
    business trust, also referred to as a “common law
    business organization” or “CBO.” The business trust was
    purportedly modeled after the Massachusetts Business
    Trust, a non-statutory arrangement by which ownership
    of a business is transferred to a trust in exchange for
    certificates of beneficial interest; the trustee then holds
    8                    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    and manages the business on behalf of the holders of
    those certificates. See Navarro Sav. Ass’n v. Lee, 
    446 U.S. 458
    , 468-69, 
    100 S. Ct. 1779
    , 1785-86 (1980) (quoting Hecht
    v. Malley, 
    265 U.S. 144
    , 146-47, 
    44 S. Ct. 462
    , 463
    (1924)) (describing Massachusetts Business Trust). A key
    point distinguishing the Aegis business trust (along
    with the other trusts making up the Aegis system) is
    that an independent trustee never assumed any real
    control over the trust assets. With the aid of Aegis per-
    sonnel, a purchaser nominally would transfer his as-
    sets—including his businesses and residence—to one or
    more trusts and formally cede control of those assets to
    the named trustee, typically Bartoli, Parker, or Stambulis.
    But routinely, within a few days after the trust was first
    established—and sometimes before the client had even
    transferred assets to the trust—the Aegis attorney would
    resign by means of a boilerplate letter citing “circum-
    stances beyond [his] control,” and appoint the client
    as his replacement. E.g., R. 917 Tr. 3495-96; R. 921 Tr. 5408-
    09; R. 965 Tr. 306. Because the purchaser thus retained
    control over the assets assigned to the trusts, the transfer
    of those assets into the trust amounted to nothing
    more than a paper transaction with no economic
    substance.1 Again, the sole purpose of the trust was to
    1
    As originally envisioned by Bartoli, a client’s wife would first
    convey all of her interest in the couple’s property to her hus-
    band, she would then become the temporary “independent”
    trustee of the business trust, her husband would transfer
    (continued...)
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                  9
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    conceal the purchaser’s assets from the IRS in an effort
    to reduce his tax liability. As the defendants themselves
    put it to their clients, the clients would “own nothing
    but control everything.” R. 921 Tr. 5384, 5406; R. 943
    Tr. 204.
    That the Aegis trust system was a fraudulent scheme
    was borne out in the manner in which the underlying
    documentation was prepared. We have noted, for ex-
    ample, that the purportedly independent trustee named
    in the creation of the trust routinely would resign
    shortly after the trust was created and be replaced by
    the client on whose behalf the trust was created.
    Typically the boilerplate resignation letter was prepared
    and signed at the same time as the paperwork creating
    the trust, although it was dated several days later,
    leaving no doubt that the resignation of the initial, “inde-
    pendent” trustee was planned from the outset. More-
    over, in many instances, the trust documents were back-
    dated to make it appear that a client had (nominally)
    transferred his assets to the trusts long before he had
    even purchased the trusts—sometimes years earlier—in
    order to retroactively claim the tax advantages of the
    trusts. (False notarizations were routinely provided to
    give cover to the backdating.) An additional fee was
    1
    (...continued)
    the property to that trust, and finally he would succeed his
    wife as the trustee. As the defendants implemented the
    system, an Aegis attorney replaced the client’s spouse as
    the initial trustee.
    10                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    sometimes charged for backdating documents in this
    way. Finally, false documents were created to make it
    appear that various legally important events had taken
    place—for example, minutes indicating that the directors
    of a trust had met—when in fact they never had.
    The income that Aegis clients derived from their busi-
    nesses was also diverted to the trusts by means of manage-
    ment and consulting contracts between the clients’ busi-
    nesses and their trusts, an arrangement that Aegis per-
    sonnel suggested and helped to implement. Ostensibly,
    pursuant to such a contract, a trust would provide
    services to the client’s business, for which the business
    would in turn compensate the trust. In actuality, the
    trust would provide no services to the business, although
    the business would compensate the trust and write
    the payments off as an expense. The actual purpose
    of these contracts was thus to conceal the diversion of
    business profits to the trusts without the payment of
    taxes on that income. See Ellefsen, 
    supra,
     
    655 F.3d at 775, 779-80
    .
    The money that Aegis clients transferred to their
    trusts would be returned to the clients and their
    businesses in a variety of ways. In some instances, the
    trusts would make fictitious loans to the client or his
    business. In other instances, charitable trusts were used
    to pay for things that really had nothing to do with
    the stated aims of those trusts. For example, a charitable
    trust might pay hundreds of thousands of dollars to
    purchase a primary residence or vacation home for the
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                 11
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    Aegis customer, on the theory that the home would
    serve as the “world headquarters” of the trust. R. 943
    Tr. 207, 222. Similarly, the charitable trust might pay for
    a family vacation trip on the theory that one of the pur-
    poses of the trip was to visit charitable enterprises to
    which the trust might make donations.
    Tax returns were prepared for the Aegis trust pur-
    chasers and for the trusts themselves, but these too were
    fraudulent in multiple respects. First, Aegis clients
    were advised by the defendants to assign their own
    income to the trusts despite the fact that the income
    was being earned and controlled by the clients just as
    it had been before the trusts were created. Second, clients
    were advised to report that assigned income on certain
    trust tax returns, but then to pass the income on to
    other trusts without taxes being paid on that income.
    The result was that the income remained in the clients’
    hands, but the tax liability was transferred elsewhere.
    Third, the defendants encouraged clients to claim
    various deductions on the trusts’ federal tax returns
    that had no basis in law or fact. For example, clients
    were told to deduct their household utility and other
    expenses on the theory that their homes were the “world
    headquarters” of their trusts. College tuition for clients’
    children was likewise posited as a trust expense based
    on the notion that the children would one day become
    directors of the trusts.
    The wealthiest Aegis clients were advised to par-
    ticipate in an offshore trust system employing foreign
    12                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    trusts and so-called “international business companies”
    (IBCs) in Belize. Belize was chosen as the locus for the
    offshore system because it was not particularly coopera-
    tive with the United States on issues related to asset-
    hiding and tax evasion. David Jenkins, a citizen of Belize,
    assisted the defendants with this aspect of the Aegis
    system, which commenced in 1995. The use of offshore
    trusts and foreign bank accounts enabled clients to
    further conceal their income by nominally transferring
    that income to a foreign trust. Again, control of the
    money would in fact remain with the client, but the tax
    liability would be shifted to a foreign entity that would,
    in actuality, file no U.S. tax return and pay no tax.
    As with the domestic trusts, foreign trusts and IBCs
    were established in such a way as to create the illusion
    that they were not under the control of Aegis clients.
    Jenkins would designate certain foreign entities to serve
    as the nominal directors, trustees, and protectors of
    these trusts or IBCs. For example, Freedom Services
    Company, an entity directed by Vallone, was often
    named as a trust protector (whose job it was to oversee
    the trustee), and a second company controlled by Jenkins
    was typically named as trustee. Meanwhile, Aegis clients
    were given undated letters of resignation from Vallone
    and Jenkins so that control of the trusts and IBCs at
    all times remained with them. Offshore accounts in
    Antigua were established in the names of these Belizean
    trusts and IBCs, and these accounts too were in
    reality under the control of the Aegis clients.
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,               13
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    To effect the concealment of his income using the off-
    shore trust system, an Aegis client was advised to first
    transfer his untaxed income to a trust bank account
    in the United States. From there, the money would be
    transferred to a bank account in Antigua that was
    held in the name of a foreign trust. The money was
    then transferred again to a second bank account, this one
    in the name of an IBC. The transfer of funds between
    domestic and foreign trusts often was characterized as
    a loan, evidenced by one or more promissory notes.
    Because the transfer of funds from one trust account
    to another was simply a means of hiding the client’s
    funds from the IRS, these notes were a fiction. But to
    give them a patina of legitimacy, Aegis clients were
    advised that periodic demands should be made on the
    notes and, in turn, relatively small repayments (say,
    $10,000) should be made on the outstanding “loans.”
    Once a client’s funds had been transferred to the IBC’s
    bank account, the money could be repatriated to the
    client in the United States in one of several ways. The
    client would be given a credit card linked to the IBC
    account in Antigua, which card he could use to access
    his money, either by making purchases using that card
    or by receiving cash advances through Automated
    Teller Machines (ATMs) in the United States. Because
    the card was linked to an offshore account, there would
    be no record of these transactions clearing in the
    United States. The IBC could also make fictitious “loans”
    or “gifts” of deposited funds to the client.
    14                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    No taxes were paid on income diverted through the
    offshore trust system. Aegis clients were assured that
    the IRS would not have access to offshore trust and
    bank records and would never be able to link the clients
    to the control of the IBCs or the bank accounts linked
    to those IBCs. The system worked to the benefit of the
    defendants as well: they could receive transaction fees
    equal to two or three percent of any funds funneled
    through the offshore trusts.
    The services that the defendants provided to Aegis
    clients did not end with the establishment of the
    various trusts. The defendants also provided clients with
    assistance on two fronts in an effort to ensure that the
    goal of tax evasion was accomplished—preparation of
    tax returns, and defense of IRS audits.
    As the trusts were a sham, Aegis insisted that clients
    use pre-selected tax return preparers whom the
    defendants knew would both conceal the true nature of
    the tax-avoidance scheme and help to perpetuate it by
    preparing returns consistent with the purpose of that
    scheme. Vallone, Dunn, and Cover each assisted clients
    and their tax preparers in preparing their personal, busi-
    ness, and trust tax returns. Copies of the tax returns
    filed on behalf of many Aegis clients were later found
    in the defendants’ offices.
    By the mid-1990s, the IRS was aware that Aegis and
    other organizations were promoting various forms of
    trusts as a means of income tax evasion, and it began to
    step up its efforts to combat the abuse of trusts for
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                15
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    this purpose. It formally signaled its focus on
    abusive trusts in April 1997, with the issuance of IRS
    Notice 97-24, available at 
    1997 WL 187852
    . The notice
    explained that it was “intended to alert taxpayers about
    certain trust arrangements that purport to reduce or
    eliminate federal taxes in ways that are not permitted
    by federal tax law.” Notice 97-24 at 1. The notice went on
    to cite five examples of potentially abusive tax arrange-
    ments, among them the business trust. Id. at 2. It ex-
    plained that a common feature of an abusive trust is
    that the original owner of the assets nominally subject
    to the trust retains the authority to cause the financial
    benefits of those assets to be returned to or made
    available to himself. Id. at 1-2. The notice also sum-
    marized the key legal principles applicable to trusts
    and tax liability, including firstly the point that
    “[s]ubstance—not form—controls taxation,” such that
    abusive trust arrangements may be treated as shams
    for tax purposes. Id. at 3. It also noted:
    When used in accordance with the tax laws, trusts
    will not transform a taxpayer’s personal, living or
    educational expenses into deductible items, and will
    not seek to avoid tax liability by ignoring either
    the true ownership of income and assets or the
    true substance of transactions. Accordingly, the tax
    results that are promised by the promoters of
    abusive trust arrangements are not allowable
    under federal tax law. . . .
    16                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    Id. at 3. As we discuss in greater detail below, the
    Aegis principals were aware of Notice 97-24: Vallone,
    for example, acknowledged that Aegis received multiple
    copies of the notice (along with client inquiries) soon
    after it was issued by the IRS. R. 921 Tr. 5434. Yet, the
    notice did not cause the firm to stop promoting
    Aegis trusts; instead, as we discuss below, it trig-
    gered efforts to avoid and/or obstruct IRS inquiry into
    the trusts.
    In fact, even before it issued Notice 97-24, the IRS
    was already quietly investigating Aegis. Michael Priess,
    then a Special Agent with the Criminal Investigation
    Division of the IRS, was among several agents who partici-
    pated in an undercover investigation of Aegis that
    began in 1996. Priess posed as Mike Jordan, an invest-
    ment adviser whose clients were mostly physicians.
    After attending an Aegis seminar in June 1996 at the
    Oak Lawn Hilton in suburban Chicago, Priess and another
    agent met with Dunn in 1997 to discuss the possibility
    of purchasing an Aegis package that would include an
    offshore trust. After attending two additional Aegis
    seminars—an October 1997 seminar in New York and a
    January 1998 seminar in Belize—Priess met again with
    Dunn in July 1998 to confirm that he was interested
    in purchasing an offshore trust package. During that
    meeting, Dunn assured Priess that he would surrender
    control of the assets he placed into the trust system for
    only about five minutes before the initial trustee re-
    signed. “In fact,” Dunn told Priess, “the resignation
    letter is completed before you’re actually signing up.”
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,               17
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-
    2174 R. 965
     Tr. 275. Two months later, Priess (as Jordan)
    agreed to purchase a trust package at a price of $38,000,
    and to engage Aegis Management to service the trusts at
    a cost of $11,500 per year. Priess told Dunn at that time
    that his accountant had told him the Aegis system
    was “bullshit” and that he should not go ahead with
    the purchase. R. 965 Tr. 288. Dunn was not surprised:
    “It’s not the first time we’ve heard those words, believe
    me.” 
    Id.
     Tr. 288. The trust documents were ready for
    Priess’s (or rather Jordan’s) signature in November.
    The package that Priess had purchased included a
    CBO/business trust (the Jordan Business Company
    Trust), an asset management trust (the MJ Asset Manage-
    ment Trust), an offshore trust (the Fructus Inter-
    national Trust), and an IBC (the Pernour Services Com-
    pany). Parker had already signed the paperwork as
    trustee of the MJ Asset Management Trust, and Jordan’s
    forthcoming signature had already been notarized.
    Dunn told Priess to date his signature August 26, 1998,
    although that date had come and gone more than
    eleven weeks earlier. (As it turned out, the dates on
    some of the documents had to be corrected later so
    that they matched the notarized dates.) Minutes had
    already been prepared showing that the asset manage-
    ment trust’s board of directors (which included only
    one director—Parker) had met by telephone on August 26,
    1998. Parker had signed a letter of resignation effective
    on September 28, 1998; and Priess was also given an
    undated letter of resignation from the trustee and
    protector of the Belizean trust, “[t]o give me [i.e.,
    18                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    Jordan] assurances that I had control of the Fructus Inter-
    national Trust.” R. 965 Tr. 332. Bank accounts at the
    Swiss American Bank in Antigua were opened for both
    the offshore trust and the IBC.
    After the trust system was established, Priess (as Jor-
    dan) set about with Dunn’s help to use the system to
    divert profits from his (fictitious) business into the
    trusts. A contract was prepared between Jordan’s
    business (Cumberland Investment Group) and the CBO
    (Jordan Business Company Trust) pursuant to which the
    CBO purportedly would provide management services
    to the business. The fee that the CBO would charge
    for these services was pegged at the amount of money
    Jordan expected his business to realize in profits that
    year—initially $220,000 and later $290,000. In reality,
    the CBO would provide no services at all to Jordan’s
    investment business, but the business would pay the fee
    to the business trust as a cover for the diversion of the
    business’s profits; the business trust would then
    transfer the fee to the asset management trust, which
    would in turn convey the fee to the offshore trust, which
    would then transfer the fee to the IBC. Priess posed a
    wrinkle to Dunn: he (Jordan) did not have $290,000 on
    hand to pay the CBO its “fee.” Dunn helped Priess come
    up with a “Plan B”: Jordan’s business would make an
    initial payment of $185,000 to the CBO; that money
    would then be transferred among the various trusts
    into the bank account of the IBC in Antigua; then
    $105,000 of that money would be repatriated to Jordan
    from the IBC account to Jordan as a “gift”; Jordan would
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                19
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    then send that $105,000 back into the trust system by
    writing a check for $106,400 to Fructus International
    Trust in purported repayment (with interest) of a
    $105,000 “loan” that Fructus had made previously. These
    machinations added a new level of deceit to the charade
    of the management fee, making it appear as though Jor-
    dan’s business ultimately paid the entire “fee” of
    $290,000, when in fact part of that total was simply a
    recycling of the initial downpayment of $185,000. The net
    effect was that Jordan’s business gained a $290,000 de-
    duction for its books, for which it paid only $185,000;
    the income tax liability that would have been due on the
    business’s profits was effectively shipped offshore to
    the IBC (which was beyond the reach of the IRS); and
    Jordan at all times retained control over the money.
    Priess subsequently had conversations with both Cover
    and Vallone at a February 1999 Aegis seminar in Cleve-
    land about the way in which he had repatriated the
    $105,000 from the Belizean IBC to himself as a “gift.”
    Cover, who told Priess that he was managing trusts
    from some fifty Aegis clients, warned Priess that bringing
    money back into the United States as a gift from the
    IBC was risky, as he would owe tax on the portion of
    any gift in excess of $10,000. Cover suggested to Priess
    that he bring back the remainder of the $290,000 sent
    abroad as a “loan.” Cover also mentioned to Priess that
    he (Cover) used a credit card linked to his own offshore
    IBC account to obtain cash from that account. “I go to the
    Cash Station every week and pull out $400,” he told the
    agent. Priess Tr. 42; R. 944 Tr. 409; R. 966 Tr. 688. When
    20                  Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    Priess raised the same subject with Vallone over lunch,
    Vallone had a different idea. Vallone suggested that
    Priess could still use a “gift” as the means of repatriating
    money from the Belizean entities, so long as he named
    a nominee director to the offshore bank accounts linked
    to the international trust and the IBC. That way, Vallone
    explained, Priess could say he had nothing to do with
    the “gift” if ever questioned by the IRS.
    Priess’s experience with the Aegis system documented
    most of the tax-evasive aspects of the Aegis scheme: a
    chain of connected trusts that, on paper, accomplished
    the transfer of client income abroad and assigned the
    income tax liability to an IBC, where it would effectively
    disappear; the designation of nominally independent
    trustees whose immediate resignation was planned for
    before the client signed the trust paperwork; the back-
    dating of documents; the preparation of minutes to
    reflect fictitious meetings of the trusts’ boards of directors
    (e.g., Parker’s telephonic meeting with himself); the use
    of bogus management services contracts to facilitate
    the transfer of a client’s business profits into the trust
    system; the repatriation of funds diverted to the
    offshore trust and IBC back to the client in the United
    States through fictitious loans and gifts; and the reality
    that for the Aegis client, all of these transactions and
    events occurred on paper only, without altering the
    operation of their businesses, control of their assets, or
    access to their money.
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                 21
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    After the IRS signaled its interest in abusive trust ar-
    rangements with the issuance of Notice 97-24 in 1997, the
    defendants created what they referred to as the “Aegis
    Audit Arsenal.” This so-called arsenal was basically a
    series of obstructionist measures that the defendants
    encouraged Aegis clients to use, and in some instances
    aided their clients in using, to thwart IRS inquiries into
    the use of Aegis trusts. For example, the defendants
    encouraged clients to withhold information from IRS
    agents, to respond to IRS inquiries and requests for
    the production of financial records with non-responsive
    letters and questionnaires drafted by defendants, and
    to file frivolous motions to quash summonses issued by
    the IRS. In some instances, attorneys Parker and Stambulis
    sent letters drafted by Vallone to the IRS on behalf of
    Aegis clients. A nine-page letter that Parker sent to
    the IRS in November 1999 on behalf of Aegis client
    Genevieve Riccordino, a real estate broker, exemplifies
    the nature of this correspondence. The letter is a font of
    evasion and obfuscation, posing a multitude of questions
    as to the IRS’s purposes in seeking information re-
    lated to Riccordino’s trusts, voicing doubt as to the IRS’s
    authority to investigate the trusts, making frivolous docu-
    ment requests, and threatening to seek sanctions if the
    IRS did not comply with Parker’s demands. Gov’t Ex.
    Dunn Office 25 (Gov’t Supp. App. 189-97). Parker later
    confessed on the witness stand that he issued letters
    such as this one with little or no forethought as to
    whether they had any arguable basis in the law. “I was
    more concerned about sending these letters out
    22                  Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    pursuant to the Aegis Audit Arsenal than determining
    at the time whether they were legally defensible or not,”
    he testified. R. 947 Tr. 2040.
    Early in 2000, the defendants also created the Washing-
    ton, D.C., law firm of Parker & Associates, which was
    owned by Parker and Hopper, to represent Aegis clients
    during IRS audits and examinations. The law firm
    served the dual function of helping to implement the
    Audit Arsenal’s goal of obstruction and to generate
    additional fees from Aegis clients.
    In a particularly brazen move, several of the
    defendants filed lawsuits against both the IRS and a
    number of its revenue and special agents, among others.
    Bartoli, Vallone, Hopper, and Dunn filed one such suit
    on May 8, 1997, in the Northern District of Illinois
    against (among others) IRS Revenue Agent James Pogue
    and the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary
    Commission (“ARDC”), which had initiated disciplinary
    proceedings against Bartoli based on his involvement
    with the trusts sold by both Heritage and Aegis. (We
    shall have more to say about the ARDC proceeding
    below.) That suit was assigned to Judge Plunkett who,
    after dismissing most of the defendants and granting
    summary judgment to Pogue, imposed Rule 11 sanctions
    on the four plaintiffs for filing a frivolous lawsuit. See
    Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. His sanctions opinion, which we later
    affirmed and adopted on appeal, observed:
    At base, the plaintiffs filed this claim because they
    believe the trusts they promote should be a legal
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                       23
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    means to avoid paying taxes. They are not. Plaintiffs
    may disagree with the state of the law, but
    Rule 11 prohibits them from filing fictional claims
    to protest it. . . .
    Bartoli v. A.R.D.C. of Ill., 
    1999 WL 1045210
    , at *3 (N.D. Ill.
    Nov. 12, 1999) (citations omitted), aff’d sub nom. Bartoli v.
    Richmond, supra, 
    2000 WL 687155
    . In May 2001, Vallone,
    Aegis, and Heritage also filed a class-action suit against the
    IRS and three of its agents (among other defendants) in the
    Southern District of Illinois, seeking damages of $556
    billion for purported violations of the plaintiffs’ civil rights.
    That action was dismissed as devoid of merit in June 2003.
    Judge Plunkett’s November 1999 ruling in the Bartoli
    case was an unmistakable rejection of the legitimacy of
    the Aegis trusts, but in fact the defendants were on
    notice long before his ruling that the Aegis system was
    contrary to longstanding rules governing trusts and
    taxation. Prospective clients of Aegis who received warn-
    ings as to the legitimacy of the system from their own
    lawyers and accountants frequently forwarded the nega-
    tive opinions to Aegis personnel; copies of such opinions
    were later discovered in the files at Aegis headquarters.
    We quoted earlier from one such opinion letter, which
    noted that the Aegis materials distributed at promo-
    tional seminars purporting to document the legality of
    the system were “full of errors, irrelevancies and partial
    truths followed by non sequiturs.” Gov’t Ex. Dunn
    Office 32, R. 962 Tr. 3395. We also noted that when
    Priess (posing as Mike Jordan) reported his own accoun-
    tant’s description of the Aegis system as “bullshit,” Dunn
    24                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    assured him it was not the first time he had heard
    such language used in reference to Aegis.
    IRS Notice 97-24, issued in April 1997, reiterated the
    ways in which abusive trusts akin to those promoted by
    Aegis violated longstanding and well-known legal princi-
    ples. This notice, as we have discussed was well-known
    to the Aegis principals, and copies of the notice were
    found in the Aegis headquarters.
    Then in June 1999, the United States Tax Court issued
    its decision in Muhich v. C.I.R., 
    1999 WL 390695
     (U.S. Tax
    Court June 14, 1999), holding that a multi-trust system
    that Bartoli had sold to Frank and Virginia Muhich
    through Heritage was a sham lacking in economic sub-
    stance that should be disregarded for tax purposes.
    Mr. and Mrs. Muhich owned a family photography busi-
    ness. They purchased a trust package from Heritage in
    1994 after meeting with Bartoli; they subsequently
    engaged Aegis to help operate the trusts. The Muhichs’
    system ultimately comprised five trusts, including an
    asset management trust, a business trust, a charitable
    trust, an equity trust, and a vehicle trust. Bartoli served
    as the initial trustee of the asset management trust,
    which was formed first, and following Bartoli’s resigna-
    tion as the initial trustee, the Muhichs became the
    sole trustees and beneficiaries of that and the other four
    trusts. Most of the Muhich’s assets were assigned to
    the asset management trust, including Mr. Muhich’s
    right to receive compensation for his services. Once the
    trusts were in place, Mr. Muhich ran the family business
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                 25
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    just as he did before. In lieu of paying a salary to him,
    however, the business paid the asset management trust
    for his services, calling the payments “consulting fees.”
    The Muhichs, as officers of the asset management trust,
    assumed responsibility for managing the trust’s affairs,
    and as compensation for their services, the trust “agreed”
    to pay the family’s housing, transportation, health care,
    and other expenses. The asset management trust, of
    course, claimed deductions for those expenses; and any
    net income remaining after the deduction of those
    expenses was transferred to the charitable trust. The
    asset management trust thus reported zero taxable
    income, and the charitable trust (which made only
    modest charitable contributions) claimed exemption
    from taxation. The other trusts reported no income what-
    soever. On the returns that the Muhichs themselves
    filed for 1994 and 1995, they reported no income in
    the form of compensation.
    The IRS determined that the trust arrangement was
    an abusive one that should be disregarded for tax pur-
    poses, and the Tax Court agreed. The court found that
    the trusts lacked any economic substance apart from
    tax considerations. The court pointed out that (1) the
    Muhichs’ relationship with their property did not
    change (“the Muhichs could manipulate, distribute, or
    otherwise use trust property at their whim”) (2) the
    trusts lacked an independent trustee (“[t]he fact that
    Bartoli served as a trustee for a limited time is
    meaningless; it was a paper appointment solely for the
    purpose of facilitating the creation of the trust scheme”);
    26                  Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    (3) “no economic interest in the trusts ever passed to
    anyone other than the Muhichs”; and (4) the Muhichs
    were not bound by any restrictions as to the use of
    trust property. 
    Id.,
     at *6-*7. The court noted that, overall,
    “the tangled web” of trusts did little more than
    conceal who really owned the assets and who earned
    the income assigned to the trusts. Id., at *7.
    In sum, petitioners established the trusts with an
    aim to avoid, improperly, Federal income tax. None
    of the trusts ever reported taxable income, and none
    of them conducted a legitimate business activity.
    Petitioners’ purpose for the trust scheme was to
    take untaxed money out of Midwest [the family
    business] and circulate it around the trusts to pay
    for the Muhichs’ personal expenses. The Muhichs
    admitted as much at trial. Although the Muhichs
    attempted to identify other nontax reasons for the
    trusts, we find these reasons incredible. Because
    the trusts lacked economic reality, the Court will
    ignore them for tax purposes.
    Id. (footnotes omitted). This decision to treat the trusts
    as a sham meant that the business income that had
    been diverted to the trusts would instead be treated as
    income to the Muhichs on which they would owe tax.
    The court went on to hold the Muhichs liable for a
    penalty equal to twenty percent of the amount of
    income they had underpaid in the relevant tax years
    based on their negligence in under-reporting their
    income. Id., at *10-*11; see 
    26 U.S.C. § 6662
    (a) and (b)(1).
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                  27
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    In imposing that penalty, the court rejected the
    Muhichs’ contention that they had reasonably relied on
    the advice of Bartoli, among others, as to the legitimacy
    of the trusts. “Bartoli’s bias was obvious, and his ability
    to benefit financially by luring individuals into the
    scheme should have sent up a red flag. Petitioner is an
    experienced businessman who should have been suspi-
    cious of Bartoli’s claims.” Id., at *11. The court opted not
    to impose an additional penalty on the Muhichs under
    
    26 U.S.C. § 6673
    (a)(1) for asserting a frivolous or ground-
    less position in response to the IRS’s claims. The court
    agreed that the Muhichs’ contention that the trusts had
    economic substance indeed was frivolous; it rejected the
    penalty only because the Muhichs had prevailed on
    the distinct question whether the “consulting fees” paid
    by the Muhichs’ business to the asset management
    trust should be included in the Muhichs’ income as
    compensation or constructive dividends. 
    Id.
    The Muhichs appealed the Tax Court’s decision to this
    court. We affirmed the Tax Court’s holding in
    January 2001, noting that it was wholly consistent with
    prior cases rejecting efforts to assign a taxpayer’s
    income and other assets to a trust, treat his personal
    expenses as deductible costs of trust administration,
    and avoid paying income taxes on his income.
    The Muhichs transferred their assets to the trusts
    and attempted to have their trusts pay all their per-
    sonal expenses. As detailed above, courts have uni-
    formly held that such transactions are a sham and
    28                  Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    that the Commissioner [of Internal Revenue] may
    disregard these sham trusts for tax purposes. This is
    what the Commissioner did and we can see no
    reason to overturn the decision of the Tax Court.
    
    238 F.3d at 864
     (footnote omitted).
    The executives of Aegis were keenly aware of the Tax
    Court’s decision in Muhich. The Muhichs may have pur-
    chased an early version of a trust system from Heritage
    (where Bartoli, Vallone, and Hopper developed the
    concept of a multi-trust package aimed at tax avoidance),
    but their package of trusts was similar in essential
    respects to the Aegis system of trusts, and the Muhichs
    had in fact engaged Aegis to help them operate their
    trusts. Frank Muhich was spotted in the audience at the
    first Aegis seminar that Agent Priess attended in 1996,
    and in the wake of the Tax Court’s decision three
    years later, Hopper remarked to Priess that Muhich “was
    one of our CBO clients.” Priess Tr. 48; R. 944 Tr. 419.
    There was extensive discussion and correspondence
    both within Aegis and between Aegis representatives
    and existing and prospective clients regarding the
    Muhich decision. Publicly, Aegis officials put on a brave
    face when referencing the decision, attempting to distin-
    guish the Aegis trusts from the Heritage system that
    the Muhichs had purchased and criticizing the Muhichs’
    implementation and use of the system. Privately, some
    at Aegis feared that the Tax Court’s decision marked
    the beginning of the end of Aegis. As we discuss in
    greater detail later in this opinion, the adverse decision
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                 29
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    led to a schism between Hopper and Vallone: Hopper
    believed that Muhich’s description of the trusts as a sham
    exposed the Aegis principals to criminal liability for
    promoting the Aegis trusts; he thought that Aegis
    clients should be encouraged to seek out independent
    advice as to how they should proceed in the wake of
    Muhich. Vallone, on the other hand, thought that Aegis
    should increase its efforts to avoid and obstruct IRS
    inquiries into the Aegis trusts.
    The other red flag that signaled official disapproval of
    the Aegis system came in the form of the disciplinary
    complaint that the Illinois ARDC filed against Bartoli in
    November 1996. By this time, Bartoli had resigned as
    Aegis’s legal counsel, assumed inactive status with the
    Illinois bar, and relocated to Myrtle Beach, South
    Carolina; but he remained involved in the management
    of Aegis. The ARDC began investigating Bartoli after
    Richmond, who had been forced out of Heritage in 1994,
    complained to the ARDC about Bartoli. The complaint
    that the ARDC ultimately filed against Bartoli was pre-
    mised primarily on the assertion that Bartoli had
    engaged in dishonesty, fraud, and deceit in promoting
    CBOs as a means of tax avoidance, because the
    applicable principles of trust, tax, and common law did
    not recognize the CBO as employed by Heritage, Aegis,
    and Bartoli as a viable entity. R. 916 Tr. 2652-53. Much
    like the Muhich litigation, then, the ARDC proceeding
    directly implicated the legitimacy of the Aegis system
    of trusts. We shall have more to say about the ARDC
    proceeding later in this opinion as we discuss an issue
    30                  Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    with respect to the evidence that the government offered
    at trial regarding that proceeding. For now it is enough
    to note that although only Bartoli was named as a re-
    spondent in the ARDC proceeding, the defendants were
    well aware of the proceeding. Vallone and Hopper, in
    addition to Bartoli, were deposed in the course of that
    proceeding. Copies of the ARDC documents were later
    discovered in the Aegis headquarters. And, as we have
    already noted, four of the defendants filed suit against
    the ARDC based on its conduct in investigating and
    charging Bartoli. Ultimately, a Hearing Board of the
    ARDC issued a Report and Recommendation in
    February 2000 proposing that Bartoli be disbarred in
    Illinois based on his conduct in connection with
    promoting and selling the CBOs. That proposal was
    adopted by the ARDC’s Review Board in December 2001,
    and Bartoli was formally disbarred by the Illinois
    Supreme Court in May 2002.
    By early 2000, it was apparent to all that the govern-
    ment had both Aegis and the firm’s clientele in its
    sights. Vallone would report in an April 2000 letter to
    Aegis clients that as of January 2000, some 150 Aegis
    members had received audit requests from the IRS, al-
    though he assured clients that the IRS dropped half
    of these “after one or two letters from us.” Gov’t Ex. Priess
    26; R. 944 Tr. 435. On March 31, 2000, search warrants
    were executed at the Aegis headquarters in Palos Hills,
    Illinois, at Dunn’s office in Indiana, and at the offices
    of other individuals working with the defendants. Both
    documents and computers were seized during the
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                   31
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    search, making plain that the government was not
    only building a case against Aegis and its officials but
    attempting to identify the firm’s clients as well. Vallone
    would later testify that “new business was practically
    completely finished” at that point. R. 921 Tr. 5356. It
    would be another four years, however, before Aegis
    finally closed its doors. Aegis continued to service
    existing clients of the trust system; and Vallone led an
    ultimately unsuccessful effort to prevent the govern-
    ment from identifying those clients.
    Vallone initiated changes in the trust system in an
    ongoing effort to keep Aegis clients “off the radar screen”
    of the IRS. E.g., R. 944 Tr. 452-53, 455; R. 954 Tr. 5501-02.
    Vallone learned that the government had been able to
    identify some Aegis clients from the Schedule C forms
    (used to report income from sole proprietorships) that
    those clients had attached to their trust tax returns. R. 944
    Tr. 438-39. Vallone adopted a new business name—“The
    Fortress Trust” (which had the same address as the
    Aegis headquarters)—and under that name promoted
    a new “Tax Minimization Plan,” which employed a
    different type of trust and a limited liability company, so
    as to eliminate the type of tax return that called for a
    Schedule C. Existing Aegis clients were encouraged to
    switch to the new system—at a cost of several thousand
    dollars—in order to avoid scrutiny from the IRS. Dunn,
    in fact, had such a conversation with Agent Priess.
    Priess, in his role as Aegis client Mike Jordan, had a
    June 2000 meeting with Dunn in which Priess voiced
    skepticism whether he had an ongoing need for the
    32                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    services of Aegis Management. Dunn responded that
    Priess (Jordan) needed those services more than ever
    “[i]n light of the increased scrutiny and them [the IRS]
    now having the records” from the March 2000 search.
    Gov’t Ex. Priess Tr. 59; R. 944 Tr. 452. “There are ways
    to get those same benefits without having to be on
    the radar screen,” Dunn told Priess. 
    Id.
     Tr. 452.
    In the meantime, changes were occurring within
    Aegis. Hopper resigned as the managing director of the
    firm in January 2000, although he remained on hand to
    provide assistance through April. Parker ceased his
    involvement as counsel in May 2000, after the Muhich
    decision caused him to seek independent advice as to
    the legitimacy of the Aegis trusts from three different
    tax attorneys, who informed him that the trusts were
    not valid. In May 2000, the same month as Parker’s de-
    parture, Dowd was named by Vallone to be the
    operations manager of both Heritage and Aegis. In a
    letter to Aegis clients announcing (among other events)
    Harper’s departure and Dowd’s promotion, Vallone
    described Dowd’s new role as a “purely administrative
    position, not managerial,” but added that Dowd “will
    greatly help me in carrying on with our operations.” Gov’t
    Ex. 27; R. 944 Tr. 450. In June 2000, Dowd, Cover and
    others joined what was known as the Aegis Advisory
    Board to counsel Vallone in his management of Aegis
    and the Fortress Trust.
    A discussion of the facts would not be complete
    without mention of the ways in which the defendants
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                33
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    themselves used the Aegis trusts. The defendants not
    only promoted the Aegis trust system but used that
    system to hide the substantial income they reaped
    from sales of trust packages. (From 1997 through 2000,
    the total incomes earned by each defendant ranged
    from a low of $142,000 in Dowd’s case to a high of
    $1.5 million in Dunn’s case. Collectively, the defendants
    earned more than $6 million from the sale and manage-
    ment of Aegis trusts over the life of the scheme.) In some
    cases, the defendants failed to file tax returns at all:
    Vallone, Bartoli, and Hopper filed no individual tax
    returns for the years 1997 to 2000, for example. To hide
    the income they earned from Aegis and other sources,
    their paychecks were made payable to the trusts they
    controlled and were deposited into the bank accounts
    held by those trusts; the defendants then withdrew
    cash and paid for personal expenditures out of the trust
    accounts. None of the income funneled through the
    trusts was reported as income and thus no tax was paid
    on it. Vallone failed to report gross income of $700,000
    from 1997 through 1999 (he was not charged for the 2000
    tax year), on which he owed federal income taxes of
    $182,000. Bartoli failed to report gross income of over
    $600,000 in 1997 through 2000, on which he owed tax of
    $192,000. Hopper failed to report gross income of more
    than $814,0000 in those four years, on which his tax
    liability was more than $220,000.
    Like Vallone, Bartoli, and Hopper, Dunn did not file a
    federal income tax for 1999, although his gross income
    exceeded $438,000 that year. He did file tax returns for
    1997 and 1998, but he reported only modest income of
    34                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    approximately $16,000 and $9,000 for those years, when
    his actual income exceeded $434,000 and $604,000 re-
    spectively. On the income that he failed to report in
    these three years, Dunn owed taxes totaling more
    than $315,000.
    Dowd and Cover both filed federal income tax returns
    in 1997 through 2000, but as with Dunn the returns
    they filed substantially under-reported their actual
    income. Dowd, for example, reported income of only
    $3,000 to $6,000 annually, although his gross income
    in those four years amounted to more than $211,000.
    He owed $55,000 on the income that he failed to report,
    while Cover owed an additional $84,000 on the income
    that he did not report for 1997 through 1999.
    Although the doors of Aegis did not close until 2004,
    the scheme was largely at an end by 2003. By that time,
    people were being summoned to testify about Aegis to
    a grand jury. In March 2003, the government conducted a
    second round of searches which included, among
    other locations, the Aegis headquarters and Vallone’s
    homes in Illinois and Florida.
    The defendants were indicted in April 2004. Count One
    of the superseding indictment charged all of the defen-
    dants with conspiring to defraud the United States by
    impairing and impeding the functions of the IRS and to
    commit tax offenses against the United States. 
    18 U.S.C. § 371
    . The defendants were also charged with multiple
    counts of mail fraud, 
    18 U.S.C. § 1341
    ; wire fraud, 
    18 U.S.C. § 1343
    ; aiding and assisting the filing of false tax
    returns by others, 
    26 U.S.C. § 7206
    (2); filing their own
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                    35
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    false tax returns, 
    26 U.S.C. § 7206
    (1); and tax evasion,
    
    26 U.S.C. § 7201
    .
    After multiple continuances were granted at the
    requests of one or more of the defendants, an eleven-
    week trial commenced in February 2008 and concluded
    in May 2008. The jury convicted Vallone, Bartoli, Hopper,
    and Cover on all counts in which they were charged.
    Dunn was convicted on the conspiracy charge and
    fourteen tax-offense charges, but he was acquitted on
    nine counts of mail and wire fraud. Dowd was convicted
    on the conspiracy count, one count of mail fraud, and
    four counts of filing false tax returns but was acquitted
    on four mail and wire fraud counts and four counts
    alleging that he aided and assisted the filing of false
    tax returns by others.
    Each of the defendants was sentenced to a substantial
    term of imprisonment: Vallone was ordered to serve a
    prison term of 223 months; Bartoli, 120 months; Hopper,
    200 months; Dunn, 210 months; Cover, 160 months; and
    Dowd, 120 months. All six defendants appeal, raising
    a multitude of joint and individual issues that we
    resolve in turn below.
    II.
    JOINT ISSUES
    A. Speedy Trial Act Claim
    The trial in this case was originally set for June 29, 2004,
    R. 31, but was continued on multiple occasions thereafter
    36                  Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    at the request of various defendants. In a number of
    instances, these continuances were granted over the
    objection of the government, but at no time did any
    defense counsel voice an objection to the delays. How-
    ever, in February 2008, shortly before the trial com-
    menced, defendant Vallone moved to dismiss the indict-
    ment, contending that the multiple postponements of
    the trial date had violated his right to an expeditious
    trial under the Speedy Trial Act, 
    18 U.S.C. § 3161
    , et seq.
    (the “STA” or the “Act”). R. 408, 411.2 That Act grants
    a defendant the right to a trial commencing within
    seventy days after he is charged or makes an initial ap-
    pearance, § 3161(c)(1), subject to certain authorized ex-
    ceptions that permit time to be excluded from the seventy-
    day period, § 3161(h). See Zedner v. United States, 
    547 U.S. 489
    , 492, 
    126 S. Ct. 1976
    , 1981 (2006); United States
    v. O’Connor, 
    656 F.3d 630
    , 636 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied,
    
    132 S. Ct. 2373
     (2012). On the defendant’s motion,
    the district court must dismiss the indictment if the trial
    does not commence within seventy non-excluded days.
    § 3162(a)(2). Principally, Vallone contended that from
    February 7 to May 3, 2007, the court had failed to enter
    an order properly tolling the running of the speedy-
    trial clock, so that by April 18, 2007, seventy days had
    elapsed and because the trial had not yet commenced, his
    2
    In a supplement to his motion, Vallone contended without
    elaboration that his speedy trial claims were based on the
    Sixth Amendment as well as the Speedy Trial Act. R. 414.
    However, Vallone’s appeal relies solely on the statute.
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                   37
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    right to a speedy trial had been violated. (Secondarily,
    Vallone suggested that “other time periods” were prob-
    lematic because the court’s findings as to the excluda-
    bility of these time periods were inadequate. But Vallone
    never identified which time periods he was relying
    upon.) At the hearing on Vallone’s motion, the gov-
    ernment responded that the lack of an order entered
    between February 7 and May 3, 2007, was immaterial,
    because the court in December 2006 had continued the
    trial date at the request of the defendants until Octo-
    ber 23, 2007, and had excluded time through that new
    trial date from the STA’s seventy-day mandate with the
    agreement of the parties. R. 1051 at 54-57; see R. 1057 at 6.
    The government presented the court with a transcript
    of the December 7, 2006 hearing at which this had oc-
    curred. R. 1051 at 58-59. After reading a portion of that
    transcript into the record, the court denied Vallone’s
    motion. R. 1051 at 64. Vallone, now joined by the other
    defendants, contends that the court erred in denying
    his motion.
    As the defendants acknowledge, “certain specified
    periods of delay are not counted” toward the STA’s
    seventy-day limit. Defendants’ Joint Br. 23 (quoting
    Zedner, 
    547 U.S. at 492
    , 
    126 S. Ct. at 1981
    ); United States
    v. Wasson, 
    supra,
     
    679 F.3d at 944
    . One such exception, and
    the one most on point here, is a continuance of the trial
    date granted based on the court’s finding that “the ends
    of justice served by taking such action outweigh the
    best interest of the public and the defendant in a
    speedy trial.” § 3161(h)(7)(A) (formerly § 3161(h)(8)(A)
    38                   Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    as noted in O’Connor, 
    656 F.3d at
    636 n.2). The statute
    identifies a number of factors that the court must consider
    in deciding whether such a continuance is warranted.
    § 3161(h)(7)(B); see Wasson, 
    679 F.3d at 944
    . The district
    judge has broad discretion in weighing the pertinent
    factors and in determining whether a continuance is
    warranted. United States v. Rojas-Contreras, 
    474 U.S. 231
    ,
    236, 
    106 S. Ct. 555
    , 558 (1985); see also United States v.
    Broadnax, 
    536 F.3d 695
    , 698 (7th Cir. 2008); United States
    v. Taylor, 
    196 F.3d 854
    , 860 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing United
    States v. Blandina, 
    895 F.2d 293
    , 296 (7th Cir. 1989)).
    Counterbalancing that open-ended discretion, however,
    is “procedural strictness”: The judge must set forth in
    the record, either orally or in writing, his reasons for
    concluding that a continuance is warranted by the ends
    of justice. § 3161(h)(7); Zedner, 
    547 U.S. at 509
    , 
    126 S. Ct. at 1990
    ; see O’Connor, 
    656 F.3d at 639-40
    ; United States v.
    Adams, 
    625 F.3d 371
    , 378-79 (7th Cir. 2010).
    The defendants’ lead and principal argument on
    appeal, as it was below, is that the district court did not
    order the exclusion of time during the time period com-
    mencing on February 7, 2007, and ending on May 3, 2007.
    As the speedy trial clock consequently was running
    during that period, the defendants reason, the district
    court was obliged to start the trial no later than April 18,
    2007 (seventy days after February 7). The fact that it
    did not shows that they were deprived of their right to a
    speedy trial and compelled the district court to grant
    Vallone’s request that the indictment be dismissed.
    § 3162(a)(2).
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                 39
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    We conclude that the defendants have waived this
    argument. The argument, as we have said, assumes
    that there was no order at all excluding time between
    February 7, 2007, and May 3, 2007, such that the speedy
    trial clock expired in April. This argument overlooks the
    fact that the court on December 7, 2006, had already
    continued the trial date from February 7, 2007, on
    motion of defendants, to October 23, 2007, and had
    orally excluded time, by agreement. The government
    relied on the December 7 continuance, and the sur-
    rounding context, as adequate to support the exclusion
    of time under the STA’s ends-of-justice provision. It is
    clear that the court itself relied on what had transpired
    on December 7 to deny Vallone’s motion: the court,
    after all, read the relevant portion of the December 7
    transcript into the record in ruling on the motion. R. 416;
    R. 1051 at 64. It made the point even more explicitly in
    its order denying the defendants’ post-trial motions for
    judgments of acquittal, where it noted that it had granted
    the continuances based on defense counsels’ representa-
    tions regarding the complexity of the case and the length
    of time needed to prepare for trial. R. 650 at 7-8. So
    the threshold question presented by the appeal on this
    issue is whether, as the government and the district
    court concluded, the December 2006 continuance of the
    trial date and the accompanying exclusion of time com-
    plied with the STA’s ends-of-justice provision. (To the
    extent the defendants presume that exclusion must take
    the form of a written order, they are mistaken. Our deci-
    sion in United States v. Napadow, 
    596 F.3d 398
    , 405 (7th
    40                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    Cir. 2010), leaves no doubt that a written order is not
    required so long as the district court’s oral remarks
    make clear its intent to exclude time. See also O’Connor,
    
    656 F.3d at 639-40
    ; Adams, 
    625 F.3d at 380
    .)
    Yet, in their lead brief, the defendants make no
    mention at all of what took place on December 7, 2006, let
    alone any argument as to why the court’s oral directive
    that time would be excluded from December 7, 2006, to
    October 23, 2007, was insufficient to comply with the
    STA. There can be no reasonable excuse for this omis-
    sion. The December continuance and exclusion of
    time was the centerpiece of the government’s response
    to the motion to dismiss below and was repeated when
    the defendants reasserted the speedy trial issue in
    their post-judgment motions for acquittal. The record
    leaves no doubt that the district court itself relied on
    the events of December 7, 2006, as the basis for its
    decision to deny Vallone’s motion to dismiss and like-
    wise to deny the defendants’ post-judgment motions
    for acquittal as to this issue. But the defendants’ lead
    brief is altogether silent as to December 7. They
    belatedly address the subject in their reply brief, but this
    is too late. E.g., United States v. Stevenson, 
    656 F.3d 747
    ,
    753 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Boisture, 
    563 F.3d 295
    , 299 n.3 (7th Cir. 2009)). Having altogether
    ignored the rationale for the district court’s ruling in
    presenting the issue and making their initial argument
    on appeal, the defendants have waived this aspect of
    their challenge. See Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 
    624 F.3d 461
    ,
    466 (7th Cir. 2010) (failure to grapple with basis for
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                    41
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    district court’s decision to dismiss case, and to respond
    to defendant’s arguments in support of dismissal,
    results in waiver of appeal); In re Snyder, 
    152 F.3d 596
    , 599-
    600 (7th Cir. 1998) (although, in bankruptcy appeal,
    appellate court’s review is not confined to district
    court’s findings but extends to findings of bankruptcy
    court as well, it is nonetheless “unacceptable” for
    appellant to ignore basis for district court’s ruling);
    United States v. Fuchs, 
    635 F.3d 929
    , 933-34 (7th Cir.
    2011) (failure to address district court’s alternative
    holding on an issue waives any challenge to that holding)
    (coll. cases); Fin. Inv. Co. (Bermuda) Ltd. v. Geberit A.G.,
    
    165 F.3d 526
    , 531 (7th Cir. 1998) (failure to address alter-
    native ground for district court’s decision until reply
    brief constitutes waiver of challenge to that ground).
    The defendants argue secondarily that many of the
    district court’s other orders excluding time based on the
    ends of justice were not supported by adequate findings;
    but this argument was waived in the district court.
    We noted above that although Vallone’s motion to
    dismiss primarily focused on the period from February 7
    to May 3, 2007, he also suggested that the district court
    had not properly excluded other periods of time in the
    case. The entirety of Vallone’s argument in that regard
    reads as follows:
    In addition, other time periods in these proceedings
    are also not excludable for speedy-trial purposes,
    because the record does not reflect that the requisite
    42                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    “findings” were “made” in support of the “ends-of-
    justice” continuances that were nominally entered.
    R. 411 at 6 (citations omitted). Vallone did not cite any
    particular order as defective, and the sole documenta-
    tion he provided to the court in support of his motion
    was the transcript of the February 7, 2007 hearing, which
    obviously had to do with his primary argument con-
    cerning the February 7 to May 3, 2007, period rather
    than any other period. At the hearing on Vallone’s
    motion, the government’s counsel asserted that this
    second argument was “undeveloped and, therefore,
    waived.” R. 1051 at 57. When Vallone’s counsel was
    given the opportunity to reply to the government’s argu-
    ments, counsel said nothing to amplify on this second
    argument nor to contest the government’s assertion that
    it was waived for lack of development. The district
    court, having been given no grist in support of the argu-
    ment, never addressed it. Because this was Vallone’s
    motion, because the secondary argument was never
    fleshed out, and because Vallone’s counsel remained
    silent in the district court in response to the govern-
    ment’s contention that the argument had been waived,
    we find that Vallone indeed did waive it.
    We add that the defendants have barely expanded on
    the basis for their secondary contention in their lead
    brief on appeal: they have cited roughly a dozen of the
    district court’s orders continuing the trial date, but have
    not bothered to address any individual orders and
    explain why, in light of the requirements of the STA and
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                  43
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    case law applying the Act, the district court’s exclusion
    of time was inadequate. To the extent that the
    defendants mean to suggest that time was not properly
    excluded because the court’s written orders granting the
    various continuances do not on their face reflect
    findings sufficient to satisfy the statute’s requirements
    as to ends-of-justice exclusions of time, we reiterate
    that the defendants are operating on a mistaken prem-
    ise. As we have already said, the court need not put its
    findings justifying such an exclusion in a written order,
    so long as the record otherwise makes clear the
    reasons why the court found that the ends of justice
    warranted the exclusion of time. The defendants have
    not bothered to address whether the court’s oral
    remarks in granting the continuances, and the con-
    text surrounding the continuances, otherwise satisfy
    the statute. See Wasson, 
    679 F.3d at 946-48
    ; O’Connor,
    
    656 F.3d at 639-40
    ; Adams, 
    625 F.3d at 380
    ; Napadow, 
    596 F.3d at 405
    .
    B. Cheek Defense
    All six of the defendants before us were charged, inter
    alia, with the willful attempt to evade or defeat the
    federal income taxes owed on their income, either by
    filing tax returns that substantially understated their
    income or by filing no tax return at all. R. 103, Counts 35-
    55; see 
    26 U.S.C. § 7201
    . Four of the defendants—Vallone,
    Bartoli, Hopper, and Dunn—also were charged with
    willfully aiding and assisting, procuring, counseling,
    44                  Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    and advising the preparation and presentation of the
    false and fraudulent income tax returns filed by
    multiple Aegis clients. R. 103, Counts 11-34; see 
    26 U.S.C. § 7206
    (2). In Cheek v. United States, 
    498 U.S. 192
    , 201, 
    111 S. Ct. 604
    , 610 (1991), the Supreme Court noted that the
    mental state of willfulness, for purposes of section
    7201 and other criminal tax laws, demands proof that
    the defendant knew of a duty imposed on him by the
    law and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated
    that duty. The court went on to hold that a defendant’s
    genuine belief that he is not legally required to do a
    particular act—to report his wages as income to the
    IRS, for example—is inconsistent with actual knowledge
    of that obligation, even if his understanding is objec-
    tively unreasonable.
    [I]f the Government proves actual knowledge of the
    pertinent legal duty, the prosecution, without more,
    has satisfied the knowledge component of the will-
    fulness requirement. But carrying this burden re-
    quires negating a defendant’s claim of ignorance of
    the law or a claim that because of a misunder-
    standing of the law, he had a good-faith belief that
    he was not violating any of the provisions of the
    tax laws. This is so because one cannot be aware
    that the law imposes a duty upon him and yet be
    ignorant of it, misunderstand the law, or believe
    that the duty does not exist. In the end, the issue is
    whether, based on all the evidence, the Government
    has proved that the defendant was aware of the
    duty at issue, which cannot be true if the jury credits
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                 45
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    a good faith misunderstanding and belief submis-
    sion, whether or not the claimed belief or misunder-
    standing is objectively reasonable.
    
    Id. at 202
    , 
    111 S. Ct. at 610-11
    .
    The over-arching premise of the government’s case
    was that the Aegis trust system was a sham and that the
    defendants knew as much. The defendants disputed
    this premise, contending that they in fact had a good-
    faith belief that the Aegis trust system was consistent
    with the relevant provisions of the Internal Revenue
    Code and thus a legitimate means of income tax
    minimization. Under Cheek, this required the govern-
    ment to negate their claim of good faith and to prove
    that they in fact realized that the Aegis system was not
    legitimate. Only if the defendants knew that the Aegis
    trusts were ineffective in reducing the income tax owed
    by those who used the trusts could the jury find that
    the defendants acted willfully with respect to their
    own income tax obligations and those of Aegis clients.
    But the defendants contend that the district court
    undermined their Cheek defense by precluding them
    from demonstrating to the jury that they had a good-
    faith belief in the legality of their actions. The problem,
    as they see it, began with the court’s pretrial ruling
    barring any attempt to show that the trusts were, in fact,
    a legal means of tax avoidance. By relieving the govern-
    ment of the burden of presenting testimony showing
    that the trusts violated the law, the court eliminated
    an opportunity for the defense to question whatever
    46                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    witnesses the government would have called on that
    subject as to potential ambiguities in the law that
    might have supported the defendants’ purported good
    faith belief in the legitimacy of the Aegis trusts. The
    defendants argue that the court later compounded the
    problem in two ways. First, the court would not allow
    the defendants to question any government witnesses
    about purported ambiguities with respect to the tax code
    and its application to entities like the Aegis trusts. Sec-
    ond, relying on the charge that the defendants had en-
    gaged in a conspiracy with one another, the court
    indicated to counsel that notice to one member of the
    conspiracy that the trusts were a sham would constitute
    notice of the same to all other members of the conspir-
    acy. The defendants assert that, collectively, these
    rulings both prevented the defendants from showing
    that ambiguities in federal tax law made room for their
    good-faith belief that the trusts were legitimate and
    eliminated the government’s burden of negating that
    good faith belief. We take each aspect of this argument
    in turn, beginning with the court’s pretrial ruling as to
    the legality of the Aegis trust system.
    In advance of trial, the government moved in limine
    to bar the defendants from presenting to the jury any
    evidence or argument suggesting that the Aegis trust
    system was a lawful means of tax avoidance. The gov-
    ernment noted that this court in a series of decisions
    had already determined that the Aegis trust system
    and others like it constituted unlawful tax shelters. R. 314
    at 2-3, citing United States v. Patridge, 
    supra,
     507 F.3d at
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                   47
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    1093-94; Muhich v. C.I.R., supra, 
    238 F.3d at 861-63
    ; Bartoli
    v. Richmond, supra, 
    2000 WL 687155
    , at *1, *4; Pfluger v.
    C.I.R., 
    840 F.2d 1379
    , 1385-86 (7th Cir. 1988); and Schulz v.
    C.I.R., 
    686 F.2d 490
    , 493-94 (7th Cir. 1982).
    Because defendants’ trust system “clearly [is] not” a
    “legal means to avoid paying taxes” (Bartoli, 
    2000 WL 687155
    , at *1), any evidence or argument that they
    are lawful tax-avoidance schemes would be contrary
    to law, and the “probative value [of the evidence
    would be] substantially outweighed by the danger
    of . . . unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
    misleading the jury” (Fed. R. Evid. 403).
    R. 314 at 3-4 (emphasis in original).
    The district court granted the motion. The court acknowl-
    edged that the Supreme Court’s decision in Cheek re-
    quired proof that the defendants knew what the Internal
    Revenue Code required of them. R. 1046 at 90. None-
    theless, “once the Court has decided that a particular
    trust or plan is unlawful, it cannot be relitigated to
    the jury.” R. 1046 at 90. Thus:
    You cannot argue to the jury that Aegis was a
    lawful plan and therefore because it was or is lawful
    that somehow the defendants are not guilty in this
    case. You certainly can require the government to
    prove that each defendant may be convicted of tax
    offenses only if he knows that the code requires him
    to pay. That’s the government’s burden here, they
    must show that the actions were willful, that they
    were done with knowledge, and the government
    48                  Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    concedes that. But you will not be permitted to
    reargue the lawfulness of the Aegis plan itself.
    R. 1046 at 90-91.
    The defendants contend that this ruling, while paying
    lip service to Cheek, actually precluded them from estab-
    lishing that they had a good-faith belief in the legality of
    the Aegis trust system. They maintain that the court’s
    order barred them not only from asserting the
    legality of the Aegis trusts, but also from “raising the
    statutes, regulations and case law on which they relied
    in formulating what they subjectively believed was a
    lawful means of income tax reduction through the use
    of the Aegis CBO system.” Defendants’ Joint Brief
    at 38 (emphasis in original).
    We do not construe the court’s order as the defendants
    do. The district court was correct in holding that the
    legality of the Aegis trust system was not a matter for
    the jury to resolve. This was, instead, a question of law
    for the court to resolve, e.g., United States v. Caputo, 
    517 F.3d 935
    , 942 (7th Cir. 2008) (“The only legal expert in a
    federal courtroom is the judge.”), and one which this
    court, indeed, had already resolved, see Muhich, 
    238 F.3d at 864
    ; Bartoli, 
    2000 WL 687155
    , at *1. It was therefore
    appropriate to preclude the defendants from attempting
    to show that the Aegis trust system was legal. See
    United States v. Cheek, 
    3 F.3d 1057
    , 1063 (7th Cir. 1993)
    (sustaining instructions advising jury that certain of
    defendant’s beliefs as to the tax laws were erroneous)
    (citing United States v. Powell, 
    955 F.2d 1206
    , 1213 (9th Cir.
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                49
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    1992) (because jury cannot decide legality of particular
    conduct under tax code, district court must instruct jury
    that conduct was unlawful)). The district court’s order
    in no way blocked an appropriate Cheek defense, how-
    ever. The court explicitly recognized that it was the gov-
    ernment’s burden to prove that the defendants knew
    what their obligations were under the law. And nothing
    the court said suggested that it would preclude the de-
    fendants from attempting to show why they in good
    faith believed that the Aegis trust system was a lawful
    means of tax avoidance under the relevant statutes,
    regulations, and case law.
    To the contrary, the testimony that some of the defen-
    dants themselves went on to give demonstrates that
    they remained free to pursue such a defense, as the gov-
    ernment points out. Dowd’s testimony is a good exam-
    ple. Dowd explained that his employment with Her-
    itage was his first job after graduating from college.
    Although he would later assume more significant re-
    sponsibilities with Aegis, in the beginning Dowd was
    something of a Man Friday whose responsibilities in-
    cluded a number of menial tasks:
    I changed light bulbs. I cleaned up. I brought my
    own vacuum a couple times and vacuumed the place,
    cleaned the windows, shoveled the walk. I made—
    whatever it took. We would have clients, they
    would have clients come in, and so I tried to make
    it look neat.
    50                  Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-
    2174 R. 938
     Tr. 6377. Dowd was given an asset management
    trust when he started work with Heritage, which his
    father (who was familiar with Heritage) told him was
    “a great idea.” 
    Id.
     Tr. 6358. Dowd himself had only a
    rudimentary familiarity with trusts and emphasized
    repeatedly during his testimony that he relied on what
    Aegis officers such as Vallone and Bartoli told him
    about the legitimacy of the Aegis system. “I believed
    in what I was doing, and I believed in The Aegis Com-
    pany. They were very convincing,” Dowd testified. R. 922
    Tr. 6415. Over time Dowd did become aware that
    the IRS was looking into the use of sham trusts, that
    Aegis clients were being audited, and that doubts were
    being raised in the media and other quarters about the
    use of trusts to minimize or avoid income taxes. He
    kept his own file (labeled “Trusts - Attacks On”) collecting
    negative opinions, rulings, and news articles. Yet, when-
    ever he discussed such negative authorities or expressed
    concern to others at Aegis, he was assured either that
    the Aegis system was materially different from the
    trust systems that the IRS was finding to be invalid or
    that the IRS itself was acting improperly. See, e.g., 
    id.
     Tr.
    6402 (Vallone told him that Muhich did not know how
    to use the trust system); 6409 (Cover told him that the
    Aegis system did not operate like the sham trusts
    referred to in a W ALL S TREET JOURNAL article); 6414
    (Vallone told him that other trust companies that the IRS
    had shut down were “doing it wrong”); 6417 (when he
    asked Vallone about IRS Notice 97-24, Vallone told him
    that Aegis was not abusing business trusts in the way
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                  51
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    described by that ruling and that Vallone was working
    on a line-by-line rebuttal to the ruling); 6418 (Vallone
    in multiple conversations cited various provisions
    of the Internal Revenue Code or pointed him to the
    Aegis Directors’ Manual in support of the validity of Aegis
    trusts); 6431 (Vallone cited a specific Code section that
    said use of a foreign credit card was acceptable. “So
    I believed him.”). Dowd also found reassurance in the
    professionals who spoke at Aegis seminars. He recalled
    attorney Parker saying at one of the seminars that Aegis’s
    attorneys were “the best,” that the Aegis trust was “ko-
    sher,” and that were it otherwise he (Parker) would not
    be promoting the trust. 
    Id.
     Tr. 6424-25. Even when the
    Aegis offices were searched in March 2000 and the com-
    pany’s computers and files seized, Vallone assured
    Dowd that the IRS was “just trying to impede Aegis.”
    
    Id.
     Tr. 6412. Not until Dowd learned later that Vallone
    and other Aegis officers were filing statements with the
    IRS claiming that they were not “citizens” subject to
    income taxes did Dowd conclude that something was
    wrong. 
    Id.
     Tr. 6440-41. At that point, he decided to leave
    the company. Dowd’s testimony, during which he was
    permitted to both recount what others told him about
    the legitimacy of the Aegis system and to identify and
    discuss the various Aegis materials and favorable authori-
    ties on which his belief in the system was based,
    illustrates that nothing in the district court’s ruling pre-
    vented him from pursuing a Cheek defense. See also infra
    at 58-59 n.4; R. 974 Tr. 5142-5220 (on direct examina-
    tion, Vallone’s counsel walks him through multiple legal
    52                    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    authorities which purportedly formed basis for Vallone’s
    good-faith belief in legality of Aegis system); e.g., 
    id.
     Tr.
    5158-65 (court overrules government objection to ad-
    mission of Vallone Ex. Aegis School Book Second Ed.
    1998—which collected authorities Vallone believed sup-
    ported Aegis trust system and which was given to par-
    ticipants at Aegis seminars—reasoning that exhibit was
    admissible as evidence of Vallone’s belief in legality
    of Aegis system; jury apprised that exhibit was admitted
    for purposes of establishing Vallone’s state of mind); 
    id.
    Tr. 5189 (Vallone testifies that he understood Parker’s
    comment at March 1999 seminar regarding lack of legal
    precedent on business trusts “to mean that there were
    certain issues that related to business trusts and their
    operation that simply had not been settled in the law”).
    The defendants posit, and we may assume arguendo,
    that expert testimony would be one way in which a
    defendant charged with tax evasion can establish that he
    had a good faith, albeit mistaken, belief that his conduct
    was lawful. Our own decision in United States v. Harris,
    
    942 F.2d 1125
    , 1132 n.6 (7th Cir. 1991), explicitly
    recognizes this possibility.3 Again, however, we see
    3
    Harris notes that among the evidence a defendant may present
    in support of a defense that he “subjectively, but wrongly”
    believed his conduct was consistent with the Internal Revenue
    Code and the cases interpreting it is expert testimony as to
    the case law on which the defendant purports to have
    actually relied. 
    942 F.2d at
    1132 n.6. See United States v. Garber,
    (continued...)
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                          53
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    3
    (...continued)
    
    607 F.2d 92
    , 95-99 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc) (in tax evasion
    case, district court erred, inter alia, by excluding expert testi-
    mony proffered by defense on novel question of whether
    certain payments defendant received in exchange for her rare
    blood plasma constituted taxable income: “In a case such as
    this where the element of willfulness is critical to the
    defense, the defendant is entitled to wide latitude in the intro-
    duction of evidence tending to show lack of intent. The defen-
    dant testified that she subjectively thought that proceeds
    from the sale of part of her body were not taxable. By disal-
    lowing [the expert’s] testimony that a recognized theory of
    tax law supports Garber’s feelings, the court deprived the
    defendant of evidence showing her state of mind to be reason-
    able.”), cited with approval in United States v. Clardy, 
    612 F.2d 1139
    , 1153 (9th Cir. 1980) (district court did not err in permit-
    ting IRS agent to give expert testimony that particular
    deduction was not proper: “we believe that this type of testi-
    mony is relevant to the issue of willfulness where the theory of
    the defense is that there is a good faith dispute as to the inter-
    pretation of the tax laws”); but see also United States v. Klaphake,
    
    64 F.3d 435
    , 438-39 (8th Cir. 1995) (where defendant’s
    attorney was permitted to testify he was retained to prepare
    prototype trust document and as to legitimate purposes and
    advantages of business trust, and where attorney’s opinion
    letter to defendant was also admitted into evidence, court
    properly excluded attorney from testifying on legality of trust
    arrangement; latter point presented question of law for court,
    and given the evidence that was admitted, defendant’s
    defense that he reasonably relied on advice of counsel was
    (continued...)
    54                    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    nothing in the district court’s ruling that preemptively
    rejected the possibility of a defense expert testifying
    about the legal precedents on which defendants pur-
    ported to have based their belief that the Aegis trusts
    were effective tax-avoidance vehicles. The defendants’
    real contention seems to be that the district court’s
    3
    (...continued)
    not eviscerated); United States v. West, 
    22 F.3d 586
    , 597-600 (5th
    Cir. 1994) (in bankruptcy fraud case, where defendant’s bank-
    ruptcy experts were permitted to testify that they advised
    defendant to structure relevant transactions as he did and that
    the transactions were lawful, district court did not abuse its
    discretion in refusing to let experts explain the legal basis
    for their advice); United States v. Bryan, 
    896 F.2d 68
    , 72-73 (5th
    Cir. 1990) (although expert testimony might be relevant to
    willfulness in certain cases, it was properly excluded where
    tax shelters devised by defendants were clearly shams lacking
    any valid business purpose); United States v. Curtis, 
    782 F.2d 593
    , 599 (6th Cir. 1986) (rejecting Garber and sustaining exclu-
    sion of defendant’s proffered expert testimony regarding uncer-
    tainty in particular area of tax law, reasoning in part that
    absent connection between uncertain state of law and defen-
    dant’s state of mind, expert’s testimony regarding uncertainty
    in law is irrelevant); United States v. Ingredient Tech. Corp., 
    698 F.2d 88
    , 96-97 (2d Cir. 1983) (declining to follow Garber and
    sustaining exclusion of expert testimony as to Department of
    Treasury regulations that defendant offered to show de-
    fendant could not have formed willful intent to evade taxes);
    United States v. Herzog, 
    632 F.2d 469
    , 473 (5th Cir. 1980) (expert’s
    view on complexity of tax laws sheds no light on defendant’s
    intent).
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                 55
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    ruling somehow relieved the government of presenting
    its own expert testimony as to the relevant provisions of
    the law, which would have presented the defendants
    with an opportunity to cross-examine the experts about
    potential good-faith misinterpretations of those provi-
    sions. Defendants’ Joint Brief at 47-48. Yet, although the
    government bore the burden under Cheek of negating
    the defendants’ good-faith defense and proving their
    actual knowledge of what the law required of them, it
    was not obliged to do so in any particular way. As we
    noted earlier in our summary of the facts, there was
    ample evidence that the defendants were on notice
    of the illegality of the Aegis trust system, and the defen-
    dants do not suggest that the government failed to carry
    its burden on this point. And because the legality of
    the Aegis trusts presented a question of law that had
    already been resolved by this court, there was no need
    for the government to present expert testimony as to
    what the law provided. The district court instead
    properly instructed the jury on the relevant provisions
    of the law.
    Finally, to the extent the defendants are suggesting
    that the government’s motion and the district court’s
    ruling somehow prevented them from showing that the
    relevant provisions of the law were ambiguous, see De-
    fendants’ Joint Brief at 45-46, they are blurring the dis-
    tinctions between objective ambiguity in the law and
    their own purportedly good-faith misinterpretation of
    the law. As our decision in Harris makes clear, objective
    ambiguity is a question for the court; and if the court
    56                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    were to find the law objectively ambiguous, that finding
    would require dismissal of the indictment, as the defen-
    dants would not have had appropriate notice that
    their conduct was illegal. 
    942 F.2d at
    1132 n.6. Defendants
    make no argument that the provisions of the Internal
    Revenue Code and regulations governing trusts are
    objectively ambiguous.
    The defendants next contend that the district court, in
    a series of evidentiary rulings during the government’s
    case, “eviscerated the government’s burden regarding
    the Cheek defense.” Defendants’ Joint Br. 48. They point
    out that the government was allowed to establish,
    through various exhibits seized during searches of
    Aegis’s office, Vallone’s home, Dunn’s office, and the
    offices of certain accountants not charged in this case,
    that the defendants had notice that the Aegis trust
    system was not lawful and thus lacked a good faith
    belief in its legality. By contrast, the defendants argue,
    when they attempted to establish on cross-examination
    of the government’s witnesses that there was other evi-
    dence indicating that the defendants in fact harbored
    a subjective belief that the Aegis system was lawful, the
    court barred them from doing so. They posit that the
    government in effect was allowed to present a one-
    sided case as to their own subjective understanding of
    the tax laws.
    Our own review of the record convinces us that
    although the district court prohibited certain questions
    and the introduction, during the government’s case, of
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                57
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    exhibits that the defendants believed were favorable
    to them, it by no means precluded the defendants
    from presenting a Cheek defense. In virtually all of the
    cited instances in which the defendants complain that
    they were not allowed to ask particular questions of a
    government witness, the court appears to have sus-
    tained government objections not on the ground that
    the questions were not relevant and permissible with
    respect to the Cheek defense, but on the basis of some
    wholly independent, and valid, ground. For example,
    while cross-examining Revenue Agent Paul Ponzo as
    to why, in calculating the income that a defendant had
    earned but failed to report, the agent had disallowed
    reliance on an asset management trust to reduce the
    defendant’s income, Bartoli’s counsel sought to question
    Ponzo about a particular revenue ruling (No. 75-258)
    and the circumstances under which a business trust
    might be lawful as opposed to a sham. R. 971, Tr. 4581-86.
    But the government had called Ponzo not to offer expert
    testimony as to the meaning of a particular revenue
    ruling or why the Aegis trust system violated the law,
    but solely to establish what income taxes three of the
    defendants (Hopper, Cover, and Dowd) would have
    owed had they properly reported their income. So it
    was perfectly reasonable to sustain the objections
    Bartoli’s attorney was attempting to pose. When com-
    parable questions were posed of Agent Priess, who in
    his undercover capacity helped expose the Aegis
    fraud, they too were properly sustained because that
    agent had been called as a fact witness rather than an
    58                   Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    expert witness. See, e.g., R. 966 Tr. 678-88 (court pre-
    cludes questions of agent about whether particular IRS
    regulations exist, but permits defense to inquire whether
    defendant Cover cited regulations to the agent); 
    id.
     Tr. 712-
    14 (sustaining objection to question about what agent
    understood was meant by citation in Aegis trust package
    to Internal Revenue regulation). Nothing that the court
    said in sustaining these objections suggested that it
    would not allow questions legitimately aimed at estab-
    lishing the defendants’ subjective understanding of
    the relevant tax laws at an appropriate time.
    As for the court’s unwillingness to allow the defense
    to introduce documents during the government’s case
    which supported their Cheek defense, this is explained
    by the court’s decision to confine defense exhibits to
    the defense case. See, e.g., R. 947 Tr. 2106-08, 2113-17; R. 969
    Tr. 3772-75; R. 935 Tr. 4086-89, 4222-29. As the de-
    fendants do not contend that they were prevented from
    introducing these exhibits in their own case,4 the
    4
    In fact, as the government suggests, the defendants had no
    difficulty introducing these exhibits in their own cases. See,
    e.g., R. 920 Tr. 5111-34 (A MERICAN J URISPRUDENCE and
    A MERICAN L AW R EPORTS articles on business trusts, among
    other authorities that Vallone purportedly relied upon); R. 953
    Tr. 5237-5248 (three positive opinion letters that Vallone
    relied upon); 
    id.
     Tr. 5248-63 (three additional opinion letters
    admitted as to Vallone’s state of mind), 
    id.
     Tr. 5295; R. 921
    Tr. 5300-03 (multiple versions of Aegis Directors’ Manual,
    (continued...)
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                     59
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    objection boils down to one of timing rather than of
    exclusion. This implicates the court’s discretion over the
    method and order of introducing evidence. Fed. R. Evid.
    611(a); see, e.g., United States v. Smith, 
    26 F.3d 739
    , 744
    (7th Cir. 1994); see generally United States v. Wilson, 
    985 F.2d 348
    , 351 (7th Cir. 1993) (district court has wide
    discretion in managing cross-examination and ruling
    on admissibility of evidence). The defendants have not
    actually addressed the merits of the district court’s prefer-
    ence for reserving defense exhibits to the defense case,
    nor have they shown how they were harmed by having
    to wait to bring those exhibits before the jury. See United
    States v. Hall, 
    165 F.3d 1095
    , 1117 (7th Cir. 1999) (district
    court did not abuse discretion in refusing admission of
    defense photo during cross-examination of government
    witness, when defendant could have introduced photo-
    graph during his own case); United States v. Ellison,
    
    557 F.2d 128
    , 135 (7th Cir. 1977) (“even if we assume
    that the records would have been relevant rebuttal evi-
    dence if offered during the presentation of Ellison’s
    own case, we need not thereby conclude that the
    district court erred in excluding the evidence at the time
    4
    (...continued)
    which included citations to authorities that Vallone believed
    supported legitimacy of Aegis trusts); R. 938 Tr. 6359-60
    (Heritage promotional brochure, indicating that Heritage
    was represented by “one of the finest counsels possible,” given
    to Dowd by his father); 
    id.
     Tr. 6369-70 (additional docu-
    ments Dowd was given).
    60                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    it was offered” in the government’s case); United States
    v. Lambert, 
    580 F.2d 740
    , 747-48 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1978)
    (“Our review of the record, which discloses proffers of
    voluminous documentary evidence, leads us to the con-
    clusion that the district judge properly controlled the
    flow of the trial under” Rule 611 by requiring defendant
    to introduce defense evidence during his own case).
    Next, the defendants complain that the district court
    improperly allowed the jury to construe notice to one
    defendant of the illegality of the Aegis trust system as
    notice to all of them. The government, as we have noted,
    relied on various documents—including adverse court
    rulings as to the legality of the Aegis system—that
    were found in the offices either of Aegis or one of its
    officers or employees (or their homes) to show that each
    of the defendants was aware that the Aegis trusts were
    not lawful means of tax avoidance and thus was
    willfully participating in a criminal tax evasion scheme.
    In a colloquy concerning the notice evidence that
    occurred fairly early on in the trial, the district court
    made the following remarks:
    THE COURT: What is it exactly that you want to say?
    MR. SCHINDLER: That this document is offered
    solely for the purpose of—that the defendants were
    on notice as of this date.
    MR. KOMIE: Some defendants.
    MR. SCHINDLER: Some defendants were on notice
    as of that date.
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                 61
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    MR. MECYZK: Otherwise I would object.
    THE COURT: Some defendants is not the issue, be-
    cause if the conspiracy is on notice, the conspiracy has
    knowledge if these documents are found in the
    premises of the conspiracy. It is like finding the
    scales and the drug paraphernalia and the ledgers
    in the place that the conspirators congregate from
    time to time or place their materials. So now it goes
    to notice but also goes to that this was found in
    the premises. It is direct evidence in that sense.
    ***
    MR. SALTZMAN: Judge, if I may just add one thing.
    It’s my view that this is not like drug paraphernalia
    found which has only one purpose. These are docu-
    ments that pertain to legal opinions that can be
    agreed with, disagreed with, and the fact that they’re
    found there doesn’t have the same significance,
    and there’s a knowledge issue.
    THE COURT: It’s not conclusive of the issue, of course
    not. But it’s evidence of knowledge, it is evidence
    of willfulness, it is evidence of notice.
    MR. SALTZMAN: Judge, with all due—in my view
    it’s not evidence of knowledge when it’s a few pages
    out of 1.2 million pages.
    62                   Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-
    2174 R. 949
     Tr. 2806-08 (emphasis ours).5 The defendants
    read the district court’s remarks regarding notice to the
    conspiracy as endorsing a theory that their individual
    willfulness could be inferred from evidence indicating
    that the conspiracy generally, or one member of the
    conspiracy, had knowledge that the Aegis trust system
    was unlawful. The court’s view, they reason, improperly
    relieved the government of its burden to show that each
    of them, individually, knew that the Aegis trust system
    was illegal and thus willfully participated in and
    promoted an illegal means of tax avoidance.
    5
    See also R. 927 Tr. 58 (“And so you can make your argument
    to the jury somehow that it doesn’t apply to you, but there is an
    agreement here, the Court said there was an agreement by a
    preponderance of the evidence. There is notice to one and,
    therefore, other members of the conspiracy.”); R. 914 Tr. 2265-66
    (“So it’s [admissible] in terms of the effect on Mr. Parker, the
    notice that he had . . . at a time when the conspiracy was
    in existence, which is to say notice to him is notice to the
    coconspirators . . . .”); R. 955 Tr. 6-7 (“where one member of a
    conspiracy knows certain things, is confronted with certain
    things or matters, it means that those who have joined the
    agreement have also been confronted with those things
    and others”); R. 969 Tr. 3774 (in discussion of willfulness, and
    whether defense exhibits should be admitted during gov-
    ernment’s case to show good faith: “In terms of Count 1, any
    act by any one member of the conspiracy may be enough,
    along with the other elements of the offense, to make out
    a prima [facie] case.”).
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                       63
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    Assuming that this was the court’s theory, any error
    in the court’s remarks was harmless, because the theory
    was not communicated to the jury. Certainly we agree
    that it would be error to instruct the jury that notice to
    one conspirator that his conduct is illegal—or notice to
    the conspiracy generally—is, in itself, notice to all
    members of the conspiracy sufficient to overcome every-
    one’s Cheek defense. See Jefferson v. United States, 
    340 F.2d 193
    , 197-98 (9th Cir. 1965) (where statute required proof
    of defendant’s specific knowledge that drug was
    illegally imported, it was plain error to instruct jury
    that knowledge of any alleged co-conspirator was
    imputed to all members of conspiracy, thus permitting
    jury to impute one conspirator’s knowledge regarding
    illegal importation to his co-conspirators, without proof
    that other conspirators actually knew drug was im-
    ported illegally); see also Cheek, 
    498 U.S. at 202
    , 
    111 S. Ct. at 610
     (“if the Government proves actual knowledge of the
    pertinent legal duty, the prosecution, without more, has
    satisfied the knowledge requirement of the wilfulness
    requirement”) (emphasis ours). But the jury in this case
    was never so instructed, nor does the record reveal
    that such a theory was otherwise communicated to the
    jury at any point in the trial—either by the court or by
    the government. The remarks on which the defendants
    rely were voiced outside the presence of the jury, and
    despite our invitation at oral argument, the defendants
    were not able to cite any instance in which comparable
    remarks were made in the jury’s presence. Certainly the
    government invited the jury to infer, from the various
    64                  Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    documents found in the possession of one or more of
    the defendants, that each defendant had actual know-
    ledge that the Aegis trust system was not legal. It
    was entirely plausible for the government to urge that
    inference be drawn and for the jury to draw it, for the
    evidence showed that Aegis officers were actively
    tracking court decisions and legal opinions as to the
    validity of the Aegis trusts and had received unequivocal
    notice, from multiple sources and on multiple occasions,
    that the Aegis system was illegal. Evidence reflecting
    that notice was found in Aegis’s offices, for example.
    In Hills, we found comparable documentation dis-
    covered in the defendant’s office sufficient to support
    a finding of a defendant’s actual notice of the illegality
    of the Aegis trust system and her criminal willfulness,
    notwithstanding the absence of any direct evidence
    that she had seen these documents. 
    618 F.3d at 638
    . The
    plausibility of such an inference may have been all that
    the district court in this case meant to convey during
    the colloquy we have recounted above, as the court’s
    subsequent remarks suggest. See R. 916 Tr. 2666 (“[I]f
    your client [Hopper] or others say that they were not on
    notice [as to the ARDC proceedings], they can certainly
    make that claim.”); 
    id.
     Tr. 2668 (“Whether your client
    [Dunn] was put on notice as a result of these [ARDC]
    proceedings is an issue for the jury to determine.”); R. 910
    Tr. 6298 (“[I]f the government establishes that this . . . was
    a seized document [from Aegis headquarters], it will be
    up to the jury to determine which one [of the defendants]
    or how many saw it. But in terms of the law itself, it is
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                   65
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    at least admissible as notice to the conspirators.”). In any
    case, the government never argued anything more
    than this sort of inference to the jury; on the contrary, its
    attorneys addressed notice, knowledge, and willfulness
    on an individualized basis in their closing arguments.
    See R. 923 Tr. 6808-24; R. 911 Tr. 6827-71. And cer-
    tainly the court never advised the jury that it could deem
    all co-conspirators to have culpable knowledge of the
    illegality of the Aegis system if just one of them had
    such knowledge.
    Finally, the defendants object to the district court’s
    decision to admit evidence from the Illinois Attorney
    Registration and Disciplinary Commission proceeding
    that ultimately resulted in Bartoli’s disbarment in Illi-
    nois. The defendants hold up the ARDC evidence as
    a “glaring” example of the court’s willingness to permit
    the government to cite third-party documents as
    evidence that the defendants had notice of the illegality
    of the Aegis system, without proof that any defendant
    saw or knew about such documents. Defendants’ Joint
    Br. 53. In the defendant’s view, the admission of such
    evidence contravened Cheek’s mandate that the govern-
    ment prove that each defendant had actual knowledge
    that his conduct was illegal.
    The ARDC filed a complaint against Bartoli in 1996
    based on his alleged misconduct in connection with
    both Heritage and Aegis. As amended, the complaint
    was based in part on trust packages that Bartoli had sold
    to (and prepared for) two couples: William and Mary
    66                  Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    DiSomma, who purchased a Heritage multi-trust system
    in March 1994 for $12,000, and Max and Linda
    Alumbaugh, who purchased an Aegis or Aegis-like CBO
    in August 1996 for $25,000.6 The DiSommas were later
    told by an independent attorney that the trust system
    would not withstand scrutiny by the IRS and would
    not reduce their income tax liability as Bartoli had said
    it would, causing them to dissolve the trusts. Their
    request for a refund of the $12,000 they had paid to Heri-
    tage for the trust system was ignored. The Alumbaughs
    were audited by the IRS and informed that the CBO
    would not achieve the tax benefits that Bartoli had
    told them it would; they then dissolved the CBO. The
    ARDC’s complaint alleged, inter alia, that Bartoli had
    represented clients when the representation might be
    limited by his responsibility to his own interests; that
    he had engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, deceit, or
    misrepresentation; that he had engaged in the unautho-
    6
    Bartoli sold the Alumbaughs the CBO pursuant to his affilia-
    tion with the Athens Company (“Athens”), an Ohio firm
    that marketed CBOs in much the same manner as Aegis.
    Bartoli served as the legal director for Athens. There was a
    separate count in the amended complaint based on Bartoli’s
    activities with Aegis generally. The ARDC’s Hearing Board
    ultimately dismissed that count of the complaint as moot
    based on its findings with respect to the “nearly identical
    allegations of misconduct” in the count dealing with Bartoli’s
    sale of the Athens trust system to the Alumbaughs. Hearing
    Board’s Report & Recommendation at 58-59, available at
    http://www.iardc.org.
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,               67
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    rized practice of law following his transfer to inactive
    status in 1995; and that he had engaged in conduct
    that was prejudicial to the administration of justice. As
    we have noted Bartoli, Hopper, and Vallone were
    deposed in the course of the ARDC proceeding. A three-
    member Hearing Board conducted an evidentiary
    hearing on the complaint in July and August 1999. Bartoli
    was represented by counsel during the hearing, but he
    did not appear in person at the hearing. He did
    participate by telephone during some portions of the
    hearing. Among the witnesses whose testimony was
    presented to the Hearing Board was William Marutzky,
    a certified public accountant and attorney with a back-
    ground in both trusts and taxation. Essentially, Marutzky
    opined that the trusts purveyed by Heritage and Athens
    were not effective means of income and estate tax
    minimization: he concluded that the system purchased
    by the DiSommas would be disregarded in an IRS
    audit, and that the CBO purchased by the Alumbaughs
    provided no value whatsoever to them.
    On February 17, 2000, the Hearing Board filed a Report
    and Recommendation proposing that Bartoli be dis-
    barred. After summarizing the evidence, the Hearing
    Board set forth a series of findings. The Hearing Board
    found, inter alia, that Bartoli had labored under a
    conflict of interest in representing both Heritage
    (which was interested in selling as many trust packages
    as possible, and which paid Bartoli for each trust he
    prepared) and Heritage members (i.e., clients like the
    DiSommas), who were relying on Bartoli’s judgment and
    68                Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    advice as a lawyer that a trust was appropriate for their
    needs. Report & Recommendation at 54-55, available
    at www.iardc.org. Bartoli labored under a similar
    conflict of interest when he sold the CBO to the
    Alumbaughs on behalf of Athens. Id. at 72-73. It found
    further that Bartoli’s conduct was prejudicial to the
    administration of justice in that he had “created a
    situation where his professional judgment could have been
    clouded by the business interests of others and his own
    interests.” Id. at 56, 69-70. It also found that Bartoli
    had misrepresented the benefits of the trust system to
    the DiSommas and the benefits of the CBO to the
    Alumbaughs. Id. at 61-69, 74, 78.
    On December 27, 2001, a Review Board rejected Bartoli’s
    challenge to the Hearing Board’s Report and Recom-
    mendation and affirmed the Hearing Board’s findings
    and sustained the recommendation that Bartoli be dis-
    barred. The Illinois Supreme Court ordered Bartoli dis-
    barred on May 24, 2002.
    Mary Robinson, who was the Administrator of the
    ARDC throughout the time period during which the
    proceeding against Bartoli was pending and who partici-
    pated in the evidentiary hearing before the Hearing
    Board, testified as a witness for the government in this
    case. Robinson identified a variety of documents con-
    nected with the ARDC proceeding which the court admit-
    ted into evidence over the defendants’ objections, in-
    cluding the ARDC’s complaint against Bartoli, the
    Hearing Board’s Report and Recommendation, and the
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                     69
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    Review Board’s own Report and Recommendation. She
    also read various excerpts from these documents, including
    portions of the Review Board’s summary of Marutzky’s
    testimony.7 These included Marutzky’s testimony (as
    summarized by the Hearing Board) that (a) the trust
    documents that Bartoli provided to clients would not
    reduce significantly the clients’ income tax liability as
    had been promised to them; (b) the tax laws would not
    permit the client to assign his future income to a trust;
    (c) nor would they permit the client to deduct the
    expenses incurred for his own housing and to educate
    his children; and (d) in an audit, the IRS would disregard
    the sort of trusts that Bartoli was providing to clients
    pursuant to the Tax Court’s decision in Muhich, which
    involved a trust system that had been created by
    Bartoli and Heritage. The Hearing Board had relied
    on Marutzky’s testimony in concluding that the
    trusts that Bartoli had sold to the DiSommas and the
    Alumbaughs were ineffective as a means of sub-
    stantially reducing their income tax liability, and that
    Bartoli, in creating the trusts and promoting them to
    his clients, had engaged in conduct involving dis-
    honesty, deceit, and misrepresentation that was
    prejudicial to the administration of justice. Robinson
    also read excerpts from other testimony and evidence
    7
    In the briefing, the defendants state that Robinson read from
    Marutzky’s testimony, but what she actually read were
    excerpts from the Hearing Board’s description of Marutzky’s
    testimony.
    70                Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    presented during the ARDC proceeding, but it is the
    excerpts from the Hearing Board’s summary of Marutzky’s
    testimony to which the defendants have given par-
    ticular emphasis.
    The district court admitted the ARDC documents,
    and permitted Robinson to read excerpts from them
    during her testimony, for the purpose of showing that
    the ARDC proceeding against Bartoli placed him and
    other defendants on notice that the Aegis trust system
    was not a legitimate means of tax avoidance; and
    we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
    discretion in so ruling. The ARDC proceeding was
    relevant because it represented a direct challenge to the
    legitimacy of the Aegis CBO and its predecessor, the
    Heritage trust. See supra at 66 n.6. The Hearing Board’s
    reasoning in finding Bartoli guilty of misconduct,
    including the aspects of Marutzky’s testimony that it
    relied upon, was particularly probative in that it
    illustrated the ways in which the CBO system as
    promoted by Bartoli was irreconcilable with basic trust
    and tax principles. Bartoli himself was the respondent
    in the ARDC proceeding, was given notice of the pro-
    ceeding and its outcome, and was represented by
    counsel throughout the proceeding. It is an entirely
    plausible and permissible inference that he was aware of
    the proceeding and what occurred in that proceeding
    despite the fact that he did not appear in person
    before the Hearing Board. Indeed, although Bartoli had
    assumed inactive status with the Illinois bar by the time
    the ARDC filed the complaint in 1996, Bartoli had an
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                   71
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    incentive to both monitor the proceeding and to deny
    the ARDC’s allegations, as the complaint called into
    question the legitimacy of the trust system promoted by
    Aegis, with which Bartoli remained involved long after
    the ARDC filed its complaint in 1996. See supra at 66 n.6.
    His co-defendants had similar reasons to be interested
    in the outcome of the proceeding, and there were
    multiple indicia that they were, in fact, aware of and
    following the proceeding. Hopper and Vallone, as we
    have noted, were both deposed in the course of the pro-
    ceeding, and Robinson recalled that she also took a state-
    ment from Dunn. Bartoli, Vallone, Hopper, and Dunn
    were also plaintiffs in the May 1997 suit filed against
    the ARDC, Robinson, and others alleging that the ARDC
    was violating Bartoli’s First Amendment and due
    process rights and was conspiring to deprive all four
    plaintiffs of their Fourteenth Amendment liberty
    interest in their business reputation. To say the least, that
    suit displays an interest in the outcome of the ARDC
    proceeding. Moreover, a copy of Marutzky’s testimony
    was found in the Aegis office along with Hopper’s
    critique of the testimony. Several volumes of additional
    ARDC documents were also found in Aegis’s office.
    Similar documents were found in Dunn’s office as well.
    The district court advised the jury that the ARDC
    evidence was admitted solely for notice purposes, R. 916
    Tr. 2673, and the jury was obviously free to give the
    evidence what weight it deemed appropriate as to the
    state of mind of each defendant. Indeed, the court
    noted that the defendants were free to question Robinson
    72                  Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    in an effort to show that they were not necessarily
    aware of the ARDC proceeding, and they exercised that
    prerogative: Bartoli’s counsel established on cross-exami-
    nation of Robinson that he was not present before
    the Hearing Board, R. 916 Tr. 2727; and Dunn’s counsel
    established that only Bartoli, as the sole named re-
    spondent, would have been given formal notice of what
    occurred during the ARDC proceeding, R. 916, Tr. 2757,
    2764, 2769-70. In our view, however, given the
    multiple indicia that Bartoli, Vallone, Hopper, and
    Dunn were following the proceeding, this was highly
    probative evidence that these four defendants, if not all
    six, had reason to know as a result of the ARDC’s
    actions that the Aegis trust system was illegitimate.
    C. Count One
    Count One of the superseding indictment charged
    that the defendants violated 
    18 U.S.C. § 371
     by con-
    spiring to
    (a) defraud the United States by impeding, impairing,
    obstructing and defeating the lawful government
    functions of the IRS of the Department of the Treasury,
    an agency of the United States, in the ascertainment,
    computation, assessment, and collection of revenues,
    namely income taxes; and (b) commit offenses
    against the United States, namely: to willfully aid
    and assist in, and procure, counsel, and advise the
    preparation and presentation, to the IRS, of returns
    and claims on behalf of others which were fraudulent
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                    73
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    and false as to various matters, in violation of Title 26,
    United States Code, Section 7206(2).
    R. 103 ¶ 2. The defendants moved to dismiss this count
    as duplicitous, reasoning that it alleged two distinct
    conspiracies and therefore two different crimes; but
    the district court denied the motion. The defendants
    contend that this was error, renewing their contention
    that Count One on its faces alleges two different crimes.
    We review the district court’s ruling on this point de
    novo. E.g., United States v. Pansier, 
    576 F.3d 726
    , 734 (7th
    Cir. 2009).
    We agree with the district court that Count One is
    not duplicitous. A duplicitous charge is not one
    that simply alleges a single offense committed by
    multiple means, e.g., United States v. Cephus, 
    684 F.3d 703
    , 706 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Davis, 
    471 F.3d 783
    , 790 (7th Cir. 2006), but rather one that joins two or
    more distinct crimes in a single count, e.g., United States
    v. Starks, 
    472 F.3d 466
    , 470-71 (7th Cir. 2006); see also
    Worthington v. United States, 
    64 F.2d 936
    , 938-39 (7th Cir.
    1933). Count One does not allege two different crimes.
    Instead, it alleges a conspiracy with two goals—(1) to
    defraud the United States by impeding the IRS’s efforts
    to collect income taxes, and (2) to commit tax offenses,
    namely the preparation of fraudulent tax returns. Such
    a charge is permissible. As the Supreme Court explained
    in Braverman v. United States, 
    317 U.S. 49
    , 54, 
    63 S. Ct. 99
    ,
    102 (1942), “A conspiracy is not the commission of the
    crime which it contemplates, and neither violates nor
    74                  Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    ‘arises under’ the statute whose violation is its object. . . .
    The single agreement is the prohibited conspiracy, and
    however diverse its objects it violates but a single stat-
    ute.” Following that reasoning, this court concluded in
    United Sates v. Hughes, 
    310 F.3d 557
    , 560-61 (7th Cir.
    2002), that a charge alleging a conspiracy with two illicit
    objectives was not duplicitous. See also United States v.
    Bradfield, 376 F. App’x 620, 623-24 (7th Cir. 2010) (non-
    precedential decision) (same).
    We see no reason to depart from our holding in
    Hughes here. As the defendants point out, both objects of
    the conspiracy charged in Hughes fell under the offense
    prong of section 371 (i.e., conspiring to commit an
    offense against the United States), whereas in this case
    the charged conspiracy implicates both prongs of the
    statute (i.e., conspiring to defraud the United States as
    well as to commit an offense against it). But that distinc-
    tion does not address Braverman’s essential point that
    it is the illicit agreement that constitutes the crime of
    conspiracy rather than the substantive crime or crimes
    contemplated by that agreement. We acknowledge that
    there is some division of authority on this point, as sum-
    marized by the Third Circuit’s decision in United States
    v. Rigas, 
    605 F.3d 194
    , 210-12 (3d Cir. 2010) (en banc).
    However, we believe the better reasoned view is the
    one adopted by the Rigas majority, which viewed a
    charge akin to the one in this case as setting forth one
    conspiracy with multiple goals rather than two distinct
    crimes. 
    Id.
     (Rigas addressed the issue in the context of a
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                  75
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    double jeopardy claim rather than one of duplicity, but
    that distinction is immaterial in terms of whether the
    charge alleges one or two crimes.) The Rigas majority
    opinion is consistent with our own reasoning in Hughes.
    Finally, the principal vice of duplicity, as we noted
    in Hughes, is that it presents the possibility that jury
    members, although agreeing that there was a con-
    spiracy, might not be unanimous as to what the object of
    the conspiracy was. 
    310 F.3d at 561
    ; see also Cephus, 684
    F.3d at 706; Starks, 
    472 F.3d at 471
    . But the district
    court instructed the jury in this case that it must unani-
    mously agree on at least one of the alleged objectives of
    the conspiracy. R. 925 at 7375. That takes care of the jury
    unanimity concern, as Hughes and Starks acknowledge.
    Hughes, 
    310 F.3d at 561
    ; Starks, 
    472 F.3d at 471
    . There
    are other concerns potentially implicated by duplicity,
    including notice to the defendants. Cephus, 684 F.3d at
    706. But no such concerns are raised here.
    D. Jury Instructions
    The defendants object to certain jury instructions given
    at the request of the government and to the court’s
    refusal to give certain instructions that the defendants
    themselves proposed. They also argue more generally
    that the instructions as given favored the government,
    unduly prejudiced the defense, and exemplify the
    court’s purported bias against the defendants, which we
    take up in the next section of this opinion. To the extent a
    76                  Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    particular jury instruction presents a legal question—for
    example, whether it accurately states the law—our review
    is de novo. E.g., United States v. Tanner, 
    628 F.3d 890
    , 904
    (7th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v. DiSantis, 
    565 F.3d 354
    , 359 (7th Cir. 2009)), cert. denied, 
    132 S. Ct. 204
     (2011).
    Beyond that, we review the district court’s decision
    whether or not to give a particular instruction for abuse
    of discretion. 
    Id.
     (citing United States v. Wilson, 
    134 F.3d 855
    , 868 (7th Cir. 1998)). We will reverse a conviction
    only if the instructions, as a whole, so misled the jury
    on the relevant principles as to have prejudiced the de-
    fendant. E.g., United States v. Quintero, 
    618 F.3d 746
    , 753
    (7th Cir. 2010). For the reasons set forth below, we con-
    clude that the jury instructions as a whole accurately
    summarized the law and did not interfere with the defen-
    dants’ ability to pursue their Cheek defense, and that
    the district court did not abuse its discretion either
    in giving a challenged instruction proposed by the gov-
    ernment or in refusing an instruction proposed by
    the defense.
    1. Instruction 27A: Income Assigned to Sham Trusts
    Instruction 27A gave the jury an overview of how
    income is assigned for tax purposes as between legal
    entities such as trusts and corporations and the
    individuals behind these entities and, in particular, the
    circumstances under which a trust will be disregarded
    for federal tax purposes. Among other points, the instruc-
    tion advised the jury that:
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                   77
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    •   “[t]ax consequences flow from the substance
    rather than the form of a transaction, and control
    over property, rather than documentary title,
    marks the real owner for federal tax purposes”;
    •   income is typically attributed to the person who
    exercises dominion and control over that income
    and its sources;
    •   ordinarily, the Tax Code will tax a legal entity like
    a trust separately from its owner; but
    •   when a trust lacks economic substance or functions
    as the alter ego of the individual taxpayer for
    the purpose of evading his tax liability, federal
    tax law will assign the tax burden to the
    individual rather than the trust.
    R. 925 Tr. 7379-80.
    The defendants argue that this instruction was both
    unnecessary, in that the court had barred the defense
    from arguing that the Aegis trust system was legal, and
    prejudicial, in that (as the defendants read the instruc-
    tion) it effectively precluded them from showing that
    they had a good faith belief in the legality of the Aegis
    trust system. “Having prevented the Defendants from
    presenting their belief in the legality of the system, the
    court’s instruction now invited the jury to convict if it
    found [the system] unlawful.” Defendants’ Joint Br. 62. Cf.
    United States v. McKnight, 
    671 F.3d 664
    , 665 (7th Cir.)
    (Posner, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)
    (“[Gratuitous] instructions are apt to confuse jurors, and
    78                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    when as in this case they are proposed by a party rather
    than given on the initiative of the trial judge, they
    may be intended to confuse, and in the present case to
    undermine the efficacy of an instruction desired by the
    opposing party and given by the judge.”), cert. denied,
    
    132 S. Ct. 2756
     (2012); United States v. Hill, 
    252 F.3d 919
    , 923 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Unless it is necessary to
    give an instruction, it is necessary not to give it,
    so that the important instructions stand out and are re-
    membered.”).
    We find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
    decision to give this instruction. The defendants
    implicitly concede that it was an accurate statement of
    the law. In order to assess the validity of the defendants’
    Cheek defense, and to determine whether the de-
    fendants had indeed willfully engaged in a scheme to
    defraud the government of its tax revenues, the jury had
    to understand the basic legal principles that the IRS
    had relied on in deeming the Aegis trusts a sham. Only
    then could the jury evaluate the plausibility of the de-
    fendants’ contention that they had a good faith belief
    in the legitimacy of the trusts notwithstanding these
    principles, as well as the plausibility of the govern-
    ment’s contrary contention that the defendants must,
    in fact, have realized that the Aegis system was illegiti-
    mate. The principles of tax and trust law are unfamiliar
    to most jurors; and the district court could reasonably
    have concluded that it was both reasonable and
    necessary to apprise the jury of the basic principles in-
    cluded in instruction 27A.
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                79
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    We reject the notion that this instruction somehow
    impeded, let alone precluded, a Cheek defense. The in-
    struction said nothing which would prevent the
    defendants from claiming that they did not realize
    the Aegis trusts were an illegal means of tax avoidance;
    in fact, the instruction said nothing at all about the
    legality of the Aegis trust system. The defendants were
    free to, and did, argue that the Aegis trusts were
    structured so as to comply with the law and to make
    it plausible for them to believe in good faith that the
    trusts were a legitimate means of tax avoidance. There
    was, at the same time, a wealth of evidence supporting
    the jury’s conclusion that the defendants were, in fact,
    aware that the Aegis trust system was illegitimate. It
    was that evidence that doomed the defendants’ Cheek
    defense, not this instruction.
    2.   Rejected Defense      Instruction    Regarding   IRS
    Notice 97-24.
    Although it did not cite the Aegis trust by name, IRS
    Notice 97-24, issued in April 1997, expressed the opinion
    of the IRS that trusts akin to the Aegis trusts were an
    unlawful means of tax avoidance. As we noted in our
    summary of the facts, there was evidence that the defen-
    dants were very much aware of this IRS notice, and the
    government, of course, cited the notice as one piece
    of evidence that the defendants knew the Aegis system
    was illegal. The defendants proposed an instruction
    that would have advised the jury on the relative legal
    80                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    weight of IRS regulations, revenue rulings, letter rulings,
    and public notices, the last of which “have no force of
    law.” R. 528 at 2; R. 940 Tr. 6770-72. The district
    court declined to give the instruction. Without such an in-
    struction, the defendants argue, the jury was left with
    the impression that IRS Notice 97-24 was an authorita-
    tive statement of the law, and that mistaken impression
    undermined the defendants’ contention that they genu-
    inely believed that the Aegis trusts were a permissible
    means of tax avoidance.
    Because reasonable minds might differ as to the propri-
    ety of this instruction, we find no abuse of discretion in
    the district court’s refusal to give it. The government
    does not quarrel with the legal accuracy of the pro-
    posed instruction, and one might argue that given the
    government’s reliance on Notice 97-24 as proof that the
    defendants knew that the Aegis system was unlawful,
    it would be appropriate to inform the jury that the
    Notice was not an authoritative statement of the law.
    On the other hand, we are pointed to no evidence that
    the government ever suggested that it was authoritative;
    and an IRS agent accurately testified before the jury
    that the Notice “expresses the IRS’s opinion of the law.”
    R. 971 Tr. 4580-81. Even if we were persuaded that it
    was an abuse of discretion for the court not to
    give this instruction, any error in refusing to give it was
    harmless, given the overwhelming evidence showing
    that the defendants appreciated the illegality of their
    conduct.
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                    81
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    3. Pinkerton Instruction
    The district court properly instructed the jury,
    consistent with Seventh Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury
    Instruction 5.09, that if it found a defendant guilty of the
    conspiracy charged in Count One of the indictment, it
    could hold that defendant accountable for any criminal
    act foreseeably committed by a co-conspirator in fur-
    therance of the conspiracy, including in particular the
    substantive criminal acts alleged in Counts 2 through 34
    of the superseding indictment. R. 925 Tr. 7381; see
    generally Pinkerton v. United States, 
    328 U.S. 640
    , 647-48, 
    66 S. Ct. 1180
    , 1184 (1946). The defendants suggest that this
    instruction “removed the intent to defraud and Cheek
    issues from the jury’s consideration once it determined
    that the Count [One] conspiracy had been proven and that
    each defendant had been a member of the conspiracy,”
    and “effectively eviscerated the government’s burden
    of proving that defendants lacked a good faith belief
    that the Aegis system was lawful and that they had the
    intent to defraud . . . .” Defendants’ Joint Br. 65. This
    particular contention was not made below, see R. 936
    Tr. 6008-09, so our review is solely for plain error, Fed.
    R. Crim. P. 30(d), 52(b); e.g., United States v. Johnson,
    
    655 F.3d 594
    , 605 (7th Cir. 2011), and we find no such
    error in the giving of this instruction.
    The instruction was an accurate statement of the law,
    and by no means did it “eviscerate” the government’s
    burden with respect to the Cheek defense. As the gov-
    ernment points out, the instructions with respect to
    82                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    Count One required a finding of intent to defraud as to
    the first prong of section 371 and willfulness as to the
    second prong. R. 925 at 7375-77. Thus, neither the intent
    to defraud nor the Cheek defense was removed from
    the jury’s consideration: before convicting a defendant
    on the conspiracy count, the jury would necessarily have
    to find that a defendant harbored an intent to defraud
    and/or lacked a good faith belief in the Aegis trust
    system’s legality, and either finding is irreconcilable
    with the defendants’ contention that they understood
    the Aegis system of trusts to be a legitimate means of
    tax minimization.
    4. Conscious Avoidance Instruction
    At the government’s request, and over the strong objec-
    tions of the defendants, the court gave the jury an instruc-
    tion on the conscious avoidance of knowledge (also
    referred to colloquially as the “ostrich” instruction),
    which advised the jury that it could infer a defendant’s
    culpable knowledge from a combination of suspicion
    and indifference to the truth. See Seventh Circuit
    Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction No. 4.06 ¶ 2. The con-
    scious avoidance instruction serves to alert the jury that
    “a person may not escape criminal liability by pleading
    ignorance if he knows or strongly suspects that he is
    involved in criminal dealings but deliberately avoids
    learning more exact information about the nature or
    extent of those dealings.” United States v. Green, 
    648 F.3d 569
    , 582 (7th Cir. 2011). However, because this instruc-
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                   83
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    tion poses a risk that a jury might improperly convict a
    defendant on the basis that he should have known that
    he was participating in wrongdoing, rather than on the
    basis of his actual knowledge, United States v. Tanner,
    
    supra,
     
    628 F.3d at 904-05
    , the instruction “is to be
    given ‘cautiously’ and only for ‘narrow’ uses,” United States
    v. Malewicka, 
    664 F.3d 1099
    , 1108 (7th Cir. 2011) (quoting
    United States v. Ciesiolka, 
    614 F.3d 347
    , 352-53 (7th Cir.
    2010)). Specifically, the instruction should only be given
    in cases “where (1) a defendant claims to lack guilty
    knowledge, i.e., knowledge of her conduct’s illegality,
    and (2) the government presents evidence from which
    a jury could conclude that the defendant deliberately
    avoided the truth.” Green, 
    648 F.3d at 582
     (quoting United
    States v. Garcia, 
    580 F.3d 528
    , 537 (7th Cir. 2009)).
    As an example of the willful blindness that it believed
    warranted the instruction in this case, the government
    cited to the district court attorney Parker’s testimony as
    to why he had remained involved with Aegis despite
    his own doubts about the Aegis system. R. 1020 Tr. 5966-
    67. Parker had acknowledged on redirect examination
    by the government that during the period of his involve-
    ment with Aegis from 1997 through 2000, he had harbored
    suspicions that the Aegis system was not legitimate and
    yet had pushed his doubts aside for fear of what he
    might learn if he looked more closely at the state of the
    law. R. 914 at 2272. He reiterated this point on re-cross
    examination by the defense. When asked whether the
    promotional materials distributed at Aegis seminars
    84                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    (at which Parker had spoken for two years) did not
    contain a wealth of citations to legal authorities
    indicating that the trusts were, in fact, legal, Parker an-
    swered, “I put my head in the sand. I put my fingers in
    my ears.” Id. at 2282. The government said that Parker’s
    testimony was just as true of the defendants who were
    on trial. R. 1020 at 5967. For its part, the district court,
    in agreeing to give the instruction, cited Vallone’s testi-
    mony regarding what he did and did not do in ascer-
    taining the legality of the Aegis system as suggestive
    of deliberate indifference. R. 1020 Tr. 5968.
    The defendants contend that the evidence did not
    warrant such an instruction, because (a) however
    willfully blind Parker may have been to the legal flaws
    in the Aegis system, he was not on trial and it was thus
    improper to attribute his own conscious avoidance to
    the six defendants who were on trial; and (b) Vallone’s
    testimony, rather than supporting an inference of de-
    liberate indifference, actually reveals the “zealous care”
    that he took to keep himself apprised of the state of the
    law and to confirm that the Aegis trust system
    complied with the law. Defendants’ Joint Br. 67-68.
    The district court did not err in giving this instruction.
    As we have noted, a conscious avoidance instruction
    is appropriate when the defendant claims not to have
    known that what he was doing was illegal and there is,
    at the same time, evidence supporting an inference that
    the defendant closed his eyes to the illegality of his con-
    duct. Green, supra, 
    648 F.3d at 582
    . It was a fair infer-
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                85
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    ence, to say the least, that the defendants in this case
    had deliberately blinded themselves to the variety of
    warnings they had received as to the illegality of the
    Aegis system. Parker’s testimony was relevant on this
    point, despite his status as a witness for the govern-
    ment, in that he was intimately involved in the promo-
    tion of the Aegis system and yet conceded, in retrospect,
    that he had essentially turned his head away from
    the multiple clues (and his own suspicion) that the
    system was illegal. And notwithstanding Vallone’s self-
    serving testimony that he was diligent in following
    and responding to the legal developments relevant to
    the Aegis trusts, the jury nonetheless could infer that
    he, like Parker, had really been burying his head in
    the sand.
    Take the following incident described by Parker.
    Parker testified that in the summer of 1999, following the
    Tax Court’s decision in Muhich, there was a meeting at
    Aegis headquarters, in Vallone’s office. In addition to
    Vallone and Parker, Dunn and Hopper were present, and
    Bartoli participated by telephone. In the course of that
    meeting, Bartoli reported that he was attempting to get
    an opinion from an Atlanta law firm as to the legality of
    the Aegis system. According to Parker, Vallone was
    critical of that idea, both because it was likely to be
    costly and because “there’s no guarantee as to what the
    result of that opinion would be, whether it would be a
    favorable opinion or a nonfavorable opinion or a neutral
    opinion.” R. 913 Tr. 1954. Parker chimed in that the IRS
    had a more economical process through which one
    86                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    could seek an opinion ruling. 
    Id.
     Vallone, according to
    Parker, rejected that idea as “ridiculous” 
    id.,
     “because
    we know what the answer will be and, therefore, why
    bother?” 
    id.
     Thereafter, Parker was asked to leave the
    room. Dunn later told him that the group had discussed
    the Audit Arsenal as a means to fend off looming
    IRS audits of Aegis clients. 
    Id.
     Tr. 1955-56.
    One can readily infer from Parker’s description of
    this meeting that the Aegis principals were deliberately
    avoiding any independent advice as to the legality of
    the Aegis trusts, realizing that the advice was likely to
    be that the trusts were an ineffective means of tax avoid-
    ance. The defendants were given many warning signs
    to that effect over the life of the charged conspiracy,
    from the ARDC complaint against Bartoli to the Tax
    Court’s decision in Muhich to Judge Plunkett’s sanctions
    decision, and yet they continued promoting the Aegis
    system, opting to pursue obstructive tactics like the
    Audit Arsenal rather than seeking out an independent
    legal opinion as to the validity of that system.
    We note that the Third Circuit’s decision in United
    States v. Stadtmauer, 
    620 F.3d 238
     (3d Cir. 2010), sustained
    the giving of a conscious avoidance instruction based
    on the defendant’s willful blindness to the legality of
    various deductions fraudulently claimed on the tax
    returns that had been filed on behalf of the limited part-
    nerships that the defendant helped manage. (The defen-
    dant was charged, inter alia, with aiding and abetting
    these false or fraudulent tax returns, in violation of
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                   87
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    
    26 U.S.C. § 7206
    (2).) The court rejected the argument that
    such an instruction, to the extent it applies to the defen-
    dant’s knowledge of the law, is irreconcilable with the
    good-faith defense endorsed by Cheek. The justification
    for the Cheek defense, the court explained, is that given
    the complexity of the tax system, one may in good faith
    err despite genuine efforts to ascertain and comply with
    the law. However, “[b]y definition, one who inten-
    tionally avoids learning of his tax obligations is not a
    taxpayer who ‘earnestly wish[es] to follow the law,’ or
    fails to do so as a result of an ‘innocent error[ ] made
    despite the exercise of reasonable care.’ ” 620 F.3d at 256
    (quoting Cheek, 
    498 U.S. at 205
    , 
    111 S. Ct. at 612
    ) (emphasis
    in Stadtmauer). “Rather, a person who deliberately
    evades learning his legal duties has a subjectively culpable
    state of mind that goes beyond mere negligence, a good
    faith misunderstanding, or even recklessness.” 
    Id.
     As
    support for giving a willful blindness instruction, the
    court cited, among other authorities, our own decision in
    United States v. Hauert, 
    40 F.3d 197
    , 203 & n.7 (7th Cir.
    1994), which affirmed the propriety of such an instruc-
    tion in a tax-protester case. 620 F.3d at 256 n.21. The
    circumstances supporting the instruction here were at
    least as compelling, if not more so, than in those cases.
    5. Caution and Great Care Instruction
    The defendants object to a standard instruction admon-
    ishing the jury to consider the testimony of David Jenkins,
    a witness who was granted immunity from prosecution
    88                  Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    by the government, “with caution and great care.” R. 925
    Tr. 7369; Seventh Cir. Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction
    No. 3.13. Jenkins, of course, testified on behalf of the gov-
    ernment. But because the defendants found certain
    aspects of Jenkins’ testimony to be helpful to their cause,
    and because the district judge himself voiced skepticism
    as to certain aspects of Jenkins’ testimony (more on
    this below), the defendants believe that this instruction
    all but invited the jury to discredit Jenkins’ testimony,
    including the portions that were favorable to the de-
    fense. We see no error in giving the instruction, how-
    ever. Jenkins was the government’s witness, and as
    such the admonishment to consider his testimony with
    caution and great care applied to those portions of his
    testimony that helped the government as well as those
    that were helpful to the defense. Nothing in the instruc-
    tion suggested to the jury that it should weigh his testi-
    mony in any particular way, but rather that it evaluate
    his testimony carefully. The instruction was unexcep-
    tional and could not have unduly prejudiced the defense.
    6.   The Cheek Instruction and the Conspiracy Instruc-
    tions
    The defendants make a wholly undeveloped, two-
    sentence argument which appears to suggest that the
    district court’s instructions as to the conspiracy charge
    undercut the pattern instruction on their Cheek defense.
    The argument is so cursorily made as to be waived.
    E.g., United States v. Thornton, 
    642 F.3d 599
    , 606 (7th Cir.
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                      89
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    2011). We do take the opportunity to reiterate that the
    conspiracy instructions did require the jury to find that
    the defendants harbored an intent to defraud and/or
    willfulness, and so in no way precluded or undercut the
    defense contention under Cheek that they genuinely, if
    mistakenly, believed that the Aegis trust system was
    lawful.
    E. Judicial Bias
    A defendant has a fundamental right to a fair trial in
    a fair tribunal, Bracy v. Gramley, 
    520 U.S. 899
    , 904-05, 
    117 S. Ct. 1793
    , 1797 (1997) (quoting Withrow v. Larkin, 
    421 U.S. 35
    , 46, 
    95 S. Ct. 1456
    , 1464 (1975)), and that fair-
    ness requires absence of actual bias or prejudice on the
    part of the judge, In re Murchison, 
    349 U.S. 133
    , 136, 
    75 S. Ct. 623
    , 625 (1955). However, impartiality does not imply
    passivity: “[j]udges . . . are not wallflowers or potted
    plants.” Tagatz v. Marquette Univ., 
    861 F.2d 1040
    , 1045 (7th
    Cir. 1988). A judge may question and even challenge an
    attorney, witness, or evidence without being said to have
    abandoned his constitutionally mandated impartiality. See,
    e.g., United States v. McCray, 
    437 F.3d 639
    , 643 (7th Cir.
    2006) (“A district judge is free to interject during direct
    or cross-examination to clarify an issue, to require an
    attorney to lay a foundation, or to encourage an exam-
    ining attorney to get to the point.”) (quoting United
    States v. Washington, 
    417 F.3d 780
    , 784 (7th Cir. 2005));
    Dugan v. R.J. Corman R.R. Co., 
    344 F.3d 662
    , 669-70 (7th Cir.
    2003) (exclusion of evidence that was not objected to but
    90                   Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    which judge found unreliable); United States v. Mohammad,
    
    53 F.3d 1426
    , 1434 (7th Cir. 1995) (criticizing trial coun-
    sel), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Sawyer, 
    521 F.3d 792
     (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Jackson, 
    983 F.2d 757
    , 762 (7th Cir. 1993) (same). But, a “judge who is so
    hostile to a lawyer as to doom the client to defeat
    deprives the client of the right to an impartial tribunal.”
    Walberg v. Israel, 
    766 F.2d 1071
    , 1077 (7th Cir. 1985). “Even
    when the biased judge neither is the trier of fact nor is
    shown to have conveyed his bias to the jury that is the
    trier of fact, there can be a violation of due process
    which requires a reversal of the conviction.” 
    Id. at 1076
    .
    The defendants suggest that the trial judge, in a
    variety of situations and in a variety of ways, exhibited
    a bias against the defense that deprived them of a fair
    trial. For the most part, their claim is not that the
    court by its conduct communicated a disbelief of or
    skepticism toward the defense to the jury, e.g., United
    States v. Barnhart, 
    599 F.3d 737
    , 742 (7th Cir. 2010), but
    rather that the judge was actually biased against the
    defense, see 
    28 U.S.C. § 455
    (b)(1). Actual bias requires
    evidence that the judge was burdened by a conflict of
    interest or had some personal stake in the proceeding
    sufficient to cause a reasonable person to believe that
    the judge was incapable of ruling fairly, and thus to
    demand that we set aside the usual presumption that the
    judge has properly discharged his duties. See Liteky v.
    United States, 
    510 U.S. 540
    , 555, 
    114 S. Ct. 1147
    , 1157 (1994);
    United States v. Diekemper, 
    604 F.3d 345
    , 352 (7th Cir. 2010);
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                      91
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    Collins v. Illinois, 
    554 F.3d 693
    , 697 (7th Cir. 2009); Harrison
    v. McBride, 
    428 F.3d 652
    , 668 (7th Cir. 2005). Actual bias,
    when shown, is the sort of structural defect that defies
    harmless-error inquiry and compels reversal regardless
    of how strong the government’s case against the de-
    fendant was or whether the defendant is able to demon-
    strate that the bias manifested itself in rulings that
    actually prejudiced him. Arizona v. Fulminante, 
    499 U.S. 279
    , 309, 
    111 S. Ct. 1246
    , 1265 (1991); Bracy v. Schomig, 
    286 F.3d 406
    , 414 (7th Cir. 2002) (en banc); Cartalino v. Wash-
    ington, 
    122 F.3d 8
    , 9-10 (7th Cir. 1997). However, mere
    “expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance,
    and even anger that are within the bounds of what imper-
    fect men and women, even after having been confirmed
    as federal judges, sometimes display,” do not by them-
    selves suffice to show actual bias. Liteky, 
    510 U.S. at
    555-
    56, 
    114 S. Ct. at 1157
    ; see also United States v. Twomey, 
    806 F.2d 1136
    , 1140 (1st Cir. 1986) (citing Offutt v. United
    States, 
    348 U.S. 11
    , 12, 
    75 S. Ct. 11
    , 12 (1954)).
    We proceed to consider each of the actions that the
    defendants cite as illustrative of the district judge’s bias
    against them. For the reasons we articulate below, we
    discern no proof of actual bias on the part of the judge.
    Furthermore, the defendants have not shown that
    anything the court did in the course of the trial conveyed
    any prejudice against the defense to the jury or other-
    wise deprived the defendants of a fair trial.
    Appointment of substitute counsel when Vallone’s counsel
    fell ill. On a morning relatively early in the trial, Vallone’s
    92                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    counsel, Richard McLeese, informed the court by tele-
    phone that he was ill with flu-like symptoms and could
    not participate in the trial that day. Vallone informed
    the court that Parker, the witness testifying on behalf of
    the government at that time, was an important witness
    and that he wanted his attorney present for his testi-
    mony rather than relying on another defendant’s coun-
    sel or a temporary replacement from the federal defender
    program, two possibilities that the court had sug-
    gested. The court recessed the trial for a day, but when
    court reconvened the next day, McLeese, who was
    still under the weather, was again absent. The court
    reported that he had left the “lamest message one can
    imagine receiving in terms of illness.” R. 1014 Tr. 1865.
    Vallone again indicated to the court that he did not
    wish to proceed in the absence of his attorney. Unwilling
    to delay the trial any longer, the court, over the vigorous
    objections of all parties, appointed an attorney from
    the federal defender’s office—who himself objected,
    noting that he had no familiarity with the case—to stand
    in for McLeese as Vallone’s counsel. The court indicated
    that it would reserve Vallone’s cross-examination of
    Parker until McLeese returned. The jury was then sum-
    moned into the courtroom, and the trial resumed with
    the continuation of the government’s direct examination
    of Parker. After Parker had given testimony spanning
    approximately forty pages of the trial transcript, the
    jury was excused when two senior members of the U.S.
    Attorney’s office appeared in the courtroom. The deputy
    chief of the criminal division expressed the govern-
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                 93
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    ment’s “serious concern” about the court’s decision to
    proceed in the absence of competent, prepared counsel
    or a clear waiver from Vallone. 
    Id.
     Tr. 1908. The court,
    although still concerned with the pace and length of the
    trial and the uncertainty as to when McLeese would be
    well enough to resume work, nonetheless agreed to recess
    the trial. When the trial resumed the following week
    with all counsel present, the court offered to have the
    government re-question Parker on the matters to which
    he had testified in McLeese’s absence. But McLeese
    declined the offer. “I have reviewed the transcript of
    the proceedings that I missed, and I don’t see any need
    to repeat that testimony.” R. 913 Tr. 1921. The court
    then specifically inquired and confirmed that both
    Vallone and his attorney wished to waive the option
    of striking and re-presenting the testimony that Parker
    had given in McLeese’s absence. 
    Id.
     Tr. 1921-24.
    We discern no evidence of bias in the course of action
    that the court pursued and no prejudice to the defense. The
    court was understandably and legitimately concerned
    about the prospect of an open-ended delay in a lengthy
    trial with a jury already empaneled. Nonetheless, Parker
    was a key government witness whose testimony sub-
    stantially incriminated Vallone. Vallone was entitled to
    representation by an attorney who was knowledgeable
    about the case and prepared to observe and respond
    appropriately to Parker’s testimony. All parties agree, as
    they did below, that the court erred in deciding to
    proceed in the absence of appropriate representation
    for Vallone. For present purposes, we may take it as a
    94                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    given that the court’s decision to go forward was mis-
    taken. Still, we see no way in which the decision reflected
    a bias against Vallone in particular or the defendants
    generally as opposed to a legitimate concern
    about delaying the trial and inconveniencing the jury.
    Moreover, the extent of the testimony that Parker gave
    in McLeese’s absence was relatively minimal. McLeese
    had the opportunity to review the transcript of Parker’s
    testimony before the trial resumed, and both he and
    Vallone waived the opportunity to have Parker repeat
    that portion of his testimony. Vallone makes no argu-
    ment that he was, in the end, concretely prejudiced by
    what occurred in his counsel’s absence; and, indeed, other
    than as an example of the court’s purported bias, Vallone
    has not raised this as a stand-alone error that demands
    a new trial. Within the overall context of a lengthy trial,
    this was a discrete and ultimately harmless error.
    Harsh interrogation when Vallone moved to dismiss indict-
    ment on speedy trial grounds. The defendants next cite as
    evidence of the district court’s bias its reaction to the
    motion to dismiss the indictment that Vallone filed
    shortly before the trial, invoking the Speedy Trial Act.
    They contend that it is evident from the transcript of the
    hearing on that motion that the court felt it had been
    “sandbagged” by Vallone’s counsel and took personal
    offense at the suggestion that it had deprived Vallone
    (or any other defendant) of the right to a speedy trial
    by granting the defendants’ own requests for continu-
    ances. Defendants’ Joint Br. 72. The defendants contend
    that the court castigated McLeese, questioned whether
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                    95
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    the motion had been filed in good faith, and interrupted
    McLeese repeatedly, evincing an animosity to the defense
    that went well beyond the impatience that one might
    otherwise expect in reaction to an eleventh-hour motion
    of this sort.
    Having reviewed the transcript of the hearing, we
    disagree with the contention that the court’s reaction to
    the motion bespeaks an anti-defense bias. The transcript
    arguably does suggest that the court was annoyed with
    the contention that Vallone had been deprived of his
    right to a speedy trial, and the court did press Vallone’s
    counsel to acknowledge that he had joined in the other
    defendants’ requests for continuances. But we believe
    that any annoyance on the part of the court was under-
    standable. Vallone’s motion was brought on the eve of
    trial after years of pre-trial litigation and multiple
    requests for delay sought by the defendants them-
    selves, agreed to by Vallone’s counsel, and granted in
    some instances over the objection of the government. We
    ourselves have observed that a record of delays sought
    by the defendant will cast doubt on the validity of
    his subsequent contention that he has been deprived of his
    right to a speedy trial. United States v. Adams, 
    supra,
     
    625 F.3d at
    379 (citing United States v. Larson, 
    417 F.3d 741
    , 746
    (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Baskin-Bey, 
    45 F.3d 200
    ,
    204 (7th Cir. 1995). To whatever degree the court may have
    interrupted McLeese during the hearing and persisted in
    extracting his acknowledgment that the complained-of
    delays had been precipitated by the defendants, the
    court nonetheless did hear both McLeese and the gov-
    96                  Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    ernment’s counsel out before denying the motion to
    dismiss. The motion, for the reasons we have already
    explained, was not meritorious. And, as we have also
    noted, expressions of impatience and annoyance—which
    are to be expected with eleventh-hour motions complain-
    ing of delays that the defendants themselves sought—are
    not sufficient by themselves to establish actual bias on the
    part of the judge. Liteky, 
    510 U.S. at 555-56
    , 
    114 S. Ct. at 1157
    .
    Skeptical reaction to Jenkins. The defendants assert
    that “the court’s animosity towards defendants was
    fully on display” during the testimony of David Jenkins.
    Defendants’ Joint Br. 73. Recall that Jenkins was the
    individual who helped set up offshore entities in Belize
    for Aegis clients. As we have said, Jenkins testified
    under a grant of immunity. And although he was
    the government’s witness, some of what he said, princi-
    pally during cross-examination by defense counsel, was
    favorable to the defense. For example, Jenkins testified
    that the backdating of documents was not prohibited
    under Belizean law (R. 929 Tr. 1381; R. 967 Tr. 1517), that
    the monetary transfers associated with demands on
    promissory notes were not illegal (R. 929 Tr. 1385), and
    that Jenkins understood Vallone to be attempting to
    establish a system that complied with U.S. as well as
    Belizean law (R. 929 Tr. 1402). There were times during
    his testimony when the court interrupted Jenkins to
    ask him if he understood the question that had been
    posed and to repeat his answer. E.g., R. 929 Tr. 1381; R. 967
    Tr. 1501, 1519-20. The defendants suggest that these
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                    97
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    interruptions communicated the judge’s skepticism and
    disbelief of Jenkins’ testimony to the jury. Again, we
    conclude that the record does not bear the defendants’
    assertion out.
    Although the record does confirm that the judge peri-
    odically interrupted Jenkins’ testimony, the interrup-
    tions on the whole do not support the inference that
    the judge was biased against the defense or conveyed a
    disbelief of Jenkins’ testimony to the jury. “District judges
    have broad discretion in conducting trials and may ques-
    tion witnesses during direct or cross-examination.”
    Barnhart, 
    supra,
     
    599 F.3d at 743
    . We note first that the
    judge’s interruptions began well before Jenkins gave
    testimony that the defendants perceive as helpful to them.
    See, e.g., R. 929 Tr. 1310-11, 1367-69, 1390; R. 967 Tr. 1439,
    1486. Indeed, our review of the record suggests that the
    judge was an active questioner of witnesses, often inter-
    jecting to ensure that the witness understood an ambigu-
    ous question, to clarify an answer, or to have the wit-
    ness expand on a point that the court was curious about.
    This was just as true in the case of Jenkins’ testimony
    as it was with other witnesses. And we note that a
    number of the interruptions of Jenkins appear to have
    been occasioned by the court’s legitimate concern that
    Jenkins may have misunderstood a broad or poorly
    worded question. E.g., R. 292 Tr. 1385; R. 967 Tr. 1501,
    1514, 1519-20. At the same time, there were numerous
    instances in which Jenkins gave a seemingly defense-
    friendly answer with no interruption or remark by the
    98                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    court. E.g., R. 929 Tr. 1382, 1388, 1401, 1402, 1403; R. 967
    Tr. 1469-71, 1473, 1499, 1577.
    In short, there is nothing in the record that suggests
    the judge was disbelieving of Jenkins’ testimony, let
    alone that he conveyed such skepticism to the jury. Of
    course, our review is confined to a written record that
    does not reveal the judge’s tone of voice or facial expres-
    sion. And we must acknowledge the possibility that
    the judge may have interrupted Jenkins in some
    instances because it was surprised by the testimony that
    Jenkins gave. Some of his answers were surprising to
    us—that backdating documents is not prohibited by
    Belizean law, for example. The material point, however,
    is that the record does not reveal a one-sided or pros-
    ecutorial bent to the questions posed by the judge.
    The interruptions were within the bounds of judicial
    discretion and do not suggest that the court conveyed
    to the jury an inclination to disbelieve Jenkins’ testimony.
    The defendants also complain that at the conclusion
    of Jenkins’ testimony, the judge, with the jury still
    present, asked Jenkins, “Could you step over here,
    please?” R. 967 Tr. 1521. Presumably, the court intended
    to confer with Jenkins in a sidebar conference. Then,
    remarking that “there’s another way to do this,” the
    court instead excused the jury from the courtroom.
    With the jury gone, the judge then suggested to Jenkins
    that he might wish to speak with his American counsel
    before returning to Belize. Although the judge did not
    make explicit why he thought Jenkins should promptly
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                 99
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    confer with his attorney, we gather that the judge had
    some concern that portions of Jenkins’ testimony may
    have placed him in jeopardy. After Jenkins was
    excused, the defendants objected to the fact that the
    court, while the jury was still present, had summoned
    Jenkins to the side. Defense counsel asserted that both
    the wording and the “pointed” tone of the court’s
    request had conveyed its disbelief of Jenkins’ testimony
    to the jury and an intent to admonish Jenkins. The
    court rejected the notion that the words it had used
    signaled something negative to the jury and, after
    having the court reporter’s audio recording played
    back, likewise rejected that there was any such implica-
    tion in its tone.
    Nothing in the court’s request that Jenkins “step over
    here, please” bespeaks bias on the part of the court or
    demonstrates prejudice to the defendants. It is pure
    speculation to suggest, even against the backdrop of
    the judge’s interruptions of Jenkins, that the jury must
    have inferred the judge’s disbelief of and unhappiness
    with Jenkins’ testimony. The defendants read entirely
    too much into this brief request of Jenkins.
    Reaction to Cross-Examination of Parker and Special Agent
    Smyros, and Direct Examination of Vallone. The defendants
    next argue that the judge’s unwillingness to allow
    Vallone’s counsel to pursue certain relevant lines of
    inquiry during the cross-examination of two govern-
    ment witnesses (Parker and Special Agent Andrew
    Smyros), and its apparent impatience with the length
    100                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    of time counsel spent on the direct examination of
    Vallone, displayed bias. As to Parker and Smyros, the
    court may have misunderstood the point that Vallone’s
    counsel was attempting to explore; and as to Vallone,
    the court appears to have been concerned about one line
    of inquiry that his counsel was pursuing rather than
    the overall length of Vallone’s direct examination. But
    in none of these three instances do we discern evidence
    of bias against Vallone, his counsel, or the defense gen-
    erally.
    The issue vis-à-vis Parker arose with respect to his
    testimony concerning the Audit Arsenal letters he sent
    to the IRS on behalf of Aegis clients who had received
    notice that they would be audited by the IRS. Parker
    prepared these letters based on a template that he had
    been given by Vallone. The letters, among other things,
    asserted to the IRS that the Aegis clients had various
    constitutional rights as taxpayers and also posed a series
    of questions to the IRS. R. 913, Tr. 1941-45. At bottom,
    the letters were part of an effort to thwart IRS inquiry
    into the Aegis trusts. On cross-examination, Vallone’s
    counsel, McLeese, sought to elicit from Parker a con-
    firmation that taxpayers do have certain rights with
    respect to an IRS audit, including a Fifth Amendment
    right not to incriminate themselves. See, e.g., United
    States v. Argomaniz, 
    925 F.2d 1349
    , 1352-53 (11th Cir.
    1991) (citing Kastigar v. United States, 
    406 U.S. 441
    , 445, 
    92 S. Ct. 1653
    , 1656 (1972)). However, the court, in the ap-
    parent belief that McLeese was running afoul of its pretrial
    ruling barring any effort to show that the federal tax laws
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                  101
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    were unconstitutional, interrupted McLeese sua sponte
    and at one point instructed the jury that the constitu-
    tionality of the tax laws was not at issue. When
    McLeese persisted in attempting to elicit an answer from
    Parker on the right against self-incrimination, the
    court summoned McLeese to a sidebar, and then, as
    it had with Jenkins, decided instead to excuse the
    jury from the courtroom, after which it reprimanded
    McLeese for persisting in the inquiry notwithstanding the
    court’s warnings. R. 947, Tr. 2044-52.
    We are inclined to agree with the government that
    this was an instance of the court misapprehending the
    point that McLeese was trying to make with the wit-
    ness. Eliciting Parker’s acknowledgment that taxpayers
    do have a Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimina-
    tion would not have called into question the constitu-
    tionality of the Internal Revenue Code or the legitimacy
    of the IRS audit notices. At the same time, it would
    have been a legitimate way for the defense to point out
    that the letters sent out by Parker were not wholly frivo-
    lous in their content, and in turn to argue to the jury
    that the letters were not, contrary to the government’s
    view, simply a means of evading and obstructing the
    IRS audits. Perhaps the court was misled on this point,
    when, at an initial sidebar, McLeese remarked, “What
    this has to do with is the constitutionality of the tax
    laws, not of filing a tax return, but rather of asserting
    your constitutional rights in response to an audit request.”
    R. 947 Tr. 2045. We understand McLeese to have been
    trying to distinguish the pretrial ruling which declared
    102                Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    the constitutionality of the tax laws off limits, but the
    ambiguous wording of this remark may have simply
    confirmed, in the court’s mind, that the constitutionality
    of the tax laws was precisely what McLeese intended
    to explore with the witness. In any case, Vallone makes
    no argument that he was prejudiced by the ruling.
    He argues only that the court’s repeated interrup-
    tions and admonitions show bias at work. We view
    it instead as an instance of miscommunication and mis-
    understanding.
    Much the same is true as to what occurred during
    Special Agent Smyros’s testimony. Smyros was one
    of the agents who participated in the March 7, 2003
    search of Vallone’s home. On cross-examination, McLeese
    sought to establish in some detail the context, chronology,
    and thoroughness of the search. R. 931 Tr. 3010-22. The
    government objected to the inquiry on the ground of
    relevance. The court, by contrast, was concerned that
    McLeese was attempting to suggest that the search was
    improper in some way. 
    Id.
     Tr. 3015. McLeese assured
    the court that he agreed the search was lawful and
    was not attempting to suggest otherwise. The court
    then sustained the government’s relevance objection.
    McLeese continued to pose questions of Smyros aimed
    at eliciting the purpose and thoroughness of the
    search. But the court, believing that McLeese’s questions
    implicated the legality of the search, repeatedly inter-
    rupted McLeese, saying it had already ruled on this
    line of inquiry, and told him to move on.
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,              103
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    Again, we believe that the court likely misunderstood
    what McLeese hoped to show through this barred line
    of questioning. We gather that what McLeese hoped
    to establish is that despite what he expected Smyros
    to say was a thorough search of Vallone’s home, the
    agents did not discover any email or other document
    in which Vallone in some way acknowledged (in
    McLeese’s words), “I know what we’re doing doesn’t
    comply with the requirements of the federal tax laws,
    but I think we can get away with it anyway.” R. 931 Tr.
    3022. Arguably this was an appropriate line of inquiry
    given Vallone’s Cheek defense and the government’s
    burden to prove his willfulness, and certainly it would
    have in no way called into question the legality of the
    search. But we see no sign that the court in limiting
    this line of inquiry was motivated by bias rather than
    a genuine misunderstanding of what McLeese hoped
    to establish. And McLeese ultimately was able to
    elicit Smyros’s acknowledgment that he did not recall
    seeing any smoking gun admission along the lines that
    McLeese posited, so there was no prejudice in the
    limits imposed on him by the court.
    Finally, the following brief exchange occurred during
    Vallone’s first day on the witness stand. When
    McLeese suggested that he had reached a point in his
    examination of Vallone that would be convenient for the
    lunch break, the court asked him how much longer
    he expected to be with his direct examination. When
    McLeese responded that he expected his examination
    to continue into the following day, the court called for
    104                Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    a sidebar. McLeese, apparently anticipating that he was
    about to be scolded, immediately pointed out that
    the government’s first witness had been on the stand for
    three days. The court admonished McLeese for making
    such a statement in front of the jury. At the sidebar,
    the court seemed to be primarily concerned with the
    amount of time McLeese was spending on a particular
    point rather than with the overall length of Vallone’s
    testimony. See R. 920 Tr. 5137-38.
    Although by now it should be clear that McLeese and
    the court did not have an easy relationship, we see no
    hint of any bias or unfairness in this exchange. Vallone
    went on to testify for a total of five days, so there can be
    no argument that the court imposed any undue limita-
    tion on his testimony. The court, as we have said,
    appears to have been primarily concerned with some-
    thing other than the length of Vallone’s testimony.
    We view the court’s decision to summon McLeese to a
    sidebar, and the exchange that followed, as immaterial.
    Court in Role of Prosecutor. The defendants contend
    that the record is “replete” with instances in which the
    court assumed a partisan role on behalf of the govern-
    ment. Defendants’ Joint Br. 77. They cite three groups
    of examples in support of their contention: (1) the
    court’s interruptions during Jenkins’ testimony, which
    we described earlier; (2) the court’s purported pattern
    of prompting the government to make objections to
    questions posed by the defense or making its own ob-
    jections to such questions, and ultimately cutting off
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                 105
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    defense questioning; and (3) the court’s purported “bol-
    stering” of the credibility of Mary Robinson during her
    testimony regarding the ARDC proceeding involving
    Bartoli.
    Having reviewed the examples that the defendants
    have cited, we find no meaningful evidence of the court
    assuming a prosecutorial role. We have thoroughly dis-
    cussed Jenkins’ testimony and the reasons why the
    court’s interruptions of Jenkins do not show bias; no
    more need be said on that subject. As to the court’s pur-
    ported proclivity to prompt objections by the govern-
    ment and to sustain its own objections to defense ques-
    tions, the defendants cite only a handful of examples,
    which in the context of an eleven-week trial is insuf-
    ficient to demonstrate anything approaching a pattern
    raising an inference of bias. Our own impression from
    the trial record is that the court consistently paid
    close attention to the testimony and showed no reticence
    to interrupt the government’s witnesses either. When
    the court did interpose its own objections, it typically
    had a neutral and legitimate reason to do so. Finally,
    having reviewed Robinson’s testimony, we have found
    no evidence that the court was in any way attempting
    to bolster her credibility. Robinson’s role was to
    identify and read from certain documents related to the
    ARDC proceeding; as such, her credibility was largely
    beside the point. Insofar as the court sustained objections
    to certain questions posed by the defense, we believe
    it had wholly legitimate grounds for doing so.
    106                Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    Evidentiary Rulings. The defendant’s next contention is
    that the court “made numerous evidentiary rulings
    which allowed the government to present nearly any
    evidence it desired.” Defendants’ Joint Br. 78. In
    examining the examples cited by the defendants, how-
    ever, we see no sign that the court admitted evidence
    improperly or in a one-sided manner.
    (1) The first example is again one we have discussed:
    the admission of evidence related to Bartoli’s ARDC
    proceeding, including the Hearing Board’s summary of
    Marutzky’s testimony that the Heritage/Aegis trusts
    were ineffective as a means of tax avoidance. The defen-
    dants’ argument in this instance is principally one of
    asymmetry: they note that the court allowed the ARDC
    evidence as proof of notice to Bartoli (as well as his co-
    defendants) that the Aegis system was illegitimate, yet
    improperly restricted the attempts of Bartoli’s counsel
    to establish that Bartoli’s participation in the ARDC pro-
    ceeding, and thus his familiarity with what occurred, was
    minimal. The defendants posit that the probative worth
    of the ARDC evidence as proof of notice to Bartoli (let
    alone his co-defendants) was weak, in that (a) Bartoli
    was not finally disbarred until May 2002, late in the life
    of the conspiracy and years after Bartoli had left his
    role as counsel to Aegis, and (b) the inference that
    Bartoli and others were aware of what occurred in the
    ARDC proceeding hinged on the mere discovery of
    ARDC materials in Aegis’s Illinois office in 2000, again
    well after Bartoli had retired to South Carolina. None-
    theless, in allowing the government to present the
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                 107
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    ARDC evidence, the court told Bartoli’s counsel that “[i]f
    your position is that Mr. Bartoli never received notice [of
    the ARDC proceeding] formally, informally, de facto, or
    otherwise, whatever your claim may be, then you can
    pursue that on cross-examination.” R. 916 Tr. 2663-64.
    But when counsel attempted to ask Robinson on cross-
    examination whether she knew whether Bartoli’s attor-
    ney in the ARDC proceeding had ever communicated
    to Bartoli the opinion Marutzky had given in that pro-
    ceeding, the court sustained the government’s objection
    to the question. R. 916 Tr. 2727. And when counsel asked
    Robinson to confirm that Bartoli was not present in
    person for the hearing before the ARDC’s Hearing
    Board, and Robinson did so, the court interrupted and
    remarked that the relevant notice was “notice of what
    had occurred and the ultimate decision.” 
    Id.
     Tr. 2728.
    Finally, the defendants note that in addition to reading
    excerpts from the ARDC proceeding, Robinson was
    also permitted to read portions of the sanctions opinion
    that Judge Plunkett entered in the lawsuit Bartoli and
    others filed against the ARDC. They argue that the
    relevant portion of Judge Plunkett’s opinion, which
    addressed the legality of the Aegis system, was dicta,
    because that point was not at issue in the proceeding
    before him. They add that when Bartoli’s counsel at-
    tempted to clarify certain points about what was alleged
    in the lawsuit before Judge Plunkett by referencing the
    complaint filed in that action, the court castigated
    counsel for doing so, suggesting that he was attempting
    108                Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    to resurrect allegations that Judge Plunkett had deemed
    frivolous. 
    Id.
     Tr. 2737-42.
    We have already explained why we believe that the
    ARDC proceeding was fairly strong evidence of notice
    that was relevant to the defendants’ Cheek defense and
    willfulness. The defendants’ contention to the contrary
    ignores both the sequence of events in the ARDC proceed-
    ing and the extent to which the proceeding involved not
    just Bartoli, but several of his co-defendants. Although
    the final order of disbarment did not issue until
    May 2002, the ARDC’s original complaint was filed in
    November 1996 and was succeeded by an amended
    complaint in September 1998. We have discussed the
    reasons why Aegis and its principals would have an
    interest in the proceeding, notwithstanding the fact that
    Bartoli was the sole respondent. In fact, as we have
    noted, Bartoli, Vallone, and Hopper were all deposed
    in the course of the proceeding; and Robinson testified
    that she recalled taking a statement from Dunn. Bartoli,
    of course, regardless of his physical absence from the
    evidentiary hearing before the Hearing Board, was repre-
    sented by counsel throughout the proceeding. The
    Hearing Board’s Report and Recommendation was
    issued in February 2000, and a copy of that decision
    along with other Aegis materials, including a copy of
    Marutzky’s testimony, was found in the Aegis offices.
    The alleged conspiracy was in full swing when the
    ARDC filed its complaint against Bartoli, and it persisted
    even after the Hearing Board’s decision issued in early
    2000. And, of course, Bartoli remained involved with
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                 109
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    Aegis long after his nominal retirement to South Carolina.
    For all of these reasons, the evidence concerning the
    ARDC proceeding was strong, not weak, evidence
    of notice.
    Robinson’s testimony about the lawsuit that four of
    the defendants filed before Judge Plunkett was also
    relevant as notice. Judge Plunkett’s decision to dismiss
    the suit as frivolous, noting among other things that the
    Aegis system was not “a legal means to avoid paying
    taxes,” R. 916 Tr. 2695, whether dicta or not, was yet
    another warning to the defendants that what they were
    doing was illegal.
    As for the court’s multiple interruptions of Bartoli’s
    cross-examination of Robinson, we see nothing that
    constituted an abuse of discretion or was so unusual or
    unjustified as to suggest bias. Robinson, obviously, could
    not speak to what Bartoli’s counsel did or did not tell
    Bartoli about what occurred in the ARDC proceeding.
    She could testify to whether Bartoli was physically
    present for the evidentiary hearing, and she did confirm
    that he was not. That the court interjected to clarify that
    it had admitted the ARDC evidence as proof of notice
    of what ultimately occurred in the proceeding, rather
    than notice of every detail of the proceeding, arguably
    was a legitimate effort to keep counsel as well as the
    jury focused on the purpose for which the evidence was
    offered. Finally, with respect to the lawsuit against the
    ARDC, the court’s legitimate concern was that Bartoli’s
    counsel might be trying to relitigate the validity of that
    110                Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    lawsuit. If there was another purpose to the inquiry,
    counsel never made that clear.
    (2) Counts 11 through 34 of the indictment charged
    Bartoli, Vallone, Hopper, and Dunn with willfully aiding
    and assisting, procuring, counseling, and advising the
    preparation and presentation of the false and fraudulent
    income tax returns filed by multiple Aegis clients, in
    violation of 
    26 U.S.C. § 7206
    (2). The tax returns of Bruce
    and Tammy Groen and John and Colleen McNinney,
    were among the false and fraudulent returns under-
    lying these charges. None of these four taxpayers
    testified at the trial; Bruce Groen, in fact, was deceased
    by that time. Instead, Internal Revenue Agent Michael
    Welch was permitted to testify about various aspects
    of their returns, including the reported income, claimed
    deductions, and income tax paid, as well as the
    substantial adjustment later made to those returns as a
    result of the audits that the IRS conducted. In addition,
    Welch testified that the returns appeared to have been
    signed by taxpayers and their preparer, CPA Laura
    Baxter. (Baxter was indicted separately for her role in
    supporting the Aegis scheme as a tax preparer.)
    The defendants contend that Welch’s testimony con-
    cerning these tax returns was contrary to Crawford v.
    Washington, 
    541 U.S. 36
    , 
    124 S. Ct. 1354
     (2004), which
    essentially disapproved the admission, for their truth,
    of out-of-court testimonial statements that are not
    subject to cross-examination. Welch’s testimony was
    meant to show that the tax returns in question
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                    111
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    fraudulently understated the taxpayers’ income and
    that they had been signed by both the taxpayers (else-
    where identified as Aegis clients) and their tax
    preparer (elsewhere identified as an Aegis-approved
    preparer). As such, his testimony was one piece of the
    government’s case for the notion that Bartoli, Vallone,
    Hopper, and Dunn had aided and abetted the prepara-
    tion of these tax returns in violation of section
    7206(2). But, as an IRS agent, Welch obviously had no
    knowledge of any interactions that these taxpayers
    might have had with the defendants, and thus could not
    be cross-examined on any such interactions. In view of
    that fact, the defendants contend that allowing Welch
    to testify about the returns deprived them of their
    Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.
    To summarize the defendants’ argument is to see
    how misguided it is. Welch did not recount any out-of-
    court statements that the taxpayers in question may
    have made about any contact they had with any of the
    defendants. Welch instead testified as both a summary
    witness, identifying the tax returns and describing
    their contents, and as an expert, explaining the extent to
    which the returns had understated the taxpayers’ actual
    income. See United States v. Pree, 
    408 F.3d 855
    , 869 (7th Cir.
    2005) (permissible for IRS agent to testify as an “expert
    summary witness,” giving testimony that both sum-
    marizes what the evidence shows and analyzing the
    tax consequences of that evidence based on his own
    expertise). Insofar as Welch’s testimony summarized
    what the tax returns themselves declared, it did not
    112                  Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    implicate the Confrontation Clause. As Crawford recog-
    nizes, the Confrontation Clause only applies to testi-
    monial statements. 
    541 U.S. at 68
    , 
    124 S. Ct. at 1374
    . To
    describe what a taxpayer has claimed on a tax return is
    not to recount a testimonial statement. See United States
    v. Doughty, 
    460 F.2d 1360
    , 1363 n.2 (7th Cir. 1972) (testi-
    mony as to contents of tax return is not hearsay, because
    it is not offered for its truth but rather to show what
    was declared); United States v. Garth, 
    540 F.3d 766
    , 778
    (8th Cir. 2008) (testimony regarding tax returns filed
    by non-testifying individuals not a Confrontation
    Clause violation), abrogated on other grounds by United
    States v. Villareal-Amarillas, 
    562 F.3d 892
    , 895-98 (8th
    Cir. 2009); United States v. Jimenez, 
    513 F.3d 62
    , 81 (3d Cir.
    2008) (admission of tax returns as filed does not
    implicate Confrontation Clause when returns not ad-
    mitted for truth); United States v. Solomon, 
    825 F.2d 1292
    ,
    1299-1300 (9th Cir. 1987) (testimony regarding tax
    returns did not pose a Confrontation Clause problem,
    as contents of returns were admitted not for their
    truth but to show what deductions were claimed; no
    need to cross-examine taxpayer, as deductions were
    either claimed or not); United States v. Austin, 
    774 F.2d 99
    , 101-02 (5th Cir. 1985) (false tax returns were not
    hearsay because they were not admitted for the truth of
    what they asserted).
    Internal   Revenue Agent James Pogue gave testimony
    regarding    the investigation of an Aegis client, T. David
    Ring, and    certain documents related to Ring that were
    recovered     from defendant Cover’s office. Pogue was
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                     113
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    involved in the civil audit that led to the Muhich
    decision as well as the audits of other taxpayers who
    were clients of Heritage and Aegis, including Ring.
    Ring ultimately became a client of Aegis, but he was a
    client of Heritage when he filed the 1993 income tax
    return that Pogue was investigating. Pogue was permit-
    ted, over objection, to read from a letter that Ring had
    written to Jennifer Sodaro, an attorney for Aegis. That
    letter related to the IRS investigation and a motion
    to quash a summons (which Ring mislabeled a “motion
    to squash”) issued in connection with the IRS’s investiga-
    tion of his 1993 return. R. 949 Tr. 2813-15. The letter
    also mentioned that “Mike” would be getting back to
    Ring with a plan to eliminate his tax liability. The “Mike”
    to whom Ring was referring could have been either
    Michael Vallone or Michael Dowd. 
    Id.
     Tr. 2833-35. Be-
    cause Pogue could not clarify which “Mike” was being
    referenced, see 
    id.
     Tr. 2837, the defendants contend that
    Pogue’s testimony posed a Crawford problem.
    We disagree. The letter from Ring to Sodaro was
    among the documents recovered from Cover’s office.
    Pogue’s testimony about what the letter said was not
    offered for its truth but rather to establish context for later
    testimony concerning backdated trust documents that
    Aegis personnel prepared for Ring. 
    Id.
     Tr. 2817. Moreover,
    the defendants have made no showing that they were
    prejudiced by the letter’s ambiguous reference to “Mike.”
    On cross-examination of Pogue, the defense made
    clear that he had no idea who “Mike” was. 
    Id.
     Tr. 2837.
    114                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    IRS Special Agent Bernard Coleman led a team of
    ten agents who searched the premises of a business in
    Charleston, Illinois in March 2000.8 While cross-examining
    Coleman, Dowd’s counsel began to ask the agent about
    the steps he had taken to procure the warrant which
    authorized the search. (For example: “Before you
    obtained a search warrant, you went before a federal
    magistrate, right?” R. 914 Tr. 2340.) The court had previ-
    ously ruled on the legality of the search and evidently
    became concerned that these questions were meant to
    suggest some impropriety in the search. The court inter-
    rupted the questioning to remind counsel that the
    search had taken place pursuant to a lawful warrant,
    and advised him that he could not question the agent
    about anything that had occurred before the search war-
    rant was issued. “You cannot bring to the attention of
    the jury anything that preceded the issuance of the
    order by the court.” R. 914 Tr. 2342. The court explained,
    Once the court entered an order authorizing the
    search and seizure, that was a lawful order of the
    court and cannot be challenged indirectly by some
    inquiry of the witness on the stand. That was an
    order of the court. Now, if you have other questions
    8
    The business belonged to Kenton Tylman, who sold video-
    tapes, among other items. The items seized from the business
    included approximately 140 videotapes related to Aegis;
    primarily these were recordings of Aegis promotional semi-
    nars. Agent Priess had purchased some of these video-
    tapes, and excerpts from these recordings were played at trial.
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                115
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    of this witness beyond the issue of the warrant,
    go ahead.
    
    Id.
     Tr. 2341. Counsel told the court he was not ques-
    tioning the legality of the search warrant nor its
    execution, but instead wanted to explore some of the
    information contained in the affidavit submitted in
    support of the application for the warrant.
    The only question I would proffer to the witness is
    that there was an affidavit, and the affidavit lists
    the names of certain individuals who the Internal
    Revenue Service is investigating. All I want to do
    is explore that affidavit before the signing of the
    search warrant, an affidavit that this agent prepared
    and signed under oath.
    
    Id.
     Tr. 2343. The court denied counsel’s request to
    question Coleman about the affidavit, reasoning that the
    affidavit was subsumed within the order of the court
    authorizing the search and was thus off-limits. Counsel
    clarified that he just wanted to inquire about the agent’s
    knowledge. The court allowed counsel to ask Coleman if
    he knew of Dowd at the time he sought the warrant;
    Coleman replied that he was not sure. Counsel then
    attempted to show Coleman the affidavit—presumably
    to confirm that Dowd’s name was not mentioned—but
    the court would not permit him to do so. The court indi-
    cated it would allow additional questions as to what
    Coleman knew at that time, and counsel was able to
    establish that Coleman knew of some twenty individuals
    whom he believed were involved with Aegis. But the
    116                Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    court would not permit counsel to establish that
    Coleman’s affidavit named these twenty individuals and
    that Dowd was not among them. The court also refused
    counsel’s repeated requests for a sidebar so that he
    could articulate what he was attempting to elicit
    from Coleman. Ultimately, Dowd’s counsel gave up.
    “Your Honor, I can’t proceed, respectfully, based on
    the Court’s rulings. I would like to develop a point,
    but I cannot.” 
    Id.
     Tr. 2348. “Then that’s it,” the court
    replied. 
    Id.
    There is little to make of this exchange. It seems clear
    that Dowd’s counsel wanted to extract an acknowledg-
    ment from Coleman that Dowd was not one of the
    twenty alleged participants in the Aegis conspiracy
    who were named in the affidavit that Coleman
    prepared and presented to the federal magistrate who
    issued the search warrant. This was a minor point that
    ultimately had little, if anything, to do with Dowd’s guilt
    or innocence on the charges. If there is more that
    Dowd’s attorney wished to establish with Coleman, the
    defendants’ brief does not identify what that was. Rea-
    sonable minds might differ as to whether the court
    ought to have allowed the question that Dowd’s counsel
    wanted to pose (which we agree did not appear to in
    any way challenge the validity of the warrant and the
    ensuing search) and as to whether the court ought to
    have allowed counsel to clarify whatever point he
    wanted to make at sidebar. But the point that counsel was
    exploring was of such minimal relevance that it is
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                 117
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    difficult to understand why this is an illustration of bias
    on the part of the court.
    Finally, the defendants contend that bias is evident
    from the fact that the district court allowed the govern-
    ment to cross-examine Vallone about the contents of
    certain documents admitted into evidence for purposes
    of showing that the defendants had notice of the
    illegality of the Aegis trust system, but which Vallone
    denied having seen. Vallone was asked, for example,
    about two documents related to the ARDC proceeding
    against his co-defendant Bartoli that had been dis-
    covered in Aegis’s Illinois office. These included one of
    the two complaints that the ARDC had filed against
    Bartoli, as well as the eventual Report and Recommenda-
    tion issued by the ARDC’s Hearing Board. Vallone ac-
    knowledged that he was aware of the ARDC proceeding.
    In fact, as we have pointed out, Vallone had been
    deposed in the course of that proceeding. But when
    questioned about the complaint and the Hearing
    Board’s recommended decision, he said that he did not
    recall having ever read the complaint and that he had not
    read the Board’s Report and Recommendation. E.g., R. 954
    Tr. 5454, 5456, 5458. Over the objection of defense
    counsel, the government was allowed to press Vallone
    on these documents, asking him several follow-up ques-
    tions as to whether he was aware of certain statements
    made in the complaint and the hearing board’s recom-
    mended decision concerning the legality of the Aegis
    system. 
    Id.
     Tr. 5454-55, 5457-58, 5458-59. The defendants
    contend that this was improper, and that the district
    118                Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    court in overruling their objections unfairly changed
    the limited purpose for which it had admitted these
    documents into evidence.
    Again, we discern no impropriety that bespeaks bias
    or prejudice on the part of the district court. As we read
    the record, the district court allowed the government to
    question Vallone on specific passages from these docu-
    ments because Vallone was admittedly aware of the
    ARDC proceedings and yet denied awareness of what
    specifically the ARDC had alleged and what the ARDC’s
    Hearing Board later found. The court reasoned that
    questioning Vallone about the contents of these docu-
    ments was an appropriate means of testing Vallone’s
    credibility. 
    Id.
     Tr. 5460-61. That rationale did not alter
    the purpose for which the court had admitted these
    documents into evidence. The court in fact reiterated
    that the documents had been admitted for purposes of
    notice. 
    Id.
     Tr. 5461-62. We do not believe that the district
    court abused its discretion in allowing the government
    to ask Vallone whether or not he was aware of some
    of the specific charges and findings reflected in these
    documents. Copies of the documents were, after all,
    found in Aegis’s headquarters, and it is reasonable to
    surmise that they were present because the Aegis princi-
    pals had an interest in the ARDC proceeding. As
    we have discussed, the ARDC’s charges, which were
    premised on the sham nature of the trusts marketed by
    Heritage and Aegis, struck at the heart of the Aegis
    scheme. The defendants, including Vallone, had every
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                  119
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    reason to pay attention to the ARDC proceeding. Given
    Vallone’s awareness of the proceeding—indeed, his
    participation in that proceeding as a witness—one would
    think that he would have some knowledge of what the
    ARDC charged and what its Hearing Board later con-
    cluded, even if he did not read those documents. (Vallone
    conceded that he was aware of the contents of other
    documents that the government relied on for notice
    purposes, including IRS Notice 97-24.)
    The fact that Vallone was one of the plaintiffs in the
    suit against the ARDC makes this inference all the
    more plausible. We add, as a last observation, that this
    questioning was not nearly as belabored as the defense
    suggests it was.
    Cumulative Effect of Alleged Errors. Finally, the de-
    fendants make a catch-all assertion that the cumulative
    effect of all of the purported errors they have cited—which
    they describe as an “avalanche of errors,”see United
    States v. Santos, 
    201 F.3d 953
    , 965 (7th Cir. 2000)—deprived
    them of a fair trial, even if those errors do not
    demonstrate bias. As set forth above, we have disagreed
    with the premise that many of these were errors, and
    in any event we have concluded that none of them, indi-
    vidually, deprived the defendants of a fair trial. We
    reach the same conclusion with the respect to all of
    these instances taken together.
    120                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    III.
    VALLONE
    Vallone makes his own individual challenge to the
    instruction on conscious avoidance of knowledge that
    the court gave the jury over his objection (among oth-
    ers). Our earlier discussion of the defendants’ joint chal-
    lenge to this same instruction suffices to dispose of
    Vallone’s challenge. We simply reiterate two points.
    First, a defendant’s willful blindness to the law can
    merit a conscious avoidance instruction just as his willful
    blindness to the facts can. United States v. Stadtmauer, supra,
    620 F.3d at 256-57. Second, there is ample evidence sup-
    porting an inference that Vallone in particular willfully
    blinded himself to the state of the law as to the validity
    of the Aegis system, and this evidence confirms the
    propriety of the instruction as to him. We have already
    discussed much of this evidence. To cite just a few
    salient examples: (1) After the Tax Court handed down
    its decision in Muhich, and Bartoli raised the possibility
    of soliciting a legal opinion from a law firm as to
    the legality of the Aegis system, Vallone opposed the
    proposal because he was not confident that the opinion
    would be positive. (2) When Parker suggested soliciting
    an opinion from the IRS, Vallone criticized that idea
    as “ridiculous,” “because we know what the answer will
    be.” R. 913 Tr. 1954. (3) At another meeting at the Aegis
    office headquarters in the fall of 1999, at which Bartoli,
    Vallone, Hopper, Parker, Dunn, and possibly Cover were
    present, Vallone and Hopper became embroiled in an
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                121
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    argument over what actions Aegis clients should be
    advised to take in response to the audit notices they
    were receiving from the IRS. Hopper viewed the wave
    of notices as a sign that the government was about to
    bring an end to Aegis. “[I]t’s over,” Hopper told the
    others. R. 913 Tr. 1957. “[W]e’re all going to jail.” Id.
    Hopper argued that Aegis clients should be encouraged
    to do what they thought best, including finding legal
    representation. Vallone agreed that clients needed
    counsel, but argued that clients should be advised to
    consult only with attorneys approved by Aegis. Hopper,
    on the other hand, thought that clients should be free
    to act in their own interests. Their dispute grew more
    heated, culminating in a pronouncement by Vallone
    that “God will be the ultimate judge,” or words to that
    effect. Id. Tr. 1959. Vallone’s disagreement with Hopper
    signals his unwillingness to allow independent attorneys
    to look at the Aegis system as well as his ongoing refusal
    to acknowledge the government’s view that the Aegis
    system was illegitimate. (4) Vallone spearheaded the
    creation and promotion of the Aegis Arsenal, which as
    we have said was essentially a means of obstructing any
    IRS inquiry into the Aegis trusts. (Earlier we cited a
    letter sent to the IRS by Parker on behalf of an Aegis
    client as an example of the Arsenal.) (5) Vallone, as we
    have mentioned, did not file income tax returns for a
    number of years. In response to the IRS’s inquiry into
    why he had not, Vallone wrote a letter to the IRS in
    which he made a variety of baseless claims, including
    the assertions that he enjoyed certain rights unique to
    122                Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    a “sovereign citizen” born in the United States; that he
    was neither a citizen nor resident of the United States as
    those terms are used in the Fourteenth Amendment or
    
    26 C.F.R. § 1.1-1
    (a) - (c), the IRS regulation identifying
    those persons who are subject to income tax by the
    United States; and that the Declaration of Independence
    and the Bill of Rights conferred to him an inalienable
    right to his property, including his labor, which when
    exchanged for income was not a gain that could lawfully
    be taxed. R. 908 Tr. 5583. Vallone made these assertions,
    which are emblematic of tax protestors and which re-
    peatedly and unequivocally had already been deemed
    frivolous by this court and others, e.g. United States v.
    Hilgeford, 
    7 F.3d 1340
    , 1342 (7th Cir. 1993) (citing United
    States v. Sloan, 
    939 F.2d 499
    , 501 (7th Cir. 1991)), without
    conducting any research of his own into the validity of
    his claims. R. 908 Tr. 5595-5600. This was in marked
    contrast to the careful research he claimed to have done
    on other matters related to Aegis. A jury could view the
    frivolous content of Vallone’s letter as a sign that he
    was intentionally turning his mind away from any
    warning or effort that would have disclosed the Aegis
    trusts as a sham. It was appropriate for the court to
    give the conscious avoidance instruction.
    COVER
    Cover challenges only his 160-month sentence. He
    makes no argument that the district court improperly
    applied Sentencing Guidelines in calculating the ad-
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                   123
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    visory Guidelines sentencing range, which was 210 to
    262 months. His sole objection is to the substantive rea-
    sonableness of the sentence that the court imposed.
    Noting the court’s obligation to consider the sentencing
    factors identified in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a), Cover makes
    two principal points. His first centers on the three-
    point increase in his offense level based on the district
    court’s finding that he played a managerial or super-
    visory role in the offense by overseeing Dowd (whose
    role he characterizes as little more than a paper pusher
    and floor sweeper) and a number of tax preparers. See
    U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b).9 Cover does not question the
    propriety of this enhancement on appeal. What he does
    contend is that any instruction or advice he gave to
    Dowd and the tax preparers was minimal, and that in
    real terms he was less culpable than all of the other de-
    fendants but Dowd. Cover points out that he received
    much less financial benefit from the fraud ($347,000)
    than other defendants, was not a founder or principal
    in the Aegis scheme, and, at age seventy-two, posed
    little or no prospective danger to the public notwith-
    standing whatever nominal supervision he had given
    to others in furtherance of the scheme. His second point
    is broader. Cover suggests that the district court in deter-
    mining the sentence was driven solely by the immensity
    of the fraud perpetrated by the defendants to the exclu-
    9
    Unless otherwise noted, all citations to the Guidelines in
    this decision are to the November 2008 version of the Guide-
    lines.
    124                  Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    sion of other mitigating factors, including his age, his
    college degree, his long-term marriage, his lengthy em-
    ployment history, his involvement with his church, and
    his contrition.
    Assessing Cover’s sentence through the deferential
    abuse-of-discretion lens, see Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51, 
    128 S. Ct. 586
    , 597 (2007); United States v.
    Bradley, 
    675 F.3d 1021
    , 1024 (7th Cir. 2012), we cannot say
    that Cover’s sentence was unreasonable. The sentence
    was fifty months below the low-end of the Guidelines
    range (210 to 262 months), which represents a nearly
    twenty-five percent reduction. It is also within—indeed,
    near the bottom of—what the range would have been (155-
    188 months) had the court not applied the three-point
    leadership enhancement that Cover suggests was not “a
    perfect fit” for his actual role in the offense. Cover Br. 8. It
    is thus a presumptively reasonable sentence even under
    the more charitable assessment of his culpability that
    Cover advocates. See, e.g., United States v. Lucas, 
    670 F.3d 784
    , 789 (7th Cir. 2012) (sentence within Guidelines
    range is presumed reasonable on appeal), petition for
    cert. filed, 
    81 U.S.L.W. 3033
     (U.S. June 25, 2012) (No. 11-
    1536); United States v. Klug, 
    670 F.3d 797
    , 800 (7th Cir.
    2012) (below-Guidelines sentence is also presumed rea-
    sonable). Having reviewed the transcript of Cover’s
    sentencing, we reject the notion that the court focused
    on the scope of the fraud to the exclusion of other
    pertinent circumstances. The court, with good reason,
    gave considerable weight to the “monumental propor-
    tion” of the fraud, R. 1036 at 37, which Cover does not
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                 125
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    suggest he failed to appreciate. But the court considered
    other pertinent factors as well, including in particular
    Cover’s age, which the court expressly cited in choosing
    a below-Guidelines sentence. Id. at 42. The court also
    cited his remorse, the unlikely prospect that he might
    recidivate, his difficult childhood (following his father’s
    death, he was raised in a home for boys), his wife’s
    health problems, and the favorable comments on his
    character contained in letters to the court. Id. at 37-45.
    Cover’s below-Guidelines sentence, although still lengthy
    (as the district court itself acknowledged, id. at 44), ap-
    propriately reflects his lesser degree of culpability.
    DOWD
    A. Sufficiency of Evidence
    Dowd was found guilty of conspiracy, one count of
    mail fraud, and four counts of filing a false tax return.
    All three charges presume that Dowd knew the Aegis
    trusts were not a lawful means of tax avoidance. Under
    Cheek, his good faith belief in the legality of the trusts,
    even if it was mistaken, would thus preclude a finding
    that he conspired to defraud the United States and/or
    to commit a tax offense against the United States (Count
    One), that he used the U.S. mail in furtherance of a
    scheme to defraud (Count Three), or that he willfully
    made or subscribed to a false tax return (Counts Fifty-
    Two through Fifty-Five). See United States v. Hills, 
    supra,
    618 F.3d at 637 (conspiracy to defraud United States
    by impeding functions of IRS requires proof, inter alia, of
    126                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    agreement to accomplish illegal objective against United
    States and intent to defraud United States); United States
    v. Howard, 
    619 F.3d 723
    , 727 (7th Cir. 2010) (mail fraud
    requires proof, inter alia, of intent to defraud, which
    entails “a wilful act by the defendant with the specific
    intent to deceive or cheat . . .”) (quoting United States
    v. Britton, 
    289 F.3d 976
    , 981 (7th Cir. 2002)); United States
    v. Kokenis, 
    662 F.3d 919
    , 930 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Willfulness
    is an essential element of the tax evasion offenses
    charged under 
    26 U.S.C. § 7206
    (1).”) (citing Hills, 
    618 F.3d at 634, 638-39
    ).
    Dowd contends that the government’s proof was insuf-
    ficient to overcome his Cheek defense, and that the
    district court therefore erred in denying his motions for
    a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 29.
    Dowd points out that he was just twenty-three years
    old when he joined Aegis, armed with a degree in
    business finance but no significant knowledge or experi-
    ence with respect to trusts, estate planning, or taxes. He
    had never before encountered a business trust, but
    was told by both his father and Cover that it was
    an effective tool. Dowd contends that he relied on his
    superiors at Aegis (in addition to his father) regarding
    the relevant trust and taxation principles, and they con-
    sistently dispelled his doubts as to the legitimacy of
    the Aegis trusts. Dowd represents that he was not privy
    to meetings among the Aegis principals regarding
    the structuring of Aegis and its product; he did not
    draft letters to clients; he did not speak or lecture at
    seminars; and he did not do legal research. With respect
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                    127
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    to the tax return charges, Dowd acknowledges that his
    returns did understate his income. But he adds that he
    also filed tax returns for his asset management trusts
    that included any income omitted from personal tax
    returns. Moreover, he hired certified public accountant
    Donald Todd to prepare his returns each year he was
    at Aegis, and there is no evidence he told Todd to
    omit items or falsely calculate his income. (Todd, by the
    way, like Laura Baxter, was himself indicted in connec-
    tion with his work on behalf of Aegis clients.) Nor, ac-
    cording to Dowd, is there evidence that he tried to
    conceal any assets or cover up sources of income.
    We review the denial of Dowd’s Rule 29 motions
    de novo. E.g., United States v. Hassebrock, 
    663 F.3d 906
    ,
    918 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 
    132 S. Ct. 2377
     (2012). But
    we will find the evidence insufficient only if the record
    is devoid of evidence from which a reasonable jury
    could find Dowd guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Cavazos v. Smith, 
    132 S. Ct. 2
    , 4 (2011) (per curiam). This is
    an “onerous burden” for Dowd. Hills, 
    618 F.3d at 637
    .
    In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we
    consider the trial record in the light most favorable to
    the government, granting it the benefit of all reasonable
    inferences. E.g., 
    id.
    The government presented ample evidence from
    which a jury could conclude that Dowd lacked a good
    faith belief in the legality of the Aegis trust system.
    First, Dowd admitted that he saw various documents
    that called into question the legitimacy of the Aegis trusts.
    128                Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    Among these were IRS Notice 97-24, R. 922 Tr. 6416-17,
    6460-61, the Tax Court’s decision in Muhich, 
    id.
     Tr. 6473-
    80, 6490-99; a memorandum from the Aegis legal de-
    partment summarizing what characteristics the IRS
    looks at in assessing the legitimacy of a trust (e.g., the
    deduction of personal expenses), 
    id.
     Tr. 6467-69; and an
    article in the W ALL S TREET JOURNAL, 
    id.
     Tr. 6409-10.
    He acknowledged that he read and understood these
    items. R. 922 Tr. 6461-67, 6473-81, 6490-99.1 0 Dowd, in
    fact, kept a cabinet drawer full of similar materials, in-
    cluding a file labeled “Trusts—Attacks on.” R. 950, Tr.
    3880-98; R. 922 Tr. 6459, 6467-68; Gov’t Ex. Aegis Office
    68 Group Room 5. 1 1 He admitted that these materials
    raised questions in his mind about Aegis; and although
    he said that he relied on the assurances that Vallone
    and Cover gave him that the Aegis system was
    materially different from trusts that had been found to
    be ineffective, he realized that neither Vallone nor Cover
    was an attorney or accountant, and he never sought
    independent advice. He also acknowledged that some
    of what Vallone told him was “mumbo jumbo” that he
    did not understand. R. 922 Tr. 6458. Dowd also knew
    10
    He marked up his copy of the Muhich decision, which of
    course involved a trust prepared and marketed by Bartoli
    and others Dowd was working with.
    11
    Among the additional items was a negative opinion as to
    the Aegis CBO from an independent CPA, forwarded to Aegis
    by a prospective client (R. 950 Tr. 3899+), and multiple
    news articles regarding abusive trusts.
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                       129
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    that large numbers of Aegis clients were facing inquiries
    by the IRS; he compiled a list of some ninety clients
    who were under inquiry as of March 15, 1999. R. 918 Tr.
    4322-23; Gov’t Ex. Aegis Office Room 5 Computer 17.
    Moreover, Dowd was present on a 1999 Aegis cruise
    when trust “guru” Joe Izen warned participants that
    “people are gonna get put in jail” for not reporting per-
    sonal purchases paid for with foreign credit cards
    drawing on funds they had placed in offshore trusts.
    R. 917 Tr. 3514; Gov’t Ex. DVD Tr. 5 (Gov’t App. 150).
    Izen, in fact, had a brief exchange with Dowd during
    his presentation, which provides ample support for
    the inference that Dowd heard Izen’s warning. R. 917
    Tr. 3508-12; Gov’t Ex. Cruise DVD Tr. 4.1 2 Yet, Dowd
    himself used a Swiss Americard linked to an offshore
    trust to do precisely that. R. 922 Tr. 6536-37; R. 971
    12
    In an effort to defeat that inference, Dowd contended that it
    was his brother to whom Izen was referring during this ex-
    change. Dowd’s brother Paul evidently was on the same
    cruise. However, after the cruise, Dowd wrote a letter to Izen
    in which he mentioned Izen’s presentation and joked,
    “I overheard both IRS agents in the audience telling each
    other they didn’t get what they came for (just kidding).” R. 918,
    Tr. 4311; Gov’t Ex. Aegis Office 5 Computer 3. It is at least
    a fair inference that when Izen singled out “Dowd” during
    his presentation, he was referring to the defendant
    Dowd rather than his brother. That point aside, it is also a
    fair inference from the letter that Dowd was present
    for Izen’s presentation, even if Izen’s reference was to
    Dowd’s brother.
    130                Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    Tr. 4534-42. Finally, he advised Aegis/Sigma client
    Joseph Kelly that he could deduct the cost of vacation
    travel so long as Kelly contemplated and actually made
    a charitable donation to a local charity during the trip.
    R. 967 Tr. 1576; R. 961 Tr. 1715-16. This was advice
    which, although consistent with what other Aegis
    clients were told, was dubious on its face. Collectively,
    this sort of evidence is more than what this court found
    sufficient to overcome the Cheek defense asserted in
    Hills, 618 F.3d at 637-39.
    The evidence was also more than sufficient to
    establish Dowd’s guilt on the false tax return charges.
    First, the amply-supported inference that Dowd under-
    stood the Aegis system to be a sham in turn supports
    an inference that he knew, as a consequence of his own
    use of that system, that he was under-reporting his
    income on his individual income tax returns. (There was
    ample testimony, by the way, that Dowd did under-
    report his income on his own tax returns. R. 971 Tr. 4522-
    42; R. 939 Tr. 6558-63.) Second, Dowd—like other defen-
    dants and Aegis clients generally—was not just under-
    reporting his income but doing so to a patently ridiculous
    degree. To cite one example, in 1999, Dowd had income
    of $60,000, but he reported only $5,250 of that total on
    his federal income tax return, an amount so low that
    he (nominally) qualified for—and claimed—an earned
    income tax credit. R. 939 Tr. 6559-60. Recall that
    claiming that same tax credit is the very type of thing
    that Hopper joked about at Aegis seminars. It is an
    entirely reasonable inference that even a young, deferen-
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                131
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    tial, and purportedly naive individual would realize
    that something was wrong with reporting less than
    ten percent of his income to the government and claiming
    a tax credit meant for the working poor.
    B. Severance
    Before the trial commenced, Dowd made an oral
    motion to sever his own case from those of his co-defen-
    dants after the district court announced it would allow
    evidence regarding the Bartoli ARDC proceeding as
    proof of notice to the defendants. Dowd’s counsel charac-
    terized the ARDC evidence as a “bombshell” that would
    have a prejudicial spillover effect on Dowd, who was
    not a party to and was otherwise unaware of the ARDC
    proceeding. R. 1046 at 28. The district court denied
    the motion, reasoning that the danger of undue
    prejudice due to the asserted spillover effect was insuf-
    ficiently grave to warrant a separate trial. Id. at 29-30.
    Dowd contends that the denial of his request was error,
    particularly in light of the court’s rationale that notice
    to one member of the conspiracy served as notice to all.
    He adds that it was “impossible for the jury to
    suppose that Mr. Dowd actually believed in the legality
    of the Aegis system where they were flooded with evi-
    dence of other’s [sic] knowledge of its illegality.” Dowd
    Br. 32. We note that the district court invited
    Dowd’s counsel to draft an appropriate limiting instruc-
    tion to address the possibility of spillover prejudice
    from the ARDC evidence. However, no such instruction
    132                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    was ever tendered: Dowd contends that no such instruc-
    tion could have remedied the problem.
    Demonstrating prejudicial error in the district court’s
    refusal to sever Dowd’s trial would be an uphill battle.
    We would review that decision under the deferential
    abuse-of-discretion standard. E.g., United States v. Del
    Valle, 
    674 F.3d 696
    , 704 (7th Cir. 2012), petition for cert.
    filed (U.S. Aug. 16, 2012) (No. 12-219). There is a
    preference for the joint trial of defendants who are
    charged together. United States v. Souffront, 
    338 F.3d 809
    , 828 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Zafiro v. United States,
    
    506 U.S. 534
    , 537, 
    113 S. Ct. 933
    , 937 (1993)). When
    the defendants have been properly joined in a single
    indictment pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal
    Procedure 8(b), as is conceded here, a court should grant
    a severance only when “there is a serious risk that a
    joint trial would compromise a specific trial right of one
    of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a
    reliable judgment about guilt or innocence.” 
    Id.
     (quoting
    Zafiro, 
    506 U.S. at 539
    , 
    113 S. Ct. at 938
    ). In challenging
    the denial of his request for a severance, the defendant
    must show that the refusal to sever resulted in “actual
    prejudice” that deprived him of a fair trial. 
    Id.
     (citing
    United States v. Rollins, 
    301 F.3d 511
    , 518 (7th Cir. 2002)).
    Relevant to the question of prejudice would be (a) the
    district court’s instruction to the jury that it was to
    consider each defendant individually (R. 925 Tr. 7389;
    Seventh Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction
    No. 4.05); (b) as we have discussed, the district court
    never communicated its theory that notice of illegality
    to one conspirator, or notice to the conspiracy generally,
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                  133
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    constitutes notice to all members of the conspiracy; (c) the
    government argued notice as an individual matter, and
    each defendant was free to argue that he did not have
    notice that the Aegis system was illegitimate; and
    (d) despite the court’s express invitation, Dowd never
    tendered a cautionary instruction as to the ARDC
    evidence that he contends was so prejudicial.
    However, Dowd’s failure to renew his motion to sever
    at the close of evidence precludes us from reaching the
    merits of his argument on appeal. As the government
    points out, “[a] motion for severance is typically waived
    if it is not renewed at the close of evidence, primarily
    because it is then that any prejudice which may have
    resulted from the joint trial is ascertainable.” United
    States v. Williams, 
    553 F.3d 1073
    , 1079 (7th Cir. 2009)
    (quoting United States v. Phillips, 
    239 F.3d 829
    , 838 (7th
    Cir. 2001)); see also United States v. Ross, 
    510 F.3d 702
    ,
    711 (7th Cir. 2007) (coll. cases). Dowd, in his opening
    brief, offered no explanation for his failure to renew the
    motion. In his reply brief, he belatedly argues that
    renewal of the motion would have been futile in light
    of the court’s notice-to-one rationale. Whatever the
    court’s thinking may have been as to notice, Dowd has
    made no showing that the court was so close-minded
    on the subject of severance that it would have been
    futile for him to renew his motion at the close of evi-
    dence. Renewing the motion at that time would have
    given the court an opportunity to consider any specific
    ways in which Dowd believed the joint trial had
    134                   Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    resulted in actual prejudice to his defense. His failure
    to renew the motion cannot be excused.
    C. Minor Role Adjustment
    The district court overruled Dowd’s objection to the
    probation officer’s pre-sentence report (“PSR”), which
    did not grant him a two-level reduction in his offense
    level for being a minor participant in the offense. See
    U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). The court reasoned:
    In terms of culpability or a hierarchy, [Dowd] certainly
    did not play a role equal to that of Mr. Vallone, or yet
    to be sentenced Mr. Dunn, or yet to be sentenced
    Mr. Bartoli. But he was very actively engaged in
    doing what he could to accomplish the conspiratorial
    objectives and on a day-to-day basis, so he did not
    play a minor role. . . . .
    R. 1039 at 62-63.
    Dowd contends that the court clearly erred in denying
    him this reduction. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 
    674 F.3d 722
    , 728 (7th Cir. 2012) (district court’s findings as to
    defendants’ role in the offense are reviewed for clear
    error), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Sept. 14, 2012) (No. 12-325).
    Dowd argues that as an administrative assistant,
    he occupied an entry level position in Aegis, for which
    he was paid roughly $25,000 per year. As we have dis-
    cussed, he represents that he was not sophisticated in
    the laws governing trusts, taxation, or offshore banking
    and that he did not comprehend the scope and nature
    of the Aegis scheme; instead, he trusted his father,
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                 135
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    Vallone, Bartoli and others who assured him that Aegis
    was legitimate. The PSR acknowledged that Dowd did
    not create the Aegis scheme, did not manage other par-
    ticipants, and did not receive the largest share of profits
    from the scheme. Dowd contends that he did not profit
    from the scheme at all. Finally, he points out that he
    was named in just ten of 114 overt acts listed in the in-
    dictment.
    Although we agree that Dowd played a lesser role in
    the offense than other defendants, we are not left with
    the definite and firm conviction that the court erred in
    declining to treat him as a minor participant in the
    offense. See Smith, 
    674 F.3d at 728
    . The commentary to
    Guidelines section 3B1.2 defines a minor participant as
    one who is substantially less culpable than the average
    participant in the offense and who is less culpable than
    most other participants, but whose role cannot be de-
    scribed as minimal. § 3B1.2, comment. (n.5). In assessing
    a defendant’s relative culpability, a court must consider
    all of the individuals who participated in the offense,
    not just those who have been convicted. See id. (n.1);
    U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1, comment. (n.1). Dowd participated in
    the Aegis scheme for a period of five years. He may
    have started out as an administrative assistant, but his
    role in the offense ultimately went far beyond that. The
    district court found that Dowd “was very actively en-
    gaged” “on a day-to-day basis” during that time
    (R. 1039 at 62-63), and the evidence certainly supports
    that finding. He had check-signing authority so that he
    could pay Aegis’s bills. He was the primary person who
    136                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    dealt with Jenkins in Belize to arrange for the requisite
    documentation as to offshore companies and trusts for
    Aegis clients and to ensure that clients made demands
    on their promissory notes in the offshore system in
    order to make those notes appear legitimate. Over time,
    he came to provide certain trust management services
    to clients. He occasionally gave clients advice about
    operating their trusts—for example, on what deductions
    they could take. E.g., R. 967 Tr. 1575-76; R. 961 Tr. 1715-16.
    He signed a commission agreement, promoted Aegis
    trusts to several clients, and actually sold trust packages
    to three clients (although he denied playing any meaning-
    ful role in recruiting these clients). In 2000, he was pro-
    moted to “operations manager” of Aegis and Heritage,
    and although that may have been more of an administra-
    tive role than a managerial one, it supports the notion
    that he was not a minor participant in the Aegis
    scheme. He was subsequently named to the Aegis Advi-
    sory Board, which consulted with Vallone on the opera-
    tion of the Fortress Trust. Without question, Dowd was
    less culpable than Vallone and Bartoli, as he argues,
    but one must remember that they received organizer/
    leader enhancements to their offense levels; and they
    were not average participants in the offense. Dowd con-
    tends that all of the facts we have cited, including his
    titles, overstate his actual role in the offense, but suffice
    it to say that it was not clearly erroneous for the court
    to conclude that he was not substantially less culpable
    than the average participant. (The average participant,
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                137
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    arguably, was the Aegis client—and several Aegis
    clients went to jail.)
    D. Reasonableness of Sentence
    The district court ordered Dowd incarcerated for a
    period of 120 months, which he contends was an unrea-
    sonably harsh sentence given his degree of culpability
    relative to the other defendants. Again, Dowd emphasizes
    that he was neither the instigator nor a leader of the
    Aegis scheme but rather someone who happened into
    it by taking a job with Heritage at the suggestion of his
    father and with no intent to become a felon. He likens
    himself to the “accidental criminal” lured into the
    scheme, as discussed in United States v. Nachamie, 
    121 F. Supp. 2d 285
    , 296 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), j. aff’d, 5 F. App’x
    95 (2d Cir. 2001). Dowd also contends that the district
    court failed to give meaningful consideration to the
    sentencing factors identified in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a). In
    particular, Dowd contends that the court ignored the
    fact that holding him responsible for a loss amount of
    $50 million vastly overstated his culpability and re-
    sulted in a Guidelines sentencing range that was “grossly
    disproportional” to his relatively minor role in the of-
    fense. Dowd Br. 40. In that respect, Dowd (like other
    defendants) was put at a disadvantage by a 2008 change
    in the Guidelines, which resulted in more punitive
    offense levels for losses of this magnitude. At the same
    time, he believes the court did not give serious consider-
    ation to mitigating factors that included his strong
    138                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    family ties, lack of criminal history, employment as an
    airline pilot, and the prospect that he would lose his
    pilot’s license as a result of his conviction. Dowd believes
    that the unreasonableness of the 120-month sentence
    imposed on him is evident from the fact that it is the
    same length as the penalty imposed on Bartoli, who was
    among the most culpable participants, and only forty
    months less than that imposed on Cover, who was
    also much more culpable.
    The sentence imposed on Dowd, being one month
    below the low end of the advisory Guidelines range, is one
    that we presume to be reasonable, e.g., United States v.
    Russell, 
    662 F.3d 831
    , 853 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 
    132 S. Ct. 1816
     (2012), and Dowd has not succeeded in rebut-
    ting that presumption. Dowd’s situation is sympathetic
    in that his employment with Heritage and Aegis was
    his first job after college, he was initially led astray as to
    the legitimacy of the business trust by his father, of all
    people, and he did not realize at the outset that he was
    joining a criminal organization. Yet, he remained with
    Heritage and Aegis for five years, took on an increasing
    level of responsibility, and was actively involved in the
    promotion and management of Aegis trusts, despite
    multiple forms of notice that the Aegis trust was a sham.
    As an employee at Aegis’s home office in Illinois, Dowd
    knew that Aegis had hundreds of clients and thus was in
    a position to appreciate the scope of the Aegis scheme. He
    knew as of 1999 (two years before his departure) that
    roughly ninety of those clients were under investigation by
    the IRS. Moreover, as the government points out, Dowd
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                139
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    benefitted from certain breaks in the district court’s
    Guidelines calculations: because the court held Dowd
    responsible for a loss amount of $50 million rather than
    $60 million based on the five years of his involvement,
    R. 1039 at 67, Dowd faced a sentencing range of 121 to 151
    months rather than 151 to 188 months; and the court
    declined to apply an enhancement for obstruction of
    justice despite its acknowledgment that the government
    had a “very strong argument” that Dowd had committed
    perjury while testifying in his own defense, id. at 57.
    The court also took into consideration Dowd’s “rational-
    ization” as opposed to willingness to accept responsi-
    bility for his conduct. R. 1039 at 57. The comparable
    length of the sentences imposed on Bartoli and Cover
    were based on their respective ages and health.
    We may assume that another judge might have
    imposed a lesser sentence on Dowd. But for all of the
    reasons we have cited, we cannot conclude that Judge
    Norgle abused his discretion in concluding that a
    sentence one month below the bottom of the range
    advised by the Sentencing Guidelines was unreasonable.
    See United States v. Tahzib, 
    513 F.3d 692
    , 695 (7th Cir.
    2008) (below-Guidelines sentence will almost never be
    unreasonable).
    E. Ex Post Facto Clause
    As we have indicated, a relatively recent change in
    the Guidelines resulted in an increase to Dowd’s offense
    level and the resulting Guidelines sentencing range. The
    140                Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    November 2000 version of the Guidelines in effect at the
    time Dowd’s offense conduct ended specified a base
    offense level of 25 for a $50 million dollar loss amount
    (see U.S.S.G. § 2T4.1(T) (Nov. 2000)), whereas the Novem-
    ber 2008 version of the Guidelines that the district court
    applied at sentencing specified an offense level of 28
    for that loss amount (see U.S.S.G. § 2T4.1(L) (Nov. 2008))—a
    difference of three levels. Had the district court applied
    the earlier version, the advisory sentencing range
    would have been 87 to 108 months rather than 121 to
    151 months. Dowd contends that relying on the later
    version amounts to a violation of his rights under the
    ex post facto clause of the Constitution. See U.S. C ONST.
    Art. I, sec. 9, cl. 3
    We have already rejected the ex post facto argument
    that Dowd is making. See United States v. Demaree, 
    459 F.3d 791
    , 793-95 (7th Cir. 2006). Dowd invites us to re-
    consider Demaree, but we have repeatedly declined
    similar invitations. E.g., United States v. Wasson, 
    supra,
    679 F.3d at 951
    .
    HOPPER
    A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
    The jury convicted Hopper on all counts in which he
    was charged. He moved pursuant to Rule 29 for a judg-
    ment of acquittal both at the close of the government’s
    case and after the jury returned its verdict. The district
    court denied his motions, reasoning that “[a]t trial,
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                  141
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    the government presented overwhelming evidence that
    the tax shelters marketed by Aegis were unlawful
    shams designed ‘to make life harder for the revenooers’
    by transferring clients’ income to both domestic and
    offshore trusts, so that clients could pretend they had
    no income.” R. 650 at 11-12 (quoting United States v.
    Patridge, 
    supra,
     
    507 F.3d at 1092
    ). Hopper concedes that
    the trial exposed the Aegis trust system as a sham, but
    he contends that the court’s ruling failed to recognize
    that the government never proved that he lacked a
    good faith belief in the legality of the Aegis trust system.
    As we noted with respect to Dowd, our review of the
    sufficiency of the evidence is de novo, United States v.
    Hassebrock, 
    supra,
     
    663 F.3d at 918
    , but we will reverse
    only if, in considering the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the government, no reasonable jury could
    have found Hopper guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,
    United States v. Hills, 
    supra,
     618 F.3d at 637.
    Hopper’s position is that he had a much stronger Cheek
    defense than his fellow defendants, and that the gov-
    ernment failed to overcome it. He asserts that his good
    faith in the legitimacy of the Aegis system is demon-
    strated by the fact that when he eventually came to
    realize that the system was a sham, he took steps to
    separate himself from the conspiracy. Until the Tax Court
    issued its June 1999 decision in Muhich, Hopper argues,
    he genuinely believed that the Aegis system was legiti-
    mate. Once that decision was issued, he began to have
    doubts. He spoke with others at Aegis in an effort to
    determine what, in fact, was lawful. And when Vallone
    142                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    proposed the Audit Arsenal as a means of thwarting
    IRS inquiry, Hopper opposed him. (Recall Parker’s testi-
    mony regarding the fall 1999 showdown between
    Vallone and Hopper.) When his efforts to pursue a more
    constructive response to the IRS inquiries facing Aegis
    clients proved unavailing, he resigned his position as
    the Managing Director of Aegis in a letter to Vallone
    dated January 17, 2000.1 3 He therefore ended his involve-
    ment sooner than others, like Parker, who were more
    educated and sophisticated than he was (Hopper had
    only a high school diploma) and thus should have been
    among the first to realize that the Aegis trust system
    was a sham. That he extricated himself from Aegis rela-
    tively soon after the Muchich decision confirms—in Hop-
    per’s view—his good faith belief in the lawfulness
    of the trust system until that time and precluded
    a reasonable finding by the jury that he exhibited the
    willfulness necessary to convict him on the charges
    of conspiracy, mail fraud, or aiding and assisting in the
    preparation of false or fraudulent tax returns.
    Although Hopper’s Cheek defense was, in some superfi-
    cial respects, more appealing than those of other defen-
    dants, the record is by no means devoid of evidence
    from which the jury could reasonably find that Hopper
    13
    Hopper’s involvement with Aegis did not end immediately.
    He continued in a “consultant and support capacity” until
    May 1, 2000. Then, on June 8, 2000, he wrote a letter severing
    all ties with Vallone.
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,               143
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    lacked a subjective good faith belief in the legality of
    the Aegis system even prior to the Tax Court’s decision
    in Muhich and his subsequent decision to resign from
    Aegis. On the contrary. From the very beginning, the
    Aegis trust system was obviously and incontrovertibly at
    odds with the fundamental proposition that the tax
    liability on income and assets rests with the individual
    who controls those assets. The ways in which the Aegis
    trusts were structured and used (for example, the
    routine resignation of the nominally-independent Aegis
    trustee and replacement with the client shortly after
    each trust was formed, typically pursuant to paperwork
    that was executed when the trust was created) would
    make plain even to a non-lawyer and non-accountant
    that the transfer of income and assets to the trusts
    was in form only, and that the Aegis client never in fact
    surrendered any control of those assets and income.
    Hopper’s own words at a videotaped Aegis seminar—the
    recording of which was offered for sale and, in fact, was
    purchased by Agent Priess—suggest that he understood
    full well that the purpose of the Aegis trusts was simply
    to hide a client’s money from the IRS:
    It’s, it’s taking it from one pocket and putting it in
    the other and you know and then, and then
    standing before your wife and saying, “See, I got no
    money, see.” That’s, that’s what it amounts to. Uhh,
    to the IRS. Okay.
    Gov’t Ex. Priess Tr. 2 (Gov’t Supp. App. 246), Gov’t Ex.
    Priess Video DVD. Hopper also told seminar attendees
    144               Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    in 1995 that he was taking tax deductions for obviously
    personal expenses such as clothes, exercise equipment,
    and cable television. Gov’t Ex. Coleman Tr. 2-5 (Gov’t
    Supp. App. 93-96). He even boasted that his reported
    income was so low that he qualified for an Earned
    Income Tax Credit from the IRS and financial aid for his
    daughters to attend college. Gov’t Ex. Coleman Tr. 6-7
    (Gov’t Supp. App. 97-98). As outrageous as these state-
    ments were, they were not simply exaggerations but
    rather outright falsehoods, in the sense that Hopper
    did not file any federal income tax returns at all from
    1995 through 2002. Instead, he was periodically writing
    to the IRS contending that he owed no taxes, even as
    he was earning hundreds of thousands of dollars from
    Aegis. (He earned a total of $701,000 from 1997 through
    2000.) A jury might reasonably infer from these
    facts that Hopper had not been led astray by his more
    sophisticated co-defendants as to the legitimacy of the
    Aegis system but understood all along that the system
    was merely a shell game, and one that he eagerly
    embraced and used to his own profit.
    There is also evidence undermining Hopper’s conten-
    tion that he was a true believer in the legitimacy of the
    Aegis system until the Muhich decision set him straight.
    Muhich, as the government points out, was not the
    first warning of illegality that the defendants received.
    IRS Notice 97-24, issued more than two years prior to the
    Tax Court’s decision, specifically addressed abusive
    trusts very much like the Aegis trusts and touched
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                         145
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    upon such highly relevant points as the deductibility
    of personal expenses:
    Personal expenses are generally non-deductible. . . .
    The courts have consistently held that non-deductible
    personal expenses cannot be transformed into de-
    ductible expenses by the use of trusts.
    IRS Notice 97-24 at 3 (citing, inter alia, Schulz v. C.I.R., supra,
    
    686 F.2d 490
    ). And the ARDC complaint issued against
    Bartoli in November 1996 asserted that Bartoli was de-
    frauding Heritage and Aegis clients by representing to
    them that the CBO and trust systems Aegis was
    peddling would minimize, if not eliminate, their tax
    liability, when, in reality, “applicable trust, tax and com-
    mon law do not recognize the CBO, as employed by
    Aegis[ ] and [Bartoli], as a viable entity formed for the
    purpose of eliminating or reducing taxes.” R. 961 Tr. 2652;
    Gov’t Ex. ARDC 1. As we noted earlier, the jury could
    infer that Hopper, along with other defendants, was
    aware of the ARDC proceeding given that he was one
    of the witnesses deposed in the course of that proceed-
    ing. Indeed, it was Hopper who prepared a summary of
    the testimony that William Marutzky gave during that
    proceeding in March 1999, opining that the Aegis
    system would not legally provide the tax benefits to the
    defendants that Aegis had advertised. R. 918 Tr. 4323-24;
    Gov’t Ex. Aegis Office Hallway Computer 1.
    Moreover, whatever distance Hopper eventually may
    have put between himself and the other defendants in
    2000 with respect to such aspects of the Aegis scheme
    146                Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    as the Fortress Trust and the Audit Arsenal, there is
    also evidence that he was by no means averse to par-
    ticipating in efforts to throw roadblocks in the path of
    the government as it sought to expose and unwind the
    defendants’ crimes. He was, after all, one of the plaintiffs
    in the lawsuit against IRS auditor Pogue and the ARDC
    in 1997 that Judge Plunkett later dismissed as frivolous
    in November 1999, sanctioning the plaintiffs for their
    “fictional claims.” Bartoli v. ARDC, supra, 
    1999 WL 1045210
    , at *3.
    Finally, although Hopper now contends that it was
    Muhich that caused him to see the light and to withdraw
    from Aegis, his behavior subsequent to that June 1999
    decision was not wholly consistent with that of a con-
    vert. In November 1999, five months after the Muhich
    decision, Hopper signed a corporate resolution con-
    firming that he along with Vallone and Bartoli shared
    equal management authority over Aegis. R. 950 Tr. 3838-
    41; R. 910 Tr. 6226; Gov’t Ex. Aegis Office 80. And al-
    though Hopper eventually did resign as the Managing
    Director of Aegis in January 2000, he continued to
    provide consulting services and support until May 2000
    and did not formally break off his ties with Vallone
    until June 2000 (more on that below). He continued to
    receive money from Aegis until June 2000 and from Aegis
    Management Company (which provided management
    services to trust clients) until December 2000. See Gov’t
    Ex. Hopper Income Summary.
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                     147
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    We may assume for the sake of argument that a jury
    could have been persuaded by Hopper’s Cheek defense. He
    was neither an attorney nor an accountant, and he ulti-
    mately did end his involvement in the Aegis scheme
    somewhat sooner than other defendants. In the fall of
    1999, he also voiced reservations to his co-conspirators
    about the Audit Arsenal and argued that Aegis clients
    ought to be encouraged to seek out legal representation
    of their own. But as we have discussed, the jury
    reasonably could infer from Hopper’s own words and
    deeds that he understood the essentially fraudulent
    nature of the Aegis system from the start, that he
    continued his involvement in the defendants’
    scheme—and continued to profit from it—long after he
    and the other defendants received notice that the Aegis
    system was not a valid means of tax minimization, and
    that he joined the other defendants in seeking to block
    exposure of the scheme. From all of this, the jury could
    reasonably find that Hopper did not have a good faith
    belief in the legality of the Aegis system and instead
    willfully conspired and schemed to defraud the govern-
    ment.14
    14
    We note that the jury was instructed, in the form proposed
    by Hopper’s counsel, that following a defendant’s with-
    drawal from a conspiracy, he could not be held liable for the
    acts of his former co-conspirators. See Hopper Instruction 4;
    R. 936 Tr. 6018-21; R. 925 Tr. 7381-82. Thus, if the jury was
    persuaded by Hopper’s contention that he withdrew from
    (continued...)
    148                  Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    A few additional words are in order as to Hopper’s
    convictions on the counts of the indictment charging him
    (among others) with knowingly aiding and assisting the
    preparation of false tax returns, in violation of section
    7206(2).15 As we discuss below with respect to defendant
    Dunn, infra at 179-80, the fact that Hopper did not
    prepare returns for others does not preclude his liability
    on these charges. Our decision in United States v. Hooks
    recognizes that liability under section 7206(2) “ ‘extends
    to all participants in a scheme which results in the filing
    of a false return, whether or not those parties actually
    prepare it.’ ” 
    848 F.2d 785
    , 791 (7th Cir. 1988), (quoting
    United States v. Siegel, 
    472 F. Supp. 440
    , 444 (N.D. Ill. 1979),
    judgment aff’d sub nom. United States v. Winograd, 
    656 F.2d 279
     (7th Cir. 1981)). Hopper without doubt understood
    that Aegis clients would be filing tax returns based on
    their use of the Aegis trusts; and as we have discussed,
    his appreciation that the trusts were not a lawful means
    of tax avoidance meant that he also understood that
    those returns would be fraudulently understating the
    clients’ income. Thus, the jury had a more than sufficient
    basis on which to find Hopper guilty under section 7206(2).
    To the extent that Hopper suggests the government
    14
    (...continued)
    the charged conspiracy in the wake of the Tax Court’s decision
    in Muhich, the jury would have understood that it could
    not convict Hopper based solely on what other members of
    the conspiracy knew or did following Hopper’s withdrawal.
    15
    These include Counts 11 through 13, 15, 16, 18, 19, 24 and
    25, and 27 through 34 of the Superseding Indictment.
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                         149
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    did not adequately prove the identity of the taxpayers
    whose returns formed the basis for these charges, our own
    review of the record convinces us otherwise. E.g., R. 963
    Tr. 4807-08, 4795-97; Gov’t Ex. Taxpayers A through O.
    B. Loss Amount
    Hopper contends that the district court clearly erred in
    holding him responsible for a loss amount in excess of
    $50 million, because that total included losses associated
    with the 2000 tax year (i.e., tax returns filed in 2001 for
    2000) despite his (purported) withdrawal from the con-
    spiracy and scheme to defraud in early 2000.1 6 Hopper
    notes that after the Muhich decision, he prepared a
    detailed letter to Bartoli and Vallone suggesting ways
    in which the Aegis system might be changed in order to
    comply with the law. R. 762 at 99-108; Gov’t Ex. Aegis
    Office 13. He also opposed Vallone’s decision to pursue
    the Audit Arsenal in the fall of 1999, as Parker testified.
    R. 913 Tr. 1954-58; R. 947 Tr. 2082-89. And he ultimately
    resigned as a Managing Director of Aegis in January 2000,
    16
    The court assumed that the total loss amount would come to
    at least $56 million even if losses for tax years after 2000 were
    excluded from the loss calculation. Hopper’s counsel conceded
    that the only way to get the loss amount below $50 million
    (and thereby reduce the offense level) was to exclude losses
    occurring after May 2000, when Hopper’s resignation took
    effect, if not all losses that occurred in 2000. The court rejected
    the contention that losses for any part of 2000 should be ex-
    cluded. See R. 1085 Tr. 10-11, 17-22.
    150                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    at which point he no longer had supervisory authority
    at Aegis. By May 2000, he was out of the Aegis
    picture altogether. In Hopper’s view, this marked his
    withdrawal not only from Aegis but from the charged
    conspiracy and scheme to defraud, and it terminated
    his liability for losses that were incurred later. The
    district court rejected that notion, reasoning that Hopper’s
    resignation did not constitute a legally effective with-
    drawal from the conspiracy and scheme. R. 1085 at 13-15.
    The court’s finding as to Hopper’s withdrawal is a
    factual finding that we review for clear error, see United
    States v. Vaughn, 
    433 F.3d 917
    , 922-23 (7th Cir. 2006), as is
    its determination of the loss amount for which Hopper
    is responsible, e.g. United States v. Borrasi, 
    639 F.3d 774
    ,
    783 (7th Cir. 2011).
    The court committed no clear error in concluding
    that Hopper’s departure from Aegis in 2000 did not
    constitute a legally effective withdrawal from the con-
    spiracy. In addition to his resignation as Managing Di-
    rector in January 2000, R. 761-1 at 3, Hopper relies on
    a letter that he wrote to Vallone in June 2000 severing
    his ties to Vallone, id. at 7. Bartoli and Parker were
    copied on that letter. Hopper reasons that this con-
    stituted an announcement sufficient to notify his co-
    conspirators of his withdrawal. See United States v. Wilson,
    supra, 
    134 F.3d at 863
     (“The affirmative step required to
    constitute withdrawal must be either a full confession by
    the defendant to the authorities, or communication by
    the defendant of the fact of his withdrawal in a manner
    designed to reach his co-conspirators.”) (emphasis ours).
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                  151
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    We may assume that the letter constituted adequate
    notice to the other defendants that Hopper would no
    longer be an active member of the conspiracy; but in
    order to effectuate a legally meaningful withdrawal
    from the conspiracy, the defendant’s announcement must
    also “disavow[ ] the conspiracy and its criminal objec-
    tives.” United States v. Morales, 
    655 F.3d 608
    , 640-41 (7th
    Cir. 2011) (noting defendant never “renounced the goals
    of the conspiracy”) (citing United States v. Emerson, 
    501 F.3d 804
    , 812 (7th Cir. 2007)), cert. denied, 
    132 S. Ct. 1121
     (2012). Nothing in Hopper’s letter disavowed or
    renounced the Aegis system. It expressed Hopper’s disap-
    proval of certain actions Vallone had taken, including
    what Hopper perceived as Vallone’s behind-the-scenes
    efforts to undermine the audit representation that Parker
    & Associates was attempting to provide to Aegis clients.
    Hopper was of the view that Vallone’s attempts to avoid
    IRS audits “in all probability will be looked upon by the
    IRS as obstruction or interfering with the administration of
    the Internal Revenue Laws.” R. 761-1 at 8. But it voiced
    no disapproval of the Aegis system or of the validity of
    the tax returns Aegis clients had been and would be
    filing based on the use of Aegis trusts. Even as to
    Vallone’s efforts with respect to the audits, Hopper
    remarked, “I truly hope that you are successful in your
    efforts. And I really mean that.” R. 761-1 at 8. This is not
    the language of renunciation.
    Because the facts support the district court’s finding
    that Hopper did not withdraw from the conspiracy early
    152                Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    in 2000, it was appropriate to charge Hopper with the
    additional tax losses that occurred in the 2000 tax year.
    See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(A), (B) and (a)(3) (defendant’s
    relevant conduct includes all harm resulting from his
    own acts and all reasonably foreseeable acts of others
    in furtherance of jointly undertaken criminal activity).
    As there is no dispute that these additional losses
    caused the total loss amount to exceed $50 million,
    there was no error in the loss-amount calculation or
    in the offense-level calculations that turned on the
    loss amount.
    C. Use of Guidelines in Effect at Time of Sentencing
    In calculating Hopper’s offense level, the district court
    used the 2008 Guidelines in effect at the time of his sen-
    tencing rather than the November 2000 version in effect
    in the waning days of the offense. As was true in
    Dowd’s case, this worked to Hopper’s disadvantage, in
    that the newer version of the Guidelines specified a
    significantly higher offense level for losses in excess of
    $50 million. Under the November 2000 Guidelines, Hop-
    per’s adjusted offense level would have been five levels
    lower than it was under the 2008 Guidelines (compare
    U.S.S.G. § 2T4.1(T) (2000) (specifying a base offense level
    of 25) with U.S.S.G. § 2T4.1(M) (2008) (specifying base
    offense level of 30)), which would have resulted in
    an advisory sentencing range of 135 to 168 months
    rather than the range of 235 to 293 months that the
    court referenced. Hopper contends that the court’s use
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                    153
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    of the newer, and more punitive, version of the Guide-
    lines constitutes a violation of the ex post facto clause
    of the Constitution.
    As Hopper acknowledges, our decision in United States
    v. Demaree, 
    supra,
     
    459 F.3d at 794-95
    , forecloses his ex post
    facto argument. Like Dowd, Hopper invites us to recon-
    sider Demaree, but, as we have noted, we have already
    rejected multiple invitations to do so. E.g., United States v.
    Wasson, 
    supra,
     
    679 F.3d at 951
    .
    D. Sentencing Manipulation
    Finally, Hopper argues that the government boosted
    the loss amount, and thus his Guidelines sentencing
    range, by not acting sooner than it did to stop what the
    defendants were doing. Hopper notes that Special Agent
    Priess commenced his undercover investigation of the
    Aegis CBO scheme in 1996, attended a series of Aegis
    seminars in that year and the ensuing three years, and
    (still in his undercover capacity) held conversations
    with a number of the defendants, tax preparers
    working with Aegis, and individual taxpayers during
    that time. No later than 1998, Hopper reasons, the gov-
    ernment had all of the information that it needed to
    conclude that the Aegis system was a criminal tax-avoid-
    ance system. Yet, not until March 2000, when it executed
    the search warrant on Aegis’s headquarters did it begin
    to signal to the defendants their criminal exposure, and
    at no time prior to the indictment in 2004 did it seek
    to enjoin the defendants’ activities. In effect, Hopper
    154                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    suggests, the government engaged in sentencing manipu-
    lation by allowing the tax losses resulting from the
    scheme to continue mounting, exposing him to a much
    longer sentence as a consequence of the delay.
    A variation of Hopper’s argument could be made in
    any number of cases, particularly those involving under-
    cover investigations of large-scale criminal activity with
    many participants. Typically, the government’s goal is
    to build a strong evidentiary case that is likely to result in
    the conviction not just of low-level players but also the
    leaders and instigators of the scheme; and that takes
    time. We know of no legal principle that requires the
    government to intervene to stop ongoing non-violent
    criminal activity as soon as it arguably has a sufficient
    case to prosecute the defendants.
    But the dispositive point is that this circuit does not
    recognize sentencing manipulation. E.g., United States
    v. Mandel, 
    647 F.3d 710
    , 720 n.3 (7th Cir. 2011); United
    States v. Long, 
    639 F.3d 293
    , 300-01 (7th Cir. 2011). More-
    over, to the extent Hopper is simply arguing that the
    government’s delay in intervening to stop the scheme
    constitutes a factor that should have been considered
    in mitigation under section 3553(a), we repeat the ob-
    servation that we made in United States v. Knox, 
    573 F.3d 441
    , 452 (7th Cir. 2009): “Although the agent’s
    tactics had the effect of increasing [the defendant’s]
    guidelines sentencing range, it also served the legitimate
    purpose of investigating the full extent of [the defendant’s]
    criminal activity . . . .” (citing United States v. Wagner,
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                 155
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    
    467 F.3d 1085
    , 1090 (7th Cir. 2006) (“It is within the dis-
    cretion of law enforcement to decide whether delaying
    the arrest of the suspect will help ensnare co-con-
    spirators, give law enforcement greater understanding
    of the nature of the criminal enterprise, or allow the
    suspect enough ‘rope to hang himself.’ ”)).
    E. Organizer Enhancement
    The district court increased Hopper’s offense level by
    four points pursuant to section 3B1.1(a) of the Guide-
    lines, deeming him an organizer or leader of a criminal
    activity that involved five or more participants. The court
    reasoned that Hopper had been the managing director
    of Aegis, supervised the company’s employees, and ran
    the day-to-day operations of the business. R. 1085 at 15-
    16. Hopper concedes that “he was one of the founders
    of Aegis, shared in monetary distributions[,] and at
    least until 1998-99 was involved in day-to-day supervi-
    sion of the staff.” Hopper Br. 37. On that basis, he agrees
    that a three-level managerial enhancement would be
    appropriate. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). But he believes that
    the more substantial organizer/leader enhancement
    overstates his actual role in the offense. His role “was
    much more subsidiary” than those of Vallone and
    Cover, he posits, Hopper Br. 37: he did not write the
    Aegis Directors’ Manual, he was not involved with
    the backdating of trusts or other documents, he was
    not responsible for the development of either the CBO
    charitable trust or the foreign trust system, he did not
    156                Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    have the working relationship with David Jenkins in
    Belize that Vallone and Cover did and had only minimal
    involvement in the foreign trust operation, he had rela-
    tively little contact with most Aegis customers, and his
    role in supervising the staff was much more akin to that
    of a mid-level manager. Hopper adds that his lesser
    station in the Aegis power structure is demonstrated by
    the fact that he was unable to prevail in his opposition
    to the creation of the Audit Arsenal and the strategy
    of obstructing IRS audits that Vallone championed.
    Our review of the district court’s decision to
    impose the organizer/leader enhancement rather than the
    managerial enhancement is for clear error, e.g., United
    States v. Smith, supra, 674 F.3d at 728, and the court did
    not clearly err in choosing to apply the former. Factors
    bearing on the appropriate label to give the defendant’s
    role in the offense “include the exercise of decision
    making authority, the nature of participation in the com-
    mission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices,
    the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the
    crime, the degree of participation in the planning or
    organizing of the offense, the nature and scope of the
    illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority
    exercised over others.” § 3B1.1, comment. (n.4). “No
    one of these factors is considered a prerequisite to the
    enhancement, and, at the same time, the factors are not
    necessarily entitled to equal weight.” United States v.
    Wasz, 
    450 F.3d 720
    , 729 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing United
    States v. Matthews, 
    222 F.3d 305
    , 307 (7th Cir. 2000)). “And
    although the nature and purposes of the enhancement
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                  157
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    certainly require the defendant to have played a leading
    role in the offense, he need not literally have been the
    boss of his cohorts in order to qualify for the enhance-
    ment, for a leader can influence others through indirect
    as well as direct means[.]” Id. at 729-30. Hopper was a
    founder and, until 2000, the managing director of Aegis.
    He held ownership interests in both Aegis and Aegis
    Management Company. Along with Bartoli and Vallone,
    he claimed a substantial share of the profits of Aegis,
    earning over $1.6 million from Aegis and related compa-
    nies from 1994 through 2000. Gov’t Ex. Hopper Income
    Summary (Gov’t Supp. App. 200). Hopper and Vallone
    certainly had their disagreements, and according to
    Hopper it was ultimately his inability to stop Vallone
    from attempting to obstruct IRS audits that caused him
    to leave the company in 2000. But as we have pointed
    out, as late as November 1999, a resolution adopted by
    the Aegis Board of Directors (and signed by Hopper)
    recognized that Hopper shared management authority
    over the company equally with Vallone and Bartoli. At
    least until 2000, then, Hopper was at the uppermost
    echelon of Aegis’s leadership, oversaw the company’s
    operations, enjoyed a greater share in the income
    generated by Aegis than everyone but Vallone and
    Bartoli, and possessed management authority on a level
    with theirs. All of these facts support the district court’s
    decision to deem him an organizer or leader of the
    Aegis scheme rather than a manager.
    158                  Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    F. Weight Given to Guidelines in Determining Sentence
    In the wake of Booker, a district court in choosing a
    reasonable sentence must not presume, as we may, that
    a sentence within the range advised by the Guidelines is
    reasonable. See Gall v. United States, supra, 
    552 U.S. at 50
    ,
    
    128 S. Ct. at 596-97
    ; Rita v. United States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    ,
    351, 
    127 S. Ct. 2456
    , 2465 (2007). Instead, after ascer-
    taining the Guidelines sentencing range, the court must
    consult the statutory sentencing factors set forth in
    section 3553(a) and determine independently what sen-
    tence is reasonable. Gall, 
    552 U.S. at 49-50
    , 
    128 S. Ct. at 596
    ;
    e.g., United States v. Young, 
    590 F.3d 467
    , 473-74 (7th Cir.
    2009); see also United States v. Robertson, 
    662 F.3d 871
    ,
    880 (7th Cir. 2011) (“A sentencing court need not compre-
    hensively discuss each of the factors listed in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a), but it must give the reasons for its sentencing
    decision and address all of a defendant’s principal argu-
    ments that ‘are not so weak as to not merit discussion.’ ”)
    (quoting United States v. Cunningham, 
    429 F.3d 673
    , 679
    (7th Cir. 2005)). Among other things, section 3553(a)
    commands that the sentence must be sufficient but not
    greater than necessary to serve the sentencing aims set
    out in the statute. E.g., United States v. Pennington, 
    667 F.3d 953
    , 957 (7th Cir. 2012). Hopper contends that the
    district court violated this so-called “parsimony” admoni-
    tion here by giving too much weight to the advisory
    Guidelines range, which in this case was driven to a
    significant extent by the loss amount of more than
    $50 million. The court acknowledged the set of mitigating
    factors that supported a lower sentence, including
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                 159
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    the abuse that Hopper had suffered as a child, his military
    service in Vietnam, the injuries he incurred during
    that service and the post-traumatic stress disorder he
    continues to experience as a result of that service, the
    physical ailments (including degenerative arthritis)
    from which he suffers, his age (sixty-three at the time of
    sentencing), his strong relationship with his wife and
    children, his sincere remorse, and certain efforts he
    made to rectify his criminal wrongdoing. R. 1085 at 45-48,
    50-51, 52. And the court ultimately did impose a
    sentence thirty-five months below the bottom of
    the Guidelines range. But, according to Hopper, the
    court believed itself constrained by the loss amount
    from deviating too far from the Guidelines range absent
    a compelling justification for doing so. The court thus
    committed a legal error, in Hopper’s view, by treating the
    Guidelines, and in particular the loss amount, as
    limiting the extent to which it could impose a sen-
    tence below the Guidelines sentencing range, even if
    the mitigating factors otherwise weighed in favor of a
    substantially below-Guidelines sentence. See, e.g., United
    States v. Grigg, 
    442 F.3d 560
    , 565-66 (7th Cir. 2006).
    We reject this argument. Our review of the sentencing
    transcript convinces us that the district court merely
    viewed the loss amount as a significant factor—in the
    court’s words, “one of the heaviest factors”—that weighed
    against a lower sentence, not one that tied the court’s
    hands. R. 1085 at 44. The court expressly acknowledged
    that it could not presume a sentence within the Guide-
    lines range to be appropriate, see id. at 44-45, acknowl-
    160                Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    edged its duty to consider the section 3553(a) factors, id.
    at 45, and proceeded to give careful attention to those
    factors, see id. at 45-53. As Hopper acknowledges, the
    court recognized and took into consideration the many
    factors that weighed in Hopper’s favor, id. at 45-48, 50-51,
    52, and in fact chose to impose a sentence that was
    nearly three years below the minimum sentence of 235
    months recommended by the Guidelines. The court
    simply did not believe that an even lower sentence was
    warranted given the scope of the loss resulting from
    Hopper’s offense. The court did not misunderstand its
    own authority nor did it commit any other form of error.
    G. Reasonableness of the Sentence
    Finally, Hopper challenges the reasonableness of the
    sentence that the district court imposed on him. The court
    ordered Hopper to serve a sentence of 200 months. Al-
    though the sentence was 35 months below the low end
    of the range advised by the Guidelines, Hopper none-
    theless contends it was excessive and therefore unrea-
    sonable. Hopper emphasizes the mitigating factors that
    the district court itself acknowledged in arriving at the
    sentence and which we have already mentioned. For a
    man in his sixties, Hopper argues, a 200-month sentence
    is a life sentence. In arriving at that sentence, Hopper
    again argues, the district court was fixated on the loss
    amount to the exclusion of the many mitigating factors
    which demonstrate that a much lower sentence would
    be reasonable.
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                  161
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    As a below-Guidelines sentence, Hopper’s sentence
    is presumptively reasonable, e.g., United States v. Russell,
    supra, 662 F.3d at 853, and Hopper has not succeeded in
    rebutting that presumption. We acknowledge that the
    sentence will require Hopper to spend most, if not all, of
    his remaining years in prison. See id. at 852-53. However,
    his offense was one that took place over a substantial
    period of time, enticed over six hundred taxpayers into
    a fraudulent scheme of tax evasion, and resulted in tens
    of millions of dollars of lost revenue to the government.
    We have no reason to question the sincerity of the
    remorse that Hopper expressed at sentencing, but Hop-
    per’s offense evidenced much more than a fleeting lapse
    in judgment: Beginning in 1994, Hopper knowingly
    and willfully engaged in a scheme to defy the tax laws
    and defraud the government; and he had continued to
    perpetrate the scheme even as he was repeatedly put on
    notice that what he and his co-defendants were doing
    was illegal. Hopper, being at the head of the scheme
    along with Bartoli and Vallone, was well situated to
    appreciate the magnitude of the fraud he and his co-
    defendants were perpetrating. Tax evasion has a long
    and storied history in this country, and Hopper joins a
    long list of practitioners that includes Al Capone, Spiro
    Agnew, and Leona Helmsley. But the scheme that
    Hopper and his partners perpetrated was particularly
    insidious. Perhaps a different judge might have deemed
    a more modest sentence sufficient to serve the aims of
    sentencing set forth in section 3553(a)(2). But examining
    Hopper’s sentence pursuant to the deferential, abuse-of-
    162                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    discretion standard, see Gall, 
    552 U.S. at 51
    , 
    128 S. Ct. at 597
    , we cannot say that it was unreasonable.
    DUNN
    A. Treatment of the Guidelines
    Dunn’s opening contention is that the district court
    committed legal error in treating the Guidelines as manda-
    tory. As we have discussed, after Booker, the Guidelines
    are advisory rather than mandatory. The district court’s
    ultimate obligation is to impose a sentence that is rea-
    sonable in light of the factors set forth in section 3553(a),
    e.g., United States v. Young, 
    supra,
     
    590 F.3d at 473-74
    ;
    and although the court is obliged to properly apply the
    Guidelines, Gall v. United States, supra, 
    552 U.S. at 49
    , 
    128 S. Ct. at 596
    , and to consider the resulting Guidelines
    sentencing range in arriving at a reasonable sentence,
    Freeman v. United States, 
    131 S. Ct. 2685
    , 2692 (2011) (“the
    judge will use the Guidelines range as the starting point
    in the analysis”), it must do so without placing a
    “thumb on the scale favoring a guideline sentence,”
    United States v. Sachsenmaier, 
    491 F.3d 680
    , 685 (7th Cir.
    2007). Dunn contends that a thumb in favor of the Guide-
    lines is evidenced in this case by the district court’s
    remark that the base offense level resulting from a
    $60 million loss “doesn’t give much latitude in terms of
    the ultimate sentence in the case.” R. 1086 at 29. The
    district court made that remark not long before it began
    to go through the various section 3553(a) sentencing
    factors, and Dunn suggests that the context of the
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                  163
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    remark suggests that the district court had already de-
    termined that it was effectively required to impose a
    sentence consistent with what the Guidelines advised.
    But we do not believe that the district court was op-
    erating under any misconception that it was bound
    by the Guidelines. Although the court’s use of the term
    “leeway” is somewhat similar to the language of obliga-
    tion that we have said is inconsistent with a court’s
    duty after Booker to treat the Guidelines as a reference
    point but not as a mandate, e.g., United States v. Penning-
    ton, supra, 
    667 F.3d at 958
     (court stated it must “follow”
    the Guidelines), in context it is clear that the court in
    no sense was treating the Guidelines as either binding
    or presumptively correct as to the recommended sen-
    tence. Much as it had with Hopper, the court noted that
    the key factor in determining Dunn’s base offense
    level under the Guidelines was the size of the tax loss, and
    it was in view of the size of that loss that the court saw
    little justification for imposing a sentence below the
    Guidelines range. R. 1086 at 27-28, 29, 35. The balance
    of the court’s sentencing remarks make clear that the
    court was wholly aware that it had both the authority
    to impose a non-Guidelines sentence as well as the duty
    to determine a reasonable sentence independent of what
    the Guidelines recommended. Id. at 30-31. The court
    considered the full range of the factors that Dunn’s coun-
    sel had cited in support of a below-Guidelines sen-
    tence—including his challenging youth, his ethic of hard
    work and self-improvement, his friendship and
    generosity to others, and his reputation as a good and
    164                   Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    honest man. Id. at 32-33. Still, the court believed that “the
    nature and the circumstances of the offense,” id. at 32,
    including the “extremely conservative figure” of the $60
    million loss, id. at 28, outweighed these mitigating factors,
    id. at 33. The court emphasized that “[t]his was not a
    simple, one-time impulsive act,” id., and pointed out that
    Dunn had shown no remorse, id. at 34. Ultimately, the
    court found, in light of the statutory sentencing factors,
    that the Guidelines range was “a fair range,” id. at 34, and
    imposed a sentence at the bottom of that range.
    B. Amount of Loss
    As noted, the district court held Dunn responsible for
    a loss amount of $60 million—i.e., the full amount of the
    loss resulting from the Aegis scheme. Dunn challenges
    the loss amount on two grounds. First, he questions
    the accuracy of the method that the government used
    to calculate the total loss, which loss the district court
    cited as an “overriding consideration” in determining
    his sentence. At trial, Agent Welch acknowledged that
    he could not accurately calculate the actual tax loss for
    every Aegis client, R. 963 Tr. 4851,1 7 and that “[r]easonable
    people could differ” on the best way to calculate that
    17
    Welch could not do this because he did not have access to all
    of the clients’ original tax returns, tax preparers’ files, and other
    information (e.g., as to applicable deductions) that would
    have permitted him to compute the actual tax loss as to
    each Aegis client.
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                   165
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    loss, R. 973 Tr. 5038. Welch had opted to estimate the
    loss by multiplying each taxpayer’s income by twenty-
    eight percent, the lowest of the federal income tax rates.
    R. 963 Tr. 4851-52. As Dunn points out, this is not a
    method that has been generally accepted in the ac-
    counting profession or by the IRS, but one that Welch
    nonetheless decided to follow in this case. R. 973 Tr. 4978-
    80. Dunn also adds that in the case of one Aegis client,
    the IRS ultimately accepted a settlement that was a
    fraction of the tax loss that Welch himself had estimated.
    R. 973 Tr. 5035-36. In Dunn’s view, all of this calls into
    question the reliability of the method by which the
    total tax loss in this case was arrived at. Second, the total
    loss included tax losses incurred after Dunn left Aegis
    in the spring of 2000. Dunn contends that his departure
    constituted a withdrawal from the conspiracy and that
    he should not be held liable for subsequent tax losses.
    Had those later losses been excluded from the calcula-
    tion, the total tax loss, according to Dunn, would have
    come to less than $50 million and resulted in a lower
    Guidelines offense level and thus a lower (advisory)
    sentencing range. As Dunn acknowledges, neither of
    these contentions was made in the district court, where
    Dunn did not challenge the loss amount, so our review
    of the loss calculation is for plain error alone. E.g.,
    United States v. Jumah, 
    599 F.3d 799
    , 811 (7th Cir. 2010).
    There was no such error here. The Guidelines them-
    selves recommend use of the twenty-eight percent rate
    in estimating the loss amount in tax fraud cases. U.S.S.G.
    § 2T1.1(c)(1)(A). Assuming that the income of each Aegis
    166                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    client would have been taxed at a rate of twenty-eight
    percent is, if anything, a conservative approach, as it is
    entirely possible that the income of some clients would
    have exceeded the twenty-eight percent tax bracket and
    would therefore have been subject to a higher marginal
    rate. Indeed, given the evidence that Aegis targeted high-
    income individuals, this may be more of a likelihood
    than a mere possibility. See R. 963 Tr. 4852-55. Thus,
    even recognizing, as Welch himself did, that reasonable
    people might differ as to the best way of determining
    a tax loss in this case, it does not follow that there was
    an obvious flaw in the approach that Welch followed.
    See United States v. Julian, 
    427 F.3d 471
    , 482 (7th Cir.
    2005) (plain error is one that is obvious in retrospect);
    United States v. Mandel, 
    supra,
     
    647 F.3d at 722-23
     (divergent
    holdings among courts demonstrate that any error
    district court may have committed was not plain). Nor
    does the fact that the IRS in one case settled an audit for
    a figure far less than the amount that Welch had
    estimated as the loss call into question the reliability of
    his calculations. As the government points out, the IRS
    might choose to accept a settlement far below the
    estimated tax due for any number of reasons. The record
    as to this one case is insufficient to cast doubt on the
    loss amount figure that the district court employed.
    Second, although Dunn terminated his employment
    with Aegis, he did not legally withdraw from the con-
    spiracy. As we have already discussed with respect
    to Hopper, a legally effective withdrawal requires
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                    167
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    more than merely ceasing one’s active involvement; one
    must also renounce the aims of the conspiracy. E.g.,
    United States v. Morales, 
    supra,
     655 F.3d at 640-41. This
    Dunn never did. Indeed, although Dunn indicated to
    others (including Parker) in the spring and summer of
    2000 that he would no longer be taking on new Aegis
    clients, he also indicated that he would continue to
    service existing clients. R. 947 Tr. 1995; R. 909 Tr. 5872-73,
    5876. Consequently, Dunn is responsible for all harm
    that was the result of his acts up to that point, see
    U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)A) & (a)(3); and, at a minimum,
    the filing of fraudulent tax returns for 2000 was
    certainly both foreseeable to Dunn and in furtherance
    of the criminal activity he had previously undertaken
    with his co-conspirators, see 1B1.3(a)(1)(B). As we have
    pointed out before, the filing of tax returns that
    minimized or eliminated a taxpayer’s taxable income
    was the entire point of the Aegis system that Dunn and
    others marketed. It would thus have been entirely fore-
    seeable to Dunn, as someone who sold Aegis trusts
    and provided follow-up trust management services to
    purchasers, that the clients of Aegis would be filing
    fraudulent tax returns which were based on the
    use of Aegis trusts. As with Hopper, even if the losses
    associated with the 2001 and 2002 tax years are excluded,
    the total loss still exceeded $50 million, which was
    the threshold for the base offense level of 30 that the
    district court referenced in this case. See U.S.S.G.
    § 2T4.1(M).
    168                Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    C. Role in the Offense
    Pursuant to Guidelines section 3B1.1(b), the district
    court enhanced Dunn’s offense level by three points
    for being a manager or supervisor. R.1086 at 4-5, 29.
    Dunn contends on appeal that the court clearly erred
    in applying this enhancement, because he in fact played
    no managerial or supervisory role in the Aegis scheme.
    Dunn contends that he did not oversee any other par-
    ticipant in the scheme, did not manage any Aegis assets
    or activities, did not possess any decision-making
    authority as to the scheme’s goals or means of attaining
    those goals, and did not help to plan or organize the
    offense. He was merely “a salesman following orders,”
    Dunn Br. 16, playing a relatively minor role in a fairly
    extensive organization. Our review is again one for clear
    error. United States v. Smith, supra, 674 F.3d at 728.
    The court did not clearly err in treating Dunn as a
    manager or supervisor. The court appears to have
    based the enhancement in part on a finding that Dunn
    recruited attorney Parker into the scheme. R. 1086 at 4-5;
    see § 3B1.1, comment. (n.4) (citing the recruitment of
    accomplices as a relevant factor in determining whether
    leadership enhancement appropriate); e.g., United States
    v. Cerna, 
    676 F.3d 605
    , 608 (7th Cir. 2012). Dunn
    contends that it is implausible to say that he recruited
    Parker, given Parker’s acknowledgment at the trial that
    it was his brother-in-law, Dennis Repka, a retired
    judge, and not Dunn, who introduced him to the Aegis
    system of trusts in June 1996. R. 913 Tr. 1939. But Dunn
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                 169
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    omits the material fact that Parker did not actually
    become involved in the conspiracy and scheme until
    Dunn asked him in March 2007 if he would be interested
    in creating CBO trusts for Aegis and offered to pay
    him $1,000 for each Aegis closing that he handled. R. 961
    Tr. 1832, 1836-37. Parker accepted the offer. Parker also
    testified that he completed the paperwork for approxi-
    mately fifteen closings for Dunn following the instructions
    that Dunn gave him as to how the documents should
    be dated. R. 961 Tr. 1839; R. 1014 Tr. 1879-80. The
    district court therefore had a sound evidentiary basis
    for finding that Dunn had in fact successfully recruited
    Parker into the scheme. Moreover, as the government
    points out, Dunn reaped some $1.5 million in income
    from the scheme, which was a relatively large share of
    the income generated by the conspiracy—on par with
    Hopper’s share, for example. Gov’t Ex. Dunn Income
    Summary (Gov’t Supp. App. 151); see § 3B1.1, comment.
    (n.4) (citing claimed right to larger share of proceeds as
    a hallmark of leadership role). And, in contrast to other
    low-level players, Dunn did attend and participate in
    some policy meetings with Vallone, Bartoli, and Hopper.
    R. 913 Tr. 1951-59. These included the meetings (described
    by Parker) that took place among the Aegis principals
    in the summer and fall of 1999 to discuss how Aegis
    should proceed in light of the Muhich decision. R. 913
    Tr. 1951-59. This evidence defeats any contention that
    it was clear error to recognize that Dunn played a more
    culpable role in the conspiracy by deeming him a
    manager or supervisor for sentencing purposes.
    170                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    D. Reasonableness of the Sentence
    The district court ordered Dunn to serve a prison term
    of 210 months, a sentence at the bottom of the range
    recommended by the Guidelines. Dunn contends that
    the sentence is substantively unreasonable, because the
    district court either failed to consider or did not give
    appropriate weight to a number of the factors identified
    as relevant by section 3553(a), including Dunn’s back-
    ground and characteristics, the sentences imposed on
    his co-defendants, and the nature and severity of his
    offense. First, given his age at the time of sentencing (forty-
    nine), Dunn argues that a sentence of seventeen years
    is effectively a life sentence. By contrast, he notes, the
    District of Columbia Circuit upheld a sentence of 108
    months for an individual it characterized as possibly
    “the largest tax evader in the history of the country.”
    United States v. Anderson, 
    545 F.3d 1072
    , 1073-74 (D.C. Cir.
    2008) (loss amount exceeding $100 million). Even that
    sentence represented a substantial upward variance
    from the high end of the range recommended by the
    version of the Guidelines that the defendant argued was
    applicable. Still, it is little more than half of the penalty
    imposed on Dunn. Second, Dunn points out that the
    defendants in this case faced basically the same set of
    charges and all had the same lack of prior criminal
    history, yet there are significant disparities in the sen-
    tences they received. For example, Dunn’s sentence
    was ten months longer than that of Hopper, who was
    convicted of twenty-six counts to Dunn’s fifteen and
    was one of the Aegis principals. Dunn was also ordered
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                        171
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    to serve fifty more months than Cover; and his sentence
    is almost twice as long as that of Bartoli, who con-
    ceived of the scheme. Third, Dunn points out that the
    district court held Dunn culpable for the full breadth
    of the scheme and ignored his purported withdrawal
    in 2000.
    Dunn’s sentence is at the bottom of the Guidelines
    range, which was properly calculated, so we presume
    that it is reasonable, e.g., United States v. Fouse, 
    578 F.3d 643
    ,
    654-55 (7th Cir. 2009); and Dunn has not persuaded
    us that it is otherwise when examined against the sen-
    tencing factors identified in section 3553(a), see United
    States v. Mykytiuk, 
    415 F.3d 606
    , 608 (7th Cir. 2005).
    As to the sentences of his co-defendants: Bartoli and
    Cover were each given significant reductions in their
    sentences either because of their advanced age: Bartoli
    was eighty years old when he was sentenced and
    Cover was seventy-two. Even so, their sentences are
    much more likely to be life sentences than Dunn’s is:
    with credit for good time, Dunn will be in his mid-
    sixties when he completes his sentence—younger than
    either Bartoli or Cover were when they began serving
    their terms. Hopper, although his sentence is still
    slightly longer than Dunn’s, was also given a significant
    reduction based on his military service and what the
    court found to be his genuine remorse, as well as his age
    (sixty-three). The disparities that Dunn cites are thus
    the result of the district court’s legitimate and rea-
    sonable attempt to recognize both the greater culpability
    172                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    of Dunn’s co-defendants along with mitigating factors
    that are not present in Dunn’s case.
    Dunn’s observation that his sentence is nearly twice the
    term imposed on the defendant in Anderson, the D.C.
    Circuit case is explained by a number of distinctions,
    including most prominently the fact that the 2000 version
    of the Guidelines under which Anderson was sentenced
    were significantly more lenient as to large-scale tax
    frauds. That is why a number of Dunn’s co-defendants
    have made ex post facto arguments with respect to the
    district court’s use of the 2008 Guidelines in sen-
    tencing them. The lesser sentence imposed (and sus-
    tained) in Anderson thus does not call into question
    the reasonableness of Dunn’s sentence.
    Nor does the fact that the court in sentencing Dunn
    held him to account for all of the consequences of the
    conspiracy, including the total loss amount, give us
    pause. Dunn contends that his liability should have
    ended with his purported withdrawal in June 2000. But
    as we discussed above, Dunn never legally withdrew.
    He stopped selling Aegis trusts in June 2000 at the
    request of his employer, the financial services firm
    SunAmerica, but he continued to service existing cli-
    ents. At the same time, he never took steps to renounce
    the aims of the conspiracy.1 8 The fact that fraudulent
    18
    We note that, as in Hopper’s case, the loss amount would
    have exceeded $50 million, and thus the offense level would
    (continued...)
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                 173
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    tax returns based on Aegis trusts would continue
    to be filed after his involvement wound down was both
    foreseeable to Dunn and, to a meaningful degree, the
    natural consequence of his earlier acts in marketing
    Aegis trusts and providing trust management services
    to Aegis clients.
    Dunn promoted and sold Aegis trusts, but that was
    not the extent of his involvement in the Aegis scheme.
    He also gave instructions to tax preparers as to how tax
    returns should be prepared in light of the Aegis trusts.
    He was one of the plaintiffs in the frivolous lawsuit
    filed against the ARDC. He participated, as we have
    noted, in Aegis policy meetings. As the district court
    noted, Dunn, in contrast to Bartoli, Vallone, and Hopper,
    already had successful employment with SunAmerica
    when he became involved with Aegis and so, arguably,
    should not have been as susceptible to a lucrative
    fraud. Like other defendants, Dunn used the Aegis
    system to dramatically under-report his taxable income:
    he reported income of only $16,000 in 1997 and $9,000
    in 1998, for example, when his actual income in those
    years was roughly $400,000 and $600,000, respectively.
    R. 1086 at 28; Gov’t Ex. Dunn Income Summary (Gov’t
    Supp. App. 151). There were mitigating factors which
    the district court noted and considered, including
    18
    (...continued)
    have been the same, even if losses occurring after the 2000
    tax year were excluded. See supra at 149 n.16.
    174                Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    Dunn’s financially difficult childhood, putting himself
    through school, caring for his mother until her death
    (Judge Norgle characterized Dunn as “an extremely
    good son,” R. 1086 at 32), and his readiness to help
    others. Yet, as the court noted, Dunn’s involvement in
    this extensive crime was anything but a one-time, im-
    pulsive act. We cannot characterize the sentence im-
    posed on Dunn as unreasonable.
    E. Fifth and Sixth Amendments and Notice-to-One
    Dunn repeats and expands upon an argument that
    the defendants made jointly: that the district court im-
    properly treated notice of the trusts’ illegality received
    by one defendant as notice to the conspiracy and thus
    notice to all of the conspiracy’s members. Dunn con-
    tends that the court’s erroneous ruling relieved the gov-
    ernment of the burden to show that Dunn himself
    realized that the Aegis trusts were a sham and yet partici-
    pated in the conspiracy and marketed the trusts to
    clients with that knowledge, and with the intent to
    defraud the government and/or violate the tax laws. In
    effect, Dunn posits, the court eliminated an element of
    the government’s burden of proof and simultaneously
    eliminated the presumption of innocence as to that ele-
    ment, forcing Dunn to offer proof (e.g., by cross-exam-
    ining government’s witnesses) that he did not
    knowingly become a party to an unlawful agreement.
    His conviction on the conspiracy charge, Dunn main-
    tains, was obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                 175
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    right to due process and his Sixth Amendment right
    to a jury finding as to his guilt or innocence.
    Our prior discussion of the defendants’ joint argument
    on this point disposes of Dunn’s individual claim.
    So far as we can determine, the district court voiced
    its notice-to-the-conspiracy rationale solely to counsel
    at sidebar in the context of admitting certain evidence:
    neither Dunn nor the defendants collectively have
    been able to point to any instance in which this rationale
    was communicated to the jury. Consequently, the jury
    was never erroneously informed, whether by way of a
    formal instruction or otherwise, that it could presume
    Dunn’s knowledge of the illegality of the Aegis scheme
    based on evidence that Bartoli or Vallone knew that the
    Aegis trusts were a sham, for example. And although
    Dunn suggests that the court’s ruling relieved the gov-
    ernment of the burden to show that Dunn became a
    party to the conspiracy with knowledge that the Aegis
    system was unlawful, there is no evidence that the gov-
    ernment itself ever argued to the jury that simply
    because another defendant had notice of the illegality
    that Dunn necessarily did as well. Instead, as it did with
    each of the six defendants, the government made a
    case that Dunn himself knew, based on the facts sur-
    rounding the trusts and on the notice that he individually
    received, that the trusts were a sham and that he was
    acting with an intent to defraud the government and
    to violate the federal income tax laws. R. 923 Tr. 6808-24;
    R. 911 Tr. 6827-71. Whatever possible misconceptions
    the district court may have held and communicated to
    176                Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    counsel, the jury was properly instructed on the law (e.g.,
    to give separate consideration both to each count and
    to each defendant, R. 925 Tr. 7389) and on the govern-
    ment’s burden of proof, and Dunn was not deprived of
    his Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights.1 9
    F. Denial of Severance
    Dunn contends that the district court abused its discre-
    tion in denying him a separate trial. Like Dowd, Dunn
    sought to sever his own trial from that of his co-defen-
    dants. R. 391. Dunn’s theory was that his defense was
    antagonistic to his co-defendants in the sense that he
    was an outsider vis-à-vis Aegis (in that he was an
    outside salesperson rather than an employee or officer
    of Aegis), did not truly believe in the Aegis trust
    system, and lacked the history that his co-defendants
    Bartoli, Vallone, and Hopper had of refusing to file any
    tax returns. He also suggested that in a separate trial,
    he could call Bartoli as a witness to testify that he had
    relied in good faith on Bartoli’s representations as to
    the legitimacy of the Aegis system. The court denied the
    motion in advance of the trial and again when Dunn
    renewed it during the direct examination of the govern-
    ment’s final witness. But Dunn did not renew the
    motion at the close of evidence. Dunn now contends
    19
    Dunn does not separately argue that the evidence was
    otherwise insufficient to overcome his Cheek defense and
    to establish his willfulness.
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                 177
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    that the court’s refusal to grant him a separate trial,
    coupled with the court’s erroneous notice-to-the-con-
    spiracy rationale, deprived him of an individual assess-
    ment of his knowledge of the illegality of the Aegis
    scheme (and thus of his guilt or innocence) and a funda-
    mentally fair trial.
    However, as we noted earlier with respect to Dowd,
    the failure of Dunn’s counsel to renew the motion to
    sever at the close of evidence resulted in a waiver of
    this issue that renders the district court’s ruling
    unreviewable. United States v. Phillips, 
    supra,
     
    239 F.3d at 837-40
    . Dunn has made no attempt to show that it would
    have been futile for him to renew his motion and his
    arguments in support thereof at the close of evidence. In
    any case, for the reasons we have already discussed,
    the district court’s notice-to-one/notice-to-the-conspiracy
    rationale, which is the principal if not sole basis on
    which Dunn argues that the joint trial worked to his
    substantial prejudice, did not in fact deprive Dunn or
    any other defendant of a fair trial.
    G. Sufficiency of the Evidence: Fraudulent Tax Returns
    Finally, Dunn contends that the evidence was insuf-
    ficient to establish his guilt on the charges that he
    aided, counseled, or otherwise encouraged the prepara-
    tion of false or fraudulent income tax returns in violation
    of section 7206(2). Much like Hopper’s challenge on
    this point, Dunn’s appeal presumes that the government
    was required to show that he had some kind of personal
    178                  Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    involvement in the preparation of the fraudulent
    tax returns in order for him to be held liable under
    section 7206(2). Dunn concedes that there was a
    videotape of him remarking at an Aegis seminar that
    he had to give direction to tax preparers, but he
    contends that this has been taken out of context. He
    emphasizes the lack of any evidence as to what he
    might have said to any tax preparer, for example. No
    such tax preparer ever testified; and, for that matter,
    no Aegis client whose false returns Dunn was found
    guilty of aiding or assisting ever testified that Dunn
    was involved in the preparation of those returns. In
    short, the jury could only speculate as to what role he
    may have played in the preparation of any tax return
    other than his own, and in Dunn’s view the evidence
    thus was insufficient to support his convictions under
    section 7206(2).20
    20
    Dunn separately suggests that the district court committed
    legal error by denying his Rule 29 motions for a judgment of
    acquittal without explanation. The argument is so cursorily
    made, however, as to have been waived. E.g., United States v.
    Adams, 
    supra,
     
    625 F.3d at 378
    . We would point out, however, that
    the court in its post-trial opinion disposing of the defendants’
    motions for judgments for acquittal and for a new trial did
    address Dunn’s motions to the extent of noting that both
    Dunn and Cover had raised many of the same issues that had
    been argued by defendants Bartoli and Hopper (and which
    the court had expressly addressed), and that the argu-
    ments made in the motions were otherwise inadequately
    (continued...)
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                     179
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    That Dunn did not prepare any of the charged tax
    returns himself does not preclude his convictions
    under section 7206(2). United States v. Hooks, 
    supra,
     
    848 F.2d at 791
    . The plain language of the statute states
    that a person need only knowingly assist or advise the
    preparation or presentation of a false tax return in order
    to be liable. United States v. Clark, 
    577 F.3d 273
    , 285 (5th
    Cir. 2009). It is worth repeating Hooks’ observation that
    “ ‘the scope of the statute extends to all participants of a
    scheme which results in the filing of a false return,
    whether or not those parties actually prepare it.’ ” 
    848 F.2d at 791
     (quoting United States v. Siegel, supra, 
    472 F. Supp. at 444
    ); see also United States v. Fletcher, 
    322 F.3d 508
    , 514-
    15 (8th Cir. 2003) (coll. cases). This includes individuals
    who help to promote a tax avoidance scheme, as the
    Eighth Circuit concluded in Fletcher. The defendant in
    that case had given a series of seminars to promote the
    services of a tax consultation and preparation company,
    James Otis & Company (“JO & C”), which advised its
    clients in the use of trusts and other vehicles as a means
    of allowing individual taxpayers to write off ordinary
    personal expenditures as business expenses—a fraudulent
    scheme not so different from the one that the de-
    fendants promoted in this case. Although the defendant
    had not actually prepared tax returns, the court none-
    20
    (...continued)
    developed with citations to case law or other legal authori-
    ties. R. 650 at 12.
    180                Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    theless sustained his convictions under section 7206(2)
    based on the false tax returns that had been filed on behalf
    of two individuals, James and Ginger McNair, that he had
    successfully recruited as clients of the tax consulting
    company at one of his seminars. “It was as a result of
    attending Mr. Fletcher’s seminar in 1994 that the McNairs
    retained JO & C to implement Mr. Fletcher’s tax strategy
    of converting ordinary personal expenses into business
    expenditures,” the court pointed out. 
    Id. at 515
    . From
    this fact, along with Fletcher’s efforts on one occasion
    to allay the clients’ subsequent concerns as to the legiti-
    macy of the scheme, the court found it reasonable for
    the jury to conclude that he had willfully aided in,
    assisted, procured, counseled, or advised the prepara-
    tion of the false or fraudulent tax returns filed by
    those clients. 
    Id.
    The filing of false tax returns was, as the government
    argues, the “essence” of the tax-avoidance scheme that
    Dunn and the other defendants perpetrated. The Aegis
    trusts were marketed to clients as a means through
    which they could substantially reduce, if not eliminate,
    their individual income tax liability. The filing of federal
    income tax returns purporting to accomplish that end
    was thus the natural, inevitable, and entirely foreseeable
    result of what Dunn and his co-conspirators were doing.
    Dunn, as a promoter of the Aegis system, regularly
    spoke with prospective clients about the sorts of deduc-
    tions they would be able to take on their tax returns by
    making use of the Aegis trusts and the significantly
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,              181
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    reduced taxes they would pay as a result. To cite one
    example, Dunn client David Vermeulen testified that in
    the fall of 1995, Dunn had told him that he would “pay
    a lot less in taxes” by using the Aegis system and could
    use the tax savings to buy a motorcycle, boat, or other
    “toy[ ].” R. 915 Tr. 2472. Dunn also boasted to Agent
    Priess, who posed as prospective client Mike Jordan,
    that another client had saved $300,000 in taxes in just
    one year by using the offshore version of the Aegis
    system. R. 965 Tr. 289-90. In other (covertly recorded)
    conversations, Dunn and Priess discussed the types of
    deductions that Priess might take on his tax returns,
    how much income Priess should report as salary
    on his individual returns, how he might make use of a
    charitable trust, and other issues related to the tax
    returns that Priess would be filing once he began using
    the Aegis system. R. 943 Tr. 221-23; R. 965 Tr. 338-39.
    The sorts of conversations that Dunn had with Priess
    were typical of the interactions that Dunn and his co-
    conspirators had with existing and prospective Aegis
    clients. E.g., R. 959 Tr. 931-32; R. 946 Tr. 1102, 1105;
    R. 967 Tr. 1560, 1574-76.
    Dunn also addressed similar topics at the Aegis promo-
    tion seminars in which he participated. An excerpt from
    one videotaped seminar was played for the jury at trial.
    After speaking at length about how an Aegis client’s
    tax return would look after taking various deductions,
    exemptions, and so forth, Dunn concluded: “So how
    much tax do we pay once we’re set up in this fash-
    ion[?] How much tax do you wanna pay? (Audience
    182                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    laughter.)” R. 914 Tr. 2315-16; Gov’t Ex. Coleman Tr. 17
    (Gov’t Supp. App. 101). Evidence along these lines is
    more than sufficient to support a finding that Dunn,
    in marketing and managing Aegis trusts, not only envi-
    sioned but promoted the fraudulent tax returns that Aegis
    clients ultimately filed based on those trusts. The fact that
    Dunn had the descriptor “Tax Engineering Services”
    printed on his Aegis Management Company letterhead,
    R. 965 Tr. 285; Gov’t Ex. Priess 6, is just one more indica-
    tion that he knew full well that what he was providing
    to Aegis clients was a means of reducing their tax liability.
    In addition to the foregoing evidence, there was addi-
    tional evidence that the defendants—including Dunn—had
    at least some involvement in the preparation of tax
    returns for Aegis clients. Recall that Aegis required its
    clients to use a tax preparer pre-cleared by Aegis for
    at least one year following their purchase of an
    Aegis package. R. 965 Tr. 283; R. 944 Tr. 423; R. 918
    Tr. 4312; R. 921 Tr. 5428-29. One could infer from
    that requirement that the defendants were interested
    in making sure that tax returns would be prepared by
    preparers who were, shall we say, sympathetic to the
    Aegis philosophy. Beyond that, there was evidence that
    Dunn, among other defendants, regularly gave advice
    to tax preparers and accountants as to how a client’s
    income and expenses should be treated on tax returns.
    Dunn himself remarked at a May 1997 seminar that
    “because many accounting people are unfamiliar with
    the process, we are getting to a point where we
    almost have to become CPAs in addition to attorneys to
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                      183
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    be able to teach them how to do the accounting work.”
    R. 914 Tr. 2315; Gov’t Ex. Coleman Tr. 16 (Gov’t Supp.
    App. 100). Dunn urges us not to put too much weight
    on that particular remark. But even if we discard the
    inference that Dunn himself was one of the individuals
    advising others as to the way in which tax returns
    should be prepared, Dunn’s remark at the seminar,
    much like his recorded remarks to Priess about the de-
    ductions Priess would be able to take, demonstrates
    Dunn’s awareness that his own actions in promoting
    and managing Aegis trusts would lead directly to the
    preparation and filing of tax returns that reflected what
    he was saying and doing in furtherance of the charged
    conspiracy. Just as in Fletcher, the jury could reasonably
    find, based on the steps that Dunn took to promote,
    sell, and manage Aegis trusts, that Dunn willfully aided
    in, assisted, procured, counseled, or advised the prepara-
    tion of the false or fraudulent tax returns filed by the
    clients he recruited and served.
    H. Venue in the Northern District of Illinois
    Dunn contends that as to six of the false tax return
    counts in which he was charged, venue was not proper
    in the Northern District of Illinois. Generally speaking, a
    defendant is to be tried in the district where the alleged
    offense was committed. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; Fed. R.
    Crim. P. 18. But an offense that involves multiple
    steps or continues over a period of time may occur in
    multiple districts. Venue as to that type of offense is
    184                Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    proper “in any district in which such offense was
    begun, continued, or completed.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 3237
    (a). The
    preparation of a false tax return can be a multi-district
    offense, as the return may be prepared in one district,
    subscribed to in another district, and filed in a third
    district; venue would thus be appropriate in any of
    these districts. United States v. Marrinson, 
    832 F.2d 1465
    ,
    1475 (7th Cir. 1987). Dunn acknowledges this point, but
    contends that the government did not present evidence
    sufficient to establish where the relevant acts underlying
    a particular tax return took place.
    Viewing the record in the light most favorable to
    the government, e.g., United States v. Ochoa, 
    229 F.3d 631
    ,
    636 (7th Cir. 2000), we are satisfied that a preponderance
    of the evidence, see 
    id.,
     confirms the propriety of venue
    in the Northern District of Illinois as to each of the
    counts in question. Counts 24 through 26 of the indict-
    ment were based on the 1997-1999 tax returns filed for
    Bruce and Tammy Groen, who were clients of Dunn.
    Although, as Dunn reminds us, the Groens themselves
    did not testify, the evidence admitted at trial showed
    that all three returns were prepared and signed by
    CPA Laura Baxter, as evidenced not only by the returns
    themselves but also the recovery of many documents
    related to those returns from Baxter’s office files,
    and Baxter’s office was located in Frankfort, Illinois—a
    municipality within the Northern District of Illinois. The
    evidence thus readily supported the inference that all
    three returns were prepared and subscribed to by their
    preparer in the Northern District of Illinois. Counts 33
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                    185
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    and 34 were based on the 1997 and 1998 tax returns
    filed for Dunn clients John and Colleen McNinney. Like
    the Groens’ returns, these returns were prepared
    and signed by Baxter, as evidenced by the returns them-
    selves as well as documentation recovered from
    Baxter’s office in the Northern District of Illinois. Finally,
    Counts 46 and 47 were based on Dunn’s own returns
    for 1997 and 1998. Those returns were prepared and
    signed by CPA Robert Clausing, as evidenced by his
    signature on the returns as well as extensive documenta-
    tion recovered from his office. Clausing’s office was in
    Lansing, Illinois—again, within the Northern District.
    The evidence was thus more than sufficient to establish
    that each of these counts was based on acts which
    took place within the Northern District of Illinois. Venue
    was therefore proper in that district.
    BARTOLI
    A. Competency to Stand Trial
    Bartoli contends that the district court erred in refusing
    to appoint a defense expert to assess his competency to
    stand trial and to conduct a proper competency hearing
    before commencing with the trial. Although Bartoli was
    examined by an expert agreed to by both Bartoli and the
    government, and that expert concluded that Bartoli was
    competent, Bartoli suggests that the court breached an
    earlier promise to appoint a defense expert and, in any
    case, should have conducted an evidentiary hearing
    before declaring him competent to stand trial.
    186                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    Bartoli’s counsel first sought a competency assess-
    ment pursuant to 
    18 U.S.C. § 4241
    (a) in December
    2007. Counsel had became concerned that Bartoli, then
    seventy-eight years old, was exhibiting poor memory
    and irrational beliefs about the Tax Code. He then
    learned that Bartoli had been preliminarily diagnosed
    with vascular dementia or early-stage Alzheimer’s Dis-
    ease. R. 321. The court granted the request for an evalua-
    tion, but, in the exercise of its authority under 
    18 U.S.C. § 4247
    (b), ordered that Bartoli be committed to the custody
    of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) for purposes of an
    inpatient evaluation by a BOP physician. R. 324; see
    United States v. Shawar, 
    865 F.2d 856
    , 860 n.4 (7th Cir.
    1989). At the government’s suggestion, the court also
    recommended that Bartoli be committed to the U.S.
    Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield,
    Missouri, for evaluation by Dr. Robert L. Denney, a
    forensic psychologist and neuropsychologist. R. 324 at 2
    ¶ 7. The court advised Bartoli’s counsel that if the gov-
    ernment’s physician deemed Bartoli competent, the court
    would appoint another expert of defendant’s choosing
    to conduct a second examination. R. 1042 at 14. Bartoli,
    who was unwilling to be committed to a BOP facility for
    purposes of the evaluation, moved for reconsideration,
    R. 329, arguing that the government had not shown, and
    the court had not found, that it was necessary for Bartoli
    to be committed to BOP custody for purposes of the
    evaluation. The court denied the request for reconsidera-
    tion in relevant part. R. 336; R. 1044. Bartoli then appealed
    the district court’s order to this court. R. 344. However,
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                 187
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    that appeal was dismissed on the joint motion of the
    parties, R. 358, after they reached an agreement for
    Bartoli to be evaluated on an outpatient basis by Diana B.
    Goldstein, Ph.D., Director of Neuropsychology with
    the Isaac Ray Forensic Group in Chicago. On remand,
    the district court acceded to the parties’ choice
    of Dr. Goldstein. R. 362; R. 363; R. 1010. Dr. Goldstein
    evaluated Bartoli and on February 14, 2008, issued a
    detailed, fifteen-page report setting forth her determina-
    tion that Bartoli was competent to stand trial. R. 1090-1.
    Among her findings: Bartoli’s cognitive functioning was
    not significantly impaired; medical tests revealed the
    beginnings of small vessel disease that ultimately could
    disrupt optimal brain function; Bartoli demonstrated
    a full understanding of both the nature of the charges
    against him and the court proceeding, and was able to
    fully participate in that proceeding and collaborate
    with his counsel; and although Bartoli exhibited some
    fatigue and diminished ability to concentrate at the end
    of the day, this should not interfere with his ability to
    work with his attorney on his defense. Id. at 11-13.
    On learning that Goldstein’s report would deem
    Bartoli fit for trial, Bartoli’s counsel filed a motion re-
    questing the appointment of two physicians so that a
    second assessment could be performed. R. 412. The
    motion also requested a continuance of the trial date
    (February 19, 2008), to accommodate both the additional
    assessment and, in the event that assessment reached
    a different conclusion than the first, a competency
    hearing before the court. The court denied the request.
    188                  Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-
    2174 R. 416
    . At the hearing on the motion, the court
    observed preliminarily that Goldstein had been selected
    “by agreement of counsel and as an alternative or as a
    compromise to having Mr. Bartoli go to the Bureau of
    Prisons.” R. 1051 at 69. The court then proceeded to
    independently consider whether a second evaluation
    was warranted and should be ordered in the exercise
    of its discretion. See United States v. Andrews, 
    469 F.3d 1113
    , 1121 (7th Cir. 2006). The court remarked that
    Goldstein’s report was comprehensive, “one of best
    I have seen in a long time.” R. 1051 at 74; see also id. at 69,
    72, 73. It noted that Goldstein’s assessment was based
    on a substantial series of tests, and that much of the
    material she had considered in evaluating Bartoli’s com-
    petency had been provided by Bartoli’s counsel. Bartoli’s
    counsel himself conceded that Goldstein’s examination
    of his client “was comprehensive and thorough.” Id. at
    77. Under these circumstances, the court saw no need
    for a second evaluation:
    So I think that’s the key here. If the Court were not
    confronted with such a comprehensive in-depth
    report, which involved testing by an eminently quali-
    fied forensic group, I would be inclined to say a
    second expert should be brought into the case.
    ***
    And so the expert, Dr. Goldstein, has taken into ac-
    count all of the submissions of Dr. Bartoli, and she
    certainly has gone well beyond all of that in her analy-
    sis and the testing procedures.
    So the motion for a second testing is denied.
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                 189
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-
    2174 R. 1051
     at 77. Subsequently, at the start of the trial, the
    court expressly found Bartoli competent to stand trial,
    taking into consideration Dr. Goldstein’s report as well
    as everything that had been presented by Bartoli’s coun-
    sel. R. 988 Tr. 7.
    The decision whether or not to order a competency
    examination is one that we review for abuse of discretion,
    see Andrews, 
    469 F.3d at 1121
    , and the court in this
    instance did not abuse its discretion by refusing the
    appointment of additional physicians for purposes of a
    second assessment. The premise for Bartoli’s contention
    that the court was obliged to order a second evaluation
    is not that there was some deficiency in Dr. Goldstein’s
    evaluation, which Bartoli’s lawyer agreed was thorough
    and comprehensive, but rather that the court had orig-
    inally committed to the appointment of a second expert
    and examination in the event that the first expert
    found Bartoli competent. But the court made that com-
    mitment in the context of ordering that Bartoli first
    be examined by an expert of the government’s choosing
    at a BOP facility. The context changed significantly
    when, for purposes of resolving Bartoli’s appeal of the
    court’s order, the parties agreed that Bartoli would be
    examined by an expert—Dr. Goldstein—acceptable to
    both of them. Thus, the district court’s understanding—
    one that we share—was that Dr. Goldstein was not the
    government’s expert, but an independent expert sub-
    mitted to by agreement. Because Dr. Goldstein was ap-
    pointed by agreement of the parties, fairness no
    longer dictated that a second expert be permitted as
    190                 Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    a matter of course in the event that Bartoli was
    dissatisfied with the results of the first examination.
    Once Dr. Goldstein concluded that Bartoli was com-
    petent, the pertinent question vis-à-vis the need for a
    second expert was whether there was some reason
    to question the soundness of Dr. Goldstein’s examina-
    tion and conclusion. No such deficiency was cited to
    the district court and none has been cited to us. In
    this context, the district court reasonably concluded
    that a second evaluation was not necessary.
    Bartoli also faults the court for not conducting an evi-
    dentiary hearing before finding him competent, but
    again we find no abuse of discretion in the court’s
    decision to determine his competency without a hear-
    ing. A hearing is required when there is reasonable cause
    to believe that the defendant may be suffering
    from a mental disease or defect that renders him unable
    to understand the nature or consequences of the pro-
    ceedings against him or to properly assist in his defense.
    § 4241(a); see United States v. Grimes, 
    173 F.3d 634
    , 635-36
    (7th Cir. 1999) (coll. cases); United States v. Graves, 
    98 F.3d 258
    , 261-62 (7th Cir. 1996) (evidentiary hearing becomes
    mandatory if, on preliminary inquiry, reasonable cause
    to believe defendant may be incompetent persists). Cer-
    tainly, based on the preliminary diagnosis of Bartoli’s
    physician coupled with the concerns that Bartoli’s counsel
    articulated, there was cause to order an examination
    of Bartoli. But once a thorough evaluation had been
    undertaken by an independent expert, and that expert
    had concluded that Bartoli was competent to stand
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                   191
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    trial, there was no longer reasonable cause to believe
    that Bartoli was incompetent and thus no need for a
    hearing. Dr. Goldstein’s report dispelled the initial
    doubts which had triggered the inquiry into Bartoli’s
    condition. Finally, we note that in finding Bartoli compe-
    tent to stand trial, the court itself took into consideration
    not only Goldstein’s report, but the materials Bartoli’s
    counsel had submitted. So the court’s finding was based
    not simply on the psychologist’s report, but all of the
    circumstances that Bartoli’s counsel deemed relevant to
    the competency determination. R. 988 Tr. 7. We find
    no procedural flaw in the court’s finding.
    B. Statutes of Limitations and Withdrawal
    Bartoli and the other defendants were indicted in
    2004, seven and one-half years after Bartoli retired as
    Aegis’s in-house counsel in 1996 and moved to Myrtle
    Beach, South Carolina. Given his retirement, Bartoli
    contends that the governing statutes of limitations—the
    longest of which is six years—preclude all of the charges
    against him. Of course, the Aegis scheme continued
    into 2002, many years after Bartoli’s retirement as
    Aegis’s counsel; and each of the acts underlying the
    charges of mail, wire, and tax fraud all occurred within
    the relevant limitations period. But, in essence, Bartoli’s
    theory is that his relocation marked his withdrawal
    from the Aegis scheme and thus caused the limitations
    clock to start running much sooner for him than it did
    for his co-defendants. Notwithstanding his retirement,
    192                Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    Bartoli remained a director and part owner of Aegis,
    and he continued to receive distributions of profits from
    its operations until 2002. But he reasons that he was
    not sufficiently involved in the operations of Aegis
    after 1996 to render him liable for any acts of the charged
    conspiracy—including the acts of mail fraud, wire fraud,
    and aiding in the preparation of false or fraudulent tax
    returns—which took place after his retirement and re-
    location. He notes, for example, that he had no hand in
    preparing any of the tax returns underlying the charges
    filed under section 7206(2); in his view, the sole connec-
    tion he had with those returns was that he came up
    with the concept of using the business trust as a tax
    avoidance vehicle five or six years before those returns
    were filed. He adds that, at the time of his retirement,
    it was still entirely plausible to view the Aegis system
    as a lawful and legitimate means of tax reduction. Thus,
    to the extent it was foreseeable to Bartoli in 1996 that
    Aegis clients would be filing income tax returns in sub-
    sequent years based on the Aegis trusts, he insists that
    it was not foreseeable to him that those returns would
    be deemed fraudulent. As he sees things, only after his
    1996 retirement did the clues as to the illegality of the
    system begin to emerge. The IRS did not issue Notice 97-
    24 until April 1997, for example, and the Tax Court
    did not issue its decision in Muhich (concerning the
    legitimiacy of an Aegis-like trust system that Bartoli
    had established) until 1999. And given how minimal
    Bartoli’s involvement with Aegis purportedly was after
    1996, he believes he cannot be held liable on charges
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                   193
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    that were filed more than seven years after he retired
    from Aegis. (He also notes, parenthetically, that changes
    were made in the Aegis trust documents and systems
    subsequent to his retirement.)
    Plainly, Bartoli’s statute-of-limitations claim hinges
    on the notion that he legally withdrew from the alleged
    conspiracy (and any effort to defraud the government of
    its tax income) in 1996. A defendant’s withdrawal from
    a conspiracy does not, in itself, absolve him of criminal
    liability for his (prior) membership in that conspiracy.
    United States v. Nava-Salazar, 
    30 F.3d 788
    , 799 (7th Cir.
    1994); see also United States v. Hughes, 
    191 F.3d 1317
    ,
    1323 (10th Cir. 1999); United States v. Grimmett, 
    150 F.3d 958
    , 961 (8th Cir. 1998). But it can foreclose such
    liability when coupled with the statute of limitations. Nava-
    Salazar, 
    30 F.3d at
    799 (citing United States v. Read, 
    658 F.2d 1225
    , 1232-33 (7th Cir. 1981)). The pertinent question
    is whether Bartoli’s retirement constituted a genuine
    withdrawal from the conspiracy, such that he could
    not be held liable for acts that occurred after that date.
    As we have discussed, simply stopping one’s active
    participation in a conspiracy does not constitute a
    legally meaningful withdrawal from that conspiracy.
    E.g., United States v. Julian, supra, 
    427 F.3d at 483
    .
    You do not absolve yourself of guilt by walking
    away from the ticking bomb. And similarly the law
    will not let you wash your hands of a dangerous
    scheme that you have set in motion and that can
    continue to operate and cause great harm without
    194                  Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    your continued participation. The courts hold that
    for withdrawal to limit a conspirator’s liability . . .
    “mere cessation of activity is not enough . . . there
    must also be affirmative action, either the making of
    a clean breast to the authorities, or communica-
    tion of the abandonment in a manner calculated to
    reach co-conspirators. And the burden of withdrawal
    lies on the defendant.”
    United States v. Patel, 
    879 F.2d 292
    , 294 (7th Cir. 1989)
    (quoting United States v. Borelli, 
    336 F.2d 376
    , 388 (2d Cir.
    1964) (Friendly, J.)); see also United States v. Schiro, 
    679 F.3d 521
    , 528-29 (7th Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed (U.S.
    July 30, 2012) (No. 12-5571); United States v. Paladino, 
    401 F.3d 471
    , 479-80 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Wilson,
    supra, 
    134 F.3d at 863
    . In order to effectuate a genuine
    withdrawal from a conspiracy, a defendant must “termi-
    nate completely his active involvement in the conspiracy,
    as well as take affirmative steps to defeat or disavow the
    conspiracy’s purpose.” United States v. Hargrove, 
    508 F.3d 445
    , 449 (7th Cir. 2007) (emphasis supplied). By his own
    admission, Bartoli did not completely end his active
    involvement with Aegis, let alone take affirmative steps
    to defeat or disavow use of the Aegis trusts. His
    retirement and relocation to South Carolina may have
    signaled a reduced role in the day-to-day operations
    of Aegis (he no longer signed trust documents as
    he had before, for example), but it did not constitute
    a withdrawal from the charged conspiracy. See 
    id. at 449
     (“That [defendant] retired in March 2000 and moved
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                  195
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    to Las Vegas does not by itself mean he withdrew from
    the conspiracy.”)
    On the contrary, there is significant evidence, some
    of which Bartoli himself cites, that he remained involved
    with Aegis, and took steps in furtherance of the charged
    conspiracy, long after his 1996 retirement as Aegis’s
    counsel. He still participated in Aegis seminars, which
    pitched the Aegis trust system to prospective clients, as
    late as May 1997. R. 954 Tr. 5463-64. Vallone and
    Bartoli consulted regularly about various issues related
    to Aegis, and this continued through 2001 and 2002.
    R. 910 Tr. 6226-27. Bartoli participated in Aegis manage-
    ment meetings in the summer and fall of 1999, R. 913
    Tr. 1952-54; he tried to keep the peace between Vallone
    and Hopper after their falling out over what they
    should advise clients in the wake of the Muhich decision,
    R. 913 Tr. 1958; R. 947 Tr. 2122; and on November 12, 1999,
    he signed the resolution indicating that he, Vallone, and
    Hopper shared equal management authority over
    Aegis, R. 910 Tr. 6226. Bartoli was listed as one of three
    managing directors of Aegis in a January 2000 letter
    received by at least two Aegis clients, David Vermeulen
    and Genevieve Riccordino, regarding IRS audits. R. 915
    Tr. 2493; R. 930 Tr. 2882. In a February 11, 2001, email,
    Bartoli noted that he was “still a director [of Aegis]
    along with Michael Vallone. . . .” R. 971 Tr. 4354-55.
    Bartoli, along with Vallone and Hopper, received periodic
    distributions of profits from Aegis. R. 921 Tr. 5401-02.
    He also received occasional checks for his consulting
    services work for Aegis, R. 970 Tr. 3941-43; see also R. 921
    196                Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    Tr. 5399-5401, and he continued to receive these checks
    as late as August 2002, R. 919 Tr. 4663-83; R. 910 Tr. 6226-
    27. And the jury could infer that he was the moving
    force behind the $565 billion class action suit filed by
    Vallone in May 2001 against the IRS and three of
    its agents. R. 971 Tr. 4354-55, 4357-61.
    Bartoli thus did not withdraw from the conspiracy in
    a way that might support his statute of limitations argu-
    ment and preclude his liability for the acts of his co-
    conspirators. The government has a point when it likens
    Bartoli to the man walking away from the ticking
    bomb that we referred to in Patel. Bartoli, after all, was
    the one who pitched the idea of the business trusts to
    his fellow defendants; in a May 15, 2001, email, he re-
    minded Vallone that he (Bartoli) was “the old fart who
    started it all” and that he “want[ed] Dustin Hoffman
    to play [his] part in the movie.” R. 971 Tr. 4356-57. In
    fact, however, Bartoli never walked away from Aegis.
    He remained involved in the company and in the efforts
    to defraud the government, and continued to profit, as
    late as 2002. We remarked earlier with respect to
    Hopper that it was clear from the start that the trust
    system that Bartoli devised did not comply with certain
    fundamental principles of trust and taxation law. Those
    principles did not change over time. But whatever
    Bartoli’s professed belief as to the legality of the Aegis
    trust system may have been at the time of his retire-
    ment as counsel to the firm, he continued his involve-
    ment well after he and the other defendants had direct
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,                  197
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    and specific notice that the government regarded the
    system as an unlawful means of tax evasion.
    The jury was instructed on the concept of withdrawal
    pursuant to an instruction proposed by defendant
    Hopper and joined by Bartoli. R. 936 Tr. 6018; R. 925 Tr.
    7381-82. There was little evidence to support the with-
    drawal defense and much evidence supporting the
    jury’s decision to reject it. The district court did not err
    in denying Bartoli’s motion for a judgment of acquittal
    insofar as it was based on the notion that his claimed
    withdrawal from the conspiracy caused the statutes
    of limitations to run on the charges against him.
    We note finally that to the extent Bartoli, like Hopper
    and Dunn, contends that he had no involvement with,
    and thus cannot be held liable for, the preparation of
    the false or fraudulent tax returns filed by Aegis clients,
    his contention fails for the same reasons. See supra at 148-
    49; 179-82; United States v. Hooks, 
    supra,
     
    848 F.2d at 791
    .
    C. Admission of Evidence Concerning ARDC Pro-
    ceedings Against Bartoli
    Finally, Bartoli contends that the district court erred
    in allowing evidence and argument as to the disbarment
    proceedings against him. Bartoli notes that these pro-
    ceedings were offered to establish his notice of the
    illegality of the Aegis trust system, but the final order of
    disbarment was not issued until May 2002, more
    than two years after the March 2000 IRS raid on Aegis
    198                Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    offices that signaled the beginning of the end of the
    conspiracy; and even the Hearing Board’s recommended
    decision was not issued until February 2000, a month
    before that raid. Moreover, the court allowed the gov-
    ernment to introduce into evidence long, prejudicial
    excerpts from the ARDC hearing—including excerpts
    from the Hearing Board’s summary of Marutzky’s testi-
    mony—during Robinson’s testimony and during the cross-
    examination of Vallone. But Bartoli was not physically
    present at that hearing due to illness and had already
    retired and taken inactive status; so he would not have
    heard the Marutzky testimony or the other evidence
    presented to the Hearing Board. In short, Bartoli views
    this evidence as having little or no probative value in
    terms of his notice as to the dubious legality of the
    Aegis trust system. He believes the evidence served only
    to inflame the jury and to suggest that Bartoli was a
    bad person who must have committed the charged crimes.
    As with the defendants’ joint challenge, we find no
    abuse of discretion by the district court in admitting this
    evidence as to Bartoli. Bartoli himself was the respondent
    in the ARDC proceedings, and there is no dispute that he
    was aware of the proceedings. The charges themselves
    would have alerted Bartoli to the suspect nature of the
    Aegis trusts. Moreover, although he was not present to
    hear the evidence presented to the Hearing Board, he was
    represented by counsel during the proceeding. A jury
    could reasonably infer that his counsel would have ap-
    prised him of the testimony, including that of Marutzky.
    Alternatively, or additionally, a jury might infer that
    Nos. 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246,               199
    08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174
    Bartoli’s ignorance of what occurred during the ARDC
    proceedings, given his status as the respondent, repre-
    sented a willful blindness to the illegality of the Aegis
    system. Moreover, there was evidence that Bartoli, like
    other defendants, remained active in the conspiracy as
    late as 2002, so the fact that the opinion of the ARDC’s
    Hearing Board did not issue until February 16, 2000, does
    not undermine its relevance as notice evidence. (The
    government did not, in fact, introduce or rely upon the
    final disbarment order issued in May 2002.)
    Bartoli points out that although the government
    agreed to redact all references to disbarment from its
    evidence concerning the ARDC proceedings, Dunn’s
    counsel nonetheless characterized the proceedings as
    disbarment proceedings twice during his opening state-
    ment. R. 942 Tr. 128. However, the court instructed the
    jury to disregard those references, R. 942 Tr. 136, and
    given the overwhelming evidence of Bartoli’s guilt, we
    believe it highly unlikely that those references had any
    impact on the jury’s assessment of the evidence.
    III.
    For all of the reasons we have discussed, we A FFIRM
    the defendants’ convictions and sentences.
    9-28-12
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 08-3690, 08-3759, 08-4076, 08-4246, 08-4320, 09-1864 & 09-2174

Citation Numbers: 698 F.3d 416, 2012 WL 4465230, 110 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6110, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 20308

Judges: Rovner, Williams, Young

Filed Date: 9/28/2012

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024

Authorities (149)

Pinkerton v. United States , 66 S. Ct. 1180 ( 1946 )

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Freeman v. United States , 131 S. Ct. 2685 ( 2011 )

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United States v. Siegel , 472 F. Supp. 440 ( 1979 )

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