United States v. Gregory Wolfe ( 2012 )


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  •                             In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 11-3281
    U NITED STATES OF A MERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    G REGORY W OLFE,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.
    No. 2:10-cr-00207-RL-PRC-2—Rudy Lozano, Judge.
    A RGUED S EPTEMBER 19, 2012—D ECIDED D ECEMBER 5, 2012
    Before B AUER, K ANNE, and W OOD , Circuit Judges.
    B AUER, Circuit Judge. Gregory Wolfe was convicted on
    one count of bank theft and one count of interstate trans-
    portation of stolen goods under 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 2113
    (b) and
    2314 for his role in a copper theft scheme. The district
    court sentenced Wolfe to eighty-eight months’ impris-
    onment on each count, to be served concurrently,
    followed by concurrent three-year terms of supervised
    release. The district judge also ordered restitution in the
    2                                            No. 11-3281
    amount of $3,028,011.29. Wolfe appeals, contending that
    he was deprived of a fair trial because of statements the
    prosecutor made during closing argument. Wolfe also
    challenges the sentence he received and the restitution
    order imposed. Finding that Wolfe’s contentions lack
    merit, we affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    Wolfe began working at Katoen Natie (“KTN”) in
    May 2008. KTN is an international company involved in
    the packaging and storing of plastics and various com-
    modities, including aluminum and copper. It has U.S.
    warehouses in Gary, Indiana; Texas; New Jersey; Louisi-
    ana; and California. Wolfe worked at the Gary ware-
    house where his stepfather, Gregory Harris, was the
    operations manager. Wolfe was hired in 2008 as a
    forklift operator but was later given more of a super-
    visory role.
    In late 2008 to early 2009, KTN began storing
    copper for Henry Bath, LLC, at the Gary warehouse.
    Henry Bath’s copper arrived at the warehouse in
    bundles of approximately sixteen to twenty-six copper
    sheets. Each copper sheet was approximately three feet
    long by three feet wide and weighed roughly 330 pounds,
    and the top sheet of every bundle had a sticker
    identifying which lot it was from. The copper is traded
    on the London Metal Exchange (“LME”) by the warrant;
    one warrant is equal to ten bundles. The weight of each
    bundle is an important component of the trading
    process, so LME regulations require each bundle to
    be secured by two bands at all times.
    No. 11-3281                                           3
    Shortly after KTN began storing copper for Henry Bath,
    Harris became the facilities manager, which put him
    in charge of the entire Gary warehouse, and Wolfe
    became the point of contact for the Henry Bath account.
    In 2009, Wolfe had an in-depth conversation
    with Kenneth England, manager of Henry Bath’s
    U.S. operations, about the protocol for banding the
    copper bundles. England informed Wolfe that it was
    KTN’s responsibility to make sure that any bands that
    had become severed during the copper’s transportation
    to the Gary warehouse were immediately repaired. He
    emphasized to Wolfe the importance of each bundle
    being secured by two bands at all times, as per LME
    regulations, in order to prevent copper from being
    stolen from a bundle. England also told Wolfe that
    KTN was not to move any copper in the Gary warehouse
    from the location where it was originally placed—known
    as the “place of rest”—unless it was being shipped out
    or moved to save space within the warehouse.
    Wolfe was also told that, before any copper shipment
    could occur, Henry Bath was required to inform KTN
    about the particular items that would be removed from
    the warehouse and loaded onto a truck. And once a
    truck was loaded but before it left the warehouse, Henry
    Bath was to create a receipt—the “bill of lading”—that
    would be given to the truck driver. Wolfe was also on
    notice that Henry Bath would only generate a bill of
    lading during its normal business hours of 8:00 a.m. to
    4:30 p.m. EST. These copper-shipping procedures were
    reiterated to Wolfe during a seminar at Henry Bath’s
    Baltimore, Maryland, headquarters in January 2010.
    4                                                 No. 11-3281
    The first copper shipments out of the Gary ware-
    house occurred in December 2009. Harris instructed
    Wolfe, who in turn called and directed Craig Olds and
    Jose Morales (lower-level employees at KTN who per-
    formed tasks at Wolfe’s direction), to arrive at the ware-
    house at 3:00 a.m. When Wolfe, Olds, and Morales were
    at the warehouse, two trucks arrived, and the three em-
    ployees loaded certain copper bundles onto the trucks.
    The trucks then left the warehouse. Wolfe testified at
    trial that he participated in two copper shipments like
    this during December 2009.
    During the summer of 2010, Wolfe asked at least five
    KTN employees—regular employees (Olds, Morales, and
    Noel Santos) and temporary help (Julio Virtes and
    Robert Martinez)—whether they would be willing to
    assist with copper re-bundling. 1 Wolfe told the indi-
    viduals that the copper bundles contained too many
    sheets, and they should take the top piece off, remove
    the next sheet or sheets from the stack, and then put the
    top piece back on the stack. This resulted in the creation
    of entirely new copper bundles. The initial plan was to re-
    1
    Olds was the first KTN employee to assist Wolfe with this re-
    bundling process. Harris asked Olds if he would be willing to
    work overtime, to which Olds said yes, and then instructed
    him to speak to Wolfe. Olds assisted Wolfe at 3:00 a.m. on the
    next Saturday morning for roughly twelve hours and the
    next Sunday morning beginning around 3:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m.
    The two men were able to create roughly five new bundles
    of copper that weekend.
    No. 11-3281                                               5
    band the original bundles, but when that proved
    too difficult, the KTN employees simply left the bundles
    with broken bands. The new bundles were moved to
    the back of the warehouse, away from the original
    copper bundles.2
    The KTN employees referred to the copper re-bundling
    as “G-Money’s Project,” “G-Money” being Wolfe’s nick-
    name. Regardless of which employees were assisting at
    the time, some employees removed copper sheets from
    the bundles while others were responsible for moving
    the newly-formed bundles to a different location.
    Wolfe maintained a piece of paper with file num-
    bers—jokingly referred to as Wolfe’s “little black
    book”—that he used to keep track of which copper
    bundles had sheets removed from them. The “project”
    was never completed during normal KTN business
    hours; employees either arrived early or stayed late
    on weekdays or completed the work on week-
    ends. Wolfe told employees who asked him about the
    copper re-bundling that they were “fixing a problem
    for the customer to keep the customer happy” or “not
    to ask questions.”
    2
    The original copper bundles were banded with a “manufac-
    turing band.” These bands were marked with the initials of
    the company factory where the bundles were made. The bands
    on the newly-formed bundles often did not have any manufac-
    turer marks. Wolfe explained this difference by stating that
    the forklift used to move bundles often caused the bands
    to break, so they had to re-band the bundles with new bands.
    6                                           No. 11-3281
    Michael Cohen, who purchased the copper directly
    from Harris on behalf of his business, Team Alliance
    Plastics, sent trucks to the Gary warehouse to pick up
    the copper. The trucks typically arrived at the Gary
    warehouse between 3:00 a.m. and 4:00 a.m. to receive
    the copper loads. Eron Titsworth, a truck driver for
    Team Alliance Plastics, testified that he had a dif-
    ficult time getting through KTN’s security gates on one
    occasion, but after calling Harris, Morales arrived at
    the gate in less than two minutes, and he never again
    had trouble with security. Once the trucks were past
    security, Olds and Morales loaded the trucks in confor-
    mance with the instructions they had received from
    Wolfe regarding which copper bundles to load. The
    truck drivers never received any paperwork from KTN
    in connection with the copper pickups; they created
    their own bills of lading in case they were stopped by
    law enforcement personnel.
    After the copper bundles were loaded onto the trucks,
    the truck drivers transported them from the Gary ware-
    house to the Team Alliance Plastics warehouse in Spring-
    field, Michigan. Upon receipt of the copper shipments,
    Cohen would remove the bands and return them to
    Harris. The copper was then repackaged and sold to
    Stiana, a company located in Toronto, Canada. Cohen
    received approximately $500,000 from Stiana for the
    copper; he paid Harris approximately $360,000. Cohen
    testified that he purchased roughly eleven to fourteen
    trucks’ worth of copper between the first shipment
    of copper in December 2009 and the last shipment
    in September 2010.
    No. 11-3281                                                7
    In late August 2010, Henry Bath conducted a random
    audit of the copper at the Gary warehouse. The auditors
    discovered that the weight of certain warrants was too
    light. Harris was notified of the discrepancies and in-
    formed that the auditors would return in a few
    days to reweigh all of the copper stored in the
    Gary warehouse.
    When the Henry Bath employees returned to the
    Gary warehouse in September 2010, they discovered
    that many of the copper bundles had broken bands and
    were missing at least one sheet of copper. They
    also noticed that seven complete warrants of copper
    that had been at the warehouse during the August 2010
    audit were now missing. Approximately $2,900,000 worth
    of copper—390 metric tons—was missing.3 A review of
    Henry Bath’s records revealed that no copper left the
    Gary warehouse legitimately between August 2009 and
    September 2010. Two days after Henry Bath learned of
    the missing copper, Harris failed to show up for work;
    instead, he sent Frank Vingerhoets, the president
    of KTN, a text message saying he believed he would
    be fired.
    Wolfe was told that day to leave the Gary warehouse
    premises, and Harris and Wolfe were fired.
    On November 18, 2010, a Grand Jury returned a two-
    count indictment against Wolfe and Harris for violating
    
    18 U.S.C. §§ 2113
    (b) and 2314—bank theft and interstate
    3
    This was a relatively small percentage of the 12,000 metric
    tons of copper that were stored in the Gary warehouse.
    8                                                No. 11-3281
    transportation of stolen goods.4 A four-day jury trial
    was later held for Wolfe.
    During the trial, Wolfe claimed he had no knowledge
    of the copper theft scheme; he was simply following
    Harris’ orders and directions. To rebut this defense, the
    Government offered the testimony of Ashby Gurgon,
    Wolfe’s on-and-off girlfriend. Gurgon described Harris
    and Wolfe as living extravagantly during the summer
    of 2010. Gurgon, Wolfe, Harris, and Harris’ mistress
    (Shantel Cottew) frequented bars and clubs in Chicago
    and spent the night at the Peninsula Hotel. They flew
    first class on trips to Puerto Rico and Las Vegas, and rode
    in limousines and party buses. Harris, whose salary was
    approximately $70,000, paid for everything. Examples of
    his expenses during the summer of 2010 include the
    following: $800 in one night for Jäger bomb shots;5 $10,000
    a month for his mistress’ rent in Ogden Dunes, Indiana;
    $2,000 for Gurgon to play a dice game; $2,000 for
    Gurgon’s mortgage; $14,800 (in $100 bills) for a down
    payment on a 2010 Chevrolet Tahoe; $18,000 for a 2007
    Ford Mustang; and “thousands of dollars” for Wolfe’s
    sister Deanna’s wedding.
    4
    At some point in time, JPMorgan Chase purchased Henry
    Bath and, therefore, was the owner of the copper stolen during
    the scheme. As discussed at oral argument, this is the reason
    for the “bank theft” count.
    5
    A Jäger bomb is a cocktail made by dropping a shot (1.5
    ounces) of the alcoholic beverage Jägermeister into a pint
    glass containing half a can of the caffeinated energy drink
    Red Bull.
    No. 11-3281                                                9
    Gurgon also described what she knew about “the busi-
    ness.” 6 She said Wolfe told her that Harris was the leader
    and he was a partner, though he was later demoted and
    called a “soldier” for messing up. When discussing the
    time period after the first audit, Gurgon said that Wolfe
    began working “really hard” during the midnight hours.
    She then described how, after a night out drinking, Wolfe
    told her that Henry Bath would find out what was missing
    and that he could get in a lot of trouble. Gurgon testified
    that Wolfe described the plan for Harris to take all the
    blame and to “go big or go home” before the second audit.
    Additionally, Gurgon said that, after Wolfe was suspended
    from his job with KTN, he spoke to her about his meeting
    with a lawyer and having nothing to worry about because
    he was not in charge of the operation. For Wolfe’s role in
    the business, Gurgon said that Harris agreed to match
    whatever payment Wolfe received from KTN.7 Gurgon also
    said that Wolfe, Harris, and Nick Chorak—another
    KTN employee at the Gary warehouse—were the only
    people who received direct compensation from the
    copper theft.
    6
    Gurgon testified that Wolfe, Harris, and Harris’ mistress
    referred to whatever scheme or illegitimate work they were
    involved in at the Gary warehouse as “the business.”
    7
    Harris paid Wolfe approximately $310 to $350 per week in
    addition to Wolfe’s KTN paycheck. Wolfe claimed Harris
    offered to pay him this amount in order to entice him to work
    at the Gary warehouse, despite the low hourly wage, after
    graduating from high school in 2008.
    10                                               No. 11-3281
    The Government also played a surveillance video
    from the Gary warehouse taken on August 23, 2010, at
    approximately 3:45 a.m. The video showed two trucks
    being loaded and an individual walking along the edge
    of the loading dock. Four witnesses for the Government
    testified that Wolfe was more than likely the man in
    the video; one Government witness said he could not
    identify the man. Wolfe was unable to tell whether he
    was the disputed man in the video, stating, “I— I don’t
    know. I don’t know if it was me. I can’t make a—I don’t
    know.” This was a central issue because Wolfe did not
    punch in until 4:00 a.m.8 Additionally, the video did
    not show any copper in the trucks; it only showed
    dunnage in the back.9
    During closing argument, the Government lawyer
    argued that Wolfe was a knowing participant of the
    scheme from the beginning and his testimony was not
    to be trusted. The prosecutor supported this contention
    by highlighting the fact that Wolfe would not even
    identify himself on the video.
    8
    KTN maintained a timekeeping system to record its em-
    ployee’s arrival and departure times at the Gary warehouse.
    Some employees, including Wolfe, were required to punch
    in; Harris was not.
    9
    Wolfe also instructed Olds and Morales to load dunnage—i.e.,
    waste-like cardboard, broken bands, or old pallets—onto the
    trucks and around the copper bundles to keep the bundles
    from moving during transport. Olds and Morales thought
    this was out of the ordinary given the weight of the bundles.
    No. 11-3281                                             11
    The jury convicted Wolfe on both counts.
    At Wolfe’s sentencing hearing on September 29, 2011,
    the district court accepted the Presentence Investigation
    Report (“PSR”) over Wolfe’s objection and sentenced
    Wolfe to eighty-eight months’ imprisonment on each
    count, to be served concurrently, followed by concurrent
    three-year terms of supervised release. Restitution in
    the amount of $3,028,011.29 was also imposed.
    II. DISCUSSION
    Wolfe challenges statements made by the prosecutor
    during his closing argument, the district court’s deter-
    mination of the victim loss amount attributed to him,
    and the district court’s restitution order. We address
    each challenge in turn.
    A. Closing Argument
    Wolfe claims two categories of improper remarks
    during the Government’s closing argument denied him
    a fair trial: (1) credibility-vouching for the Government’s
    witness, Gurgon; and (2) misstating trial testimony.
    These statements were not objected to at trial, so our
    review is limited to plain error.
    A review of comments by a prosecutor involves a two-
    part inquiry. First, we consider whether the challenged
    remark was improper, and second, whether the remark
    deprived the defendant of a fair trial. United States
    v. Lathrop, 
    634 F.3d 931
    , 939 (7th Cir. 2011). We
    12                                              No. 11-3281
    consider five factors to determine whether the remarks
    prejudiced the defendant: “(1) the nature and seriousness
    of the misconduct; (2) the extent to which the comments
    were invited by the defense; (3) the extent to which
    any prejudice was ameliorated by the court’s instruction
    to the jury; (4) the defense’s opportunity to counter
    any prejudice; and (5) the weight of the evidence sup-
    porting the conviction.” United States v. Adams, 
    628 F.3d 407
    , 418-19 (7th Cir. 2010). The plain error review
    requires Wolfe to demonstrate that the trial’s outcome
    would have been different absent the prosecutor’s re-
    marks. Wolfe faces an uphill battle in making this chal-
    lenge as improper statements during closing argu-
    ment rarely constitute reversible error. United States
    v. Nunez, 
    532 F.3d 645
    , 654 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v.
    Anderson, 
    303 F.3d 847
    , 854 (7th Cir. 2002).
    1. Credibility Vouching Comments
    We have recognized two types of impermissible vouch-
    ing: “a prosecutor may not express her personal belief
    in the truthfulness of a witness, and a prosecutor may
    not imply that facts not before the jury lend a witness
    credibility.” United States v. Alviar, 
    573 F.3d 526
    , 542
    (7th Cir. 2009). A prosecutor may, however, comment on
    a witness’ credibility as long as “the comment reflects
    reasonable inferences from the evidence adduced at
    trial rather than personal opinion.” Nunez, 
    532 F.3d at 654
    (quotations omitted). Wolfe identifies three examples
    of improper vouching, which we now consider.
    No. 11-3281                                                13
    Wolfe’s first challenge is to the following remark:
    I think [Ms. Gurgon] was—and I think you would agree
    with me, hopefully you’ll agree with me, one of the clear-
    est, sharpest witnesses on trial. Obviously she’s a
    very bright person. (emphasis added).
    The Government acknowledges that vouching occurs
    when a prosecutor expresses his own personal belief
    regarding a witness’ credibility. That is exactly what we
    have here. In fact, it is telling that the Government never
    even mentions in its brief the first part of the quote;
    it only mentions the “one of the clearest, sharpest wit-
    nesses on trial” portion. But we still must consider
    whether the improper statement affected the fairness
    of the trial overall, and if so, whether the outcome
    would have been different but for the remark.
    We believe that, at worst, the prosecutor’s comment
    that he hopes the jury will agree with his assessment of
    Gurgon’s testimony was “borderline” inappropriate. See
    United States v. McMath, 
    559 F.3d 657
    , 667 (7th Cir.
    2009) (concluding that the prosecutor’s comment that
    the police officers were “ ‘really credible,’ while tech-
    nically improper vouching, also seem[ed] fairly inno-
    cuous in context.”). Here, the prosecutor immediately
    followed his comment with a reference to Gurgon’s
    trial testimony: “On cross examination, when [defense
    counsel] asked her about the double life, she actually
    said, you know, it wasn’t just a double life; it was a triple
    life. It was the life with me, the life with Ms. Yaw and
    then his life at the warehouse.” Gurgon also testified at
    length and in detail about the summer of 2010 with
    14                                            No. 11-3281
    Wolfe and Harris, in addition to what Wolfe told her
    about the business. In short, the prosecutor should not
    have injected his own personal beliefs into the trial, but
    the evidence supported his characterization and this
    misstep in the context of the entire case does not sup-
    port a finding that Wolfe was denied a fair trial. A
    full discussion of the relevant factors for prejudice
    is unnecessary.
    Wolfe’s next challenge is to the following statement
    in which the prosecutor characterized Gurgon as an
    innocent bystander of the scheme whose testimony
    should be given more weight:
    And unlike Mr. Morales, and unlike Craig Olds, and
    unlike Noel Santos, Ms. Gurgon has no reason to
    shade the truth in this case or to shade her testi-
    mony. She doesn’t have to worry about getting
    charged with anything. She was working—she
    wasn’t working at KTN. She wasn’t involved in this.
    Wolfe contends these statements were improper be-
    cause the Government was implying that it had inde-
    pendently investigated Gurgon’s role in the copper theft
    and cleared her of any wrongdoing, neither of which
    was a fact in evidence, and we agree. The evidence pre-
    sented at trial does not support an inference that Gurgon
    was entirely guilt-free because she did not work at
    KTN—e.g., testimony demonstrated that she benefitted
    from the crime’s financial fruits—but again, this does
    not end the inquiry.
    All of the relevant factors except factor number two
    tip the scale in favor of a finding that Wolfe was not
    prejudiced by the remark. Credibility was a focus of the
    No. 11-3281                                             15
    trial, but whether Gurgon was criminally involved in the
    scheme did not make her testimony any more or less
    believable because she was not testifying pursuant to
    any agreement with the Government. She had no
    extra incentive to testify a certain way. See United States
    v. Clarke, 
    227 F.3d 874
    , 885 (7th Cir. 2000) (describing
    how both sides may argue the competing inferences
    resulting from a witness testifying pursuant to a plea
    agreement). The prosecutor’s comments were neither
    serious nor substantial mistakes.
    Moreover, Wolfe had an opportunity to respond to
    the remark during his closing argument (the Govern-
    ment did not reference it during its rebuttal), and the
    district court instructed the jury before and after
    closing arguments that the attorneys’ statements were
    not to be taken as evidence. (There was no instruction
    immediately following the remark because Wolfe did
    not contemporaneously object at trial.)
    Lastly, the evidence supporting the conviction was
    more than sufficient. Gurgon’s testimony was no doubt
    important, but the testimony of the other witnesses—
    namely, Olds and Morales—firmly establishes Wolfe’s
    knowledge of and participation in the scheme. They
    both described taking orders from Wolfe and being
    told not to question him about the copper. Morales addi-
    tionally described Wolfe as indicating a guilty conscience
    once KTN began to investigate the missing copper, testi-
    fying that Wolfe said, “We’re screwed,” and, “[W]e
    need to get our stories together and make sure we are
    doing the same thing, that we were doing our jobs.”
    16                                              No. 11-3281
    In short, we are not persuaded that Wolfe was prej-
    udiced by the remark, even when considered with the
    first challenged statement.
    Wolfe’s third challenge is to the Government’s descrip-
    tion of Gurgon’s memory:
    And you heard [Gurgon] say she’s got no hard
    feelings against the defendant despite what hap-
    pened in their relationship. Her kids still ask about
    him. She obviously has a memory for detail.
    These remarks lack any indicia of impermissibility, as
    the prosecutor made them shortly after his description
    of Gurgon’s testimony explaining Wolfe’s triple life
    (discussed above). That “triple life” comment alone was
    sufficient to support the inference that Gurgon had a
    memory for detail. See Nunez, 
    532 F.3d at 654
    . Wolfe
    nevertheless directs our attention to United States v.
    Francis, 
    170 F.3d 546
     (6th Cir. 1999), to avoid this conclu-
    sion. 
    Id. at 552
     (concluding that the prosecutor’s comments
    about the defendant’s credibility were impermissible
    because the prosecutor did not provide evidentiary
    examples supporting the inference). He contends
    the sentence about Gurgon’s kids does not support the
    “more general, powerful statement” that Gurgon has a
    memory for detail. We do not read the rule regarding the
    use of trial evidence to support a closing argument charac-
    terization as requiring an attorney to make “bookend”
    comments. An inference made during closing argument
    need not always be introduced, nor immediately
    followed, by a direct reference to the trial record. See
    Soltys v. Costello, 
    520 F.3d 737
    , 745 (7th Cir. 2008) (“At-
    No. 11-3281                                             17
    torneys have more leeway in closing arguments to
    suggest inferences based on the evidence, highlight
    weaknesses in the opponent’s case, and emphasize the
    strengths in their own case.”). References to evidence
    supporting an inference are sufficient if they are made
    contemporaneously; that occurred here.
    2. Trial Testimony Comments
    Misstatement of evidence may be improper prosecu-
    torial conduct. See United States v. Badger, 
    983 F.2d 1443
    ,
    1450-51 (7th Cir. 1993). When discussing the video at
    trial and why Wolfe would not admit he is in the video,
    the prosecution explained that “all the other witnesses”
    identified the man on the video as Wolfe. Wolfe correctly
    points out this was a misstatement of the evidence:
    Titsworth, a truck driver who transported the stolen
    copper on a few occasions, testified that he could not
    positively identify the man at issue in the video. The
    Government argues in response that it did not misstate
    the evidence because, “[n]otwithstanding Titsworth,
    every government witness who could identify the
    first individual shown in the video testified that it
    was Wolfe.” We interpret this clarification as a conces-
    sion that the prosecutor’s remark was indeed a misstate-
    ment of the evidence.
    Again, however, Wolfe is unable to demonstrate that
    he was prejudiced by the prosecutor’s remark. The only
    witness familiar with Wolfe’s appearance who could not
    conclusively identify Wolfe in the video was Wolfe
    himself. The four Government witnesses who identified
    18                                               No. 11-3281
    Wolfe in the video were his boss (Vingerhoets), his
    co-workers (Olds and Morales), and his girlfriend
    (Gurgon)—i.e., the four Government witnesses who
    knew Wolfe well. It is not all that surprising that
    Titsworth, who testified that he had only met Wolfe on
    one prior occasion and incorrectly thought Wolfe’s
    first name was Justin, could not identify who was in
    the video. The Government did not take a “No” and
    turn it into a “Yes;” it merely failed to mention the unfa-
    miliar witness who could not identify the man in the
    video. Even Wolfe’s counsel conceded in his closing
    argument, “And it probably is him [in the video].” We
    do not believe that the remark justifies a new trial.
    B. Victim Loss Amount
    The district court found the victim loss amount attribut-
    able to Wolfe to be $2,947,348. U.S.S.G § 2B1.1(b)(1)(J) calls
    for an 18-level increase if the victim loss is between
    $2,500,000 and $7,000,000, so Wolfe’s offense level cal-
    culation was increased 18 levels. Wolfe claims the victim
    loss calculation was improper because, he says, the evi-
    dence did not support a calculation above $2,500,000.
    Therefore, his offense level should have been 2 levels
    lower. Specifically, Wolfe contends that he was unaware
    of the copper theft in 2009, that the value of the copper
    stolen in 2010 is likely $2,500,000 or less, and that he
    only loaded four trucks. We review the challenged victim
    loss calculation for clear error. United States v. Reese,
    
    666 F.3d 1007
    , 1021 (7th Cir. 2012).
    No. 11-3281                                              19
    The Government called Olds as a witness at the sen-
    tencing hearing. Olds testified that during the 2010 sum-
    mer, copper was loaded, at a minimum, on fifteen
    to eighteen trucks. 1 0 Each truck was believed to transport
    seven bundles of copper, with each bundle weighing
    approximately 6,500 pounds.1 1 Based on these numbers,
    approximately 370 metric tons of copper were stolen
    from the KTN warehouse during the 2010 summer.
    The district court found this testimony credible, as well
    as the testimony that all of the truck loading was done
    at Wolfe’s direction. Wolfe contends this was improper
    because: (1) Olds’ testimony was contested (other testi-
    mony could be interpreted to show 40 metric tons was
    stolen in 2009 and Olds said the total number of metric
    tons stolen during the 2010 summer was 390); (2) the
    district court relied on information from Harris (who
    even the Government acknowledged was not credible);
    (3) and the district court failed to consider Wolfe’s inter-
    pretation of the record.
    We decline to disturb the district court’s credibility
    determinations in this matter. See United States v.
    Smith, 
    576 F.3d 681
    , 687 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[W]e do not
    ‘second-guess the trial judge’s credibility determina-
    tions.’ ” (quoting United States v. French, 
    291 F.3d 945
    ,
    951 (7th Cir. 2002))).
    10
    Olds described one additional occasion when Wolfe and
    Harris personally loaded three trucks, but he could not see
    what they were loading onto the trucks.
    11
    Six thousand five hundred pounds is equal to approximately
    2.948 metric tons.
    20                                              No. 11-3281
    Furthermore, it did not matter how many trucks
    Wolfe personally loaded. Section 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) provides
    that a defendant is accountable for others’ conduct that
    is in furtherance of the criminal activity and reasonably
    foreseeable. See United States v. Sheneman, 
    682 F.3d 623
    ,
    631 (7th Cir. 2012). And regardless of how much copper
    was stolen in December 2009, the district court deter-
    mined Wolfe was a knowing participant from the outset.
    The evidence was sufficient to support a conclusion
    that $2,947,348 of copper (391.941 metric tons) was
    stolen during the entire copper theft scheme and Wolfe
    was a knowing participant from the beginning. The
    losses were reasonably foreseeable to Wolfe, and the
    district court acted reasonably when it accepted the
    PSR’s victim loss calculation.
    C. Restitution
    The district court imposed a restitution order totaling
    $3,028,011.29. Wolfe challenges this amount on the
    ground that it was not supported by the jury’s factual
    findings, a violation of the Sixth Amendment under
    Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
     (2000). Specifically,
    he contends that the recent Supreme Court decision in
    Southern Union Co. v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 
    132 S. Ct. 2344
     (2012), first, requires us to overturn our long-
    standing jurisprudence that restitution is not a criminal
    penalty, and second, mandates that all restitution
    amounts be supported by the jury’s verdict.
    A discussion of the rule of Apprendi and the Southern
    Union decision is necessary to give context to Wolfe’s
    No. 11-3281                                              21
    claims. Apprendi stands for the proposition that, “[o]ther
    than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases
    the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory
    maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved
    beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi, 
    530 U.S. at 490
    .
    “Statutory maximum” has been defined as “the maxi-
    mum sentence a judge can impose without additional
    jury findings.” United States v. Seymour, 
    519 F.3d 700
    ,
    709 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Blakely v. Washington, 
    542 U.S. 296
    , 303-04 (2004)). Other sentencing facts can be found
    by the district court using a preponderance of the
    evidence standard. United States v. Kriegler, 
    628 F.3d 857
    , 863 (7th Cir. 2010). The recent trend, in order
    to circumvent later constitutional concerns, has been to
    submit more facts to the jury. See United States v. Booker,
    
    543 U.S. 220
    , 277-78 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In
    many cases, prosecutors could avoid an [Apprendi]
    problem simply by alleging in the indictment the facts
    necessary to reach the chosen Guidelines sentence.”).
    The Supreme Court continued this trend in Southern
    Union. A jury convicted Southern Union, a natural gas
    distributor, on one count of violating the Resource Con-
    servation and Recovery Act of 1976, which allowed for
    the imposition of a fine not more than $50,000 per
    day of violating the Act. Southern Union, 
    132 S. Ct. at 2349
    . The probation office determined Southern Union
    had violated the Act for 762 days, so a maximum fine
    of $38.1 million was appropriate. 
    Id.
     The district court
    imposed a $6 million fine, plus a “community service
    obligatio[n]” of $12 million. 
    Id.
     Southern Union argued
    that Apprendi applied to criminal fines, and because
    22                                                No. 11-3281
    the jury was only required to find a violation for one
    day (the jury verdict form only listed the violation’s
    start date), the district court’s imposition of a fine
    greater than the $50,000 single-day penalty required
    extra fact-finding in violation of Apprendi. 
    Id.
     The Gov-
    ernment contended that Apprendi did not apply to
    criminal fines. 
    Id.
     The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
    First Circuit accepted the Government’s argument and
    upheld the fine. 
    Id.
    The Supreme Court reversed, holding that “the rule
    of Apprendi applies to the imposition of criminal fines.”
    
    Id. at 2357
    . The Court stated that it had never dis-
    tinguished between types of punishments—e.g., sen-
    tences, penalties, or punishments—and “[w]here a fine
    is substantial enough to trigger a party’s [Sixth Amend-
    ment jury trial right], Apprendi applies in full.” 
    Id.
     at 2351-
    52. In response to the Government’s policy concerns,
    the Court concluded that applying Apprendi to criminal
    fines was simply an expected extension of the doctrine.
    
    Id. at 2357
    .
    We review an Apprendi challenge de novo. Seymour,
    
    519 F.3d at 709
    . However, Wolfe failed to object to the
    restitution order on Apprendi grounds in the district
    court, so the Government argues we should review his
    argument for plain error. See United States v. Fluker,
    Nos. 11-1013, 11-3008 & 11-3082, 
    2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 22219
    , at *34 (7th Cir. Oct. 26 2012) (stating that we
    review a sentencing challenge for plain error if it was not
    made in the district court). Wolfe points out, and a
    review of our case law demonstrates, a disputed question
    No. 11-3281                                                 23
    as to which standard should be applied to an Apprendi
    challenge if the issue was not raised in the district court.
    Citing United States v. Kamoga, 
    177 F.3d 617
    , 622 n.5 (7th
    Cir. 1999), Wolfe contends we should apply a de novo
    review because the question before us is purely legal—i.e.,
    whether restitution is a criminal penalty, subject to
    Apprendi.
    An Apprendi challenge is reviewed for plain error if it
    was not made in the district court.1 2 See United States v.
    Hernandez, 
    330 F.3d 964
    , 979 (7th Cir. 2003). Accordingly,
    we review Wolfe’s Apprendi argument for plain error.
    Now to the merits of Wolfe’s argument:
    Wolfe argues that his restitution order is similar to the
    criminal fine in Southern Union because the order is a “life-
    long payment burden.” Yet, the only way Southern
    Union may affect the outcome of this case is if we first
    conclude restitution is a criminal penalty. (If so, the
    issue becomes whether Southern Union’s holding that
    Apprendi applies to criminal fines should extend to
    another type of criminal penalty: restitution.) Reaching
    12
    To the extent Wolfe believes that we should create an excep-
    tion to this rule because of the Government’s contention that
    a legal argument on appeal based on a subsequent Supreme
    Court case can never present a “clear or obvious” error, we
    do not need to decide this issue because the result here is the
    same regardless of which standard of review is applied. See
    United States v. Boden, 
    854 F.2d 983
    , 990 n.2 (7th Cir. 1988)
    (stating that “[i]n almost all cases, including this one, the
    result will be the same under any standard”).
    24                                               No. 11-3281
    such a conclusion, however, would be in direct opposi-
    tion to this Circuit’s well-established precedent that
    restitution is not a criminal penalty. See United States
    v. Bonner, 
    522 F.3d 804
    , 807 (7th Cir. 2008); see also
    United States v. LaGrou Distrib. Sys., Inc., 
    466 F.3d 585
    ,
    593 (7th Cir. 2006) (“We reiterate: restitution is not a
    penalty for a crime for Apprendi purposes since restitu-
    tion for harm done is a classic civil remedy that is ad-
    ministered for convenience by the courts that have
    entered criminal convictions.” (internal quotation marks
    omitted)). Wolfe admitted this at oral argument and
    conceded that we would have to overrule our precedent
    to find in his favor.
    Having examined our sister circuits who have
    addressed whether restitution is civil or criminal in
    nature, we find ourselves in the minority. Only the
    Eighth and Tenth Circuits, like us, have found restitution
    to be civil in nature. See United States v. Millot, 
    433 F.3d 1057
    , 1062 (8th Cir. 2006) (stating that restitution orders
    “are not in the nature of a criminal penalty.” (quoting
    United States v. Carruth, 
    418 F.3d 900
    , 904 (8th Cir. 2005)));
    United States v. Nichols, 
    169 F.3d 1255
    , 1279-80 (10th Cir.
    1999) (stating that the purpose of restitution under
    the Victim Witness Protection Act “is not to punish de-
    fendants or provide a windfall for crime victims but
    rather to ensure that victims, to the greatest extent possi-
    ble, are made whole for their losses.” (quoting United
    States v. Arutunoff, 
    1 F.3d 1112
    , 1121 (10th Cir. 1993))).
    But a “compelling reason” is required to overrule our
    Circuit’s precedent. United States v. Kendrick, 
    647 F.3d 732
    ,
    No. 11-3281                                             25
    734 (7th Cir. 2011). Being in the minority is not enough.
    This is true even if the trend is against us. See Patel v.
    Holder, 
    563 F.3d 565
    , 569-71 (7th Cir. 2009) (Ripple, J.,
    concurring) (agreeing with the court’s judgment because
    it was based on this Circuit’s precedent but writing
    separately to discuss how our interpretation of the
    statute “puts us on the distinct minority side of an
    intercircuit split”); but see Russ v. Watts, 
    414 F.3d 783
    ,
    788 (7th Cir. 2005) (describing why we may overturn our
    Circuit precedent if no other circuit accepts it (quoting
    United States v. Hill, 
    48 F.3d 228
    , 232 (7th Cir. 1995))).
    Wolfe’s only other arguments as to why we should treat
    restitution as a criminal penalty are that the Supreme
    Court referred to restitution as a “criminal punishment”
    in Pasquantino v. United States, 
    544 U.S. 349
    , 365 (2005),
    the restitution order is a “significant infringement
    on [his] freedom,” and Apprendi should be “extended
    broadly.”
    We have already rejected the Pasquantino argument,
    so that argument is unavailing. See Bonner, 
    522 F.3d at 807
    . Likewise, whether a court judgment infringes
    upon someone’s life does not make the judgment inher-
    ently criminal. For example, a defendant who is found
    liable in a civil tort case could also be on the hook for
    a significant damage award. See, e.g., Kimberlin v. DeLong,
    
    637 N.E.2d 121
    , 129 (Ind. 1994) (upholding a $1,610,000
    jury verdict against the defendant in an intentional tort
    case). That type of award would surely infringe upon
    an individual’s financial freedom, but no one would
    argue that the damage award, imposed under the
    same preponderance of the evidence standard Wolfe
    26                                          No. 11-3281
    essentially contests, invokes any Sixth Amendment con-
    cerns. And the degree to which Apprendi is extended
    has little value when answering the initial question
    before us: whether restitution is a criminal penalty. As
    we stated, Southern Union and the scope of Apprendi
    only come into consideration if we first conclude resti-
    tution is a criminal penalty. We decline to reach such
    a conclusion.
    Wolfe has not provided us with a compelling reason
    as to why the holding in Southern Union—or this case
    in general— should be used as the vehicle to overturn
    our long-standing Circuit precedent that restitution
    is not a criminal penalty. The district court’s restitu-
    tion order was not required to be supported by the
    jury’s fact-finding, and therefore, it did not violate
    Wolfe’s Sixth Amendment rights.
    III. CONCLUSION
    We A FFIRM the judgment of the district court for the
    reasons discussed above.
    12-5-12