NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 25, 2013
Decided February 26, 2013
Before
WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge
No. 12‐3176
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appeal from the United States
Plaintiff‐Appellee, District Court for the Southern
District of Illinois.
v.
No. 3:02‐cr‐30086‐GPM‐1
RONALD E. BLAKE,
Defendant‐Appellant. G. Patrick Murphy,
Judge.
O R D E R
Ronald Blake is serving a sentence for distribution of crack cocaine. He appeals the district
court’s denial of his motion for a reduced sentence pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) based on
retroactive changes to the crack cocaine sentencing guidelines. We affirm.
This is Blake’s fifth appeal related to his sentence for a 2003 conviction for distributing
cocaine base in violation of
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B). In light of that conviction
and prior convictions for a crime of violence and a controlled substance offense, the district
No. 12‐3176 Page 2
court concluded that Blake was a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 and sentenced him to
360 months’ imprisonment. We affirmed Blake’s conviction in 2005 but ordered a limited
remand with respect to Blake’s sentence following United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220,
125 S.Ct.
738,
160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), pursuant to United States v. Paladino,
401 F.3d 471, 484 (7th Cir.
2005). See United States v. Blake,
415 F.3d 625 (7th Cir. 2005). The district judge indicated that
he would have imposed a different sentence had he known that the Sentencing Guidelines were
advisory, so we vacated Blake’s sentence and remanded for re‐sentencing. See United States v.
Blake, No. 03‐3716,
146 Fed. Appx. 851 (7th Cir. 2005) (unpublished).
At Blake’s re‐sentencing, after taking into account Blake’s career offender status, as well
as his intervention in an attack on a correctional officer by another inmate, the district court
imposed a sentence of 210 months’ imprisonment. Blake appealed, and we once again
remanded the case for re‐sentencing after concluding that Blake had not been given his right
of allocution during his re‐sentencing hearing. See United States v. Blake, No. 06‐3390,
227 Fed.
Appx. 506 (7th Cir. 2007) (unpublished). On remand, the district court again imposed a
sentence of 210 months’ imprisonment. Blake raised several challenges to his sentence on
appeal, and we remanded the case in light of Kimbrough v. United States,
552 U.S. 85,
128 S.Ct.
558,
169 L.Ed.2d 481 (2007), because we could not be certain from the record whether the
district judge would have imposed a lesser sentence had he known that he was free to consider
the sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine offenses. See United States v. Blake,
No. 07‐3279,
289 Fed. Appx. 118 (7th Cir. 2008) (unpublished). The district judge re‐sentenced
Blake to a term of 168 months’ imprisonment after adopting all of his findings from the
previous sentencing hearings, including the determination that Blake qualified as a career
offender, and considering the sentencing disparity between crack and powder cocaine. We
affirmed this sentence on appeal. See United States v. Blake, No. 08‐3814 (7th Cir. June 23, 2009).
Following passage of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 and the retroactive reduction in the
crack cocaine sentencing guidelines in 2011, Blake filed a motion to reduce his sentence
pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). The district court denied the motion, concluding that it
lacked jurisdiction to consider the request because Blake’s sentencing guidelines range was
based on his classification as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, not the guidelines
applicable to crack offenses under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1. Blake’s subsequent motion for
reconsideration was also denied by the district court, and Blake timely appealed. We review
de novo a district court’s determination of whether a sentence is legally eligible for discretionary
relief under § 3582(c)(2). United States v. Dixon,
687 F.3d 356, 358 (7th Cir. 2012) (citations
omitted).
We agree with the district court that Blake is not eligible for a sentence reduction under 18
§ 3582(c)(2). Section 3582(c)(2) authorizes a sentencing reduction if a defendant’s sentence was
No. 12‐3176 Page 3
based on a sentencing range subsequently lowered and made retroactive by the Sentencing
Commission. See Dillon v. United States, —U.S.—,
130 S.Ct. 2683, 2687,
177 L.Ed.2d 271 (2010)
(quoting § 3582(c)(2)). A district court may reduce a sentence under § 3582(c)(2) only if two
conditions are met: “(1) the original sentence was ‘based on a sentencing range that has
subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission,’ and (2) ‘such a reduction is
consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission [,]’ namely
§ 1B1.10(a).” United States v. Davis,
682 F.3d 596, 609‐10 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing
18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(2); United States v. Guyton,
636 F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 2011); U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(a)(2), p.s.
(Nov. 2011)). “If the first condition is not met, a district court lacks subject‐matter jurisdiction
to consider the movant’s request for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2).” Id. at 610 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
Here, throughout Blake’s numerous sentencings, appeals, and re‐sentencings, Blake’s
classification as a career offender remained unchanged, and that classification determined his
applicable sentencing guidelines range even though the district judge ultimately sentenced
Blake below that guidelines range. See Guyton,
636 F.3d at 318‐20 (holding that the applicable
guidelines range for the purposes of § 3582(c) is the range before the district court makes any
departures). Accordingly, Blake was not sentenced “based on a sentencing range that has
subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission,”
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), and he is
not eligible for a reduction. See Guyton,
636 F.3d at 318; United States v. Jackson,
573 F.3d 398,
399‐400) (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Forman,
553 F.3d 585, 590 (7th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
