Haley, Nathan v. Feinerman, Adrian , 168 F. App'x 113 ( 2006 )


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  •                             UNPUBLISHED ORDER
    Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Argued October 18, 2005
    Decided February 24, 2006
    Before
    Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge
    Hon. MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge
    Hon. ANN CLAIRE WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge
    No. 04-3823
    NATHAN HALEY,                                Appeal from the United States District
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                     Court for the Southern District of
    Illinois
    v.
    No. 03:01-CV-574-WDS
    DR. ADRIAN FEINERMAN
    and DR. JAMES KRIEG,                         William D. Stiehl,
    Defendants-Appellees.                   Judge.
    ORDER
    Nathan Haley brought suit under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     against two prison doctors
    alleging that their deliberate indifference to his broken arm necessitated surgery to
    re-break the arm and free a compressed nerve. The district court granted summary
    judgment in favor of both doctors because it found no evidence that the doctors were
    indifferent or disregarded Haley’s injury. Haley appeals arguing that the district
    court improperly weighed the evidence. We affirm the district court’s judgment as
    to both defendants.
    On August 6, 2000, Haley broke his upper arm while playing touch football
    with other inmates at Menard Correctional Center. Defendant Dr. James Krieg, a
    doctor who worked in the prison infirmary, examined an x-ray of Haley’s arm the
    No. 04-3823                                                                  Page 2
    next day and observed that the bone was offset by two centimeters, and he treated
    it with a “hanging cast” that allows gravity to pull the bones into alignment. A
    week after the first examination, Dr. Krieg saw Haley again and noted that the
    bone was still misaligned by one centimeter and that Haley complained his hand
    was numb. Defendant Dr. Adrian Feinerman, Menard’s medical director, reviewed
    Dr. Krieg’s notes two weeks after the injury occurred and called Dr. Jose Ramon, an
    orthopedist, to discuss the fracture. They agreed, based on Dr. Krieg’s notes, that
    the injury was a routine fracture and that any numbness was probably due to a
    bruise. Dr. Ramon recommended using a sling in addition to the hanging cast to
    help reduce movement. Haley remained in the cast for approximately five more
    weeks. Dr. Krieg continued to examine Haley approximately once a week during
    this period.
    Several days after the cast was removed Haley returned to the infirmary
    complaining of pain near the fracture. The nurses noted a “deformity” of the left
    arm and that Haley could not fully extend his arm because of the pain. An x-ray
    taken a week later revealed that the bone fracture had shifted two centimeters from
    center. Dr. Krieg recommended that Dr. Feinerman consult with an orthopedist
    about Haley’s injury. A week later (about ten weeks after the accident and two
    weeks after the cast was removed) Haley met with Dr. Feinerman for the first time
    to discuss Dr. Krieg’s recommendation. Dr. Feinerman made an appointment for
    Haley to see Dr. Ramon, the orthopedist that Dr. Feinerman had already consulted
    about Haley’s case.
    Dr. Ramon examined Haley and recommended either surgery or use of a bone
    stimulator to treat the bone’s faulty union. Although Haley originally chose the
    bone stimulator, he changed his mind five days later when he learned that he would
    need to be confined to the infirmary for four weeks. According to Dr. Feinerman’s
    notes in Haley’s medical records, Dr. Feinerman again consulted with Dr. Ramon,
    who changed his recommendation. He now recommended that Haley remain in a
    sling for another three months with continuous monitoring. The medical records do
    not explain why Dr. Ramon changed his recommendation.
    Approximately one month later–over four months after the injury–Dr.
    Feinerman examined Haley for the first time and could feel that the fracture was
    still “unstable,” so he scheduled a second visit with Dr. Ramon. Several weeks after
    that, Haley met with Dr. Ramon, who diagnosed Haley with an entrapped radial
    nerve and recommended that a neurosurgeon examine Haley to evaluate the injury
    for a surgery to re-break the arm and release the trapped nerve. Haley was
    examined by several specialists, and finally underwent surgery four months
    later–eight months after the initial injury.
    Dr. Harvey Mirly, the doctor who performed the surgery, testified in an
    No. 04-3823                                                                     Page 3
    affidavit for Haley that there was an obvious deformity when he examined the arm
    before surgery and that the operation was made more difficult by the degree of
    “healing” that had occurred since the injury. Dr. Mirly’s affidavit did not state that
    the increased healing or the deformity were the result of poor medical care. Haley
    continued to complain of pain and numbness for nearly a year after the surgery.
    Haley brought this action against Drs. Feinerman and Krieg. The doctors
    filed a motion for summary judgment in which they argued, as relevant here, that
    their actions refute Haley’s claim of deliberate indifference because Haley
    underwent extensive medical treatment, was allowed to see a specialist, and that
    the doctors followed the specialist’s advice. The district court agreed that Haley
    received “comprehensive and ongoing care” for his injury, and that the allegations
    “do not approach” a constitutional violation.
    A district court’s entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo with facts
    read in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Green v. Butler, 
    420 F.3d 689
    , 694 (7th Cir. 2005). To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim, the prisoner
    must demonstrate that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious
    medical condition. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; Pierson v. Hartley, 
    391 F.3d 898
    , 902
    (7th Cir. 2004). Deliberate indifference is established when the plaintiff shows that
    the medical condition from which he suffered is objectively serious and that
    responsible prison officials knew of, but disregarded, the need for treatment. 
    Id.
    The parties do not dispute that Haley suffered a serious medical condition.
    The issue rather is whether the district court properly applied the subjective test
    under Farmer v. Brennan, 
    511 U.S. 825
    , 837 (1994). Haley contends that the
    doctors were aware that nerve damage was possible and that it could cause pain
    and numbness, but ignored the risk and continued treatments that they knew were
    ineffective. Moreover, he contends that because they pursued this course of action,
    he required surgery to correct the improperly healed bone and suffered unnecessary
    pain.
    Haley believes this case is analogous to Sherrod v. Lingle, 
    223 F.3d 605
     (7th
    Cir. 2000), in which the court found that the prison medical staff showed deliberate
    indifference to an inmate’s complaints of pain, which turned out to be the result of
    an inflamed appendix. In Sherrod, the prisoner went to the infirmary complaining
    of abdominal pain; the nurse gave him an enema and aspirin, both of which proved
    ineffective. 
    Id. at 608
    . The prisoner continued to complain of abdominal pain along
    with other symptoms that the nurses recognized were consistent with appendicitis,
    but he was never allowed to go to the hospital. 
    Id. at 608-09
    . Eventually the
    appendix burst. 
    Id.
     We held that the prisoner was not required to show that he
    was “literally ignored” by the medical staff. 
    Id. at 610-12
    . He only needed to
    No. 04-3823                                                                     Page 4
    demonstrate that prison officials knew there was an excessive medical risk and
    disregarded that risk. 
    Id.
    Haley argues that, like the doctors in Sherrod, his doctors knew of the risk of
    a serious medical condition–in this case a trapped nerve and a faulty union of the
    bone–but did not take appropriate steps to correct the deformation. He contends
    that treating the broken arm with a hanging cast, Motrin, and a sling was
    equivalent to treating appendicitis with an enema and aspirin. As in Sherrod, the
    doctors’ regular treatments failed to focus on a problem that ultimately developed
    into a more serious (and painful) medical condition.
    Haley attempts to appeal to common sense because the doctors must have
    been deliberately indifferent if it took them eight months to determine that a broken
    arm was not healing correctly, but he has not supplied any medical evidence to
    support his position. Haley has the burden to designate specific facts that show
    there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
    477 U.S. 317
    , 324 (1986); Fisher v. Lovejoy, 
    414 F.3d 659
    , 661 (7th Cir. 2005). Doctors
    Feinerman and Krieg have offered the only evidence that addresses the proper
    medical standards in this case. Haley simply has not provided evidence that creates
    a material issue of whether the doctors were deliberately indifferent.
    Haley complains that the eight-month delay between his injury and the
    surgery in itself demonstrates deliberate indifference. But the only delay that could
    be deemed unreasonable was the time between Dr. Ramon’s second recommendation
    and the surgery that took place four months later (eight months after the injury)
    because by then Dr. Feinerman was certainly aware of a serious medical
    condition–the trapped nerve and misaligned bone–and the delay in treatment may
    have been needless. And Dr. Mirly’s affidavit established that the delay caused
    unnecessary “healing,” which resulted in a more difficult surgery. See Langston v.
    Peters, 
    100 F.3d 1235
    , 1240 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[A]n inmate who complains that delay
    in medical treatment rose to constitutional violation must place verifying medical
    evidence in the record to establish the detrimental effect of delay in medical
    treatment to succeed.” (emphasis in original) (quoting Beyerbach v. Sears, 
    49 F.3d 1324
    , 1326 (8th Cir. 1995)).
    But the primary reason for this delay was that Haley was being evaluated in
    preparation for surgery. During these four months, Feinerman scheduled
    examinations by a neurosurgeon and another doctor who performed additional tests
    that were recommended by the neurosurgeon. Dr. Mirly also examined the arm
    prior to the surgery. Prisoners are not entitled to the best possible care, only
    reasonable measures to meet a substantial risk of serious harm; we do not believe
    this delay rose to the level of deliberate indifference. Forbes v. Edgar, 
    112 F.3d 262
    ,
    267 (7th Cir. 1997).
    No. 04-3823                                                                   Page 5
    To establish that Drs. Feinerman and Krieg were deliberately indifferent
    Haley must demonstrate that they failed to act despite the knowledge of a
    substantial risk of serious harm. Walker v. Benjamin, 
    293 F.3d 1030
    , 1037 (7th Cir.
    2002). Haley points to Dr. Mirly’s affidavit stating that there was “an obvious
    deformity about the left humerus” at the time he operated on it as evidence that Drs.
    Feinerman and Krieg should have been aware of a substantial risk. Haley also
    points to Dr. Krieg’s notes early in the treatment stating that there was an “ulnar
    neuropathy” as evidence that he knew the nerve was going to become trapped.
    Neither Dr. Mirly’s affidavit nor Dr. Krieg’s notes support Haley’s position.
    The fact that the deformity was obvious when Dr. Mirly operated on it does not
    support the inference that Haley was improperly treated. Similarly, Haley has not
    supplied evidence that the possible nerve damage that Dr. Krieg noted made a
    trapped nerve the obvious and inevitable result. All the evidence shows is that Dr.
    Krieg exercised his medical judgment to determine that a hanging cast would allow
    the arm to heal properly. Cole v. Fromm, 
    94 F.3d 254
    , 260-61 (7th Cir. 1996)
    (rejecting argument that medical staff must take precautions against all possible
    risks). Moreover, Dr. Krieg’s medical judgment was fully supported by Dr.
    Ramon–the orthopedic specialist. Haley produces no evidence that Drs. Feinerman
    or Krieg failed to respond to an obvious injury, which is the standard required to
    constitute deliberate indifference. Farmer, 
    511 U.S. at 837
    ; Pierson, 
    391 F.3d at 902
    .
    Haley also argues that there was no evidence that Dr. Feinerman consulted
    with Dr. Ramon after Haley chose not to use the bone stimulator. We have held that
    failing to follow specialists’ advice can be cruel and unusual. Jones v. Simek, 
    193 F.3d 485
    , 490 (7th Cir. 1999). But Haley’s medical record includes Dr. Feinerman’s
    notes stating that Dr. Ramon recommended that Haley remain in a sling with
    follow-up monitoring. Although it is not clear from the record why Dr. Ramon
    changed his original recommendation, Haley did not supply any evidence to
    contradict the medical record. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Walker v. Shansky, 
    28 F.3d 666
    ,
    670-71 (7th Cir. 1994). Haley cannot fault Dr. Feinerman for following the
    recommendation of a specialist. 
    Id.
    We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the
    doctors.