Beul, Kristin v. ASSE Int'l, Inc. ( 2000 )


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  • In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 99-3978
    Kristin Beul, et al.,
    Plaintiffs-Appellees,
    v.
    ASSE International, Inc., et al.,
    Defendants-Appellants,
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
    No. 98-C-426--Myron L. Gordon, Judge.
    Argued September 7, 2000--Decided November 15,
    2000
    Before Bauer, Posner, and Evans, Circuit
    Judges.
    Posner, Circuit Judge. In this diversity
    suit for negligence, governed (so far as
    the substantive issues are concerned) by
    Wisconsin law, the jury returned a
    verdict finding that plaintiff Kristin
    Beul’s damages were $1,100,000 and that
    she was 41 percent responsible for them;
    in accordance with the verdict, judgment
    was entered against defendant ASSE
    International for $649,000 (59 percent of
    $1.1 million). The other parties can be
    ignored. The appeal raises issues of both
    tort law and civil procedure.
    The defendant is a nonprofit corporation
    that operates international student
    exchange programs. For a fee of $2,000 it
    placed Kristin, a 16-year-old German girl
    who wanted to spend a year in the United
    States, with the Bruce family of Fort
    Atkinson, Wisconsin. The family, which
    consisted of Richard Bruce, age 40, his
    wife, and their 13-year-old daughter, had
    been selected by Marianne Breber, the
    defendant’s Area Representative in the
    part of the state that includes Fort
    Atkinson. Breber is described in the
    briefs as a "volunteer," not an employee;
    the only payment she receives from ASSE
    is reimbursement of her expenses. Nothing
    in the appeal, however, turns either on
    her "volunteer" status or on ASSE’s
    nonprofit status. Charities are not
    immune from tort liability in Wisconsin,
    Kojis v. Doctors Hospital, 
    107 N.W.2d 131
    (Wis. 1961), and ASSE does not deny that
    if Breber was negligent it is liable for
    her negligence under the doctrine of
    respondeat superior, even though she was
    not an employee of ASSE. The doctrine is
    nowadays usually described as making an
    employer liable for the torts of his
    employees committed within the scope of
    their employment, but strictly speaking
    the liability is that of a "master" for
    the torts of his "servant" and it extends
    to situations in which the servant is not
    an employee, provided that he is acting
    in a similar role, albeit as a volunteer.
    E.g., Heims v. Hanke, 
    93 N.W.2d 455
    , 457-
    58 (Wis. 1958), overruled on other
    grounds by Butzow v. Wausau Memorial
    Hospital, 
    187 N.W.2d 349
    , 353-54 (Wis.
    1971); Morgan v. Veterans of Foreign
    Wars, 
    565 N.E.2d 73
    , 77 (Ill. App. 1990);
    Restatement (Second) of Agency sec. 225
    (1958). In Morgan, as in this case, the
    defendant was a charity.
    There is also no argument that the
    contract between ASSE and Kristin’s
    parents is the exclusive source of ASSE’s
    legal duties to Kristin. Negligence in
    the performance of a contract that
    foreseeably results in personal injury,
    including as here emotional distress, is
    actionable under tort law. See, e.g.,
    Kuehn v. Childrens Hospital, 
    119 F.3d 1296
     (7th Cir. 1997). As we pointed out
    in Rardin v. T & D Machine Handling,
    Inc., 
    890 F.2d 24
    , 29 (7th Cir. 1989),
    "tort law is a field largely shaped by
    the special considerations involved in
    personal-injury cases, as contract law is
    not. Tort doctrines are, therefore, prima
    facie more suitable for the governance of
    such cases than contract doctrines are"
    even when victim and injurer are linked
    by contract. See also Fireman’s Fund
    American Ins. Cos. v. Burns Electronic
    Security Services, Inc., 
    417 N.E.2d 131
    ,
    134 (Ill. App. 1980).
    As the sponsor of a foreign exchange
    student, ASSE was subject to regulations
    of the United States Information Agency
    that require sponsors to train their
    agents, "monitor the progress and welfare
    of the exchange visit," and require a
    "regular schedule of personal contact
    with the student and host family." 22
    C.F.R. sec.sec. 514.10(e)(2), 514.25
    (d)(1), (4) (now sec.sec. 62.10(e)(2),
    62.25(d)(1), (4)). These regulations are
    intended for the protection of the
    visitor, see "Exchange Visitor Program,"
    
    58 Fed. Reg. 15,180
    , 15,190 (1993)
    (statement of USIA accompanying
    promulgation of 26 C.F.R. sec. 514.25),
    and the jury was therefore properly
    instructed, under standard tort
    principles not challenged by ASSE, that
    it could consider the violation of them
    as evidence of negligence. There is no
    argument that the regulations create a
    private federal right of suit that would
    allow the plaintiffs to sue ASSE under
    the federal-question jurisdiction of the
    federal courts (and we have found no case
    suggesting there is such a right), or
    that Wisconsin is legally obligated to
    use the regulations to define the duty of
    care of a sponsor sued under state tort
    law. (In other words, there is no
    argument that the federal regulations
    have preemptive force in state tort
    litigation.) But the district court was
    entitled to conclude that a state court
    would look to the regulations for
    evidence of the sponsor’s duty of care.
    Courts in tort cases commonly take their
    cues from statutes or regulations
    intended to protect the safety of the
    class to which the tort plaintiff
    belongs. See, e.g., Bennett v. Larsen
    Co., 
    348 N.W.2d 540
    , 548-49 (Wis. 1984).
    ASSE is also a member of a private
    association of sponsors of foreign
    exchange students, the Council on
    Standards for International Educational
    Travel, which requires members to
    "maintain thorough, accurate, and
    continual communication with host
    families and school authorities." A jury
    could reasonably consider the Council’s
    statement as additional evidence of the
    standard of care applicable to sponsors
    and it could also accept the plaintiff’s
    argument that due care required Breber to
    try to develop rapport with Kristin so
    that Kristin would trust and confide in
    her and so that Breber could pick up any
    signals of something amiss that Kristin
    might be embarrassed to mention unless
    pressed.
    Kristin Beul arrived in Wisconsin from
    Germany on September 7, 1995, and was met
    at the airport by Richard Bruce and his
    daughter. Marianne Breber did not go to
    the airport to meet Kristin. In fact,
    apart from a brief orientation meeting at
    a shopping mall in September with Kristin
    and one other foreign exchange student,
    at which Breber gave Kristin her phone
    number, she didn’t meet with Kristin
    until January 21 of the following year--
    under unusual circumstances, as we’ll
    see. She did call the Bruce home a few
    times during this period and spoke
    briefly with Kristin once or twice, but
    she made no effort to make sure that
    Kristin was alone when they spoke. She
    would ask in these calls how Kristin was
    doing and Kristin would reply that
    everything was fine. Breber did not talk
    to Mrs. Bruce, who would have told her
    that she was concerned that her husband
    seemed to be developing an inappropriate
    relationship with Kristin.
    Kristin had led a sheltered life in
    Germany. She had had no sexual
    experiences at all and in fact had had
    only two dates in her lifetime. On
    November 17, 1995, Richard Bruce, who
    weighed almost 300 pounds and who was
    alone at home at the time except for
    Kristin, came into the loft area in which
    she slept and raped her.
    This was the start of a protracted
    sexual relationship. In the months that
    followed, Bruce frequently would call the
    high school that Kristin was attending
    and report her ill. Then, with Mrs. Bruce
    off at work and the Bruce’s daughter at
    school, Bruce would have sex with
    Kristin. By February 22, Kristin had been
    absent 27 days from school. Bruce
    brandished a gun and told      Kristin that
    he would kill himself if she told anyone
    what they were doing together.
    Curiously, in January Bruce and Kristin
    called Marianne Breber and told her that
    Mrs. Bruce appeared to be jealous of the
    time that her husband was spending with
    Kristin. Bruce invited Breber to dinner
    on January 21. Breber did not meet
    privately with either Kristin or Mrs.
    Bruce on that occasion, and she observed
    nothing untoward. In February, however,
    Mrs. Bruce told Breber that she and her
    husband were getting divorced, and Breber
    forthwith found another host family to
    take in Kristin. Kristin didn’t want to
    leave the Bruce home, but on February 22
    Breber arrived there with a sheriff’s
    deputy to remove Kristin. The deputy
    asked Kristin in the presence of Richard
    Bruce and his daughter whether there was
    any inappropriate sexual activity between
    Richard and Kristin, and Kristin answered
    "no." The same day Breber, upon calling
    Kristin’s school to tell them that
    Kristin would be out for a few days in
    connection with her change of residence,
    learned for the first time of Kristin’s
    many absences.
    Kristin lived with Breber for a few days
    between host families, but Breber didn’t
    use the occasion to inquire about any
    possible sexual relationship between
    Kristin and Bruce. Breber told the new
    host family that Kristin was not to
    contact Bruce for a month, but she did
    not tell Bruce not to have any contact
    with Kristin. They continued to
    correspond and talk on the phone. Kristin
    had decided that she was in love with
    Bruce and considered herself engaged to
    him.
    In April, Mrs. Bruce discovered some of
    Kristin’s love letters and alerted the
    authorities. A sheriff’s deputy
    interviewed Bruce. The next day Bruce,
    who had committed a misdemeanor by having
    sex with a 16 year old, Wis. Stat. sec.
    948.09, killed himself, leaving a note
    expressing fear of jail. It is undisputed
    that the events culminating in Bruce’s
    suicide inflicted serious psychological
    harm on Kristin; the jury’s assessment of
    her damages is not claimed to be
    excessive.
    The defendant argues that it was
    entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
    or alternatively to a new trial because
    of trial error. The first argument
    divides into three: there was
    insufficient proof of a causal
    relationship between the defendant’s
    negligence in failing to keep closer tabs
    on Kristin Beul and her sexual
    involvement with Bruce culminating in his
    suicide; Bruce’s criminal activity was
    the sole, or superseding, cause of her
    harm; and the harm was too "remote" in a
    legal sense from the defendant’s failure
    of due care to support liability.
    Since Kristin was determined to conceal
    her relationship with Bruce, the
    defendant argues, no amount of care by
    Breber would have warded off the harm
    that befell Kristin; she would have
    stonewalled, however pertinacious Breber
    had been in her questioning. This is
    conceivable, and if true would let ASSE
    off the hook; if there was no causal
    relation between the defendant’s
    negligence and the plaintiff’s harm,
    there was no tort. E.g., Merco
    Distributing Corp. v. Commercial Police
    Alarm Co., 
    267 N.W.2d 652
     (Wis. 1978);
    Vastola v. Connecticut Protective System,
    Inc., 
    47 A.2d 844
    , 845 (Conn. 1946);
    Guthrie v. American Protection
    Industries, 
    206 Cal. Rptr. 834
    , 836 (Cal.
    App. 1984).
    But it is improbable, and the jury was
    certainly not required to buy the
    argument. Suppose Breber had inquired
    from the school how Kristin was doing--a
    natural question to ask about a foreigner
    plunged into an American high school. She
    would have learned of the numerous
    absences, would (if minimally alert) have
    inquired about them from Kristin, and
    would have learned that Kristin had been
    "ill" and that Richard Bruce had been
    home and taken care of her. At that point
    the secret would have started to unravel.
    As for the argument that Bruce’s
    misconduct was so egregious as to let
    ASSE off the hook, it is true that the
    doctrine of "superseding cause" can
    excuse a negligent defendant. Suicide by
    a sane person, unless clearly foreseeable
    by the tortfeasor, for example a
    psychiatrist treating a depressed person,
    is a traditional example of the operation
    of the doctrine. E.g., McMahon v. St.
    Croix Falls School District, 
    596 N.W.2d 875
    , 879 (Wis. App. 1999); Wyke v. Polk
    County School Board, 
    129 F.3d 560
    , 574-75
    (11th Cir. 1997); Bruzga v. PMR
    Architects, P.C., 
    693 A.2d 401
     (N.H.
    1997); Edwards v. Tardif, 
    692 A.2d 1266
    ,
    1269 (Conn. 1997); W. Page Keeton et al.,
    Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts
    sec. 44, p. 311 (5th ed. 1984). So if
    Bruce’s boss had refused him a raise and
    Bruce had responded by killing himself,
    the boss even if somehow negligent in
    failing to give him the raise would not
    be considered the legal cause of the
    death. Or if through the carelessness of
    the driver a truck spilled a toxic
    substance and a passerby scraped it up
    and poisoned his mother-in-law with it,
    the driver would not be liable to the
    mother-in-law’s estate; the son-in-law’s
    criminal act would be deemed a
    superseding cause. See Giebel v.
    Richards, 
    591 N.W.2d 901
     (Wis. App.
    1999); Henry v. Merck & Co., 
    877 F.2d 1489
    , 1494-97 (10th Cir. 1989); Rowe v.
    State Bank of Lombard, 
    531 N.E.2d 1358
    ,
    1368 (Ill. 1988); Shelton v. Board of
    Regents, 
    320 N.W.2d 748
    , 752-53 (Neb.
    1982).
    Animating the doctrine is the idea that
    it is unreasonable to make a person
    liable for such improbable consequences
    of negligent activity as could hardly
    figure in his deciding how careful he
    should be. Cf. Schuster v. Altenberg, 
    424 N.W.2d 159
    , 165 (Wis. 1988). The doctrine
    is not applied, therefore, when the duty
    of care claimed to have been violated is
    precisely a duty to protect against
    ordinarily unforeseeable conduct, as in
    our earlier example of a psychiatrist
    treating depression. The existence of the
    duty presupposes a probable, therefore a
    foreseeable, consequence of its breach.
    (All that "foreseeable" means in tort law
    is probable ex ante, that is, before the
    injury that is the basis of the tort
    suit.) Thus a hospital that fails to
    maintain a careful watch over patients
    known to be suicidal is not excused by
    the doctrine of superseding cause from
    liability for a suicide, e.g., DeMontiney
    v. Desert Manor Convalescent Center, 
    695 P.2d 255
    , 259-60 (Ariz. 1985), any more
    than a zoo can escape liability for
    allowing a tiger to escape and maul
    people on the ground that the tiger is
    the superseding cause of the mauling.
    City of Mangum v. Brownlee, 
    75 P.2d 174
    (Okla. 1938); see also Scorza v.
    Martinez, 
    683 So. 2d 1115
    , 1117 (Fla.
    App. 1996); Behrens v. Bertram Mills
    Circus, Ltd., [1957] 2 Q.B. 1, 1 All E.R.
    583 (1957).
    So Kristin’s high school would not have
    been liable for the consequences of
    Bruce’s sexual activity with Kristin even
    if the school should have reported her
    frequent absences to Breber; the criminal
    activities with their bizarre suicide
    sequel were not foreseeable by the
    school. But part of ASSE’s duty and
    Breber’s function was to protect foreign
    girls and boys from sexual hanky-panky
    initiated by members of host families.
    Especially when a teenage girl is brought
    to live with strangers in a foreign
    country, the risk of inappropriate sexual
    activity is not so slight that the
    organization charged by the girl’s
    parents with the safety of their daughter
    can be excused as a matter of law from
    making a responsible effort to minimize
    the risk. See, e.g., Niece v. Elmview
    Group Home, 
    929 P.2d 420
    , 427 (Wash.
    1997); R.E. v. Alaska, 
    878 P.2d 1341
    ,
    1346-48 (Alaska 1994); Juarez v. Boy
    Scouts of America, Inc., 
    97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 12
    , 31 (Cal. App. 2000); Phillips v.
    Deihm, 
    541 N.W.2d 566
    , 573 (Mich. App.
    1995). Sexual abuse by stepfathers is not
    uncommon, see, e.g., Diana E.H. Russell,
    "The Prevalance and Seriousness of
    Incestuous Abuse: Stepfathers vs.
    Biological Fathers," 8 Child Abuse &
    Neglect 15 (1984), and the husband in a
    host family has an analogous relationship
    to a teenage visitor living with the
    family.
    It is true (we turn now to the issue of
    remoteness) that when through the
    negligence of an alarm company, to which
    ASSE in its role as protector of foreign
    students from the sexual attentions of
    members of host families might perhaps be
    analogized, a fire or burglary is not
    averted or controlled in time, the
    company is generally not liable for the
    consequences; the consequences are deemed
    too remote. E.g., Edwards v. Honeywell,
    Inc., 
    50 F.3d 484
    , 491 (7th Cir. 1995);
    Fireman’s Fund American Ins. Cos. v.
    Burns Electronic Security Services, Inc.,
    supra, 417 N.E.2d at 132-33; cf.
    Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Morse Signal
    Devices, 
    198 Cal. Rptr. 756
    , 760 (Cal.
    App. 1984); see also Heitsch v. Hampton,
    
    423 N.W.2d 297
    , 299 (Mich. App. 1988).
    There are two related considerations. One
    is that so many factors outside the alarm
    company’s control determine the
    likelihood and consequences (whether in
    property loss or personal injury) of a
    failure of its alarm to summon prompt aid
    on a particular occasion that the company
    is bound to lack the information that it
    needs to determine what level of care to
    take to prevent a failure of its system.
    See, e.g., Guthrie v. American Protection
    Industries, supra, 206 Cal. Rptr. at 836.
    This basis of the doctrine is the same as
    that of the doctrine of superseding
    cause. A harm is not foreseeable in the
    contemplation of the law if the injurer
    lacked the information he needed to
    determine whether he must use special
    care to avert the harm. See, e.g., Lodge
    v. Arett Sales Corp., 
    717 A.2d 215
    , 223
    (Conn. 1998). The second point is that
    the alarm company is not the primary
    accident avoider but merely a backup, and
    the principal responsibility for avoiding
    disaster lies with the victim. See, e.g.,
    Rardin v. T & D Machine Handling, Inc.,
    supra, 
    890 F.2d at 27
    ; EVRA Corp. v.
    Swiss Bank Corp., 
    673 F.2d 951
    , 957-58
    (7th Cir. 1982). The points are related
    because both involve the difficulty a
    backup or secondary protector against
    disaster has in figuring out the
    consequence of a lapse on its part.
    Neither point supports ASSE, which was
    standing in the shoes of the parents of a
    young girl living in a stranger’s home
    far from her homeland and could
    reasonably be expected to exercise the
    kind of care that the parents themselves
    would exercise if they could to protect
    their 16-year-old daughter from the
    sexual pitfalls that lie about a girl of
    that age in those circumstances. ASSE
    assumed a primary role in the protection
    of the girl.
    So the plaintiff was entitled to get to
    the jury, and we turn to the two alleged
    errors in the procedure at trial. The
    first concerns the judge’s response to a
    question submitted to him by the jury
    during its deliberations. To try to
    discipline the jury’s thinking, Wisconsin
    makes the submission of a special verdict
    the default rule in all civil cases. Wis.
    Stat. sec. 805.12(1) and Judicial Council
    Committee’s 1974 Note thereto; see
    Anderson v. Seelow, 
    271 N.W. 844
    , 846
    (Wis. 1937). In a negligence case,
    therefore, the jury will be asked to
    enter separately on the verdict form the
    amount of damages and the percentage of
    the plaintiff’s comparative fault and not
    make the "bottom line" computation, which
    involves deducting from the amount of
    damages that amount times the plaintiff’s
    percentage of comparative fault. The fear
    is that the jury will fill in the bottom
    line first and then work backwards,
    failing to give due consideration to the
    significance of the plaintiff’s fault.
    McGowan v. Story, 
    234 N.W.2d 325
    , 329
    (Wis. 1975). The question the jury asked
    the judge in this case was, "What bearing
    do the negligence factors have on the
    amounts we may or may not choose to
    award?" The judge’s answer, given after
    consultation with the lawyers, was that
    "the comparison factor, if you find both
    parties negligent, has a significant
    impact upon the award that the Court
    enters. . . . If you answer the
    comparison question, then it is a problem
    that’s presented to the Court as to . .
    . how to apply those percentages to the
    damages." ASSE argues that this answer
    was inconsistent with the policy of
    Wisconsin law of keeping the jury from
    working backwards from the bottom line in
    completing the rest of the special
    verdict.
    In making this argument ASSE assumes
    that the federal district court in a
    diversity case is bound not only by
    Wisconsin’s presumption in favor of the
    use of special verdicts but also by
    whatever standard Wisconsin courts use to
    determine how a judge should respond to a
    jury’s question arising from the use of a
    special verdict. That is incorrect.
    Wisconsin’s affection for the special
    verdict is not limited to a particular
    area of law, which would suggest that it
    was motivated by a desire to shape
    substantive policy in that area. Compare
    Herremans v. Carrera Designs, Inc., 
    157 F.3d 1118
    , 1123 (7th Cir. 1998); Harbor
    Ins. Co. v. Continental Bank Corp., 
    922 F.2d 357
    , 364 (7th Cir. 1990). Rules of
    general applicability and purely
    managerial character governing the jury,
    such as the form in which a civil jury is
    instructed, are quintessentially
    procedural for purposes of the Erie rule.
    See, e.g., Odekirk v. Sears Roebuck &
    Co., 
    274 F.2d 441
    , 445 (7th Cir. 1960);
    Turlington v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 
    795 F.2d 434
    , 441 (5th Cir. 1986); Seltzer v.
    Chesley, 
    512 F.2d 1030
    , 1035 (9th Cir.
    1975); 9A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R.
    Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
    sec. 2555, p. 432 (1995). They are
    therefore supplied by federal law in
    diversity as in all other federal cases.
    But supplied by what federal law here?
    Rule 49(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
    Procedure authorizes but does not direct
    the use of special verdicts, and this is
    the rule that federal courts are to
    follow, as the cases hold without
    exception. E.g., Sadowski v. Bombardier
    Ltd., 
    539 F.2d 615
    , 622 (7th Cir. 1976);
    Geosearch, Inc. v. Howell Petroleum
    Corp., 
    819 F.2d 521
    , 527 (5th Cir. 1987);
    Shultz v. Rice, 
    809 F.2d 643
    , 650 (10th
    Cir. 1986); DeEugenio v. Allis-Chalmers
    Mfg. Co., 
    210 F.2d 409
    , 414-15 (3d Cir.
    1954); Lang v. Rogney, 
    201 F.2d 88
    , 97
    (8th Cir. 1953); 9A Wright & Miller,
    supra, sec. 2502, pp. 154-55. We think it
    follows that whether the federal court
    should try to keep the jury in the dark
    about the legal effect of the jury’s
    answers to the questions posed to it by
    the special verdict is also a question of
    federal law, whether viewed as an
    interpretation of Rule 49(a) or as the
    creation of a federal common law of
    special verdicts to supplement the rule.
    E.g., Thedorf v. Lipsey, 
    237 F.2d 190
    (7th Cir. 1956); Carvalho v. Raybestos-
    Manhattan, Inc., 
    794 F.2d 454
    , 457 n. 2
    (9th Cir. 1986); Lowery v. Clouse, 
    348 F.2d 252
    , 260-61 (8th Cir. 1965).
    Although the cases (particularly in this
    court) make clear that the judge has no
    general duty to inform the jury of the
    legal consequences of its verdict, see,
    e.g., Freeman v. Chicago Park District,
    
    189 F.3d 613
    , 616 (7th Cir. 1999), and
    intimate that in some circumstances the
    giving of such information might
    interfere with the jury’s appraisal of
    the facts, e.g., Gullett v. St. Paul Fire
    & Marine Ins. Co., 
    446 F.2d 1100
    , 1105
    (7th Cir. 1971), there is no rule against
    giving the information, Simms v. Village
    of Albion, 
    115 F.3d 1098
    , 1107 (2d Cir.
    1997); Lowery v. Clouse, 
    supra,
     
    348 F.2d at 261
    ; 9A Wright & Miller, supra, sec.
    2509, p. 198, nor have we found any case
    in which the giving of it was held to be
    a reversible error. In fact, we find it
    difficult to conceive of such a case. As
    Lowery points out, since the judge could
    submit to the jury instead of a special
    verdict a general verdict with special
    interrogatories, a form of verdict that
    would reveal to the jury the legal
    consequences of its specific findings,
    there is no purpose in forbidding him to
    do the same thing with a special verdict.
    All this is rather to one side of the
    present case, since in the particular
    circumstances presented here it is
    apparent that the judge gave as good an
    answer to the jury’s question as he could
    have done, and a better answer than
    saying nothing and leaving the jury
    confused. Cf. Bollenbach v. United
    States, 
    326 U.S. 607
    , 612-13 (1946);
    Davis v. Greer, 
    675 F.2d 141
    , 145 (7th
    Cir. 1982); Testa v. Wal-Mart Stores,
    Inc., 
    144 F.3d 173
    , 176 (1st Cir. 1998).
    He made clear in the second part of his
    answer that the jurors were not to make
    the bottom-line computation. Had he said
    in the first part that their answer to
    the question of comparative fault would
    have no or an insignificant impact on the
    damages award, that might have been an
    invitation to them not to take it
    seriously; but he did not do that.
    The defendant also complains about the
    following instruction to the jury:
    "You’re instructed that the law of
    Wisconsin does not allow a child under
    the age of 18 to consent to an act of
    intercourse." This was a reference to the
    state’s statutory rape law, but it was
    not elaborated further. The jury was
    instructed to consider the instructions
    as a whole and another instruction was
    that it was to consider Kristin’s
    comparative fault. The jury assessed that
    fault at 41 percent, so obviously it did
    not think the age-of-consent instruction
    prevented it from considering Kristin’s
    responsibility for the harm that befell
    her as a consequence of her sexual
    relationship with Bruce.
    But should the jury have been told what
    the age of consent is in Wisconsin and,
    if so, was the information conveyed to
    the jury in the right way? The answer to
    the first question is yes. The age of
    consent fixed by a state represents a
    legislative judgment about the maturity
    of girls in matters of sex. Eighteen is a
    pretty high age of consent by today’s
    standards and of course the law was not
    fixed by reference to German girls; but
    it is nonetheless a reminder that teenage
    children are not considered fully
    responsible in sexual matters, and this
    was something relevant to the jury’s
    consideration of Kristin’s share of
    responsibility for the disaster. The
    criminal law is frequently used to set a
    standard of care for civil tort cases--
    for the general principle, see, e.g.,
    Bennett v. Larsen Co., supra, 348 N.W.2d
    at 548; Cutsforth v. Kinzua Corp., 
    517 P.2d 640
    , 647 (Ore. 1973); Southern
    Pacific Co. v. Watkins, 
    435 P.2d 498
    , 511
    (Nev. 1967), and for its application to
    age of consent see Doe v. Greenville
    Hospital System, 
    448 S.E.2d 564
    , 566
    (S.C. App. 1994); cf. Mary M. v. North
    Lawrence Community School Corp., 
    131 F.3d 1220
    , 1227 (7th Cir. 1997)--and that was
    essentially the use made of it here. It
    would have been error to instruct the
    jury that because Kristin was below the
    age of consent her comparative fault must
    be reckoned at zero. That would have
    given too much force to the criminal
    statute in this civil case, for the
    statute cannot be considered a
    legislative judgment that minors are
    utterly incapable of avoiding becoming
    ensnared in sexual relationships. A
    comparative-fault rule, moreover,
    requires gradations of victim
    responsibility that are alien to the
    normal criminal prohibition. Victim fault
    is not a defense, either partial or
    complete, to criminal liability. It is
    not a defense to a charge of rape that,
    for example, the victim was dressed
    provocatively, or drunk, or otherwise
    careless in the circumstances in which
    the rape occurred.
    It would have been better, though, if
    the jury had been told how it should take
    the age of consent into account in their
    deliberations. It should have been told
    that in deciding how much responsibility
    to assign to Kristin for the events that
    gave rise to the harm for which she was
    suing, it could consider that the state
    had made a judgment that girls below the
    age of 18 should be protected by the
    criminal law from sexual activity even if
    they agree to it. As it was, the jury was
    left to tease out the relation between
    the age-of-consent instruction and the
    comparative-fault instruction for itself.
    But we cannot think that it was other
    than a harmless error. Indeed, we are
    surprised that the jury assigned so large
    a responsibility to this young foreign
    girl virtually abandoned by the agency
    that was standing in for her parents. The
    jury verdict was rather favorable to the
    defendant than otherwise.
    Affirmed.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 99-3978

Judges: Per Curiam

Filed Date: 11/15/2000

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/24/2015

Authorities (32)

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