Int'l Truck Engine v. United Steel 3740 ( 2002 )


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  •                              In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 01-4067
    INTERNATIONAL TRUCK AND ENGINE CORP.,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    UNITED STEEL WORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 3740,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
    No. 01 C 31—John W. Reynolds, Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED MAY 22, 2002—DECIDED JUNE 21, 2002
    ____________
    Before POSNER, KANNE, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.
    POSNER, Circuit Judge. The plaintiff, a company that man-
    ufactures steel castings, fired one of its foundry workers
    for refusing to submit to a drug test. The defendant union
    took the matter to arbitration, pursuant to its collective bar-
    gaining agreement with the company, and won. The com-
    pany brought suit under section 301 of the Taft-Hartley Act,
    29 U.S.C. § 185, to set aside the arbitrator’s award; lost; and
    appeals, arguing that the arbitrator, rather than interpret-
    ing the agreement, in effect rewrote it; but conceding as
    it must that as long as the arbitrator was interpreting the
    2                                                No. 01-4067
    parties’ contract rather than basing decision “on some body
    of thought, or feeling, or policy, or law that is outside the
    contract,” Ethyl Corp. v. United Steelworkers of America, 
    768 F.2d 180
    , 184-85 (7th Cir. 1985), the award must stand even
    if the arbitrator’s interpretation was actually a misinterpre-
    tation. E.g., Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine
    Workers of America, District 17, 
    531 U.S. 57
    , 62 (2000). Only
    if “there is no possible interpretive route to the award,
    so [that] a noncontractual basis can be inferred,” may the
    award be set aside. Chicago Typographical Union No. 16 v.
    Chicago Sun-Times, Inc., 
    935 F.2d 1501
    , 1506 (7th Cir. 1991).
    The collective bargaining agreement states that “where the
    Company has reasonable cause to believe that an employee
    is under the influence of drugs . . . the employee will
    be required to submit to a test of his/her urine and/or
    blood . . . . Refusal by an employee to consent to a test for
    the presence of drugs . . . or to otherwise fully cooperate
    in an investigation involving drugs pursuant to this policy
    will constitute insubordination and result in immediate ter-
    mination.” After receiving anonymous phone calls accus-
    ing an employee named Cox of trafficking in illegal drugs,
    and observing him at meetings in which he appeared to be
    under the influence of drugs, the company’s director of
    human resources, Vandermale, decided there was reason-
    able cause to require Cox to take a blood or urine test for
    drugs. But to make assurance doubly sure he had the out-
    side of Cox’s car, and the area of the foundry in which
    Cox (though others as well) worked, swept by a machine
    that detects drugs by contact with any surface that contains
    drug residue. This “environmental” test detected cocaine
    in both places swept, whereupon Vandermale asked Cox
    to submit to a blood or urine test plus an environmental test
    of the outside of his clothing. Upon his refusing, the com-
    pany fired him for failing to cooperate in an investigation
    involving drugs.
    No. 01-4067                                                  3
    The arbitrator interpreted the passage we quoted from
    the collective bargaining agreement to permit the company
    to require an employee to take a urine or blood test for
    drugs only if there is reasonable cause to believe him under
    the influence of drugs at the very moment he is asked to take
    it; and the company concedes that it had no reason to be-
    lieve Cox under the influence of drugs at the moment
    Vandermale asked him to submit to the tests. The arbitra-
    tor’s interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement
    is narrow, literalistic, and quite possibly wrong, especially
    when one considers how dangerous foundry work is and
    how dangerous therefore a foundry worker high on cocaine
    is to himself and his fellow workers. A blood or urine test
    based on reasonable cause to believe that a worker is an in-
    termittent user of cocaine though not necessarily under its
    influence at the instant he was asked to take the test—no
    one is under the influence of drugs all the time—would be
    a reasonable safety measure, since it would detect recent
    use, indicating a nontrivial probability that the worker is
    sometimes high at work.
    But the fact that the arbitrator chose to interpret the par-
    ties’ agreement literally (more precisely, adopted the nar-
    rowest possible literal meaning, for it would have done
    no violence to the text to interpret “is under the influence”
    as denoting intermittent use over a longer period than the
    instant at which the worker is asked to take the test), ig-
    noring contextual factors that pointed to the wisdom of
    a somewhat broader interpretation, hardly shows that he
    was not really interpreting the agreement but instead was
    off on a frolic of his own, disregarding the contract in fa-
    vor of his own views of labor relations or workplace safety.
    Of this there is no indication in his long and careful opinion.
    The company indulges in paradox in attacking the opin-
    ion as too literal; we are cited to no cases in which an attack
    4                                                 No. 01-4067
    based on such a ground has succeeded. For while literal in-
    terpretations are often wrong (as we noted recently in Bean-
    stalk Group, Inc. v. AM General Corp., 
    283 F.3d 856
    , 859-61
    (7th Cir. 2002)), they are wrong because the interpreter un-
    derstood the task of interpretation set him by the parties
    too narrowly. That mistake (which would be no mistake
    if the parties wanted him to stick to the words of the doc-
    ument to be interpreted) is at the opposite end of the error
    spectrum from the mistake of interpreting a document so
    broadly that the intentions of the parties and the manifesta-
    tion of those intentions in the written word are set aside in
    favor of the arbitrator’s own idea of how the parties should
    have arranged their affairs. Taken far enough, loose inter-
    pretation can be as unhinged from the parties’ intentions
    and expression as the interpretation of a dream can be from
    the dream’s true meaning (if there is such a thing)—so
    unhinged as to show that really there is no possible inter-
    pretive route from the document purportedly interpreted
    to the conclusion reached. But, to repeat, if the arbitrator
    made a mistake in this case it was in sticking too close to
    the actual language of the contract, not in casting it aside.
    It is not as if the collective bargaining agreement had con-
    tained a rule of interpretation requiring loose interpreta-
    tion—had, for example, instructed the arbitrator to “inter-
    pret the company’s drug policy broadly in light of the safety
    concerns that actuated it,” as in such cases as Schacht v.
    Beacon Ins. Co., 
    742 F.2d 386
    , 388 (7th Cir. 1984) (“the ar-
    bitrators . . . shall make their award with a view to effect-
    ing the general purpose of this Agreement rather than in
    accordance with the literal interpretation of the language”);
    see also Pacific Reinsurance Management Corp. v. Ohio Rein-
    surance Corp., 
    935 F.2d 1019
    , 1025 (9th Cir. 1991); Eagle Star
    Ins. Co. v. Yuval Ins. Co., [1978] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 357, 362 (Ct.
    App. 1977). An arbitrator who discarded an interpretive rule
    laid down in the collective bargaining agreement might
    No. 01-4067                                                     5
    be guilty of usurpation, but that is not our case. No inter-
    pretive rule was prescribed and so the arbitrator was free
    to choose an interpretive rule, Richmond, Fredericksburg &
    Potomac R.R. v. Transportation Communications Int’l Union,
    
    973 F.2d 276
    , 279 (4th Cir. 1992)—and so to opt for literal-
    ism, among the various recognized interpretive strategies,
    if he wanted to.
    Whereas commercial arbitrators frequently choose lit-
    eralism, Lisa Bernstein, “Private Commercial Law in the
    Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules,
    Norms, and Institutions,” 
    99 Mich. L
    . Rev. 1724, 1735 (2001);
    Bernstein, “Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking
    the Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms,” 144 U.
    Pa. L. Rev. 1765, 1769-70 (1996), labor arbitrators generally
    prefer loose interpretation. See, e.g., Tice v. American Airlines,
    Inc., 
    288 F.3d 313
    , 317 (7th Cir. 2002); International Ass’n of
    Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Progressive Lodge No. 1000 v.
    General Electric Co., 
    865 F.2d 902
    , 906 (7th Cir. 1989); SFIC
    Properties, Inc. v. International Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace
    Workers, District Lodge 94, 
    103 F.3d 923
    , 925 (9th Cir. 1996).
    And this is a labor arbitration case. But we do not under-
    stand the company to be arguing that labor arbitrators are
    required by the understanding the parties bring to labor
    arbitration to foreswear literalism. Southern California Gas
    Co. v. Utility Workers Union of America, Local 132, 
    265 F.3d 787
    , 793-94 (9th Cir. 2001), illustrates judicial reluctance, in
    a case much like this, to set aside a labor arbitrator’s award
    merely because the arbitrator stuck close to the literal terms
    of the collective bargaining agreement.
    In the district court and again in this court, the company
    argues that the arbitrator’s really serious mistake was in
    overlooking its argument that Cox’s refusal to submit to a
    nonintrusive environmental search of his clothing was a
    failure to cooperate in the investigation of his drug use and
    that the failure provided cause for his termination. The
    6                                                  No. 01-4067
    arbitrator did not mention the argument and we are rea-
    sonably certain that it was not made to him. The company
    claims to have made it in its brief to the arbitrator, but the
    union vociferously denies this and the company failed to
    make the brief a part of the record either in the district court
    or in this court and so has disarmed itself from rebutting
    the finding of waiver on the basis of what the brief con-
    tained. So far as we can determine, the only issue before the
    arbitrator was whether the company had reasonable cause
    to believe that Cox was under the influence of cocaine, an
    issue the arbitrator resolved against the company by his nar-
    row but permissible interpretation of “is under the influ-
    ence.” That refusing to submit to the environmental test
    of his clothing violated Cox’s duty of cooperation was hard-
    ly an argument that the arbitrator was likely to tumble to
    on his own. Not only or mainly because it was not the arbi-
    trator’s business to repair the company’s forensic omission,
    and because the collective bargaining agreement contains
    no reference to environmental tests, and because the test
    in question is not obviously less intrusive than testing a
    urine sample. But also and more important because the
    company hadn’t offered Cox the option of taking just the
    environmental test. It had insisted that he take a blood or
    urine test as well, which, under the arbitrator’s interpreta-
    tion, he was entitled to refuse to do without being punished
    for his refusal.
    AFFIRMED.
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    _____________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-97-C-006—6-21-02