Great Lakes Dredge v. Northbrook Casualty ( 2001 )


Menu:
  • In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Nos. 99-3844, 99-3877 & 00-4295
    Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Company,
    Plaintiff, Counterdefendant-Appellee,
    v.
    City of Chicago, et al.,
    Defendants, Counterplaintiffs-Appellees,
    v.
    Commercial Union Insurance Company, et al.,
    Defendants-Appellants.
    Appeals from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 94 C 2579--Joan B. Gottschall, Judge.
    Argued November 1, 2000--Decided August 10, 2001
    Before Cudahy, Coffey, and Easterbrook,
    Circuit Judges.
    Easterbrook, Circuit Judge. The Chicago
    Flood of 1992 occurred when the Chicago
    River sprung a leak and drained into a
    tunnel system connecting many buildings
    in the Loop. Events were set in motion in
    August and September 1991, when Great
    Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. replaced the
    pilings ("dolphins") protecting the
    Kinzie Street Bridge. Because of Great
    Lakes’ carelessness, poor maps or other
    directions provided by the City, or a
    combination of events, Great Lakes drove
    dolphins into the riverbed immediately
    above one of the tunnels that had been
    built almost a century earlier to move
    coal and other freight without tying up
    the City’s streets. Buildings in Chicago
    no longer burn coal, but the old tunnels
    have found new uses, such as carrying
    chilled water for air conditioning or
    hosting electric power and communications
    lines. Cracks in the ceiling of the
    tunnel, caused by the work in the River,
    grew as the weeks passed. Deterioration
    could have been stopped if the damage had
    been detected during inspections and the
    roof shored up pending repairs, but this
    did not happen. On April 13, 1992, the
    roof caved in and the waters of the
    Chicago River rushed through the tunnel
    system, flooding basements and streets
    throughout downtown Chicago. Damage has
    been estimated at more than $300 million
    (and by some accounts more than $1.5
    billion). Navigation on the River was
    halted for about a month while the tunnel
    was repaired. Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v.
    Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 
    513 U.S. 527
    (1995), affirming 
    3 F.3d 225
    (7th
    Cir. 1993), holds that Great Lakes’
    request for limitation of liability under
    46 U.S.C. sec.sec. 181-96 comes within
    the admiralty jurisdiction. Our case
    concerns not the amount of liability but
    the allocation of responsibility among
    Great Lakes’ insurers. As part of a
    settlement the City of Chicago and a
    class of injured parties have succeeded
    to Great Lakes’ rights under the
    policies, but for clarity we refer to
    Great Lakes as the insured.
    Insurance coverage could have been
    simple. Great Lakes acquires insurance to
    match its fiscal year, from August
    through July. Both the damage to the
    tunnel and the flood occurred during one
    policy year. At the beginning of August
    1991 Great Lakes was the beneficiary of
    three relevant policies: a primary policy
    with a cap of $1 million and two excess
    policies purchased by its corporate
    parent Itel Corporation, and on which
    Great Lakes was an additional insured: a
    first excess policy providing $40 million
    in coverage, and a second excess policy
    providing $60 million in additional
    coverage. Both of these excess policies
    were underwritten by a consortium that
    for convenience we call the "London
    Insurers." (Details about the
    participants would have been relevant and
    likely would have led to dismissal if
    jurisdiction depended on diversity of
    citizenship, see Indiana Gas Co. v. Home
    Insurance Co., 
    141 F.3d 314
    (7th Cir.
    1998), but admiralty jurisdiction saved
    the day.) Things grew complicated when
    Itel sold its subsidiary to the
    Blackstone Dredging Partnership l.p. on
    October 15, 1991--after the damage to the
    roof of the tunnel, but before the flood.
    The spinoff made it impossible for Great
    Lakes to remain as an additional insured
    on Itel’s policies. So as part of the
    transaction Itel and Blackstone arranged
    for Great Lakes to be deleted as an
    insured on the first excess policy; the
    London Insurers then wrote an identical
    $40 million policy naming Blackstone as
    the insured and Great Lakes as an
    additional insured, charging exactly the
    premium that had been refunded to Itel
    for the cancellation of the remaining
    term on the original policy. The $60
    million second-tier excess policy was
    canceled, but Blackstone purchased a $10
    million second-tier excess policy from
    Continental Insurance. Thus when the
    damage to the tunnel’s roof occurred,
    Great Lakes had $100 million worth of
    excess coverage, all through the London
    Insurers; when the roof collapsed, Great
    Lakes had only $50 million in coverage,
    of which $40 million was supplied by the
    London Insurers and $10 million by
    Continental. (The parties call the
    policies in force when the dolphins were
    driven the "first-period policies" and
    the policies in force when the flood
    occurred the "second-period policies." We
    follow suit.)
    The change in both the identity of the
    underwriters and the maximum coverage
    between the first and second periods has
    led to conflict. Continental contended in
    the district court that the first-period
    policies supply all of the coverage,
    because that is when Great Lakes weakened
    the tunnel’s roof. The London Insurers,
    by contrast, contended that only the
    second-period policies were triggered,
    because they were in force when the flood
    occurred. (They concede that the first-
    period policies cover damage to the
    tunnel itself, but this loss is trivial
    compared with the damage sustained by
    businesses whose basements were flooded
    and by the utilities that had laid cables
    in the tunnels.) Great Lakes contends
    that all excess policies were triggered
    and should be stacked--that the maximum
    indemnity is not the $50 million or $100
    million Great Lakes had in force at any
    one time, but $150 million, the sum of
    all policy limits in force in either
    period. The district court agreed with
    Great Lakes, issuing a declaratory
    judgment that the London Insurers must
    pay up to $140 million and Continental up
    to $10 million, no matter who suffered
    each loss and no matter when the losses
    occurred. The judge added that all
    insurers must pay prejudgment interest
    and that the London Insurers must pay a
    penalty of almost $1 million for bad
    faith in delaying recognition that
    Chicago was an additional insured on the
    $1 million primary policy. See 57 F.
    Supp. 2d 525 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (principal
    ruling); 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 13914 (Aug.
    25, 1999) (order resolving remaining
    issues); 1999 U.S. Dist. Lexis 16296
    (Sept. 28, 1999) (declaratory judgment).
    Only one of the policies was written out
    in full, but the parties agree that its
    language is universally applicable. Thus
    all policies cover property damage caused
    by an "occurrence," a term defined as:
    an accident or a happening or event
    or a continuous or repeated exposure
    to conditions which unintentionally
    results in . . . Property Damage .
    . . during the policy period. All
    such exposure to substantially the
    same general conditions existing at
    or emanating from one premises or
    location shall be deemed one
    Occurrence.
    The district court concluded that both
    the damage to the tunnel structure and
    the losses from flood waters are
    occurrences under this definition. While
    this case was being litigated in the
    district court the parties agreed that
    Illinois law supplies the rule of
    decision; the London Insurers have
    changed their tune on appeal, arguing
    that federal law governs in an admiralty
    action. See Continental Casualty Co. v.
    Anderson Excavating & Wrecking Co., 
    189 F.3d 512
    (7th Cir. 1999) (applying
    federal law to an insurance dispute in
    admiralty). That new line of argument has
    been met by a claim of forfeiture. To
    simplify analysis we follow the parties’
    original agreement, though with some
    sidelong glances at admiralty law. See
    Kamen v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc.,
    
    500 U.S. 90
    , 100 n.5 (1991) (courts are
    entitled, though not required, to apply a
    body of law chosen by the parties even if
    this is not the law the court would
    choose on its own).
    The district judge rejected as
    unsupported by either the policies’
    language or Illinois case law the London
    Insurers’ contention that only a person
    who suffers injury while the policies are
    in effect may resort to those policies.
    This was the principal ground on which
    the London Insurers sought to restrict
    coverage of the first-period policies to
    the cost of repairing the tunnel. Having
    concluded that all of the policies apply
    to all injuries, the district judge then
    stacked the coverage limits on two
    grounds: first, this is what Zurich
    Insurance Co. v. Raymark Industries,
    Inc., 
    118 Ill. 2d 23
    , 
    514 N.E.2d 150
    (1987), did in an asbestosis case;
    second, the policies omit an anti-
    stacking clause found in a standard form
    prepared by Lloyd’s of London. Both the
    London Insurers and Continental have
    appealed. Continental no longer argues
    that all liability must be borne by the
    London Insurers, but it does oppose
    stacking and prejudgment interest. The
    London Insurers object to stacking, to
    the use of the first-period policies to
    cover flood losses, to prejudgment
    interest, and to the bad-faith penalty.
    (A third appeal, No. 00-4295, concerns
    the district judge’s costs award. We
    stayed briefing on this appeal because
    costs must be reconsidered in light of
    our disposition of the merits.) We start
    with stacking.
    1. Stacking. Great Lakes argues, and
    the district court held, that it can pick
    any policy during either period and
    require its insurer to bear the whole
    loss up to the limit of liability. If
    this does not cover the loss, the insured
    names a second policy, and so on until
    all have been exhausted. The strategy is
    known variously as "stacking" and "joint
    and several liability" (an unusual use of
    that phrase, but one entrenched in
    insurance decisions). See Olin Corp. v.
    Insurance Co. of North America, 
    221 F.3d 307
    , 322-24 (2d Cir. 2000). See also
    Comment, Allocating Progressive Injury
    Liability Among Successive Insurance
    Policies, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 257 (1997).
    A recent decision by this court concludes
    that stacking is not an appropriate
    response to a single tort that spans
    multiple policy periods. See Sybron
    Transition Corp. v. Security Insurance,
    No. 00-1407 (7th Cir. July 12, 2001).
    That would be clear enough if, for
    example, the tunnel had collapsed before
    Great Lakes finished driving the
    dolphins. All responsibility would be
    under the policies then in force; that
    Great Lakes acquired a new corporate
    parent in October, and a new set of
    insurers, would not require those
    insurers to pay just because some of the
    victims of the tort had continuing
    losses, or because the losses could not
    be quantified until the new policy
    period. One occurrence, one policy.
    That’s what the definitional clause says.
    Why should things be otherwise because
    the piles were driven in the first period
    and the roof caved in during the second?
    In either case Great Lakes committed a
    single tort, with the same injury. So
    following the approach of Sybron (and
    Olin, which Sybron followed) is
    incompatible with stacking. But both Olin
    and Sybron applied New York law; perhaps
    Illinois law is different.
    Relying on Zurich Insurance, the
    district court concluded that Illinois is
    different. Zurich Insurance rejected the
    position taken by some courts that the
    sole trigger for coverage in
    occupational-disease cases occurs when
    the disease becomes manifest. Instead,
    the Supreme Court of Illinois held, the
    policies in force when asbestos is
    inhaled and when the disease becomes
    manifest are available for indemnity. The
    opinion went on to say that the limits of
    each policy are available, from which the
    district court inferred that Illinois has
    adopted joint and several liability. But
    Zurich Insurance interpreted the language
    of particular policies; the Supreme Court
    of Illinois did not establish a principle
    that transcends the text of insurance
    contracts. At least two appellate
    decisions in Illinois since Zurich
    Insurance have concluded that the Supreme
    Court of Illinois does not require joint
    and several liability independent of
    policies’ language. See Missouri Pacific
    R.R. v. International Insurance Co., 
    288 Ill. App. 3d 69
    , 
    679 N.E.2d 801
    (2d Dist.
    1997); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty
    Mutual Insurance Co., 
    283 Ill. App. 3d 630
    , 
    670 N.E.2d 740
    (2d Dist. 1996). See
    also Roman Catholic Diocese of Joliet,
    Inc. v. Interstate Fire Insurance Co.,
    
    292 Ill. App. 3d 447
    , 456, 
    685 N.E.2d 932
    , 939 (1st Dist. 1997). Like the
    intermediate appellate courts in Missouri
    Pacific and Outboard Marine, we think it
    likely that, when squarely faced with the
    question, the Supreme Court of Illinois
    will follow the better reasoned (and more
    numerous) decisions of other
    jurisdictions that make policies’
    language the benchmark for stacking. See
    not only Olin (representing New York law)
    but also, e.g., Public Service Co. of
    Colorado v. Wallis & Cos., 
    986 P.2d 924
    ,
    939-40 (Colo. 1999); Northern States
    Power Co. v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 
    523 N.W.2d 657
    , 662-64 (Minn. 1994); Owens-
    Illinois Inc. v. United Insurance Co.,
    
    650 A.2d 974
    , 985-96 (N.J. 1994); Sharon
    Steel Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
    Co., 
    931 P.2d 127
    , 140-42 (Utah 1997);
    Gulf Chemical & Metallurgical Corp. v.
    Associated Metals & Minerals Corp., 
    1 F.3d 365
    , 371-72 (5th Cir. 1993);
    Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Sepco
    Corp., 
    918 F.2d 920
    , 923-25 (11th Cir.
    1990). (We add, for completeness, that if
    maritime rather than state law supplies
    the rule of decision, we would hold, for
    reasons given in Olin and Sybron, that
    stacking is inappropriate unless the
    policies provide for cumulation.)
    Great Lakes does not rely on any
    language in the London Insurers’ or
    Continental policies. Instead it observes
    that the insurers could have put explicit
    anti-stacking language in their policies.
    The absence of such language implies,
    Great Lakes insists, that cumulation of
    policy limits is a coverage paid for by
    the premium. Maybe so, although it is
    familiar in both contractual and
    legislative drafting that people over-
    write, guarding against a misreading with
    a plenitude of negations; then the
    absence of one possible negation is a
    poor reason to conclude that the text has
    any particular meaning. Instead of
    seeking to draw inferences from missing
    language, we use more valuable clues.
    Recall that the premium for the $40
    million policy did not change when
    Blackstone replaced Itel as Great Lakes’
    parent corporation. Yet if the division
    of the original policy into two on
    October 15, 1991 (the date of its spinoff
    from Itel) raised the effective policy
    limit for the 1991-92 fiscal year to $80
    million, surely an additional premium
    would have been charged. There ain’t no
    such thing as a free lunch, even in the
    insurance business. Great Lakes never
    carried more than $101 million of
    coverage at any moment, and in connection
    with the spinoff it cut that maximum to
    $51 million. Yet, if stacking is allowed,
    coverage went from $101 million on
    October 14 to $151 million on October 16,
    even though the premium reflected a
    reduction to $51 million. That is
    exceedingly unlikely. The parties’
    transactions thus demonstrate that there
    is only one limit for the 1991-92 policy
    year, even though the corporate
    reorganization led to the creation of two
    policies, each in force for a shorter
    period. This conclusion also respects the
    language of the policies. They do not use
    the text from the 1971 model form, but
    they do say: "All such exposure to
    substantially the same general conditions
    existing at or emanating from one
    premises or location shall be deemed one
    Occurrence." This means that the whole
    loss from the tunnel collapse is "one
    Occurrence" even if parts of the injury
    were felt in two policy periods. Thus it
    remains only to determine which period is
    the right one.
    2. Trigger and allocation. The $1
    million policy was in force the entire
    year, as was a $40 million first-excess
    policy (so for this policy it is
    unnecessary to determine whether the
    trigger falls in the first period or the
    second). Continental no longer contests
    the district court’s conclusion that its
    $10 million second-excess policy was
    triggered by the collapse, so Continental
    must indemnify Great Lakes for any loss
    in the $41 million to $51 million band.
    (The portion of the district court’s
    judgment providing that an excess policy,
    once triggered, is available from the
    first dollar of loss, is untenable;
    Continental need not pay until the
    underlying limits have been exhausted.)
    The only remaining question about
    triggering and allocation is whether the
    London Insurers’ $60 million first-
    period, second-excess policy is
    available. In principle the answer could
    be yes; Chicago suffered a loss when its
    tunnel was damaged while the first-period
    policies were in force. But no one thinks
    that it would have cost more than $41
    million (or even more than $1 million) to
    repair the tunnel, and the second-excess
    policy does not come into play until all
    underlying policies have been exhausted.
    This makes it impossible to see how the
    second-excess policy that ended on
    October 15, 1991, could have been
    triggered, unless the future claims of
    businesses harmed by the flood are
    projected back into the policy period.
    Yet in Illinois, as elsewhere, an
    occurrence policy is not triggered unless
    loss to the claimant happened while that
    policy was in force. E.g., Pekin
    Insurance Co. v. Janes & Addems
    Chevrolet, Inc., 
    263 Ill. App. 3d 399
    ,
    
    636 N.E.2d 34
    (4th Dist. 1994); Seegers
    Grain Co. v. Kansas City Millwright Co.,
    
    230 Ill. App. 3d 565
    , 
    595 N.E.2d 113
    (1st
    Dist. 1992); Great American Insurance Co.
    v. Tinley Park Recreation Commission, 
    124 Ill. App. 2d 19
    , 
    259 N.E.2d 867
    (1st
    Dist. 1970). This is exactly what the
    policy itself provides, in direct
    language, by defining "property damage"
    as an "accident or happening or event
    [that] . . . results in a . . . physical
    injury to . . . tangible property . . .
    during the policy period" (emphasis
    added). No loss to businesses in the Loop
    occurred until April 1992.
    Great Lakes relies on cases such as
    Zurich Insurance that address
    occupational diseases, pollution,
    products liability, or other events
    characterized by long delay between the
    wrongful act and the manifestation of
    harm. In cases of this kind, Zurich
    Insurance held, policies in force at the
    time of the wrongful acts, in addition to
    those in force while the harm occurred
    and became manifest, may be triggered.
    See also Eljer Manufacturing, Inc. v.
    Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 
    972 F.2d 805
    (7th Cir. 1992). The extent to which
    the Supreme Court of Illinois subscribes
    to this principle has been called into
    question by Travelers Insurance Co. v.
    Eljer Manufacturing, Inc., 2000 Ill. Lexis
    1712 (Dec. 1, 2000), which held (in
    circumstances identical to our Eljer
    decision) that the installation of a
    defective product does not trigger
    coverage until the harm from the defect
    comes to pass. But the extent to which
    the Supreme Court of Illinois subscribes
    to its own opinion in Eljer (and thus
    disagrees with our Eljer holding from
    1992) has been called into question by
    the grant of rehearing in that case. See
    2001 Ill. Lexis 231 (Jan. 29, 2001). Eljer
    has been rebriefed and reargued in the
    Supreme Court of Illinois, and until a
    fresh decision is released state
    insurance law is up in the air.
    Waiting for that decision is
    unnecessary, however, because the cases
    such as Zurich Insurance and our opinion
    in Eljer involve damage to the same
    property over multiple periods. Here the
    injured persons are distinct: the City
    suffered injury when the dolphins were
    driven into the tunnel’s ceiling during
    the first period, and businesses (as well
    as the City) were injured when the
    ceiling collapsed and the flood occurred
    during the second period. The definitions
    in the policies show that the businesses
    did not suffer property damage, and so
    there was no "occurrence" triggering cov
    erage, until the collapse in April 1992.
    What is more, even after the damage to
    the tunnel, the loss was preventable. Our
    problem is not at all like asbestosis,
    where once fibers accumulate in the lung
    there is nothing to do but wait and see
    whether disease develops. Here there was
    a cure: inspection and repair. That is to
    say, even after the pile driving there
    was still an insurable event: whether a
    collapse would occur before the City
    detected the damage and repaired the
    tunnel. Not until the second per-iod did
    the City fail to take precautions that
    could have avoided all loss to
    businesses. In February 1992 (while the
    second-period policies were in force)
    inspectors discovered a foot of water in
    the tunnel and saw cracks in its ceiling,
    yet failed to take steps that would have
    prevented the roof’s collapse. See In re
    Chicago Flood Litigation, 
    308 Ill. App. 3d
    314, 320-21, 
    719 N.E.2d 1117
    , 1122
    (1st Dist. 1999). Hence the "occurrence"
    is in the second period so far as the
    victims of the flood are concerned. The
    London Insurers’ $60 million second-
    excess policy therefore has not
    beentriggered.
    3. Prejudgment interest. The district
    court made the London Insurers and
    Continental jointly and severally liable
    for more than $2 million in prejudgment
    interest for delay in funding an $11
    million settlement that Great Lakes
    reached with the City and some of the
    injured businesses. Our ruling on the
    stacking question requires revision of
    that decision in part: Continental cannot
    be held jointly and severally liable.
    Moreover, because Continental’s policy
    does not come into play until the
    underlying limits of $41 million have
    been exhausted, Continental is not
    obliged to fund any of this settlement
    and cannot be required to pay interest
    for delay. The London Insurers’ $40
    million first-excess policy was
    triggered, however, and the London
    Insurers do not dispute that they tarried
    in providing indemnity.
    Both the district court and the parties
    have treated prejudgment interest as a
    matter to be resolved under admiralty
    law. (They do not remark the
    inconsistency of this approach with their
    resort to Illinois law to determine other
    issues.) Prejudgment interest is an
    aspect of full compensation and therefore
    is available under admiralty law; neither
    equitable considerations nor the
    existence of a bona fide dispute about
    liability affect the running of interest.
    See Milwaukee v. Cement Division of
    National Gypsum Co., 
    515 U.S. 189
    , 195
    (1995); In re Oil Spill by the Amoco
    Cadiz, 
    954 F.2d 1279
    , 1331-32 (7th Cir.
    1992). See also, e.g., West Virginia v.
    United States, 
    479 U.S. 305
    , 310-11 n.2
    (1987); General Motors Corp. v. Devex
    Corp., 
    461 U.S. 648
    , 655 n.10 (1983). The
    award of interest for the delay in
    funding the settlement therefore is
    unexceptionable.
    Part of the award, however, reflects not
    delay in funding the settlement but delay
    in handing over the entire limits of the
    $40 million first-excess policy after
    Great Lakes assigned its rights under
    this policy to Chicago and a class of
    injured parties. It is not clear to us
    why the assignment created any obligation
    to pay; an underlying loss still must be
    established. This aspect of the district
    judge’s decision seems to have been
    influenced by her assignment of joint and
    several liability; with stacking out of
    the case the matter of interest on
    amounts other than the settlement needs a
    fresh look. Nor is it clear that interest
    has been adequately separated from the
    losses. (If, for example, compensation
    for the time value of money is built into
    a victim’s claim for damages, a separate
    award of prejudgment interest would be
    double counting.) So although we agree
    with the district court that admiralty’s
    norm of prejudgment interest should be
    applied, we remand for a recalculation
    that is limited to eligible amounts under
    the $40 million first-excess policy and
    does not include any interest
    againstContinental.
    4. Bad-faith penalty. The primary $1
    million policy had a separate limit of $1
    million for legal expenses incurred in
    defense of claims made against the
    insured. The London Insurers disbursed
    the policy limit of indemnity and
    expended the full $1 million in legal
    costs on behalf of Great Lakes.
    Nonetheless, the district judge ordered
    the London Insurers to pony up an extra
    $500,000 in indemnity and an additional
    $495,000 in defense outlays as penalties
    for bad-faith failure to treat Chicago as
    an additional insured--which it was, by
    virtue of its contract with Great Lakes
    and a clause in the policy promising
    indemnity to Great Lakes’ customers. The
    London Insurers did not tarry in
    recognizing their obligation to defend
    and indemnify Great Lakes, but
    recognizing the obligation to Chicago,
    which was not named on the face of the
    policy, took additional time. Because the
    London Insurers paid out the policy
    limits on behalf of Great Lakes, Chicago
    received none of the benefit even though
    it was an insured. By requiring the
    London Insurers to provide an extra
    $500,000 in indemnity and (almost)
    $500,000 in defense expenses, the
    district court sought to put Chicago in
    the position it would have occupied had
    the London Insurers recognized that under
    this policy they owed to Chicago the same
    duties they owed to Great Lakes.
    The London Insurers’ principal response
    on appeal is that the two-year delay in
    responding to Chicago’s demands for
    indemnity and defense should be chalked
    up to a series of bureaucratic errors and
    miscommunication among its brokers and
    lawyers. Illinois authorizes penalties
    for bad-faith refusals and delays by
    insurers, see 215 ILCS 5/155 (a provision
    authorizing awards of attorneys’ fees),
    but negligence cannot be treated as "bad
    faith," the London Insurers insist. Like
    the district court, we find it difficult
    to see how the problem can be ascribed
    entirely to paperwork problems. The
    London Insurers did not disburse the
    policy limits until April 1995, well
    after they had recognized that Chicago is
    an additional insured. Cases such as
    Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Citgo
    Petroleum Corp., 
    166 F.3d 761
    , 764 (5th
    Cir. 1999), which hold that it is not bad
    faith to pay the policy limits on behalf
    of one insured if no claim has been made
    by or against another, therefore do not
    help the London Insurers. See Western
    Alliance Insurance Co. v. Northern Insur
    ance Co., 
    176 F.3d 825
    , 828 (5th Cir.
    1999). More to the point, however--for
    neither of the fifth circuit’s cases
    rests on Illinois law--is the fact that
    Illinois does not use "bad faith" to
    describe an insurer’s state of mind or to
    distinguish between negligent and
    intentional wrongdoing. It is just a
    label applied to objectively unreasonable
    conduct that injures an insured--which is
    to say, negligence. See Transport
    Insurance Co. v. Post Express Co., 
    138 F.3d 1189
    , 1192 (7th Cir. 1998) (Illinois
    law); Twin City Fire Insurance Co. v.
    Country Mutual Insurance Co., 
    23 F.3d 1175
    (7th Cir. 1994) (Illinois law);
    Adduci v. Vigilant Insurance Co., 98 Ill.
    App. 3d 472, 475, 
    424 N.E.2d 645
    , 648
    (1st Dist. 1981); Kavanaugh v. Interstate
    Fire & Casualty Co., 
    35 Ill. App. 3d 350
    ,
    356, 
    342 N.E.2d 116
    , 120 (1st Dist.
    1975). Illinois courts have adopted a
    confusing label for a familiar concept,
    one that lacks any requirement of
    scienter.
    Appellate review of a bad-faith finding
    is deferential. See Venture Associates
    Corp. v. Zenith Data Systems Corp., 
    96 F.3d 275
    , 280 (7th Cir. 1996); PSI
    Energy, Inc. v. Exxon Coal USA, Inc., 
    17 F.3d 969
    , 973 (7th Cir. 1994). We do not
    think that the district court committed a
    clear error or abused its discretion. It
    is of course hard to know what sanction
    is appropriate; the London Insurers ask
    how the district court could be sure that
    Chicago would have obtained the benefit
    of $500,000 in indemnity and $495,000 in
    legal expenses had they discharged their
    duties. It is a good question; other
    numbers would have been possible. But the
    difficulty of reconstructing how things
    would have gone in an alternate reality
    is a principal reason why appellate
    courts accept reasoned resolutions by
    triers of fact, and because the district
    judge’s split-the-limits approach is a
    sensible one--the claims made by third
    parties against Chicago greatly exceed
    $500,000, so it could have used the
    indemnity--we affirm this aspect of the
    judgment except to the extent the
    district judge added $345,287 in
    prejudgment interest to the award of
    $495,000 in legal expenses. As with the
    award of interest on the settlement, it
    is unclear whether the district judge
    properly separated interest from loss. If
    the $495,000 already includes
    compensation for the time value of money,
    there is no basis for prejudgment
    interest too.
    This opinion requires revisions to many
    aspects of the district court’s decision
    and reconsideration of one aspect of the
    prejudgment-interest dispute. Proceedings
    on remand will affect the award of costs,
    so we do not discuss appeal No. 00-4295
    but remand that subject, too, for
    adjustment as appropriate.
    The judgment of the district court with
    respect to penalties under the primary
    policy is affirmed. The judgment and the
    award of costs are otherwise vacated, and
    the case is remanded for further
    proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    CUDAHY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part
    and dissenting in part.
    I agree with the majority that the $40
    million first excess policies should not
    be stacked, but not because of some
    purported trend in the Illinois case law.
    There is ample support on other, more
    compelling, grounds for declining to
    stack two policies that appear separate
    in form, but are one and the same in
    substance. As the majority points out,
    the premium for the $40 million policy in
    force before the sale of Great Lakes by
    Itel to Blackstone did not change after
    the sale had taken place. If it were the
    intention of the parties that coverage be
    increased to $80 million as a result of
    the transaction, there would have been no
    way to escape the additional premium that
    would go with the additional coverage. In
    my view, these circumstances provide good
    and sufficient support for an anti-
    stacking result on the specific facts of
    the duplicate policies. But by attempting
    to support this proposition with Illinois
    case law purportedly rejecting stacking
    in general, the majority heads down the
    wrong path, and calls into question the
    Illinois Supreme Court’s authoritative
    pronouncement on the subject.
    There is agreement here that Illinois
    law governs the issues that are before
    us. And on the question of stacking,
    Illinois law has been authoritatively
    announced in Zurich Ins. Co. v. Raymark
    Indus., Inc., 
    118 Ill. 2d 23
    , 
    514 N.E.2d 150
    (1987). The majority inappropriately
    seeks to escape the implications of that
    opinion. Essentially, the majority tries
    to limit Zurich by seeing it as tied to
    the particular circumstances and policy
    language of that case, rather than as
    standing for a general principle. I do
    not agree with that interpretation.
    Zurich expressly rejected the premise
    underlying the pro rata ("time on the
    risk") approach outlined in Insurance Co.
    of N. Am. v. Forty-Eight Insulations,
    Inc., 
    633 F.2d 1212
    (6th Cir. 1980),
    aff’d on rehearing, 
    657 F.2d 814
    (1981),
    cert. denied, 
    454 U.S. 1109
    (1981).
    There, the Sixth Circuit held, in an
    asbestos case, that the insurance
    policies were triggered only by
    claimants’ exposure to asbestos and that
    thus there was a reasonable means of
    allocating liability among the triggered
    policies--based on the number of years of
    exposure. Rejecting this approach, the
    court in Zurich noted that the trial
    court had "found nothing in the policy
    language that permits 
    proration." 118 Ill. 2d at 57
    , 514 N.E.2d at 165. Rather
    than indicating a specific reliance on
    the policy language to bind it to its
    conclusion that "stacking" was
    appropriate, the Zurich court seems to
    indicate that--absent policy language to
    the contrary--joint and several liability
    is the rule in Illinois.
    The majority looks to other cases (from
    intermediate Illinois appellate courts)
    that do not require stacking and
    concludes that the Supreme Court of
    Illinois would probably adopt anti-
    stacking as a general rule if now
    presented with that question. This is
    particularly likely, the majority opinion
    states, because other jurisdictions have
    done so in well-reasoned opinions (New
    York, Colorado, Minnesota, New Jersey and
    Utah). The majority adds that even if we
    were to apply maritime law, the reasoning
    of Olin Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am.,
    
    221 F.3d 307
    (2d Cir. 2000) and Sybron
    Transition Corp. v. Security Ins., 
    2001 WL 788624
    (7th Cir. July 12, 2001),
    support the anti-stacking view. But we
    are not applying maritime law or the law
    of any other state; we are applying
    Illinois law. And the relevant
    intermediate appellate courts in Illinois
    have distinguished Zurich on the grounds
    that the cases before these lower courts,
    unlike Zurich, involved what have been
    characterized as single continuous
    occurrences that implicated successive
    policy periods and that in such a
    situation a pro rata, time-on-the-risk
    allocation is appropriate. See Missouri
    Pacific Railroad Co. v. International
    Ins. Co., 288 Ill.App.3d 69, 79-80, 
    679 N.E.2d 801
    , 808 (2d Dist. 1997); Outboard
    Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
    283 Ill.App.3d 630, 642-45, 
    670 N.E.2d 740
    , 748-50. I do not believe that these
    intermediate appellate courts have gone
    so far as to reject joint and several
    liability (stacking) when the policy
    language and the specific facts do not
    preclude it.
    As the district court noted, Outboard
    Marine and Missouri Pacific were "single
    continuous occurrence" cases. Thus:
    In these cases, the facts, as viewed by
    the appellate court, involved damage
    continuously caused and continuously
    sustained. The cause of the damage and
    the damage caused were essentially
    contemporaneous, with the causative agent
    and the resulting damage occurring
    repeatedly and continuously. In such
    cases, because both the damage-causing
    agency and the damages the agency caused
    occurred continuously in each policy
    period, a rule which required the policy
    in effect when the first damage occurred
    to cover damages caused in that and
    successive policy periods would make no
    sense. The sensible rule, as the
    appellate court held, is to attempt to
    make each policy respond to the damage
    that occurred during its policy period.
    Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
    Order at 39. The language of these cases
    distinguishes them from the "triple
    trigger" approach of Zurich, which found
    that the policies were triggered at the
    time of the original exposure to
    asbestos, again at the time asbestosis
    appeared and also at times in between
    when the claimant manifested illness. See
    Missouri Pacific, 288 Ill.App. at 
    79, 679 N.E.2d at 807-08
    (citing 
    Zurich, 118 Ill. 2d at 44
    , 514 N.E.2d at 165);
    Outboard Marine, 283 Ill.App.3d at 
    641, 670 N.E.2d at 748
    . The case before us
    involves similar progressive damage, with
    at least one trigger (the 1991 tunnel
    damage) that, like exposure to asbestos,
    results in some damage immediately to the
    tunnel and later damage to the flooded
    premises. On the other hand, Missouri
    Pacific and Outboard Marine do not
    concern a single trigger to which the
    later damage may be attributed. And,
    since the initial damage here may cause
    progressively increasing injury over
    time, "it makes sense to hold the policy
    in effect at the time of the initial
    injury responsible for all the claimant’s
    damages, even though the progression of
    the damage could over time trigger
    additional policies." Findings of Fact,
    Conclusions of Law and Order at 39.
    On the question whether the $60 million
    first-period second excess policy is
    available to cover the flood damage, the
    proper interpretation of the policy
    language, as well as the impact of
    Zurich, leads me to a different
    conclusion than that reached by the
    majority. The majority believes that the
    $60 million first-period policy was not
    triggered because an insurance policy is
    not triggered unless loss to the claimant
    occurred while the policy was in force.
    This is contrary to the most reasonable
    reading of the policy language. The
    majority opinion tells us that the policy
    defines "property damage" as an "accident
    or happening or event [that] . . .
    results in a . . . physical injury to .
    . . tangible property . . . during the
    policy period" (emphasis added). That is
    not exactly the case. The policy actually
    defines "property damage" as:
    (a) physical injury to or destruction of
    tangible property, including the loss of
    use thereof at any time resulting
    therefrom; and/or
    (b) loss of use of tangible property which
    has not been physically injured or
    destroyed; and/or
    (c) evacuation losses arising from actual
    or threatened physical injury to or
    destruction of tangible property or
    bodily injury.
    The temporal limitation appears, not in
    the definition of "property damage," but
    in the definition of "occurrence," which
    is "an accident or happening or event or
    a continuous or repeated exposure to
    conditions which unintentionally results
    in . . . Property Damage . . . during the
    policy period. All such exposure to
    substantially the same general conditions
    existing at or emanating from one
    premises or location shall be deemed one
    Occurrence." (Emphasis added.) This
    temporal limitation appears only under
    the definition of "occurrence." But the
    policy provides coverage for "damages on
    account of . . . Property damage . . .
    caused by or arising out of each
    occurrence happening anywhere in the
    world." (Emphasis added.) Thus, any
    damage "caused by or arising out of" any
    occurrence will be covered, regardless
    whether the damage occurred during the
    policy period. The policy language
    clearly supports the position of Great
    Lakes.
    The majority then moves on from its
    creative parsing of policy language to
    rummage for Illinois case law to support
    its position. Again, the opinion cites
    cases from lower Illinois courts for a
    proposition that is at odds with the
    Illinois Supreme Court’s holding in
    Zurich. For example, the majority relies
    on Pekin Ins. Co. v. Janes & Addems
    Chevrolet, Inc., 263 Ill.App.3d 399, 
    636 N.E.2d 34
    (4th Dist. 1994), in which the
    Illinois appellate court clearly
    distinguished Zurich:
    Plaintiffs argue under Zurich coverage
    under a general liability policy is
    triggered, not when the wrongful conduct
    takes place, but when the complained-of
    damage occurs. This is contrasted with
    the protection provided by an
    "occurrence" or "acts and omissions"
    policy, which provides coverage for the
    negligent acts or omissions which occur
    during the policy period, regardless of
    when the injury occurs or the claim is
    made. In this case, the insured was
    covered under a general liability policy
    and coverage is triggered when the injury
    occurs.
    263 Ill.App.3 at 
    404, 636 N.E.2d at 38
    (citations omitted). The district court
    noted that this language indicated a
    possible misunderstanding by the Pekin
    court about the nature of occurrence
    policies. Whether the Pekin court erred
    or not, the district court concluded--and
    I agree--that the policies interpreted in
    Pekin are significantly different in
    language from the policies before us.
    The majority has no good reason to
    depart from the Illinois Supreme Court’s
    pronouncement in Zurich, which indicated
    that events characterized by a long delay
    between the wrongful act and the
    manifestation of harm may be covered both
    by policies in force at the time of the
    wrongful acts and those in force when the
    harm becomes apparent. The fact that
    Travelers Ins. Co. v. Eljer Mfg., Inc.,
    
    2000 WL 1763322
    (Ill. Dec. 1, 2000) is
    being reheard certainly does not change
    Zurich’s standing as authoritative
    Illinois law. In Eljer, the court found
    that installation of a potentially
    defective product into a home constituted
    injury to tangible property within the
    meaning of the insurance policy. See 
    id. at *2
    (interpreting New York law). This
    conclusion in Eljer is not at odds with
    Zurich; it does not even address Illinois
    law on a subject relevant here./1
    According to the majority, we need not
    wait for Illinois to resolve the question
    whether a policy in force at the time of
    the wrongful act covers liability for
    injuries that are later manifested. For
    the majority argues that Zurich and Eljer
    are distinguishable on the ground that
    they involve damage to a single property
    (or person) over multiple periods. Here,
    by contrast, the City suffered injury in
    the first period, and the businesses in
    the Loop (as well as the City) were
    injured in the second period. Thus, the
    majority argues that there was no trigger
    for the property damage from the flood
    pertaining to the first-period policies,
    because no "occurrence" relating to flood
    damage happened with respect to any
    policies until the second period. To
    distinguish the controlling Illinois
    authority on the ground that it involved
    damage to the same property (or to the
    same person) over multiple periods is not
    persuasive. First, this distinction is
    not one indicated or relied on in the
    language of Illinois cases, nor is it
    otherwise apparent that the distinction
    has significance. Second, to view the
    1991 tunnel damage and the 1992 flood
    damage as unrelated denies reality: there
    was a progressive series of consequences
    flowing from the 1991 damage, culminating
    in the flood of 1992. How quickly or
    sluggishly the consequences were revealed
    should not be material. As in Zurich,
    this case involves the manifestation of
    damage (absestosis or a flood) resulting
    from a single occurrence (inhalation of
    asbestos fibers or cracking of a tunnel
    wall).
    The majority cites Illinois cases for
    the proposition that an occurrence policy
    is not triggered unless loss to the
    claimant occurred while the policy was in
    force, but those cases are inapposite.
    See Pekin, 263 Ill.App.3 at 
    404, 636 N.E.2d at 847
    (and discussion of the
    
    case, supra
    ); Seegers Grain Co. v. Kansas
    City Millwright Co., 230 Ill.App.3d 565,
    566-67, 
    595 N.E.2d 113
    , 114 (1st Dist.
    1992) ("The property damage covered under
    completed operations coverage was
    expressly defined in the policy to
    include only property damage which
    ’occurs during the policy period.’");
    Great American Ins. Co. v. Tinley Park
    Recreation Comm’n, 124 Ill.App.2d 19, 21-
    23, 
    259 N.E.2d 867
    , 868-69 (1st Dist.
    1970). Great American turns on the
    definition of the term "accident," which
    constituted the only relevant occurrence,
    and the court concluded that an
    "accident" had not occurred until the
    injury was manifest. 124 Ill.App.2d at
    
    21-23, 250 N.E.2d at 868-69
    . Further,
    Seegers and Great American are pre-
    Zurich, policy language-specific, lower
    Illinois court cases, and thus cannot
    defeat Zurich’s clear mandate.
    In the case before us, there is no
    mention of a "to the claimant" limitation
    on coverage in the policies and no
    Illinois law to support such a
    requirement. To read the policies as not
    requiring damage to the ultimate claimant
    during the policy period would not only
    be reasonable, but it would also be the
    most plausible reading of the policy
    language. Coverage for property damage
    "caused by or arising out of" an
    occurrence supports an unrestricted
    reading. A similar "to the claimant"
    argument was made in Travelers Ins. Co.
    v. Penda Corp., 
    974 F.2d 823
    (7th Cir.
    1992), in which the insurer argued that
    coverage was not available because the
    underlying claimant did not actually own
    the damaged property--even though the
    policy provided coverage for liability
    incurred "because of property 
    damage." 974 F.2d at 830
    . This court observed that
    "Illinois cases do not consider who owned
    the property in question when determining
    if a claim is within policy coverage."
    
    Id. These points
    demonstrate the irrelevance
    of the fact that different property
    belonging to different claimants was
    damaged in 1992 than was the case in
    1991. At the very least, these arguments
    demonstrating irrelevance show that such
    a reading of the policies at hand is
    reasonable. And where there is reasonable
    disagreement, we construe the policy
    against the insurer. "If the language of
    a policy is ambiguous or otherwise
    susceptible to more than one reasonable
    interpretation, it will be construed in
    favor of the insured." International
    Minerals & Chemical Corp. v. Liberty Mut.
    Ins. Co., 168 Ill.App.3d 361, 370, 
    522 N.E.2d 758
    , 764 (1988); see also Allen v.
    Transamerica Ins. Co., 
    115 F.3d 1305
    ,
    1309 (7th Cir. 1997); 
    Travelers, 974 F.2d at 828
    .
    There is good reason for this policy--
    especially here, where cause and effect
    are clear. Without this approach,
    insurers could completely escape
    liability for damage caused by an event--
    an occurrence--that happened "on their
    watch." This would be an indefensible
    result, given that the flood damage
    resulted directly from an occurrence that
    happened while the questioned policy was
    in force. It is mere fortuity that the
    tunnel wall took a few months to
    collapse. No one would question London
    Insurers’ liability if the tunnel had
    promptly given way to the blow of the
    pile driver.
    The majority goes on to bolster its
    conclusion by pointing out that here the
    flood loss was preventable (unlike-asbes-
    tosis) because inspection and repair of
    the tunnel could arguably have prevented
    the flood. Thus the majority notes that
    in February 1992 (when the second-period
    policies were in effect) inspectors saw
    cracks in the tunnel but failed to
    prevent the roof’s collapse. I do not
    understand the relevance of this
    circumstance. Failure to repair has never
    been argued as an independent intervening
    cause of the collapse. The cause
    continues to be an occurrence resulting
    in damage to property that took place
    during the first period. That some
    inspectors saw a crack is certainly not
    an adequate reason to absolve the
    insurers of all liability.
    Therefore, on the issue of the
    availability of the $60 million first-
    period first excess policy to respond to
    the flood damage, I must reject the
    outcome reached by the majority. The
    policy language and the controlling
    Illinois law point to a different result.
    I respectfully dissent.
    FOOTNOTE
    /1 The court did address Illinois law in Eljer, but
    not in any way relevant to this case. It held
    that coverage for potentially defective plumbing
    systems was not triggered for systems that did
    not leak, i.e., systems that did not manifest any
    defect. See 
    2000 WL 1763322
    , at *2. The court did
    not address the question whether, for plumbing
    systems that proved faulty, installation trig-
    gered coverage under Illinois law.