United States v. Ligas, Lawrence J. ( 2008 )


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  •                               In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    No. 06-3917
    U NITED STATES OF A MERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    LAWRENCE J. LIGAS,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 04 C 930—James F. Holderman, Chief Judge.
    A RGUED D ECEMBER 3, 2007—D ECIDED D ECEMBER 1, 2008
    Before BAUER, EVANS, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.
    SYKES, Circuit Judge. Lawrence Ligas appeals the district
    court’s grant of summary judgment to the government for
    $319,883.60 in unpaid taxes, interest, and penalties. Al-
    though Ligas raises multiple arguments in support of
    reversal, we need only consider one: lack of personal
    jurisdiction. The government never properly served Ligas.
    2                                                 No. 06-3917
    It sought multiple extensions of time to effectuate service,
    asserting that if the case was dismissed for lack of personal
    jurisdiction, it could not be refiled because the statute of
    limitations had expired. After giving the government nearly
    a year to serve Ligas, the district court dismissed the govern-
    ment’s complaint for failure to serve process as required
    under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
    Because the government had imposed two liens on Ligas’s
    property, Ligas subsequently asked the court to extinguish
    the liens. The district court treated Ligas’s motion as a
    request for affirmative relief that waived his prior objection
    to personal jurisdiction and on that basis reinstated the
    government’s complaint. That was an error. Although
    jurisdictional defenses may be waived, Ligas’s motion to
    quash the tax liens was not inconsistent with his jurisdic-
    tional objection, which he continuously maintained and on
    which he prevailed when the district court dismissed the
    case under Rule 4(m). The government’s tax liens were only
    valid if the government obtained a judgment against Ligas;
    removing them was a consequence of and consistent with
    the dismissal, since the government had maintained that the
    suit could not be refiled. Ligas’s motion to quash was not a
    voluntary submission to the court’s jurisdiction, so there
    was no basis to reinstate the government’s complaint.
    Accordingly, we reverse and remand with instructions to
    dismiss.
    I. Background
    This case stems from Lawrence Ligas’s failure to pay more
    than $300,000 in taxes, interest, and penalties. Between 1988
    No. 06-3917                                                    3
    and 1990, Ligas reported that he owed $26,134 in individual
    federal income tax, but he did not submit payment when he
    filed his tax returns. In addition, Ligas was the president,
    sole stockholder, and director of L.J. Ligas, Inc., an electrical
    contracting company, and it, too, owed back taxes. More
    specifically, the company failed to pay $88,314 in income
    and FICA taxes it claimed it withheld from employee
    paychecks in the final three quarters of 1987 and the first
    quarter of 1988. In 1991 the Internal Revenue Service
    determined that Ligas was a responsible person of a
    corporation that willfully failed to pay taxes under I.R.C.
    § 6672 and assessed a penalty against him. When Ligas
    failed to pay these assessments, federal tax liens automati-
    cally attached to his property under I.R.C. § 6321. Although
    the IRS accidently released the liens in 2001, they were
    reinstated in 2003. As of 2005, the government calculated
    that Ligas owed $319,883.60.
    On February 6, 2004, just before the 10-year statute of
    limitations expired, the government filed a complaint
    seeking to reduce to judgment the unpaid assessments of
    federal income taxes and the § 6672 penalty. Although Ligas
    received a copy of the complaint and summons in the
    mail, he refused to waive personal service of process. The
    government thus embarked on an unsuccessful 15-month
    effort to serve Ligas. When the government initially encoun-
    tered difficulty serving Ligas within the normal 120-day
    period, it asked the district court for additional time.
    The district court granted two extensions of time to serve
    Ligas and on September 9, 2004, authorized service by
    publication as permitted by Rule 4(e)(1) and 735 Ill. Comp.
    Stat. 5/2-206.
    4                                                No. 06-3917
    In late 2004 the government missed two obvious chances
    to accomplish service. Following the district court’s Septem-
    ber 9 order authorizing service by publication, IRS agents
    left a copy of the summons and complaint at Ligas’s
    residence, claimed service by publication was perfected,
    and moved for default judgment when Ligas did not answer
    the complaint. Appearing for the limited purpose of
    challenging the sufficiency of process, Ligas asked the court
    to vacate the September 9 order and quash the service by
    publication. At a hearing on December 7, 2004, the district
    court concluded that the government had not complied with
    the requirements of 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-206 and quashed
    the service by publication. The court then invited the
    government to personally serve Ligas right then and there;
    he was present in court, having appeared pro se for the
    hearing. The government’s attorney did not have a copy of
    the summons and complaint, however, and the opportunity
    was lost. The court gave the government a third exten-
    sion—until January 19, 2005—to serve Ligas.
    On January 31, 2005—after the third extension of time had
    expired—the government asked for a fourth extension. On
    March 1, 2005, the court granted the government’s request
    and authorized service under Rule 4(e)(1) and 735 Ill. Comp.
    Stat. 5/2-203.1, which allows a court to order service “in any
    manner consistent with due process.” The district court
    permitted the government to serve Ligas under section 5/2-
    203.1 by posting a copy of the complaint and summons on
    the door to Ligas’s home, mailing copies of the complaint
    and summons to Ligas’s home by first-class and certified
    mail, and by faxing the complaint and summons to the
    number listed on Ligas’s pro se appearance form.
    No. 06-3917                                                      5
    Ligas asked the court to reconsider the March 1 order (this
    time he was acting through an attorney), and the district
    court agreed. Two intervening developments persuaded the
    court to vacate its order. First, Labe Bank, which held a
    mortgage on Ligas’s property and was added as a
    codefendant, had filed and successfully served a third-party
    complaint by using the sheriff’s department to personally
    serve Ligas at his home.1 Second, one of the private process
    servers the government used could not provide evidence of
    its pre-2005 attempts to serve Ligas. The district court was
    troubled by the fact that the government had not used
    federal or state agencies to try to serve process and instead
    relied on “seemingly inept process servers.” Taken together,
    these developments convinced the court that the govern-
    ment had not diligently attempted to serve Ligas, had not
    shown good cause for its failure to serve Ligas, and was not
    entitled to a fourth extension of time. On May 17, 2005, the
    district court dismissed the complaint for failure to serve
    Ligas within the period of time prescribed by Rule 4(m).
    The dismissal was without prejudice, but the government
    1
    While the government was trying to serve Ligas, it amended its
    complaint to add Labe Bank as a defendant. Labe Bank held the
    mortgage on Ligas’s Chicago home, and the government wanted
    to foreclose its liens against Ligas’s home. The bank filed a
    counterclaim against the United States to establish the priority of
    its lien and a third-party complaint against Ligas to foreclose its
    mortgage. On February 28, 2005, the bank successfully used a
    sheriff’s deputy to personally serve Ligas at his home. The details
    of the bank’s actions against the government and Ligas are
    otherwise irrelevant for purposes of this appeal.
    6                                                No. 06-3917
    had represented in its motions for extension of time that it
    could not refile the complaint because the statute of limita-
    tions had run.
    Ligas immediately (that very same day) moved the court
    to quash the federal tax liens against his property. (This was
    not the first time Ligas had requested such relief; he had
    asked the court to remove the liens in his brief opposing the
    government’s fourth request for an extension of time.) The
    government responded with a cross-motion asking the court
    to reconsider its May 17 order dismissing the complaint. In
    the government’s view, when Ligas asked the court to
    extinguish the liens, he waived any objection to service of
    process and consented to personal jurisdiction.
    In another about-face, the district court agreed. Constru-
    ing Ligas’s motion to quash the liens as a waiver of his
    previous objections to personal jurisdiction, the court
    vacated the dismissal order, reinstated the government’s
    complaint, and denied the motion to quash. The case
    proceeded to discovery, and the district court eventually
    granted the government’s motion for summary judgment
    and ordered Ligas to pay $319,883.60 in back taxes, interest,
    and penalties. This appeal followed.
    II. Analysis
    A district court may not exercise personal jurisdiction
    over a defendant unless the defendant has been properly
    served with process, see Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe
    Stringing, Inc., 
    526 U.S. 344
    , 350 (1999), and the service
    requirement is not satisfied merely because the defendant
    No. 06-3917                                                  7
    is aware that he has been named in a lawsuit or has received
    a copy of the summons and the complaint, see McMasters v.
    United States, 
    260 F.3d 814
    , 817 (7th Cir. 2001). Acceptable
    methods for service of process are specified in Rule 4 of the
    Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; the preferred approach is for
    the plaintiff to mail the defendant a copy of the complaint
    and summons and obtain a waiver of personal service from
    the defendant under Rule 4(d). But if the defendant does not
    waive service and if no federal statute otherwise supplies a
    method for serving process, then Rule 4(e)’s list of methods
    is exclusive: personal service (Rule 4(e)(2)(A)); leaving a
    copy of the complaint and summons at the defendant’s
    “usual place of abode” with someone of suitable age and
    discretion who resides there (Rule 4(e)(2)(B)); delivering a
    copy of the complaint and summons to an agent authorized
    to accept service (Rule 4(e)(2)(C)); or any other manner of
    serving process permitted by the law of the state where the
    district court sits (Rule 4(e)(1)).
    Rule 4(m) generally requires a plaintiff to serve process
    within 120 days, but a plaintiff may move for additional
    time to serve the defendant. If the plaintiff shows good
    cause for his failure to accomplish service within the
    designated period of time, then the district court must grant
    an extension. United States v. McLaughlin, 
    470 F.3d 698
    , 700
    (7th Cir. 2006). If the plaintiff cannot show good cause, then
    the decision to grant an extension is left to the discretion of
    the district court. Henderson v. United States, 
    517 U.S. 654
    ,
    662-63 (1996). When a plaintiff fails to serve process within
    the period of time prescribed by the federal rules, Rule 4(m)
    requires the district court to dismiss the complaint without
    prejudice.
    8                                                  No. 06-3917
    The civil procedure rules also specify the manner by
    which a defendant may object to a plaintiff’s failure to serve
    process. Under Rule 12(b) a defendant may move for
    dismissal based on the court’s lack of personal jurisdiction,
    the insufficiency of process, or the insufficiency of service of
    process. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2), (4)-(5). However, unlike
    subject-matter jurisdiction, these objections can be waived.
    See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 
    456 U.S. 694
    , 703 (1982). For example, if a defendant does not
    object to the manner in which he was served in his answer
    or his first motion to the court (whichever occurs first), he
    waives the objection. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(1). Similarly, a
    defendant who properly raises a jurisdictional defense can
    nevertheless waive the defense by his subsequent conduct.
    See Compagnie des 
    Bauxites, 456 U.S. at 702-07
    ; Trs. of Cent.
    Laborers’ Welfare Fund v. Lowery, 
    924 F.2d 731
    , 732-33 (7th
    Cir. 1991).
    In this case, the district court correctly dismissed the
    government’s complaint under Rule 4(m) for failure to serve
    Ligas within the designated—and here, much ex-
    tended—time period. However, the court thereafter re-
    versed course and reinstated the complaint based on Ligas’s
    request to extinguish the tax liens, which the judge treated
    as a waiver of Ligas’s previous objections to personal
    jurisdiction. We review the district court’s decision to
    reconsider and vacate the dismissal order for an abuse of
    discretion. See Deere & Co. v. Ohio Gear, 
    462 F.3d 701
    , 706
    (7th Cir. 2006). “A district court by definition abuses its
    discretion when it makes an error of law,” Koon v. United
    States, 
    518 U.S. 81
    , 100 (1996), and here, the court committed
    No. 06-3917                                                   9
    a legal error when it construed Ligas’s motion to quash as
    a waiver of his objection to personal jurisdiction.
    A district court may reconsider a prior decision when
    there has been a significant change in the law or facts since
    the parties presented the issue to the court, when the court
    misunderstands a party’s arguments, or when the court
    overreaches by deciding an issue not properly before it. See
    Bank of Waunakee v. Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 
    906 F.2d 1185
    ,
    1191 (7th Cir. 1990). The district court thought this case fell
    within the first category, holding that Ligas’s effort to
    extinguish the tax liens was a significant change in the facts
    before the court. But nothing new indicated that Ligas had
    been properly served after all or that the government had in
    fact shown good cause and was consequently entitled to a
    fourth extension of time to accomplish service. Rather, the
    district court simply interpreted Ligas’s motion to quash the
    liens as a request for affirmative relief that waived his
    previously asserted jurisdictional objection.
    That interpretation flowed from an erroneous legal
    conclusion about the effect of Ligas’s motion on his prior
    jurisdictional objection. Under the circumstances of this
    case, Ligas’s motion is closely analogous to an answer that
    includes both a jurisdictional defense and a counterclaim.
    The general rule is that a defendant does not waive an
    asserted jurisdictional defense when his answer also
    requests relief in the form of a counterclaim, a cross-claim,
    or a third-party claim. See, e.g., Rates Tech. Inc. v. Nortel
    Networks Corp., 
    399 F.3d 1302
    , 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Bayou
    Steel Corp. v. M/V Amstelvoorn, 
    809 F.2d 1147
    , 1149 (5th Cir.
    1987); Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, 
    743 F.2d 1325
    , 1330 (9th
    10                                                No. 06-3917
    Cir. 1984); Chase v. Pan-Pac. Broad., Inc., 
    750 F.2d 131
    , 132
    (D.C. Cir. 1984). As these cases explain, the federal rules
    permit defendants to simultaneously seek relief and raise a
    jurisdictional defense without waiving that defense. In some
    cases, the requested relief is completely unconnected to the
    jurisdictional argument, such as when a defendant files a
    counterclaim unrelated to the merits of the plaintiff’s claim.
    See, e.g., Frank’s Casing Crew & Rental Tools, Inc. v. PMR
    Techs., Ltd., 
    292 F.3d 1363
    , 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that
    personal jurisdiction is not waived “where an unrelated
    claim is brought as a permissive counterclaim against the
    plaintiff” if the proper jurisdictional objection is raised by
    motion or answer). In other cases, the sought-after relief is
    consistent with the jurisdictional objection because a court’s
    decision to grant the relief is simply the logical extension of
    a ruling in the defendant’s favor on jurisdictional grounds.
    See Neifeld v. Steinberg, 
    438 F.2d 423
    , 425 n.4 (3d Cir. 1971)
    (declining to find defendant waived jurisdictional objection
    when it filed a motion to extinguish a writ of attachment
    and a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction).
    Ligas’s request to extinguish the tax liens falls into this
    second category of cases because the liens were unenforce-
    able once the district court dismissed the government’s
    complaint. The tax liens were valid only to the extent that
    the government could have prevailed against Ligas. Al-
    though our dissenting colleague maintains that “the govern-
    ment’s case was not obviously destroyed by the dismissal of
    its complaint,” infra p. 15, the government itself thought so;
    the government had consistently maintained that it could
    not refile the lawsuit because the statute of limitations had
    No. 06-3917                                                      11
    expired.2 Ligas’s motion to extinguish the liens was a logical
    extension of the jurisdictional dismissal of the complaint,
    following necessarily from the court’s Rule 4(m) order. In
    opposing the government’s fourth request for an extension
    of time, Ligas had asked the district court to remove the
    liens if it dismissed the complaint. By renewing that request
    after the Rule 4(m) dismissal, Ligas did not voluntarily
    submit to the jurisdiction of the court.
    The district court apparently thought that because Ligas
    had alternative methods of extinguishing the tax liens that
    required him to submit to a court’s jurisdiction, his effort to
    seek such relief in this proceeding constituted a waiver of
    his jurisdictional objection. It is true that Ligas had other
    procedural avenues to remove the liens. For example, under
    I.R.C. § 6325(a)(1), the Secretary of the Treasury must
    release a lien within 30 days after the liens become “legally
    2
    An additional observation about the statute-of-limitations issue
    is appropriate. There is a difference between dismissing a suit
    without prejudice and dismissing a suit with leave to reinstate;
    after a dismissal without prejudice, the plaintiff can resurrect his
    lawsuit only by filing a new complaint. See Richmond v. Chater, 
    94 F.3d 263
    , 267-68 (7th Cir. 1996). We have previously implied that
    when the statute of limitations prevents a lawsuit that has been
    dismissed under Rule 4 from being refiled, reinstatement is not
    possible either. See 
    McLaughlin, 470 F.3d at 701
    . At the same time,
    Rule 60(b) may permit a district court in some circumstances to
    reinstate a suit it erroneously dismissed without prejudice, but
    the district court did not rely on Rule 60(b) as the basis for
    reconsidering and vacating its order dismissing the government’s
    complaint.
    12                                                  No. 06-3917
    unenforceable,” which would not occur until the final
    judgment was entered against the government. If the
    Secretary did not release the liens, then Ligas could have
    brought suit under I.R.C. § 7432 for damages. Similarly,
    Ligas could have filed a separate action under 28 U.S.C.
    § 2410 to quiet title, or he could have waited until the
    government filed a second lawsuit to assert the statute-of-
    limitations defense.
    However, the existence of these alternative remedies does
    not make Ligas’s motion to quash the tax liens improper,
    nor does it mean that by making the motion he waived his
    objection to personal jurisdiction. Just as the assertion of a
    counterclaim does not waive an asserted jurisdictional
    defense, Ligas’s motion to quash did not waive the jurisdic-
    tional objection he maintained throughout the proceedings.3
    The motion to quash was not at all inconsistent with his
    long-standing jurisdictional objection. To the contrary, like
    the Fifth Circuit, “we cannot fathom how a motion premised
    on a jurisdictional objection could simultaneously operate
    as a waiver of that very objection.” PaineWebber Inc. v. Chase
    Manhattan Private Bank (Switz.), 
    260 F.3d 453
    , 461 (5th Cir.
    3
    In response to Labe Bank’s third-party suit against him to
    foreclose his mortgage, Ligas apparently wanted to refinance the
    mortgage. As he pointed out, as long as the federal tax liens
    remained on the home, any refinanced mortgage would be
    inferior to the federal tax liens. Given that Ligas reasonably
    believed no lender would agree to refinance his home as long as
    the federal tax liens remained on his property, Ligas understand-
    ably wanted the liens removed as soon as possible to increase his
    chances of successfully refinancing his home.
    No. 06-3917                                                  13
    2001); cf. 
    Neifeld, 438 F.2d at 425
    n.4, 431 (affirming district
    court’s decision to simultaneously dismiss a case for lack of
    jurisdiction and quash a writ of attachment).
    Nor did Ligas waive his objection by subsequently filing
    an answer and litigating the merits of the government’s
    complaint. We have previously held that a defendant does
    not waive a jurisdictional argument when it properly raises
    the defense but participates in litigation at the district
    court’s direction. See IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica Life Ins.
    Co., 
    136 F.3d 537
    , 540 (7th Cir. 1998). In short, given that
    Ligas had consistently maintained his objection to personal
    jurisdiction and only entered limited appearances for that
    purpose, we cannot identify anything to support the govern-
    ment’s contention that Ligas waived his service-of-process
    objection.
    The government nonetheless argues that the district
    court’s decision to reinstate its complaint was proper
    because the government served Ligas on March 15, 2005, in
    accordance with the district court’s March 1, 2005 order
    authorizing service pursuant to Rule 4(e)(1) and 735 Ill.
    Comp. Stat. 5/2-203.1. The problem for the government is
    that even if it properly served Ligas under section 5/2-203.1,
    the period of time in which Rule 4(m) required it to serve
    Ligas had already elapsed. At the time the district court
    ordered the government’s complaint dismissed, it had given
    the government until January 19, 2005, to serve Ligas. True,
    the district court’s March 1 order extended the time for
    service beyond that date, but the court vacated this order
    and quashed the alternative service when it dismissed the
    government’s complaint. We have concluded that the
    14                                                  No. 06-3917
    court’s decision to reconsider and vacate this dismissal
    order was premised upon a legal error and must be re-
    versed.
    Ligas was never properly served, and the court’s decision
    to reconsider and vacate the Rule 4(m) dismissal order and
    reinstate the complaint was based on a legally erroneous
    conclusion that Ligas’s motion to quash waived his objec-
    tion to personal jurisdiction. Accordingly, we REVERSE the
    judgment of the district court and REMAND the case to the
    district court with instructions to dismiss the complaint.
    EVANS, Circuit Judge, dissenting. The majority concludes
    that Ligas’s motion to quash tax liens did not waive his
    previous objection to service of process and invest the
    district court with personal jurisdiction. I disagree.
    In the first instance, it is somewhat regrettable that we are
    squabbling over service of process; Ligas was clearly
    dodging service and gaming the system. But service of
    process represents an important value on the whole—notice
    to defendants that they are being sued—even if it seems like
    a frustrating formality from time to time (as in this case
    where Ligas knew the government was after him). See United
    States v. Jiles, 
    102 F.3d 278
    , 282 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[S]ervice of
    process laws are designed to ensure defendants receive
    No. 06-3917                                                 15
    notice in accordance with concepts of due process.”); cf.
    McMasters v. United States, 
    260 F.3d 814
    , 817 (7th Cir. 2001)
    (“Actual notice to the defendant is insufficient; the plaintiff
    must comply with the directives of Rule 4.”).
    The question here, however, is not whether service of
    process was effectuated. The district court, Chief Judge
    Holderman presiding, decided that it was not, and the case
    is only before us now because the court shifted course and
    subsequently found that Ligas waived his previously
    sustained objection. As to the issue of waiver, the majority
    holds that Judge Holderman erred as a matter of law
    because Ligas’s request to extinguish the liens was “simply
    the logical extension of a ruling in the defendant’s favor on
    jurisdictional grounds.”
    Is that so? Judge Holderman thought not, and I tend to
    agree.
    The problem I see with the majority’s reasoning is that the
    government’s case was not obviously destroyed by the
    dismissal of its complaint on service of process grounds.
    Since the dismissal was without prejudice, the government
    had the ability to lodge a new complaint and make a fresh
    run at service of process. True, the government was in a bad
    spot in light of the statute of limitations. However, the
    district court ruling on service of process had nothing to do
    with the statute of limitations. The potential application of
    the statute of limitations, an affirmative defense that Ligas
    would have to prove even in the face of the government’s
    statements that the suit might be time-barred, hinged on
    facts—including those pertaining to a likely argument for
    equitable tolling—that were not litigated. See General Auto
    16                                                 No. 06-3917
    Serv. Station v. City of Chicago, 
    526 F.3d 991
    , 1001 (7th Cir.
    2008) (the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense);
    Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., Inc. v. Northwestern Mut. Life
    Ins. Co., 
    480 F.3d 499
    , 504 (7th Cir. 2007) (equitable tolling
    “enable[s] a plaintiff to extend the statute of limitations in
    exigent circumstances”). So, while a final defeat for the
    government would have rendered the liens invalid, see 26
    U.S.C. § 6325(a)(1), that defeat did not happen here, and
    extinguishing the liens did not “follow necessarily” from the
    dismissal without prejudice.
    That may all seem like a hypertechnical approach to civil
    procedure. But keep in mind Judge Holderman’s take:
    “Ligas has litigated this case on procedure.” Ligas sought to
    avoid the merits of the lawsuit—and skirt hundreds of
    thousands of dollars in tax obligations, including remitting
    FICA taxes he withheld from his employees’ paychecks—by
    evading service of process at every step. To say that Ligas
    was within his rights to demand service by the book is not
    to say that his approach was laudable. Under these circum-
    stances, the district court’s exacting application of proce-
    dure on the other end seems more than reasonable. The
    court simply gave Ligas a taste of his own medicine; those
    who live by the sword of procedural technicalities cannot
    complain when they die by it.
    Because I do not believe the district court abused its
    discretion, I respectfully dissent.
    12-1-08
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-3917

Judges: Sykes

Filed Date: 12/1/2008

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/24/2015

Authorities (19)

Henderson v. United States , 116 S. Ct. 1638 ( 1996 )

Murphy Brothers, Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc. , 119 S. Ct. 1322 ( 1999 )

ids-life-insurance-company-and-american-express-financial-advisors-inc-v , 136 F.3d 537 ( 1998 )

General Auto Service Station v. City of Chicago , 526 F.3d 991 ( 2008 )

franks-casing-crew-rental-tools-inc-c-h-pipe-services-inc-damco , 292 F.3d 1363 ( 2002 )

Trustees of Central Laborers' Welfare Fund v. Keith and ... , 924 F.2d 731 ( 1991 )

Jerry RICHMOND, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Shirley S. CHATER, ... , 94 F.3d 263 ( 1996 )

Debra McMasters v. United States of America and the ... , 260 F.3d 814 ( 2001 )

deere-company-a-delaware-corporation-and-funk-manufacturing-company-a , 462 F.3d 701 ( 2006 )

David Neifeld v. Meyer Steinberg. David Neifeld v. Meyer ... , 17 A.L.R. Fed. 374 ( 1971 )

Rates Technology, Inc. v. Nortel Networks Corp. , 399 F.3d 1302 ( 2005 )

Bank of Waunakee, a Wisconsin Banking Corporation v. ... , 906 F.2d 1185 ( 1990 )

Travelers Casualty & Surety Company of America, Inc. v. ... , 480 F.3d 499 ( 2007 )

United States v. Thomas B. McLaughlin and Christine ... , 470 F.3d 698 ( 2006 )

Koon v. United States , 116 S. Ct. 2035 ( 1996 )

gates-learjet-corporation-and-gates-learjet-export-corporation-v-james-b , 743 F.2d 1325 ( 1984 )

Seymour M. Chase v. Pan-Pacific Broadcasting, Inc. Miko ... , 750 F.2d 131 ( 1984 )

PaineWebber Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Private Bank (... , 260 F.3d 453 ( 2001 )

United States v. Lashawn P. Jiles , 102 F.3d 278 ( 1996 )

View All Authorities »