McAtee, Ronnie L. v. Uchtman, Alan , 162 F. App'x 621 ( 2006 )


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  •                            UNPUBLISHED ORDER
    Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Submitted December 19, 2005*
    Decided January 10, 2006
    Before
    Hon. KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge
    Hon. DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge
    Hon. MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge
    No. 05-2949
    Appeal from the United States District
    RONNIE L. MCATEE,                           Court for the Southern District of
    Petitioner-Appellant,                   Illinois
    v.                                    No. 02-1100-JLF
    ALAN M. UCHTMAN,                            James L. Foreman,
    Respondent-Appellee.                    Judge.
    ORDER
    Inmate Ronnie McAtee appeals the denial of his petition for habeas corpus
    under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    . McAtee seeks relief from three decisions by the Illinois
    Department of Corrections Administrative Review Board (ARB) that affirmed a
    series of disciplinary convictions. We affirm the district court’s denial of the
    petition.
    *
    After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that
    oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the
    record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    No. 05-2949                                                                    Page 2
    Over a roughly four-month period in 1998, prison officials cited Ronnie
    McAtee for committing disciplinary infractions on at least thirteen separate dates.
    The alleged infractions included insubordination, threatening corrections officers,
    covering his cell door and covering the light in his cell to inhibit surveillance,
    sabotaging the sprinkler head in his cell and causing minor flooding, refusing to
    surrender a meal tray, refusing to remove his arm from the hatch in his cell door
    and jamming the lock on that hatch, and stealing a book from the prison law
    library. A hearing committee of the Illinois Department of Corrections, meeting on
    multiple occasions throughout this period, found McAtee guilty of almost every
    charge and, among other administrative sanctions, revoked a total of 37 months of
    good-time credit.
    McAtee filed three separate grievances with the ARB seeking the restoration
    of his good-time credits. The ARB reviewed the hearing committee’s records and
    recommended that each grievance be denied because it was “reasonably satisfied
    that the inmate committed the infractions.” McAtee filed an action for mandamus
    in the state court, asking that his credits be reinstated because they had been
    revoked in violation of his due process rights and the Department of Corrections’
    regulations. The state court held that he had not stated a viable claim and
    dismissed his action. Without appealing his case to the Illinois Appellate Court,
    McAtee petitioned in district court for a writ of habeas corpus under § 2254. The
    district court found that McAtee had not procedurally exhausted his state remedies
    and denied the petition, and we affirmed that denial. See McAtee v. Cowan, 
    250 F.3d 506
     (7th Cir. 2001).
    McAtee proceeded to exhaust his state remedies, taking his case to the
    Illinois Appellate Court. There he argued that the trial court erred by dismissing
    his complaint, that his disciplinary hearing was not fair and impartial, that he was
    denied due process, and that there was insufficient evidence on the record to
    support his disciplinary sanctions. The state appellate court disagreed,
    determining that his conduct hearing was fair and impartial and that the trial
    court’s decision was supported by adequate evidence and an adequate written
    record. McAtee petitioned for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court, but
    was denied.
    Following this denial, McAtee filed a second petition under § 2254 in the
    district court. He alleged again that there was insufficient evidence on the record to
    sustain the disciplinary findings, that he was not given notice of the charges
    underlying those findings, that there was an insufficient written record to sustain
    the decisions, and that the hearing committee’s deficient process violated state
    laws. Upon the magistrate judge’s recommendation the district court denied the
    petition. McAtee appeals that decision.
    No. 05-2949                                                                        Page 3
    As a preliminary matter, we note that because McAtee is appealing the
    administrative revocation of good-time credits, he was not required to obtain a
    certificate of appealability in order to proceed on appeal. See Walker v. O’Brien, 
    216 F.3d 626
    , 637 (7th Cir. 2000). The respondents ask that we overrule Walker and
    require a certificate of McAtee and future appellants. We decline to do so.
    We review the district court’s denial of McAtee’s petition de novo. See Horton
    v. Litscher, 
    427 F.3d 498
    , 504 (7th Cir. 2005). Because his claim was adjudicated on
    the merits in an Illinois court, we may not grant McAtee’s petition unless the state
    court’s decision was contrary to or misapplied Supreme Court precedent, or was
    based on an unreasonable reading of the facts in light of the evidence. See id.; 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    (d)(1), (2). Insofar as McAtee’s petition is based on asserted violations
    of Illinois law, there is no relief available under § 2254; federal habeas relief “is only
    available to a person in custody in violation of the United States Constitution or
    laws or treaties of the United States.” See Dellinger v. Bowen, 
    301 F.3d 758
    , 764
    (7th Cir. 2002). McAtee alternatively characterizes his arguments on appeal as due
    process arguments, and we will address them as such.
    McAtee first argues that he was denied due process stemming from the
    prison’s failure to provide a fair and impartial hearing committee. He contends that
    the two committee members who issued the decisions in each of his disciplinary
    hearings intentionally misrepresented the statements of one of his witnesses,
    Randy Ryder-El. The committee reported that Ryder-El testified that he heard
    McAtee make insubordinate and derogatory comments to a correctional officer,
    while McAtee submitted an affidavit from Ryder-El denying that he gave such
    testimony.
    McAtee has a due process right to an impartial decisionmaker in a prison
    disciplinary hearing. See Piggie v. Cotton, 
    344 F.3d 674
    , 677 (7th Cir. 2003), citing
    Wolff v. McDonnell, 
    418 U.S. 539
    , 566 (1974). The decisionmakers are entitled to a
    presumption of “honesty and integrity,” and thus “the constitutional standard for
    impermissible bias is high.” Piggie v. Cotton, 
    342 F.3d 660
    , 666 (7th Cir. 2003).
    McAtee does not explain how the variance between Ryder-El’s reported testimony
    and his subsequent affidavit shows bias on the part of the hearing committee,
    especially given the presumption of honesty and integrity that we afford the
    adjudicators. “The requirements of due process are considerably relaxed in the
    setting of prison discipline.” Eads v. Hanks, 
    280 F.3d 728
    , 729 (7th Cir. 2002). The
    Illinois Appellate Court determined on the same record that McAtee had not shown
    that his hearing committee was biased, and he has not demonstrated here any error
    in that holding.
    McAtee next contends that the hearing committee’s decisions are not
    adequately supported by a written record. He cites Redding v. Fairman, 717 F.2d
    No. 05-2949                                                                       Page 4
    1105, 1114-15 (7th Cir. 1983), for the proposition that a disciplinary committee
    violates an inmate’s due process rights when it provides only a conclusory
    statement of reasons for its ruling. In that case, the record of the committee’s
    decision said only, “All evidence presented has convinced the committee the
    resident is guilty” of the alleged infractions. Id. at 1108. We held that the
    committee’s statement in that case was so broad that a reviewing court could not
    adequately discern whether the committee was impartial or its actions were
    arbitrary. Id. at 1116.
    Redding is distinguishable, however, from a case like this in which the
    committee specifies a basis for its decision, even when that explanation is cursory.
    In Saenz v. Young, 
    811 F.2d 1172
    , 1174 (7th Cir. 1987), we observed that the
    deficiency with the hearing in Redding was that the committee explained that it
    relied on “all evidence,” which was effectively the same as no explanation at all. 
    Id.
    Even an extremely brief summary, such as the statement of the committee in Saenz
    that the correctional officer’s “written statement supports the finding of guilt,” will
    suffice so long as there “is no mystery about [the committee’s] reasoning process.”
    
    Id. at 1173, 1174
    . See Moffat v. Boyles, 
    288 F.3d 978
    , 981 (7th Cir. 2002).
    Here, the Illinois Appellate Court properly found that the committee had
    sufficiently explained its reasons. Each hearing committee report includes a
    heading entitled “Basis for Decision”, and in each report that heading precedes a
    short but adequate summary of the testimony against McAtee along with his
    history of prior similar offenses. For example, one committee report reads, “Based
    on the observation of the reporting employee that McAtee popped tha [sic] cap off
    his fire sprinkler in the back of his cell which flooded the gallery, positive
    identification made by gallery chart, past history [of five citations for a related
    offense code]. This committee is satisfied the inmate is guilty as charged.”
    This summary was more specific than simply citing “all evidence presented,” as the
    committee did in Redding. Because McAtee’s evidence was limited to his own
    testimony and that of other inmates, the only question before the committee was
    one of credibility. Even a “curt explanation” was therefore adequate. Moffat, 
    288 F.3d at 981
     (noting in dicta that when the dispute is over “a curt explanation may
    suffice when it was evident to all involved that the only question was one of
    credibility, so that to find the prisoner guilty at all is to reveal how the core dispute
    has been resolved.”).
    McAtee raises additional arguments that the committee’s written record was
    inadequate, asserting that it was unreasonable to rely on past offenses that were
    dissimilar to the instant offenses or that the hearing committee violated his rights
    by not calling favorable witnesses. But he fails to make any argument as to how
    the Illinois Appellate Court’s decision that found the record adequate falls short of
    the highly deferential standard of § 2254(d). See Pannell v. McBride, 
    306 F.3d 499
    ,
    No. 05-2949                                                                      Page 5
    502 (7th Cir. 2002). The Illinois Appellate Court did not misapply Supreme Court
    precedent or make any unreasonable factual findings of fact in resolving this issue.
    Finally, McAtee contends that the hearing committee violated his due process
    rights by finding him guilty of the disciplinary infractions without sufficient
    evidence. He asserts that the committee relied on nothing more than the
    disciplinary reports against him and the testimony of the prison staff submitting
    those reports. There must be "some evidence" to support the hearing committee's
    findings in order to provide the due process of law. See Superintendent, Mass. Corr.
    Inst. v. Hill, 
    472 U.S. 445
    , 454 (1985); McPherson v. McBride, 
    188 F.3d 784
    , 786
    (7th Cir. 1999). As noted, the evidence the committee cited for each infraction
    consisted of testimony, generally that of the correctional officer reporting the
    infraction, and a list of McAtee’s prior, similar infractions. The officers’ reports, as
    submitted to the committee, are included in McAtee’s pleadings, and are the sort of
    evidence that we have found to meet the “some evidence” standard. McPherson, 
    188 F.3d at 786
     (concluding that brief conduct report was sufficient evidence so long as
    cited behavior violated the prison rule).
    AFFIRMED.