Allen, John L. v. Frank, Matthew J. , 246 F. App'x 388 ( 2007 )


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  •                       NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
    To be cited only in accordance with
    Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Submitted August 29, 2007*
    Decided August 30, 2007
    Before
    Hon. WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge
    Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge
    Hon. JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge
    No. 07-1031
    JOHN L. ALLEN,                                   Appeal from the United States
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                        District Court for the Eastern District
    of Wisconsin
    v.
    No. 05 C 975
    MATTHEW FRANK , et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.                        William C. Griesbach,
    Judge.
    ORDER
    Wisconsin prisoner John Allen claims in this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that
    the defendants ignored his complaints of testicular pain, which Allen suspects is
    caused by cancer. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants.
    We affirm.
    The essential facts are undisputed. Allen informed prison staff at his initial
    medical screening that eight months earlier he had found blood in his urine. This
    *
    After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral
    argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See
    Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    No. 07-1031                                                                   Page 2
    problem did not resurface, but in October 2002, a year after he entered the prison,
    Allen began persistently complaining of testicular pain on his right side. Over the
    next three years, he was seen by prison doctors or nurses for these complaints at
    least 17 times, by radiologists at the University of Wisconsin hospital three times,
    and by an emergency-room doctor once. Yet three separate ultrasounds and four
    blood workups and urinalyses during that period uncovered no evidence of cancer or
    other disease. One physician speculated that Allen might be experiencing residual
    pain from a vasectomy, but no other basis for his reported pain was detected.
    Prison doctors prescribed the antibiotic Ciproflaxen several times, gave Allen a
    scrotum support and an extra mattress to make him more comfortable, and referred
    him to prison psychologists out of concern that his pain might be psychologically
    driven.
    As part of the investigation into Allen’s complaints, prison medical staff
    ordered a urology consult after the second ultrasound revealed a small cyst,
    although on his left side outside his testicles. One radiologist told Allen that most
    masses outside the testicles prove benign, but added that, as a radiologist, he could
    not draw any conclusion on his own. Allen was then examined by a nurse
    practitioner in the urology department of the university hospital. Her findings were
    reviewed by a urologist. The examination revealed no conditions or symptoms of
    medical significance, and afterward the third ultrasound confirmed that the cyst
    had shrunk considerably in size. In the nurse practitioner’s experience, patients
    with pain similar to Allen’s had responded well to long-term use of Ciproflaxen, so
    she recommended its continued use.
    A year after the urology consult, in September 2005, Allen filed his complaint
    naming 25 defendants, only five of them prison employees who were directly
    involved in his medical care. The other defendants included prison administrators
    and every outside medical provider who treated Allen. Allen complained that all of
    the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his condition because they delayed
    sending him to the urologist and treated him only with Ciproflaxen, which he
    deemed ineffective. In granting summary judgment, the district court assumed
    with some hesitation that Allen suffered from a serious medical condition, but
    concluded that he lacked evidence of deliberate indifference. The court reasoned
    that Allen had presented nothing but his personal disagreement with the course of
    treatment offered by the prison-staff defendants. As to the outside providers, the
    court noted that Allen did not even say what he believes they should have done
    differently and that his own evidence demonstrated that they diligently
    investigated the source of his reported pain.
    To have survived summary judgment on his Eighth Amendment claim, Allen
    was required to produce evidence that (1) he suffered from an objectively serious
    medical condition, and (2) a defendant who can be liable under § 1983 was
    No. 07-1031                                                                     Page 3
    deliberately indifferent to that condition. See West v. Atkins, 
    487 U.S. 42
    , 49 (1988);
    Board v. Farnham, 
    394 F.3d 469
    , 478 (7th Cir. 2005). Deliberate indifference “is
    more than negligence and approaches intentional wrongdoing.” Johnson v. Snyder,
    
    444 F.3d 579
    , 585 (7th Cir. 2006). The prisoner must establish that the defendants
    knew about but disregarded a substantial risk of harm. Greeno v. Daley, 
    414 F.3d 645
    , 653 (7th Cir. 2005).
    At the outset we note our uncertainty about whether each of the outside
    providers even qualifies as a state actor who can be held liable to Allen under
    § 1983 for violating his civil rights. See 
    West, 487 U.S. at 54-56
    ; Wade v. Byles, 
    83 F.3d 902
    , 907 n.6 (7th Cir. 1996); Takle v. Univ. of Wis. Hosp. and Clinic. Auth., 
    402 F.3d 768
    (7th Cir. 2005). But see Lamoreux v. Oreck, 
    686 N.E.2d 722
    (Wis. App.
    2004). But the district court did not address the issue except as to one emergency-
    room doctor who was dismissed on this ground, so we will address Allen’s
    arguments about the care he received from the other defendants.
    Allen argues that the defendants (medical and non-medical) were
    deliberately indifferent to his condition because they prescribed Ciproflaxen
    repeatedly instead of referring him to a specialist when they were nonetheless
    unable to diagnose the source of his reported pain. To satisfy the objective
    component of such a claim—that prison officials delayed rather than denied medical
    assistance—the inmate generally is required to offer “verifying medical evidence”
    that the delay caused some degree of harm. See Williams v. Liefer, __ F.3d __, 
    2007 WL 1932475
    , *3 (7th Cir. 2007). This Allen did not do. In fact, we are not
    convinced that he even could prove an underlying “objectively serious medical
    condition” since not even the urologist could discern a problem. But even if we
    assume, as did the district court, that Allen could satisfy the objective component,
    he could not satisfy the subjective one. A prisoner’s dissatisfaction with a particular
    course of treatment does not give rise to an Eighth Amendment claim unless the
    medical treatment was “so blatantly inappropriate as to evidence intentional
    mistreatment likely to seriously aggravate” the prisoner’s condition. Edwards v.
    Snyder, 
    478 F.3d 827
    , 831 (7th Cir. 2007); Snipes v. DeTella, 
    95 F.3d 586
    , 592 (7th
    Cir. 1996). Here the prison medical staff performed countless examinations and
    ordered multiple tests but Allen has identified nothing of concern in the results that
    should have called for treatment other than the use of Ciproflaxen to combat the
    possibility of infection. Only the cyst appeared unusual, and when it surfaced Allen
    was promptly referred to the urologist. Allen emphasizes that he reportedly was in
    pain, but this alone fails to demonstrate that the need for other, unspecified
    treatment was so obvious that deliberate indifference can be inferred. See Johnson
    v. Doughty, 
    433 F.3d 1001
    , 1013 (7th Cir. 2006); Steele v. Choi, 
    82 F.3d 175
    , 179
    (7th Cir. 1996) (citing as examples of serious medical needs requiring immediate
    attention that “the leg is broken, so it must be set; the person is not breathing, so
    CPR must be administered”). And the non-medical officials cannot be held liable for
    No. 07-1031                                                                    Page 4
    reasonably relying on the medical judgment of professionals. See 
    Greeno, 414 F.3d at 656
    ; Perkins v. Lawson, 
    312 F.3d 872
    , 875-76 (7th Cir. 2002).
    Allen finally argues that the district court erred by granting summary
    judgment for the radiologists and the nurse practitioner at the university hospital
    before he obtained complete discovery from them. In his responses to their motions
    for summary judgment, Allen cryptically indicated that it was “difficult” for him to
    respond without knowing their precise job descriptions, but otherwise he said
    nothing about the progress of discovery. A party in such a situation—even a pro se
    litigant—must submit an affidavit explaining why additional discovery is
    necessary—a “simple procedure.” Deere & Co. v. Oh. Gear, 
    462 F.3d 701
    , 706 (7th
    Cir. 2006); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f); DiCesare v. Stuart, 
    12 F.3d 973
    , 979 (10th Cir.
    1993) (requiring pro se litigant to follow Rule 56(f)). Even if we liberally construe
    Allen’s submission as such a request, he did not explain why the job descriptions
    were necessary to establish deliberate indifference, and we agree with the district
    court that they were not.
    The judgment is AFFIRMED.