Emini, Arta v. Gonzales, Alberto R. , 247 F. App'x 812 ( 2007 )


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  •                        NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
    To be cited only in accordance with
    Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Argued August 7, 2007
    Decided September 10, 2007
    Before
    Hon. William J. Bauer, Circuit Judge
    Hon. Michael S. Kanne, Circuit Judge
    Hon. Ilana Diamond Rovner, Circuit Judge
    No. 06-3669
    Arta Emini,                                        Petition for Review of an Order
    Petitioner,            of the Board of Immigration Appeals
    v.                                           No. A95-574-815
    Alberto R. Gonzales,
    Respondent.
    ORDER
    Arta Emini, a native Albanian, petitions for review of an order of the Board of
    Immigration Appeals affirming the denial of her application for asylum, withholding
    of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Because substantial
    evidence does not compel a finding that Emini suffered persecution or that she has a
    well-founded fear of future persecution, we deny Emini’s petition for review.
    I. Background
    In support of her application for asylum, Emini testified at a hearing before the
    Immigration Judge (“IJ”) to incidents of interrogation and physical abuse at the hands
    No. 06-3669                                                                        Page 2
    of the police and threats from university faculty arising from her involvement in the
    Albanian Democratic Party, which was the leading opposition party in Albania. The
    IJ found that Emini testified credibly to these incidents but denied her application for
    asylum and withholding of removal because the incidents did not amount to past
    persecution and she had failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of future
    persecution.
    Emini testified at the hearing to the following events. She became involved in
    Albanian politics in 1996 when she joined the Youth Forum of the Democratic Party
    of Albania. Emini also had associations with the Democratic Party through her father,
    who had been a member since the early 1990’s and who had held the position of party
    secretary in the village of Bulgarec. Because of her father’s affiliation with the
    Democratic Party and because her birthplace was in Bulgarec, Emini was appointed
    to the position of election observer to oversee the June 1997 polls in Bulgarec. The
    Socialist Party won the June 1997 election, however, remaining in power through the
    time that Emini fled from Albania to the United States in August 2001.
    Emini entered college to pursue a nursing degree in 1997 and became a student
    organizer for the Youth Forum. It was here that she first experienced problems
    because of her political affiliation. Emini’s professors, who were sympathizers of the
    Socialist Party, advised her to give up her political activities and to focus her attention
    on her studies. In May 1998, the Vice Dean of the college threatened that he would
    prevent Emini from graduating and have her arrested if she continued her political
    involvement. Despite this threat, Emini graduated with a degree in nursing in 2001.
    She was unsuccessful in her attempts to find a nursing job following graduation,
    however, because the Socialist Party controlled the hospitals and would not hire
    members of the Democratic Party.
    While attending the university, Emini’s involvement with the Youth Forum also
    came to the attention of the police. She and several friends were arrested and
    interrogated by the police and Albanian state intelligence service in September of 1998
    because of their participation in a silent protest in memory of Azem Hajdari, the
    assassinated leader of the Democratic Party. During the interrogation, the police told
    Emini and her friends that they knew that they had organized the protest and that
    they would go to jail for doing so. The police then separated Emini and her friends,
    taking them to different rooms and questioning them for approximately half an hour.
    One officer forced Emini against a wall, hurting her left shoulder and the right side of
    her head. The officer used profanity and threatened her, trying to scare Emini into
    quitting her political activities. Emini and her friends were not imprisoned that day.
    A year later, in September 1999, Emini went to the police station accompanied by
    her father in response to a summons requesting that she appear to clarify her political
    No. 06-3669                                                                       Page 3
    involvement. When she arrived, she was taken to a room where she was questioned
    for three hours by two men in civilian clothing about student plans and demonstrations
    to commemorate Hajdari’s assassination. During the questioning, the officers slapped
    Emini so hard that her nose bled and dragged her by hair. The officers also hit and
    bruised her legs with rubber sticks, threatened her life and the lives of her family
    members, and threatened to sell her into prostitution if she did not provide the
    information that they sought. After she was released, Emini did not seek medical
    attention for her injuries.
    The following September, as local elections neared, Emini and several of her friends
    were returning from a campaign rally sponsored by the Democratic Party in another
    village when they were stopped by six police officers. The officers questioned them
    about where they had been and what they were doing. The officers threatened Emini
    and her friends, telling them that they would “get it in the neck” if they continued their
    political activities. The officers hit Emini in the face and dragged her by her hair. Her
    male friends were punched in the face. The officers detained the group for an hour and
    then released them.
    Emini was unable to vote in the local elections that September because her name,
    along with the names of her family members, had been left off of the list of registered
    voters. Emini believed that this was a tactic used by the Socialist Party to prevent
    members of the Democratic Party from voting in the election.
    In October 2000, Emini was returning home from a protest challenging the Socialist
    Party’s alleged manipulation of the election results when she was forced into a car with
    individuals who appeared to be agents of the secret service. She was taken to the
    police station where she was placed in a room, punched in the face, and detained for
    three days. A family friend and doctor later treated Emini’s injuries at her home, and
    she took time off from school to recover.
    Emini’s name was included on the list of registered voters by the time of the
    Parliamentary elections in June of 2001. She continued to participate in protests
    following this election. At a demonstration on July 15, 2001, Emini saw police openly
    beat protesters, place them in police cars, and arrest them. An agent of the secret
    service apprehended her, but her friends were able to extract her from his grip.
    Following this incident, Emini stayed with friends because she feared that the
    police would come to her home. Two warrants for her arrest were sent to her home
    during this period. Emini did not report to the police station because she feared
    further harm at the hands of the police. Emini did not present the warrants to the IJ
    at the hearing because her father had torn them up and thrown them away. On
    No. 06-3669                                                                       Page 4
    August 20, 2001, shortly after her parents received the warrants, Emini left Albania;
    she arrived in the United States on August 25, 2001.
    II. Analysis
    Where, as here, the BIA affirms the IJ’s decision without an opinion, we review the
    IJ’s analysis directly. Moreno-Cebrero v. Gonzales, 
    485 F.3d 395
    , 398 (7th Cir. 2007).
    We review the IJ’s decision under the deferential “substantial evidence” standard: “we
    require only that the decision be supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative
    evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Gjerazi v. Gonzales, 
    435 F.3d 800
    , 807
    (7th Cir. 2006) (citation and internal quotation omitted). “It is irrelevant whether or
    not this court would have reached the same conclusion if in the IJ’s position.” Bejko
    v. Gonzales, 
    468 F.3d 482
    , 485 (7th Cir. 2006). We will reverse only if the evidence
    compels a different result. Boci v. Gonzales, 
    473 F.3d 762
    , 766 (7th Cir. 2007).
    Asylum may be granted “to aliens who apply for asylum in a timely fashion, meet
    certain procedural requirements, and qualify as refugees.” Sosnovskaia v. Gonzales,
    
    421 F.3d 589
    , 593 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing 
    8 U.S.C. § 1158
    (b)(1)(A)). A “refugee” is
    “a person who is unable or unwilling to return to the country of her nationality
    because of ‘persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution on account or
    race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
    opinion. . . .’” 
    Id.
     (quoting 
    8 U.S.C. § 1101
    (a)(42)(A)). The asylum applicant bears the
    burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that she qualifies as a refugee
    according to this definition. 
    Id.
     (citing 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.13
    (a)). If the applicant
    establishes that she suffered past persecution, she is presumed to have a well-founded
    fear of future persecution. 
    Id.
     (citing 
    8 C.F.R. § 208.13
    (b)(1)).
    On appeal, Emini challenges the IJ’s denial of her petition for asylum based on
    political persecution. This Court has explained that persecution “must rise above the
    level of harassment.” Prela v. Ashcroft, 
    394 F.3d 515
    , 518 (7th Cir. 2005). The acts in
    question must go beyond merely being unfair, unjust, or unlawful. Margos v. Gonzales,
    
    443 F.3d 593
    , 596 (7th Cir. 2006). They instead must threaten death, imprisonment,
    or substantial harm or suffering. Boci, 
    473 F.3d at
    766 (citing Sharif v. INS, 
    87 F.3d 932
    , 935 (7th Cir. 1996)). Persecution also “must result from more than unpleasant or
    even dangerous conditions in [the] home country.” Nakibuka v. Gonzales, 
    421 F.3d 473
    , 476 (7th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). “Past persecution may be shown through
    even a single episode of detention or physical abuse, if it severe enough.” 
    Id.
     (citations
    omitted). And it “may include detention, arrest, interrogation, prosecution, illegal
    searches, confiscation of property, surveillance, beatings, [ ] torture, behavior that
    threatens the same, and non-life-threatening behavior such as torture and economic
    deprivation if the resulting conditions are sufficiently severe.” Gjerazi, 
    435 F.3d at 808
    (internal quotations and citation omitted).
    No. 06-3669                                                                        Page 5
    Emini based her claim of persecution on the following incidents: (1) the threat from
    the university’s dean; (2) the September 1998 arrest and interrogation, during which
    an officer hurt Emini’s left shoulder and the right side of her head; (3) in September
    1999, the interrogation and 20-hour detainment at the police station, during which an
    officer slapped her, causing her nose to bleed, and grabbed her by her hair; (4) in
    September 2000, the police stopped Emini and her friends, detained them for an hour,
    hit Emini in the face and dragged her by her hair, and told her that she and her friends
    would “get it in the neck” if they continued their political activities; and (5) in October
    2000, the police detained Emini for three days at the police station, punching her in the
    face and pulling her hair when she refused to cooperate. Considering these incidents
    in the aggregate, it is possible to find that Emini suffered past persecution. The IJ,
    however, found that these incidents were not so severe as to constitute persecution.
    The record does not compel a contrary finding.
    This Court has examined a broad spectrum of asylum cases in which the applicant
    claims past persecution based, in part, on detentions. See Diallo v. Ashcroft, 
    381 F.3d 687
    , 698 (7th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that “short detentions or detentions without
    physical abuse seem to have been less apt to reach the ‘persecution’ threshold required
    by this court”). On prior occasions, we have denied petitions for review where the
    asylum applicant claimed past persecution arising from being detained, beaten, and
    deprived of food for three days, see Dandan v. Ashcroft, 
    339 F.3d 567
    , 574 (7th Cir.
    2003); from having a van stolen with gun shots fired in the vicinity of the applicant’s
    yard, being questioned at a police station and a fine imposed the following day, being
    confined at a police station for two weeks, and having his home and family threatened,
    see Bejko, 
    468 F.3d at 485-86
    ; and from being interrogated on several occasions,
    arrested, detained once for thirty-six hours, and having his home searched and
    property confiscated but never being beaten, tortured, or forced to perform hard
    labor, see Zalega v. INS, 
    916 F.2d 1257
    , 1260 (7th Cir. 1990). Because she suffered
    physical abuse, as well as arrests, interrogations, and threats, Emini’s claim of past
    persecution may be deemed more serious than those asserted in the above-cited cases.
    At the same time, the physical abuse, coupled with the detentions and
    interrogations, that Emini experienced does not rise to the level of severity suffered by
    the petitioner in Asani v. INS, 
    154 F.3d 719
    , 721 (7th Cir. 1998). In Asani, this Court
    found it likely that the detentions at issue were sufficiently serious as to constitute
    past persecution where the petitioner was detained in a jail cell for two weeks with no
    room to sit, deprived of food and water, and repeatedly interrogated. 
    Id. at 724
    . He
    was later detained again and beaten with fists and a police stick, during which two
    teeth were knocked out. 
    Id.
     Likewise, in Vaduva v. INS, 
    131 F.3d 689
    , 690 (7th Cir.
    1997), this court agreed with the BIA’s finding of past persecution where, in a single
    beating, the petitioner was punched, his face bruised, and his finger broken.
    No. 06-3669                                                                      Page 6
    While this is hardly an exhaustive review of this Court’s consideration of claims of
    past persecution involving detentions, it suffices to show that the detentions and
    physical abuse that Emini experienced, while serious, do not compel a finding of past
    persecution.1 Unlike the petitioner in Asani or Vaduva, Emini did not offer specific
    information about the degree of her injuries that would allow us to assess the severity
    of the acts. See, e.g., Dandan, 
    339 F.3d at 574
     (“A standard of review that requires
    our being compelled to reach a conclusion contrary to the BIA means that we
    necessarily search for specifics, not generalities.”) (emphasis in original). While this
    Court has expressed its distaste with being tasked with quantifying suffering for
    purposes of determining asylum eligibility, see 
    id.,
     it is our responsibility. Here,
    Emini’s detentions and physical abuse are not of such a greater degree than those at
    issue in Dandan, for example, that we are compelled to find that she was subject to
    past persecution.
    We note that this conclusion comes with reservation. The context of Emini’s harms
    shows that she suffered physical abuse, detentions, and threats because of her support
    of the Democratic Party. The detentions were systematic: they occurred at times of
    increased political activism during which the police targeted Emini because of her
    efforts for the Democratic Party as a means of quelling popular support. Additionally,
    her detentions and physical abuse were repetitive and their length and the associated
    violence increased over time. This increase in severity was accompanied by threats on
    her life and the lives of her family members, threats of imprisonment, and threats of
    forced prostitution. At the time Emini fled Albania, the police were seeking her out,
    in line with their threats, by issuing two warrants. While these facts support a finding
    of persecution, they do not compel such a finding, and the law requires that such a
    finding be compelled before we grant a petition for review. Boci, 
    473 F.3d at 766
    .
    Because Emini did not demonstrate past persecution, she is not entitled to a
    rebuttable presumption of future persecution. She may nevertheless establish “a well-
    founded fear of future persecution if [her] fear is subjectively genuine and objectively
    reasonable in light of credible evidence.” Gjerazi, 
    435 F.3d at 808
     (citations omitted).
    As evidence of the objective component of her fear of future persecution, Emini
    offered testimony about the two arrest warrants that were sent to her parents’ home.
    Since she had not seen the warrants, she did not know whether they required her
    arrest or requested her presence for questioning. She also offered a letter from her
    father, which states that two policemen showed up with a summons for Emini, which
    he tore up. The letter continued that Emini’s father advised her against appearing at
    1
    We do not suggest that it is necessary for the asylum applicant to have bones
    broken or teeth lost in order to establish the requisite severity of abuse for asylum
    purposes.
    No. 06-3669                                                                      Page 7
    the Prosecutor’s Office. A few days later, the police threatened that there would be
    consequence for her family if Emini failed to appear. The IJ found that this evidence,
    on its own, did not establish a reasonable possibility that she would face political
    persecution if she were to return to Albania because they established nothing more
    than that she was being sought for questioning.
    Additionally, the IJ considered U.S. State Department country reports, which
    stated that the Democratic Party in Albania often has complained credibly about
    incidents of police harassment and the dismissal of some party members from their
    official positions because of political reasons. The IJ reasoned that these reports
    showed that Emini might expect to be questioned by authorities and may be subjected
    to harassment by the police because of her continued support of the Democratic Party
    if she returns to Albania. We agree with the IJ that these types of actions, questioning
    and harassment, do not suffice to create a reasonable possibility of persecution.
    Moreover, the IJ considered the fact that Emini’s family has continued to live in
    Albania in relative comfort despite her father’s involvement with the Democratic Party
    and despite the previous threats to her family in connection with Emini’s failure to
    appear in response to the summonses. See Boci, 
    473 F.3d at 767
    . The IJ found that
    this factor likewise weighed against a finding of a reasonable possibility of future
    persecution if she were to return to Albania. We conclude that the evidence does not
    compel a conclusion contrary to the one reached by the IJ.
    Because Emini failed to meet her burden of proof in establishing her eligibility for
    asylum, she cannot meet the more stringent requirement of a clear probability of
    persecution for withholding of removal. Shymyhelskyy v. Gonzales, 
    477 F.3d 474
    , 481
    (7th Cir. 2007).
    III. Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED.
    ROVNER, Circuit Judge, DISSENTING.
    I respectfully dissent. The IJ found Emini credible and found that her testimony
    was supported by corroborating documents, leaving only the question of whether the
    incidents she described amount to past persecution or support a well-founded fear of
    future persecution. As the majority notes, to constitute past persecution the acts in
    question must rise to a level above mere harassment: they must threaten death,
    imprisonment, or substantial harm or suffering beyond being merely unfair, unjust,
    No. 06-3669                                                                        Page 8
    or unlawful. Boci v. Gonzales, 
    473 F.3d 762
    , 766 (7th Cir. 2007); Margos v. Gonzales,
    
    443 F.3d 593
    , 596 (7th Cir. 2006); Dandan v. Ashcroft, 
    339 F.3d 567
    , 573-74 (7th Cir.
    2003). Emini’s evidence must be specific in its descriptions of the type of harms she
    suffered in order to prove that the treatment was severe enough to constitute
    persecution. Dandan, 
    339 F.3d at 573-74
    .
    Here, the record more than adequately supports these requirements: Emini was
    imprisoned, she was credibly threatened with death, and she did suffer in a way that
    surpassed unfairness and entered the realm of political subjugation. She described all
    these events with sufficient clarity and specificity for the IJ to find that they happened
    just as she described them. The majority is willing to admit that the record indeed
    supports a determination of persecution; I believe it compels that result, requiring that
    this court grant Emini’s petition, vacate the decision of the BIA, and remand for a new
    hearing in which Emini would be properly afforded a presumption of a well-founded
    fear of future persecution. See Boci, 
    473 F.3d at 766
    ; Bejko v. Gonzales, 
    468 F.3d 482
    ,
    485 (7th Cir. 2006).
    The pattern of harms suffered by Emini is key to understanding the seriousness of
    the situation she faced in Albania. When one couples the undisputed facts of her
    detentions and mistreatment (including several events of significant physical violence)
    with (1) the steadily escalating nature of the abuse, (2) the explicit threats that she
    should discontinue her political activity, and (3) the continuing official interest in her,
    as evidenced by the warrants delivered to her home just before she fled, the finding of
    political persecution is inescapable. The socialist Albanian authorities communicated
    a clear message (stop your opposition) and backed it up with detentions and
    mistreatment. The police, knowing of her organizational role among the student
    members of the Democratic Party, routinely and systematically sought her out,
    detained her, and abused her in an attempt to learn about upcoming party rallies and
    events so that they could quell broader political expression. Through both explicit
    threats of more serious reprisals and an escalating pattern of abuse, they warned her
    that if she did not stop, she would suffer worse treatment than she already had. This
    worsening trend was apparent in the years before she fled: in 1998 she was detained
    for a half hour and pushed against a wall; in 1999 she was detained for 20 hours,
    dragged by her hair, slapped in the face, and beaten and bruised by “rubber sticks;” in
    2000 she was detained for three days and punched in the face, necessitating that she
    miss school and receive medical attention for her injuries. This increase in severity
    was accompanied by threats on her life, such as “you’ll die in jail” and “you’ll get it in
    the neck,” and also threats of prolonged imprisonment and of forced prostitution that
    she believed had already been carried out on her first cousin. These threats were
    entirely credible in the context of her worsening abuse.
    No. 06-3669                                                                      Page 9
    Consequently, no reasonable person in Emini’s position could have thought that she
    was free to continue participating in political opposition without risking more grave
    physical injury or detention than she had already experienced. The majority itself
    acknowledges this. Yet the majority in essence requires that she wait until she was
    even more severely beaten or incarcerated even longer before she could claim she was
    politically persecuted. A need to show more severe treatment might be plausible if the
    mistreatment were occurring at random and with no explicit message that it would
    worsen if she continued her political activity. But when the handwriting was so clearly
    on the wall, Emini was not obligated to ignore it.
    The socialist authorities ultimately achieved exactly what they sought: the
    suppression of Emini’s political expression. Initially when she was imprisoned
    multiple times and beaten, she still continued in her opposition. The record shows that
    for years Emini was willing to persevere even through increasing physical harm,
    accepting that her harms were collateral for her cause. But finally she became certain
    that the harm resulting from her continued expression would be more than she could
    bear, and she fled Albania. The authorities succeeded by pushing her to the limit of
    what she was willing to risk: her life. And yet the majority seems to find that
    inadequate for asylum. While it is inescapable that we must sometimes engage in a
    grotesque calculation of a petitioner’s harm to determine if it is severe enough to
    warrant asylum, see Dandan, 
    339 F.3d at 573-74
    , I fear that in this case the majority
    has set the bar too high. It engages in an overly-demanding search for specificity and
    severity, a formalism that undermines the purpose and function of our asylum law in
    cases in which the causal connection between political expression and inflicted harm
    is so high, and the clarity of increased future severity is apparent from context. If
    Emini’s case does not warrant asylum, then it becomes very hard to identify just what
    does. The danger of this uncertainty extends beyond the fate of a single petitioner; it
    tends toward incongruous results that can give the appearance of asylum as judicial
    fiat rather than the promise of our government to the oppressed.
    Because the record compels the conclusion that Emini’s experiences amount to past
    persecution, she is therefore entitled to a presumption of a well-founded fear of future
    persecution should she be returned to Albania. I would grant her petition for review,
    vacate the decision of the BIA, and remand for a new hearing in which she would
    receive the benefit of that rebuttable presumption.