United States v. Lawrence, Robert , 217 F. App'x 553 ( 2007 )


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  •                     NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
    To be cited only in accordance with
    Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Argued February 5, 2007
    Decided March 1, 2007
    Before
    Hon. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge
    Hon. ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
    Hon. DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
    No. 06-3205
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                           ] Appeal from the United
    ] States District Court for
    Plaintiff-Appellee,       ] the Central District of
    ] Illinois, Peoria Division
    ]
    v.                                    ] No. 06 CR 10019
    ]
    ]
    ROBERT LAWRENCE,                                    ]
    ] Michael H. Mihm,
    Defendant-Appellant.      ] Judge.
    ORDER
    On March 16, 2006 , a federal grand jury indicted Robert Lawrence on three
    counts of tax evasion under 
    26 U.S.C. § 7201
     and three counts of willful failure to
    file income taxes under 
    26 U.S.C. § 7203
    , relating to the years 1999, 2000, and
    2001. Shortly before trial, the government discovered an error in computing the tax
    amount due. Although that error impacted only some of the counts, the government
    inexplicably filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, and the district court granted
    the motion to dismiss with prejudice. Lawrence’s response to this fortuitous turn of
    No. 06-3205                                                                           2
    events was to file a motion for attorney’s fees and costs under the Hyde
    Amendment.
    The Hyde Amendment provides that “the court ... may award ... a reasonable
    attorney’s fee ... where the court finds that the position of the United States was
    vexatious, frivolous or in bad faith ....” Pub.L. No. 105-119, § 617, 
    111 Stat. 2519
    (1997) (reprinted in 18 U.S.C. § 3006A , historical and statutory notes). Lawrence
    argues that the government acted in bad faith or in a vexatious or frivolous manner
    in obtaining the indictment and pursuing the criminal case.
    According to Lawrence, the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA) required
    the Internal Revenue Service to display valid Office of Management and Budget
    (OMB) numbers on its Form 1040 and the1040 tax form does not in fact contain a
    valid OMB number. Lawrence argues that the PRA by its terms prohibits the
    government from imposing a criminal penalty upon a citizen for the failure to
    complete a form where the information request at issue does not comply with the
    PRA. Lawrence never explains how this argument is even relevant to the three
    counts involving tax evasion, but even as to the other three counts, it must fail.
    Although Lawrence recites the meaning of vexatious, frivolous and bad faith
    in an extensive quote of the government’s filing, Lawrence fails to set forth how
    those terms are met by the alleged conduct here. Lawrence’s brief represents an
    attempt to prove that the PRA could present a valid defense to the criminal charges.
    Yet Lawrence conceded at oral argument that no case from this circuit establishes
    such a proposition, and in fact Lawrence cites to no caselaw from any jurisdiction
    that so holds. In contrast, the government referenced numerous cases supporting
    its position that the PRA does not present a defense to a criminal action for failure
    to file income taxes, including: Salberg v. United States, 
    969 F.2d 379
     (7th Cir. 1992);
    United States v. Neff, 
    954 F.2d 698
     (11th Cir. 1992); United States v. Kerwin, 
    945 F.2d 92
     (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hicks, 
    947 F.2d 1356
     (9th Cir. 1991); and
    United States v. Wunder, 
    919 F.2d 34
     (6th Cir. 1990). Nor is the correctness of
    Lawrence’s position evident from the language of the PRA itself. Lawrence provides
    no explanation for how government conduct can be vexatious, frivolous, or in bad
    faith when there is no law contrary to it.
    Lawrence’s own definition of those terms is instructive. He notes that:
    vexatious means “without reasonable or probable cause or excuse,” United States v.
    Gilbert, 
    198 F.3d 1293
    , 1298 (11th Cir. 1999); frivolous means “groundless,” as where
    “the government’s position was foreclosed by binding precedent,” United States v.
    Braunstein, 
    281 F.3d 982
    , 995 (9th Cir. 2002); and bad faith is “not simply bad
    judgment or negligence, but rather ... the conscious doing of a wrong because of
    dishonest purpose or moral obliquity,” United States v. True, 
    250 F.3d 410
    , 423 (6th
    No. 06-3205                                                                           3
    Cir. 2001). He then spends the majority of his brief refuting the applicability of the
    numerous cases cited by the government. His refutation consists mainly of the
    argument that those cases addressed an earlier version of the PRA, but he makes
    no effort to explain how the reasoning in those cases is no longer relevant in light of
    the amendments to the PRA. His attempts at refuting those cases thus ring hollow,
    but that ultimately would not matter. Lawrence cannot simply argue that the
    government was wrong; he must argue that they are so wrong that the criminal
    case was vexatious, frivolous or in bad faith, and that the district court erred in
    holding otherwise. He has no case support for his argument that the PRA so clearly
    foreclosed the criminal action as to render the conduct vexatious, frivolous or in bad
    faith, nor does the language of the PRA establish that proposition. And that is all
    that matters in this appeal. That failure renders the myriad other arguments
    raised by the government irrelevant. It matters not whether the 1040 tax form in
    fact included a valid OMB number, because that is not the issue in this Hyde
    Amendment appeal. Nor does the standard of review ultimately matter here,
    because the appeal would fail regardless of the standard employed.
    Lawrence makes a secondary argument which, as far as we can discern,
    asserts that the indictment did not charge a triable offense because it failed to
    reference the statutory requirement to file a tax return. A similar argument was
    rejected in Sloan v. United States, 
    939 F.2d 499
    , 501-03 (7th Cir. 1991), and
    Lawrence makes no effort to distinguish that case. In fact, Lawrence again supplies
    no case support for his argument, let alone any cases establishing that the
    inadequacy of the indictment was so clear as to render the government’s conduct
    vexatious, frivolous or in bad faith. The district court properly denied the request
    for attorney’s fees under the Hyde Amendment. AFFIRMED.