United States v. Ramirez-Ibarra, Jero ( 2006 )


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  •                               UNPUBLISHED ORDER
    Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Submitted May 31, 2006*
    Decided June 2, 2006
    Before
    Hon. THOMAS E. FAIRCHILD, Circuit Judge
    Hon. TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge
    Hon. DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
    No. 05-2994
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,               Appeal from the United States District
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                 Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
    Eastern Division.
    v.
    No. 04 CR 505-1
    JERONIMO RAMIREZ-IBARRA,
    Defendant-Appellant.                Samuel Der-Yeghiayan,
    Judge.
    ORDER
    While Jeronimo Ramirez-Ibarra was serving an Illinois sentence for drunk
    driving, immigration authorities discovered that he was a native and citizen of
    Mexico and that he was deported from the United States in 1992 after a conviction
    for a drug trafficking offense. The government charged him with being in the
    United States without permission after his removal, see 
    8 U.S.C. § 1326
    (a), and he
    pleaded guilty. At sentencing his attorney argued that a below-guidelines sentence
    was appropriate because the lack of a “fast-track” program, see U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1, in
    *
    After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that
    oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the
    record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    No. 05-2994                                                                    Page 2
    the Northern District of Illinois creates disparity with § 1326(a) sentences imposed
    in districts that have such a program. The district court rejected Ramirez-Ibarra’s
    argument because Congress and the Sentencing Commission left the
    implementation of such programs to the discretion of the government. After
    considering the sentencing factors in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a), the district court imposed
    a sentence of 70 months’ imprisonment—a sentence at the low end of the guidelines
    range.
    On appeal Ramirez-Ibarra first argues that the presumption of
    reasonableness afforded a sentence imposed within the guidelines range is
    inconsistent with United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
     (2005). Ramirez-Ibarra
    concedes, however, that his position is foreclosed by circuit precedent. See United
    States v. Mykytiuk, 
    415 F.3d 606
     (7th Cir. 2005). He makes the argument here to
    preserve the possibility of review by the Supreme Court.
    Ramirez-Ibarra next argues that his sentence is unreasonable because the
    district judge did not go below the guidelines range to compensate for the fact that
    the Northern District of Illinois does not have a fast-track program. The
    consequence, he contends, is that the court failed to consider the sentencing
    disparities caused by having fast-track programs in some districts but not others,
    thus failing to consider a factor specified in § 3553(a)(6). We resolve this argument
    against Ramirez-Ibarra. As we explained in United States v. Martinez-Martinez,
    
    442 F.3d 539
     (7th Cir. 2006), and United States v. Galicia-Cardenas, 
    443 F.3d 553
    (7th Cir. 2006) (per curiam), Congress knew that disparities would result from
    leaving it to the Attorney General to decide which districts should implement fast-
    track procedures, and thus a sentence imposed for violating § 1326(a) cannot be
    deemed unreasonable simply because the defendant was convicted in a jurisdiction
    without a fast-track program. Ramirez-Ibarra’s sentence is within the properly
    calculated guidelines range and is therefore presumptively reasonable; he cannot
    rebut that presumption by pointing to a factor that does not justify a reduced
    sentence. See Martinez-Martinez, 
    442 F.3d at 542-43
    .
    The key to the foregoing analysis is that the disparities between sentences
    imposed in a fast-track district and a district not having a fast-track program do not
    rebut the presumption of reasonableness. Another analysis would lead to the same
    result. It is that these disparities being authorized by Congress and the Sentencing
    Commission, to accomplish an efficient use of limited resources, are not
    “unwarranted” and consideration of them is therefore not required by the terms of
    
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a)(6). The judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-2994

Judges: Hon, Fairchild, Evans, Sykes

Filed Date: 6/2/2006

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024