United States v. Hubbert, Willie R. ( 2006 )


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  •                              UNPUBLISHED ORDER
    Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Submitted September 22, 2006*
    Decided November 29, 2006
    Before
    Hon. RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge
    Hon. ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
    Hon. TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge
    No. 05-1661
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       Appeal from the United States
    Plaintiff-Appellee,                         District Court for the Eastern
    District of Wisconsin
    v.
    No. 04-CR-167
    WILLIE R. HUBBERT,
    Defendant-Appellant.                       Charles N. Clevert, Jr.,
    Judge.
    ORDER
    A gun fell out of Willie Hubbert’s pants during a struggle with Milwaukee
    police officers. A jury found Hubbert guilty of unlawfully possessing a firearm
    following a felony conviction, in violation of 
    18 U.S.C. § 992
    (g)(1), and he was
    sentenced to 92 months’ imprisonment. Hubbert now appeals, arguing that his
    sentence, which falls at the bottom of the properly calculated guidelines range, is
    unreasonable. We affirm.
    *
    Although oral argument was originally granted in this case, the appellant, with
    no objection from the government, moved to waive oral argument. An order granting
    the motion and vacating oral argument was entered on September 22, 2006, and the
    case was submitted on the briefs and record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f).
    No. 05-1661                                                                     Page 2
    At his sentencing Hubbert objected to the addition of one point to his
    criminal history score for a prior loitering offense. The district court sustained this
    objection, but then added one point for a marijuana offense that the probation
    officer had not counted because it was related to the loitering offense. See U.S.S.G.
    § 4A1.2(a)(2). This placed Hubbert in criminal history category V, which, combined
    with a total offense level of 24, yielded a guidelines imprisonment range of 92 to 115
    months. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A. The district court acknowledged that the
    guidelines are not mandatory, see United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    , 245 (2005),
    and considered the factors set forth in 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a). The court then
    sentenced Hubbert to 92 months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release.
    Hubbert does not argue that the district court miscalculated his guidelines
    imprisonment range. But he apparently believes that, in the exercise of its post-
    Booker discretion, the court could have—and should have—declined to assess a
    criminal history point for his seven-year-old marijuana conviction. Without that
    point the imprisonment range would have been 77 to 96 months, see U.S.S.G. Ch. 5,
    Pt. A, and Hubbert assumes that, had the court adopted the lower range, it would
    have sentenced him to 77 months’ imprisonment. He further asserts that a 77-
    month sentence would better achieve the sentencing goals enumerated in § 3553(a).
    Hubbert is plainly wrong if he thinks the district court was free to disregard
    his prior conviction when it applied the guidelines. As we have stated, “[e]ven in
    the post-Booker era, the first step in imposing a sentence is properly to calculate a
    Guidelines range.” United States v. Hawk, 
    434 F.3d 959
    , 962 (7th Cir. 2006);
    United States v. Robinson, 
    435 F.3d 669
    , 700-01 (7th Cir. 2006); see Booker, 543
    U.S. at 259. Even if the district court agreed with Hubbert that assessing a
    criminal history point for a seven-year-old marijuana conviction is unreasonable, it
    was not empowered to ignore the Sentencing Commission’s contrary judgment as
    expressed in the guidelines. See United States v. Gonzalez, 
    462 F.3d 754
    , 755 (7th
    Cir. 2006); United States v. Wallace, 
    458 F.3d 606
    , 611 (7th Cir. 2006). As we stated
    in Wallace, “[o]nly after computing the guidelines range . . . does the district judge
    have discretion to impose a sentence that is above or below that range.” 
    Id.
    Accordingly, the reasonableness of Hubbert’s prison sentence must be measured
    against the properly calculated range of 92 to 115 months and not, as Hubbert
    apparently suggests, against a range of 77 to 96 months.
    Because the district court imposed a sentence within the guidelines range, it
    is presumptively reasonable. United States v. Mykytiuk, 
    415 F.3d 606
    , 608 (7th Cir.
    2005). To rebut that presumption, Hubbert must show that his sentence is
    unreasonable in light of the 
    18 U.S.C. § 3553
    (a) factors. 
    Id.
     The sentencing judge
    must give meaningful consideration to the § 3553(a) factors, but she need not
    discuss and make findings as to each of them. United States v. Dean, 
    414 F.3d 725
    ,
    729 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Williams, 
    425 F.3d 478
    , 480 (7th Cir. 2005);
    No. 05-1661                                                                   Page 3
    United States v. Rodriguez-Alvarez, 
    425 F.3d 1041
    , 1047 (7th Cir. 2005). If the
    judge ignored a relevant consideration or “unreasonably discounted a factor so
    weighty as to compel a sentence outside of the Guidelines range,” we may intervene.
    United States v. Blue, 
    453 F.3d 948
    , 954 (7th Cir. 2006). But we will not vacate a
    sentence merely because we might have imposed a different one. United States v.
    Gonzalez, 
    462 F.3d 754
    , 756 (7th Cir. 2006); Williams, 
    425 F.3d at 481
    . As long as
    the district judge imposed the sentence for reasons that are logical and consistent
    with the § 3553(a) factors, we will not disturb it. Id.
    Here, the district court gave meaningful consideration to the § 3553(a)
    factors. The court highlighted the circumstances of the offense—finding that
    Hubbert had jeopardized both his own and the officers’ lives by fighting with
    them—as a substantial reason for sentencing within the guidelines range. The
    court noted Hubbert’s substantial criminal history (his prior convictions included
    possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute, assault and battery, and vehicular
    theft), but also considered Hubbert to be “youthful, and certainly not beyond
    rehabilitation.” The court also acknowledged that Hubbert “has a family which
    clearly needs him.” And while the court did not explicitly mention “deterrence” or
    “protecting the public,” it was not required to go through the § 3553(a) factors in
    checklist fashion. Dean, 
    414 F.3d at 729
    . Hubbert’s reasonableness argument is
    thus without merit.
    Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.