Curtis Westbrook v. Barclay Court Reporters ( 2015 )


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  •                         NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
    To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Submitted February 17, 2015*
    Decided February 17, 2015
    Before
    WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge
    JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge
    DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
    No. 14-2998
    CURTIS L. WESTBROOK,                             Appeal from the United States District
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                        Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
    Eastern Division.
    v.
    No. 14 C 2365
    BARCLAY COURT REPORTERS, and
    LITTLER MENDELSON, LLP,                     Gary S. Feinerman,
    Defendants-Appellees.                  Judge.
    ORDER
    After losing an employment-discrimination suit against the Boy Scouts of
    America, see Westbrook v. Boy Scouts of America, 560 F. App’x 574 (7th Cir. 2014), Curtis
    Westbrook brought this civil-rights suit against the law firm that represented the Boy
    Scouts and the court reporting agency it had hired. The district court dismissed the
    civil-rights suit for failure to state a claim. We affirm.
    *The defendants were not served with process in the district court and are not
    participating in this appeal. After examining the appellant’s brief and the record, we
    have concluded that the case is appropriate for summary disposition. See FED. R. APP. P.
    34(a)(2)(C).
    No. 14-2998                                                                            Page 2
    At the core of this suit is Westbrook’s belief that he was wrongly denied an
    opportunity in the underlying suit to review a transcript of a deposition he had given.
    The transcript had been prepared by Barclay Court Reporters, which had been hired by
    the Boy Scouts’ counsel, Littler Mendelson. For reasons not reflected in the record,
    Westbrook was unable to review the transcript at Barclay’s Chicago office during the
    initial 30 days after it was made available. According to the district court’s docket sheet
    from the prior suit, however, he eventually was able to review the transcript after Judge
    Dow arranged for it to be made available at the federal courthouse in Indianapolis
    (closer to Westbrook’s home in Muncie). But Westbrook did not timely respond to the
    Boy Scouts’ motion for summary judgment, which the court eventually granted. He now
    alleges that his response was untimely because of the delay he experienced in being able
    to review the transcript.
    The following year Westbrook sued Littler Mendelson and Barclay, asserting that
    they violated his civil rights by not allowing him to review his deposition transcript
    within 30 days of it being made available, see FED. R. CIV. P. 30(e)(1)(A). Judge Feinerman
    dismissed the case sua sponte for failure to state a claim. 
    28 U.S.C. § 1915
    (e)(2)(B)(ii). The
    law firm and the court reporting agency are not state actors (nor were they alleged to
    have conspired with state actors), the judge explained, so Westbrook could not bring a
    claim against them under 
    42 U.S.C. § 1983
     or § 1985. Judge Feinerman added that the
    “gist” of Westbrook’s claim—that he was prohibited from reviewing his deposition
    transcript—was inconsistent with Judge Dow’s order in the underlying case allowing
    him to review the transcript in Indianapolis.
    On appeal Westbrook contends that he stated a claim by pleading that Barclay
    Court Reporters and Littler Mendelson, though private actors, conspired with Judge
    Dow and a district court deputy, both of whom he characterizes as state actors. But
    Westbrook did not state a claim because he failed to allege any factual basis for a
    conspiracy, Cooney v. Rossiter, 
    583 F.3d 967
    , 970-71 (7th Cir. 2009); Estate of Sims ex rel.
    Sims v. Cnty. of Bureau, 
    506 F.3d 509
    , 517 (7th Cir. 2007), let alone any wrongdoing by
    Judge Dow, see Liteky v. United States, 
    510 U.S. 540
    , 555–56 (1994) (federal judges’
    “ordinary efforts at courtroom administration” do not provide evidence of bias); Starnes
    v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 
    39 F.3d 1394
    , 1397 (7th Cir. 1994) (district judge’s adverse
    ruling did not demonstrate collusion with opposing party).
    Nor did Westbrook allege any violation of his constitutional rights or other
    federal statutes, as he must under § 1983. See Planned Parenthood of Indiana, Inc. v. Comm'r
    No. 14-2998                                                                          Page 3
    of Indiana State Dep't Health, 
    699 F.3d 962
    , 972 (7th Cir. 2012). Westbrook’s claim of a
    violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(e)(2)—a rule established by the Supreme
    Court allowing deponents 30 days to review their deposition transcripts—cannot
    provide a basis for a § 1983 claim. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 
    536 U.S. 273
    , 283-84 (2002)
    (whether violation may be enforced through § 1983 depends on whether Congress
    intended to create private right).
    Finally Westbrook has not stated a claim under § 1985(3) because his complaint
    does not allege any racial or class-based motive for the defendants’ actions. See Griffin v.
    Breckenridge, 
    403 U.S. 88
    , 102 (1971); Kyle v. Morton High Sch., 
    144 F.3d 448
    , 457 (7th Cir.
    1998) (per curiam).
    AFFIRMED.