United States v. Donald Young , 368 F. App'x 680 ( 2010 )

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 3, 2010*
Decided March 4, 2010
Before
JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
No. 09-3277
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appeal from the United States District
Plaintiff-Appellee, Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
v. No. 06-CR-332
DONALD RAY YOUNG, Charles N. Clevert, Jr.,
Defendant-Appellant. Chief Judge.
ORDER
In this criminal case, Donald Ray Young appeals from a district court order that
granted a government motion to reduce his sentence for substantial assistance, see FED. R.
*
After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is
unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record. See FED. R. A PP. P.
34(a)(2)(B).
No. 09-3277 Page 2
C RIM. P. 35(b)(2), and argues that district court erred by refusing to consider the disparity
between crack and powder cocaine sentences. We affirm.
Young pleaded guilty in 2007 to knowing and intentional distribution of 50 or more
grams of crack cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and was sentenced to ten years’
imprisonment followed by 5 years’ supervised release. In May 2009, the government filed a
motion to reduce Young’s sentence based on his substantial assistance to the government.
At the hearing, Young argued that the court should also consider the disparity between
crack and powder cocaine sentences. The district court stated that it could not consider the
disparity. It granted the government's motion and reduced Young’s sentence by 20
months.
We have recently addressed the matter in United States v. Shelby, 584 F.3d 743, 749-50
(7th Cir. 2009), which held that, once district courts decide to grant a Rule 35(b)(2)
substantial-assistance motion, they may not then consider the factors articulated in 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a), including any disparity between crack and powder cocaine sentences.
Young urges us to reconsider the matter, but concedes that Shelby controls. We recently
denied rehearing and rehearing en banc in Shelby, and Young offers no argument not
considered in that case. We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s order.