Peter Jokich v. Rush University Medical Center ( 2022 )


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  •                                  In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Seventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 21-2691
    PETER JOKICH, M.D.,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    RUSH UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ____________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
    No. 18 C 7885 — Joan H. Lefkow, Judge.
    ____________________
    ARGUED FEBRUARY 23, 2022 — DECIDED JULY 28, 2022
    ____________________
    Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and KANNE *, Circuit
    Judges.
    SYKES, Chief Judge. Rush University Medical Center fired
    Dr. Peter Jokich, a distinguished radiologist who had
    worked at the hospital for nearly two decades. Dr. Jokich
    * Circuit Judge Kanne died on June 16, 2022, and did not participate in
    the decision of this case, which is being resolved under 
    28 U.S.C. § 46
    (d)
    by a quorum of the panel.
    2                                                 No. 21-2691
    sued Rush, asserting claims under Title VII of the Civil
    Rights Act of 1964 and Illinois law. He contends that his
    termination and other actions taken by Rush were unlawful
    retaliation for his participation in a colleague’s Title VII
    lawsuit and his opposition to discriminatory practices at
    Rush. He also contends that Rush’s actions violated the
    procedures set out in his employment contract and that Rush
    failed to adhere to an agreement guaranteeing his employ-
    ment for an additional year.
    The district judge entered summary judgment for Rush
    on all claims. We affirm. The record supports Rush’s conten-
    tion that its actions were taken because of Dr. Jokich’s clash-
    es with his colleagues; it does not support Dr. Jokich’s claim
    that he was fired because of his participation in activity
    protected by Title VII. Nor does the record support
    Dr. Jokich’s claims for breach of contract. Rush’s actions
    comported with his employment contract, and the agree-
    ment extending his employment was subject to a condition
    precedent—approval by the hospital’s Board of Trustees—
    that was never satisfied and that Rush did not waive.
    I. Background
    Dr. Peter Jokich is an accomplished radiologist who spe-
    cializes in breast imaging. He was recruited to Rush in 2001
    by Dr. Larry Goodman, then the hospital’s Dean, to improve
    Rush’s struggling breast-imaging practice. Over the next two
    decades, Dr. Jokich built a highly successful practice and
    until his final year of employment, served as the director of
    the hospital’s Division of Breast Imaging. That changed in
    August 2018 when Rush stripped him of this role, cut his
    pay by over $200,000, and provided notice that his employ-
    ment contract would not renew when it expired in June
    No. 21-2691                                                3
    2019. Dr. Jokich contends that these actions resulted in
    several breaches of contract and were unlawful retaliation
    for his participation in activity protected by Title VII.
    A. The Employment Contract
    Dr. Jokich and Rush had an employment contract called a
    “Faculty Employment Agreement.” The agreement, stand-
    ard for doctors employed by Rush, set Dr. Jokich’s duties
    and base salary and provided for a one-year employment
    term. The agreement automatically renewed on July 1 each
    year unless one party provided 120 days’ notice of the intent
    to terminate the agreement. Rush could terminate the
    agreement mid-term only for cause. However, Rush could
    modify Dr. Jokich’s pay and duties with 60 days’ notice.
    In addition to the Faculty Employment Agreement,
    Dr. Jokich’s employment was at times governed by “letter
    agreements,” which were written on Rush letterhead and
    sent to Dr. Jokich for his signature. Dr. Jokich specially
    negotiated for the letter agreements, which provided for
    multiyear employment terms—superseding the Faculty
    Employment Agreement’s one-year term—and annual
    bonuses and special benefits for him and his breast-imaging
    team. Absent an active letter agreement, Dr. Jokich’s em-
    ployment was governed solely by the Faculty Employment
    Agreement.
    In August 2016 Dr. Jokich signed a letter agreement ex-
    tending his employment through June 30, 2020. (We call this
    the “2016 letter agreement” or “2016 agreement.”) The
    enforceability of the agreement was subject to a condition
    precedent: approval by Rush’s Board of Trustees. The Board
    of Trustees had to approve the pay of very highly compen-
    4                                                  No. 21-2691
    sated doctors like Dr. Jokich because the hospital, a tax-
    exempt, not-for-profit entity, risked liability under antikick-
    back laws if it overcompensated a physician relative to his
    clinical productivity.
    At an October 2016 meeting, the Board of Trustees con-
    sidered and declined to approve the 2016 letter agreement. It
    worried that Dr. Jokich’s clinical productivity was too low to
    warrant the bonus compensation, exposing Rush to the risk
    of liability. After the Board’s decision, Rush tried to craft an
    amendment to the 2016 agreement acceptable to both
    Dr. Jokich and the Board. Dr. Jokich personally participated
    in the negotiations, sending several e-mails in March 2017
    suggesting changes that he hoped might assuage the Board’s
    legal concerns.
    In April 2017 Rush sent Dr. Jokich a proposed amend-
    ment to the 2016 agreement. The proposal, drafted with
    recommendations from the Board of Trustees, sought to add
    productivity benchmarks for Dr. Jokich’s practice. He would
    be eligible for the bonus compensation set out in the 2016
    agreement only if the benchmarks were met. Dr. Jokich
    found the productivity requirements unacceptable and
    immediately sent an e-mail rejecting the offer.
    In June Rush returned with another proposed amend-
    ment to the 2016 agreement. This offer (which we call the
    “2017 amendment”) likewise added productivity bench-
    marks, albeit less demanding ones, limiting Dr. Jokich’s
    eligibility for the bonus compensation set out in the 2016
    agreement. The amendment invited Dr. Jokich to accept with
    his signature. But Dr. Jokich did not sign or otherwise signal
    acceptance, and unlike his rejection of the first proposed
    amendment, this time he told no one about his decision. At
    No. 21-2691                                               5
    his deposition he agreed that he had not accepted the 2017
    amendment because “[i]t was basically the same letter that
    [he] had earlier said [that he] wouldn’t sign.”
    Although the Board of Trustees had not approved the
    2016 agreement and although Dr. Jokich had not accepted
    the 2017 amendment, Rush provided Dr. Jokich and his team
    bonuses and benefits consistent with the 2016 agreement.
    This included paying Dr. Jokich a yearly bonus in October
    2017. Dr. Ranga Krishnan, Rush’s Dean and the person
    responsible for approving Dr. Jokich’s bonuses, explained in
    a declaration that he signed off on the bonus because he
    mistakenly believed that Dr. Jokich had accepted the 2017
    amendment.
    B. Conflict and Termination
    The parties have entered a mountain of evidence catalog-
    ing a series of conflicts between Dr. Jokich and his col-
    leagues. We will simplify where we can and focus on the key
    events. In February 2018 Dr. Jokich e-mailed Dr. Krishnan,
    Dr. Larry Goodman (who by then was Rush’s CEO), and
    Rush’s head of surgery to complain about the hospital’s
    breast surgeons. Dr. Jokich urged the administrators to find
    an adequate replacement for a recently retired breast sur-
    geon and criticized the performance of the remaining breast
    surgeons, two of whom are female.
    The head of surgery showed the e-mail to the two sur-
    geons so they could gather evidence to rebut Dr. Jokich’s
    suggestion that their performances were subpar. After
    learning of the e-mail, the two female surgeons and
    Dr. Paula Grabler, a radiologist who worked under
    Dr. Jokich, raised concerns about him with the hospital’s
    6                                                  No. 21-2691
    human-resources department. They complained about their
    working relationship with him generally and suggested that
    he may have engaged in sex discrimination.
    Rush’s response to the complaints was twofold. First,
    Dr. Krishnan made changes to the reporting hierarchy.
    Dr. Grabler would now report to Dr. Robert DeCresce, the
    acting director of the Rush Cancer Center, rather than
    Dr. Jokich. Dr. Jokich would now report to Dr. DeCresce as
    well rather than Dr. Sharon Byrd, the chair of the Depart-
    ment of Diagnostic Radiology and Nuclear Medicine, which
    housed Dr. Jokich’s Division of Breast Imaging. Second,
    Rush hired an outside investigator to assess whether
    Dr. Jokich had violated hospital policy or engaged in sex
    discrimination. In April 2018 the investigator returned a
    report concluding that Dr. Jokich had done neither.
    Eight days after the investigator submitted her report,
    Dr. DeCresce, who had received a copy of the report, placed
    Dr. Grabler in charge of supervising breast-imaging facilities
    at Rush’s satellite locations. The responsibility formerly
    belonged to Dr. Jokich, and he considered the change a
    demotion. At his deposition Dr. DeCresce explained that he
    made the change because others involved in planning the
    satellite facilities had said that Dr. Jokich had been difficult
    to work with.
    Dr. Jokich claims that it was really the investigator’s re-
    port that motivated Dr. DeCresce to make the change.
    Specifically, the report took note of Dr. Jokich’s theory that
    his female colleagues had ginned up their complaints at the
    urging of Rush leadership for the purpose of dissuading him
    from testifying in another employee’s discrimination lawsuit
    against Rush. That suit, filed in November 2017 by Norma
    No. 21-2691                                                  7
    Melgoza, a Hispanic administrator, asserted claims under
    Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. During discovery, Melgoza
    had named Dr. Jokich (along with 111 others) as a potential
    witness. Other than appearing on the witness list, Dr. Jokich
    was not involved in Melgoza’s case.
    According to Dr. Jokich, Dr. DeCresce would have been
    unhappy to learn about Dr. Jokich’s potential involvement in
    Melgoza’s lawsuit. The previous year Dr. DeCresce had
    interviewed Melgoza for an internal promotion, and she
    claimed that he put on a “Trump mask” during the inter-
    view. Melgoza told Dr. Jokich about the incident, and he
    encouraged her to complain to human resources. In Decem-
    ber 2017 after Melgoza had filed her lawsuit, Dr. Jokich told
    human-resources personnel who were investigating the
    incident that he had told Melgoza that he thought the con-
    duct was “unbelievable and unprofessional.” He did not,
    however, say that Dr. DeCresce had discriminated against
    her.
    Returning to 2018 in the timeline, Dr. Jokich’s conflicts
    with Dr. Grabler continued. On May 21 she gave a presenta-
    tion on a breast-imaging technology called “tomosynthesis”
    (or 3D mammography). Dr. Jokich attended the presentation
    and made no comments while there. But the next day he
    criticized the presentation in an e-mail sent to 60 colleagues,
    including Drs. DeCresce, Goodman, and Krishnan, but not
    including Dr. Grabler. Dr. Jokich suggested that tomosyn-
    thesis was a gimmick to increase revenue at the expense of
    patient safety and expressed broader concerns that money
    was improperly driving the hospital’s decisions regarding
    patient care.
    8                                               No. 21-2691
    A few hours later, Dr. DeCresce e-mailed Dr. Krishnan
    about “Dr. Jokich’s latest outburst concerning his col-
    leagues.” He raised concerns about Dr. Jokich’s behavior,
    concluding: “I believe it is time for a change in mammogra-
    phy. … If we want to be a leading cancer center[,] we need
    individuals who will work together to achieve the goal. Pete
    is not one of those people.” Dr. Krishnan added
    Dr. Goodman to the e-mail chain, and Dr. Goodman re-
    sponded to both, saying: “I totally support your judgement
    [sic] concerning the individuals that report to you.”
    Later that week on May 26, 2018, Dr. DeCresce contacted
    human resources and explained the decision to terminate
    Dr. Jokich’s employment. The hospital engaged outside
    counsel to help carry out the termination, and by June 6 a
    draft termination letter was ready.
    June 11, however, brought another e-mail from
    Dr. Jokich. This time he wrote to three Rush executives,
    including Dr. Goodman, saying that he was aware of “seri-
    ous discrimination issues and unfair employment practices
    that have occurred, and are occurring, at Rush involving at
    least gender, age, and national origin.” He then filed a
    formal complaint with human resources alleging specific
    instances of unlawful practices. The only ones relevant here
    are the alleged discrimination underlying Melgoza’s already
    pending lawsuit and retaliation against Dr. Jokich for his
    supposed involvement in the case.
    Dr. Goodman wanted to learn more about the issues
    raised by Dr. Jokich before moving forward with the termi-
    nation. To that end, Rush hired an outside investigator to
    look into the claims. On July 29 the investigator returned a
    report concluding that Dr. Jokich’s complaints were merit-
    No. 21-2691                                                  9
    less. With that, according to Rush, it was time to proceed
    with the previously planned termination.
    On August 8 Drs. DeCresce and Krishnan met with
    Dr. Jokich and presented a choice: resign under a special
    agreement or face termination. The special agreement was
    essentially a severance package that would pay Dr. Jokich
    his salary of nearly $660,000 through June 2020 and leave
    him free to take any other job. It also included mutual
    nondisparagement provisions and a positive recommenda-
    tion from Dr. Goodman. On August 21 Dr. Jokich declined
    the offer.
    The next day Dr. DeCresce informed Dr. Jokich by letter
    that he was removed as the director of the Division of Breast
    Imaging and provided notice that in 60 days his salary
    would be reduced to about $450,000 to reflect the change in
    duties. The letter also provided notice that Rush would
    terminate the Faculty Employment Agreement at the end of
    its term in June 2019, ending Dr. Jokich’s employment at
    Rush.
    C. Proceedings Below
    Dr. Jokich responded with this lawsuit. He sued under
    Title VII, asserting that Rush’s actions were unlawful retalia-
    tion for his participation in Melgoza’s lawsuit and his oppo-
    sition to discriminatory practices at Rush. He also brought
    contract claims under Illinois law. His primary contention is
    that Rush breached the 2016 letter agreement by employing
    him through only June 2019, not June 2020. He also claimed
    that Rush violated the Faculty Employment Agreement by
    terminating him mid-term without cause and by allowing
    10                                                No. 21-2691
    Dr. DeCresce, rather than Dr. Byrd, the head of his depart-
    ment, to remove him as a division director.
    The district judge entered summary judgment for Rush
    on all claims. On the Title VII claim, she determined that
    some of the challenged actions were not adverse employ-
    ment actions. For those that were, she determined that the
    evidence was insufficient to allow an inference that Rush
    took the actions because of Dr. Jokich’s participation in
    protected activity.
    The judge likewise determined that no reasonable fact-
    finder could conclude that Rush breached any contractual
    obligation to Dr. Jokich. Rush’s actions complied with the
    Faculty Employment Agreement, and the 2016 letter agree-
    ment was subject to a condition precedent—approval by
    Rush’s Board of Trustees—that was never satisfied. The
    condition was not waived by Rush, nor was the hospital
    estopped from enforcing it.
    II. Discussion
    We review a summary judgment de novo, reviewing the
    record in the light most favorable to Dr. Jokich, the nonmov-
    ing party, and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor.
    Hansen v. Fincantieri Marine Grp., LLC, 
    763 F.3d 832
    , 836 (7th
    Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no
    genuine dispute of material fact and Rush, the moving party,
    is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. McCurry v. Kenco
    Logistics Servs., LLC, 
    942 F.3d 783
    , 788 (7th Cir. 2019).
    A. Title VII Retaliation
    Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate
    against an employee because he opposes any employment
    practice proscribed by Title VII or because he participates in
    No. 21-2691                                                  11
    an investigation or proceeding under Title VII. 42 U.S.C.
    § 2000e-3(a). To survive summary judgment on his retalia-
    tion claim, Dr. Jokich needed to provide evidence that (1) he
    engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) he suffered an
    adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal link
    between the protected activity and the adverse employment
    action. Boston v. U.S. Steel Corp., 
    816 F.3d 455
    , 464 (7th Cir.
    2016).
    To attempt to make his case, Dr. Jokich points to two sets
    of actions taken by Rush. The first is Dr. DeCresce’s decision
    to transfer oversight of the satellite breast-imaging facilities
    to Dr. Grabler, which came about a week after an outside
    investigator’s report noted Dr. Jokich’s theory that his
    female colleagues had sought to dissuade him from testify-
    ing in Melgoza’s lawsuit. Dr. Jokich claims that the report
    revealed his “participation” in Melgoza’s lawsuit, prompting
    Dr. DeCresce to retaliate against him.
    The judge determined that the transfer of supervisory
    responsibility was not a sufficient change to Dr. Jokich’s
    duties to constitute an adverse employment action. Rush
    advances the same argument on appeal. For present purpos-
    es we put the dispute aside and focus on the other two
    elements of a retaliation claim.
    Dr. Jokich’s case falls short on both. First, he presented
    no evidence that he engaged in protected activity prior to the
    challenged action. In relevant part, § 2000e-3(a) protects an
    employee who “ma[kes] a charge, testifie[s], assist[s], or
    participate[s]” in a Title VII “investigation, proceeding, or
    hearing.” To say that appearing with 111 others on a list of
    potential witnesses counts as “participation” in a lawsuit
    stretches the statutory language too far. Cf. Hatmaker v.
    12                                                No. 21-2691
    Mem’l Med. Ctr., 
    619 F.3d 741
    , 746–47 (7th Cir. 2010) (analyz-
    ing the text of § 2000e-3(a) and concluding that participating
    in an internal investigation is generally not protected activi-
    ty).
    Insisting that he engaged in protected activity, Dr. Jokich
    emphasizes that he spoke with Rush’s human-resources
    department about Dr. DeCresce wearing a “Trump mask”
    when interviewing Melgoza. That conversation was not
    protected activity because Dr. Jokich did not claim that
    Dr. DeCresce had discriminated against Melgoza at all, let
    alone on the basis of a protected characteristic. See
    Tomanovich v. City of Indianapolis, 
    457 F.3d 656
    , 663 (7th Cir.
    2006) (“Merely complaining in general terms of discrimina-
    tion or harassment, without indicating a connection to a
    protected class or providing facts sufficient to create that
    inference, is insufficient.”). Nor does the conversation with
    human resources do anything to transform Dr. Jokich’s mere
    appearance on a witness list into protected participation in
    Melgoza’s suit.
    Even if we assume that Dr. Jokich engaged in protected
    activity, he would still need evidence that doing so motivat-
    ed Rush to take the challenged action. Specifically, Dr. Jokich
    must show that Rush would not have transferred his duties
    to Dr. Grabler but for his supposed participation in
    Melgoza’s lawsuit. McKenzie v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 
    92 F.3d 473
    , 483 (7th Cir. 1996). But-for causation may be inferred
    from circumstantial evidence, although Rush may rebut the
    inference with evidence of a nondiscriminatory explanation
    for the challenged action. See Tomanovich, 457 F.3d at 663. If
    Rush does so, the burden returns to Dr. Jokich to show that
    No. 21-2691                                                     13
    the hospital’s nondiscriminatory explanation is pretextual.
    McKenzie, 
    92 F.3d at 483
    .
    Temporal proximity between protected activity and an
    adverse employment action can support an inference of
    causation between the two. Castro v. DeVry Univ., Inc.,
    
    786 F.3d 559
    , 565 (7th Cir. 2015). Suspicious timing alone,
    however, is generally insufficient to establish a retaliatory
    motivation. Daugherty v. Wabash Ctr., Inc., 
    577 F.3d 747
    , 751
    (7th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). Moreover, any inference of
    causation supported by temporal proximity may be negated
    by circumstances providing an alternative explanation for
    the challenged action. See, e.g., Parker v. Brooks Life Sci., Inc.,
    No. 21-2415, 
    2022 WL 2721059
    , at *4 (7th Cir. July 14, 2022);
    Sun v. Bd. of Trs., 
    473 F.3d 799
    , 816 (7th Cir. 2007).
    In this case, there is insufficient evidence to infer a causal
    link between the supposed protected activity and the trans-
    fer of responsibility to Dr. Grabler. Suspicious timing, at
    most, is all there is, and without more a reasonable fact-
    finder could not infer a retaliatory motivation for the action.
    This is especially so in light of the competing explanation
    that those working at the satellite locations found Dr. Jokich
    difficult to work with, which Dr. Jokich has not shown to be
    a pretext.
    The second set of actions that Dr. Jokich challenges are
    the August 2018 decisions to remove him as a division
    director—with an associated pay cut of over $200,000—and
    to not renew his Faculty Employment Agreement. Dr. Jokich
    claims that these actions were taken in retaliation for his
    June 2018 complaints about discriminatory practices at Rush.
    The pay cut and termination are plainly adverse employ-
    ment actions. See Barton v. Zimmer, Inc., 
    662 F.3d 448
    , 453–54
    14                                                 No. 21-2691
    (7th Cir. 2011). And we assume for present purposes that
    Dr. Jokich’s formal complaint about alleged discrimination
    was a “step in opposition to a form of discrimination that
    [Title VII] prohibits” qualifying as protected activity. Ferrill
    v. Oak Creek-Franklin Joint Sch. Dist., 
    860 F.3d 494
    , 501 (7th
    Cir. 2017) (quotation marks omitted).
    Dr. Jokich’s trouble, again, is establishing a causal link
    between his protected activity and Rush’s actions. Rush says
    that it decided to terminate Dr. Jokich in May 2018—when
    Dr. Jokich sent an e-mail to 60 colleagues criticizing
    Dr. Grabler’s presentation and Rush generally—before his
    June complaints. A paper trail confirms this account:
    Dr. DeCresce told human resources about the decision on
    May 26, and by June 6 a draft termination letter was ready.
    The termination was halted, according to Rush, in response
    to Dr. Jokich’s complaints about discrimination, which came
    shortly after the draft termination letter had been completed.
    Dr. Jokich urges us to reject Rush’s timeline, suggesting
    that the true decision to fire him was made after his June
    2018 complaints. That would require an improbable series of
    events such as this: Rush decided in May 2018 to fire
    Dr. Jokich; engaged outside counsel to do so; drafted a
    termination letter; then—for reasons unexplained—had a
    change of heart and decided to keep him on; finally,
    Dr. Jokich lodged his complaints, provoking Rush to fire him
    (again, and to follow through this time). The story is tough
    to swallow in theory, and it’s impossible to credit in fact
    because there is no evidence for it.
    Even if we fully accept this unsupported back-and-forth-
    and-back-again hypothesis, Dr. Jokich still cannot win. The
    only evidence of a retaliatory motive would be arguably
    No. 21-2691                                                15
    suspicious timing between his June 2018 complaints and
    Rush’s August 2018 actions. That’s not enough to make his
    case. Pushing back, Dr. Jokich insists that his positive per-
    formance reviews evince pretext on Rush’s part. They don’t.
    Rush agrees that Dr. Jokich is an excellent doctor and has
    always maintained that it fired him because of his conflicts
    with colleagues. The judge properly granted Rush’s motion
    for summary judgment on the retaliation claim.
    B. Breach of Contract
    Dr. Jokich contends that Rush’s actions resulted in sever-
    al breaches of contract under Illinois law. The district court
    had supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims
    pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1367
    (a) because they form part of the
    same “case or controversy” as the Title VII retaliation claim.
    Like the retaliation claim, the state-law claims center on
    Rush’s August 2018 actions against Dr. Jokich.
    Dr. Jokich’s primary contention is that Rush breached the
    2016 letter agreement, which extended his employment
    through June 2020, by employing him through only June
    2019 when the Faculty Employment Agreement terminated.
    The 2016 agreement, Dr. Jokich concedes, was subject to
    approval by Rush’s Board of Trustees, a condition precedent
    that was never satisfied. Nonetheless, he argues that Rush
    waived the condition precedent or is estopped from enforc-
    ing it.
    A condition precedent may be waived by the party
    whom it was intended to benefit. Downs v. Rosenthal Collins
    Grp., L.L.C., 
    963 N.E.2d 282
    , 290 (Ill. App. Ct. 2011). Waiver
    may occur either “expressly or by conduct indicating that
    strict compliance with the condition[] is not required.”
    16                                                    No. 21-2691
    Hardin, Rodriguez & Boivin Anesthesiologists, Ltd. v. Paradigm
    Ins. Co., 
    962 F.2d 628
    , 633 (7th Cir. 1992). Conduct implies
    waiver only when it is “wholly inconsistent with the clause
    or condition, thereby indicating [the] intent to abandon the
    contractual right.” Sphere Drake Ins. Ltd. v. Am. Gen. Life Ins.
    Co., 
    376 F.3d 664
    , 679 (7th Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omit-
    ted). Put differently, “[a]n implied waiver of a right may be
    shown when the conduct of the person against whom waiv-
    er is asserted is inconsistent with any intention other than to
    waive the right.” Downs, 
    963 N.E.2d at
    290–91.
    A party to a contract may likewise lose a contractual
    right by virtue of estoppel. Estoppel occurs when a party’s
    “statement or conduct misleads another into the belief that a
    right will not be enforced and cause[s] him to act to his
    detriment in reliance on that belief.” Sphere Drake Ins.,
    
    376 F.3d at 679
     (quoting Old Sec. Life Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l
    Bank & Tr. Co. of Chi., 
    740 F.2d 1384
    , 1392 (7th Cir. 1984)).
    The statement or conduct causing detrimental reliance need
    not be fraudulent in the legal sense or even done with the
    intent to mislead. Ceres Ill., Inc. v. Ill. Scrap Processing, Inc.,
    
    500 N.E.2d 1
    , 7 (Ill. 1986). But the reliance of the party acting
    to his detriment must be reasonable. Schwinder v. Austin Bank
    of Chi., 
    809 N.E.2d 180
    , 192 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
    No express statement from Rush supports waiver or es-
    toppel, so Dr. Jokich’s arguments rely on Rush’s conduct.
    The hospital provided him benefits and a bonus consistent
    with the 2016 agreement. Dr. Jokich argues that these actions
    implied waiver by indicating that Rush intended to abandon
    the condition that the Board of Trustees approve the con-
    tract. He further argues that Rush is estopped from enforc-
    ing the condition because, he claims, he would have left the
    No. 21-2691                                                      17
    hospital if not for the belief, induced by Rush’s conduct, that
    he had the assurance of a multiyear agreement.
    Beginning with waiver, we agree that a party’s perfor-
    mance or its acceptance of another party’s performance may
    sometimes establish waiver of a condition precedent to the
    formation of a contract. E.g., Whalen v. K-Mart Corp.,
    
    519 N.E.2d 991
    , 994 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); H.J., Inc. v. Int’l Tel. &
    Tel. Corp., 
    867 F.2d 1531
    , 1545–46 (8th Cir. 1989). We also
    agree that some of Rush’s actions—providing certain bene-
    fits and paying an annual bonus—were consistent with the
    2016 agreement.
    Waiver of a condition precedent, however, requires more
    than just some actions consistent with the performance of
    the contract. It requires conduct “wholly inconsistent” with
    the condition. Sphere Drake Ins., 
    376 F.3d at 679
    ; see also
    Downs, 
    963 N.E.2d at
    290–91. The record does not satisfy this
    demanding standard. After the Board of Trustees rejected
    the 2016 agreement, Rush worked to craft an amendment
    that the Board would accept. It did so openly with Dr. Jokich
    himself participating in the negotiations. Rush also entered
    unrefuted evidence that for several months in 2013 and 2014,
    it had provided Dr. Jokich benefits consistent with a prior
    letter agreement even though a new letter agreement had
    not been reached. Whatever the reason for Rush’s provision
    of compensation consistent with the 2016 agreement—
    whether a mistake or an act of grace for a valued doctor—
    those actions cannot establish waiver where Rush otherwise
    demonstrated an unwillingness to waive the condition.
    Dr. Jokich’s estoppel argument fares no better. He could
    not have been misled into thinking that Rush would not
    enforce the condition precedent because, as just explained,
    18                                                No. 21-2691
    the hospital openly worked to gain the Board of Trustees’
    approval. What’s more, he cannot show that he reasonably
    and detrimentally relied on a misrepresentation to stay at
    Rush. He learned that the Board had rejected the 2016
    agreement and silently chose not to accept the 2017 amend-
    ment. He stayed at Rush anyway.
    With the waiver and estoppel arguments knocked out,
    there is no basis for the enforceability of the 2016 agreement.
    And Dr. Jokich provides no argument for the enforceability
    of the 2017 amendment. (Indeed, he affirmatively disavows
    it.) Thus, the Faculty Employment Agreement controlled the
    employment relationship. It ran through June 2019, and
    consequently, Rush did not breach any contract by employ-
    ing Dr. Jokich through only that date.
    Dr. Jokich has two additional arguments for breach of
    contract. The first is that Rush breached the Faculty Em-
    ployment Agreement by terminating him mid-term without
    identifying cause for doing so. The argument has no merit
    because Rush did not terminate Dr. Jokich mid-term. Rather,
    the hospital declined to renew the Faculty Employment
    Agreement (with 120 days’ notice) at the end of its term. No
    cause was required for that nonrenewal. Rush did modify
    Dr. Jokich’s duties and pay (with 60 days’ notice) in the
    middle of the term. But the Faculty Employment Agreement
    specifically allowed the hospital to make these changes
    without cause; they are not, in any event, a “termination.”
    Second, Dr. Jokich argues that Rush violated its medical-
    staff bylaws by allowing Dr. DeCresce to remove him as a
    division director. (Rush concedes that the Faculty Employ-
    ment Agreement incorporated the bylaws.) Bylaw 10.3-2(c)
    provides that a division director serves in the position
    No. 21-2691                                                19
    “solely at the discretion” of the chair of the department in
    which the division sits. By Dr. Jokich’s reading of the bylaw,
    his removal as a division director could occur only if
    Dr. Sharon Byrd, the department chair, initiated the action.
    Dr. Jokich’s reading of the bylaw is far too stringent.
    Dr. DeCresce made the decision to remove Dr. Jokich as a
    division director with the support of Dr. Krishnan, Rush’s
    Dean, and Dr. Goodman, Rush’s CEO. Dr. Byrd later learned
    about the decision but did not seek to change it. Indeed, she
    explained at her deposition that she hardly interacted with
    Dr. Jokich in practice and was content for those who did to
    handle the situation. Whatever level of discretion the bylaw
    required Dr. Byrd to exercise, her decision to hand off the
    matter to others satisfied it.
    The evidence was insufficient to prove a breach of con-
    tract on any theory. Accordingly, the judgment of the district
    court is AFFIRMED.