Fitsum Segid v. USCIS ( 2022 )


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  •                               In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 21-3333
    FITSUM G. SEGID,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES, et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ____________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
    No. 1:20-cv-01228-SEB-DML — Sarah Evans Barker, Judge.
    ____________________
    ARGUED MAY 27, 2022 — DECIDED AUGUST 26, 2022
    ____________________
    Before ST. EVE, KIRSCH, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit
    Judges.
    JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge. Fitsum G. Segid applied
    to become a naturalized citizen but was denied, and when he
    petitioned a district court for review of that denial, that too
    was denied. He now appeals, but because he has waived his
    arguments on the merits, we affirm.
    2                                                    No. 21-3333
    I
    Segid is a citizen of Eritrea. While he lived there, he was in
    a relationship with a woman. Together they had two children
    by 2004 and another in mid-2006. In January 2004, Segid mar-
    ried another woman who was a United States citizen in Eri-
    trea. He continued his relationship with both women until the
    first woman left him, taking the children with her, in October
    2005.
    In early 2006, Segid fled Eritrea for Egypt. There, he ap-
    plied for an immigrant visa without the help of legal counsel.
    The visa application asked him to list “ALL Children.” But he
    did not list the two children from his first relationship (the
    third had not yet been born); instead, he simply marked
    “N/A.” He received the immigrant visa and moved to the
    United States to live with his wife.
    In February 2007, Segid became a lawful permanent resi-
    dent. Today, he has three children from his marriage, bring-
    ing his total number of children to six, from two different re-
    lationships.
    In April 2015, Segid applied for naturalization, again with-
    out the aid of legal counsel. On this application, he listed all
    six children, including the two omitted from his visa applica-
    tion. He also marked that he had never lied to a United States
    official to gain entry to the United States and that he had
    never given false, fraudulent, or misleading information to a
    United States government official. At his naturalization inter-
    view—where, again, he appeared without a lawyer—an adju-
    dications officer asked him if he had in fact never given false
    or misleading information to a government official. Segid de-
    nied doing so. The officer then confronted him about the
    No. 21-3333                                                   3
    discrepancy between his visa and naturalization applications.
    Segid responded that he did not list the two children because
    they were not part of his visa petition, and he did not believe
    he was named on their birth certificates. He also stated he did
    not list them because he worried for their safety if he did.
    In November 2017, United States Citizenship and Immi-
    gration Services denied Segid’s naturalization application. It
    determined that Segid had given false testimony at two dif-
    ferent points: (1) on his visa application, because he did not
    disclose his children, and (2) at his naturalization interview,
    because he stated he had never given false, fraudulent, or mis-
    leading information even though he had previously omitted
    his children from his visa application. Consequently, USCIS
    determined that Segid had not established that he was a per-
    son of good moral character and therefore did not qualify for
    naturalization.
    Segid asked for and was granted a hearing, at which
    USCIS denied his application again. USCIS found that Segid
    lied during his naturalization interview, and because he had
    also lied on his visa application, he was never lawfully admit-
    ted to the United States to begin with.
    Segid, now with retained counsel, filed a petition for re-
    view in the district court under 
    8 U.S.C. § 1421
    (c). In his com-
    plaint, Segid repeated the facts described above. USCIS
    moved to dismiss the suit and argued that Segid had pled
    himself out of court. Segid opposed the motion and argued
    that (1) he satisfied the requirements of § 1421(c) and (2) he
    was eligible for naturalization. The district court disagreed on
    the second point. The district court found that Segid had ad-
    mitted in his complaint that he intentionally omitted the two
    children from his visa application, which the court concluded
    4                                                   No. 21-3333
    was a material misrepresentation to procure an immigration
    benefit, meaning Segid was not lawfully admitted to the
    United States. The district court also found that Segid pled
    himself out of establishing good moral character by admitting
    that he stated that he had never provided misleading infor-
    mation to a United States official during his naturalization in-
    terview. Based on these two findings, the district court
    granted the motion to dismiss. Segid timely appealed.
    II
    An individual whose naturalization application is denied
    after a hearing can petition a district court to perform a de
    novo review of the application. 
    8 U.S.C. § 1421
    (c). To apply
    for review under § 1421(c), an individual must meet three cri-
    teria: (1) the individual must have filed a naturalization ap-
    plication; (2) USCIS must have denied the application; and (3)
    the individual must have requested and had a hearing before
    USCIS that resulted in a second denial. Id. These requirements
    of § 1421(c) are mandatory administrative requirements or
    claim-processing rules—without satisfying them, an individ-
    ual has not exhausted administrative remedies before USCIS
    and cannot pursue relief under § 1421(c). Moya v. United States
    Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
    975 F.3d 120
    , 126–27 (2d Cir. 2020) (ci-
    tation omitted) (“In short, Section 1421(c)’s exhaustion re-
    quirement is ‘mandatory,’ and [plaintiffs] may not sue until
    they have satisfied it.”); Shweika v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
    723 F.3d 710
    , 716, 719–20 (6th Cir. 2013) (requirements under
    § 1421(c) are jurisdictional claim-processing rules).
    Although Segid argued the merits of his eligibility for nat-
    uralization before the district court, his primary argument on
    appeal is that he has stated a claim for relief under § 1421(c)
    because he has met the administrative requirements of the
    No. 21-3333                                                                5
    statute: he filed a naturalization application, which was de-
    nied, and he had a hearing that also resulted in a denial.
    Unfortunately, Segid misconstrues the statute. These re-
    quirements are claim-processing rules; they are not the ele-
    ments of a claim under the statute. Rather a claim under
    § 1421(c) focuses on whether the individual should have been
    granted naturalization. See Bijan v. USCIS, 
    900 F.3d 942
    , 946
    (7th Cir. 2018). Segid’s opening brief is silent on this question.
    The mere fact that Segid has followed the administrative pro-
    cess properly does not—on its own—entitle him to proceed
    on his § 1421 claim.
    Seemingly recognizing the error of focusing on the admin-
    istrative requirements of § 1421(c), Segid addresses the merits
    of his naturalization claim in his reply brief. He suggests that
    he preserved his merits arguments because he argued in his
    opening brief that the district court relied on information out-
    side the pleadings when it determined that he had failed to
    state a claim. But arguing that the district court considered
    extrinsic facts outside the four corners of the complaint in
    denying Segid’s petition for review still does not amount to
    addressing the merits of Segid’s claim to naturalization. 1
    Segid’s failure to properly present his arguments before us
    constitutes waiver. We have consistently held that “argu-
    ments raised for the first time in a reply brief are waived,”
    Thorncreek Apts. III, LLC v. Mick, 
    886 F.3d 626
    , 636 (7th Cir.
    2018) (citation omitted), even when the litigant previously
    1 Moreover, Segid’s procedural argument is meritless. In ruling on
    USCIS’s motion to dismiss, the district court relied solely on Segid’s com-
    plaint; in reciting and analyzing the facts, the district court cited only to
    the complaint and nothing more.
    6                                                  No. 21-3333
    raised the issue before the district court. See McCarty v.
    Menard, Inc., 
    927 F.3d 468
    , 472 n.2 (7th Cir. 2019) (citation
    omitted).
    Here, Segid presented his arguments on the merits of his
    naturalization claim before the district court, but he neglected
    to address this dispositive issue in his opening brief. That is
    waiver. See 
    id.
     Because of Segid’s waiver, we have no occasion
    to consider any potentially meritorious arguments about his
    eligibility for naturalization.
    AFFIRMED.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-3333

Judges: Jackson-Akiwumi

Filed Date: 8/26/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 8/26/2022