United States v. Mixon, Sheyerman , 457 F.3d 615 ( 2006 )


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  •                           In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 05-3795
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    SHEYERMAN D. MIXON,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
    No. 03 CR 33—Charles N. Clevert, Jr., Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED MAY 9, 2006—DECIDED JULY 12, 2006
    ____________
    Before CUDAHY, KANNE, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.
    KANNE, Circuit Judge. Sheyerman Mixon, a felon, was
    convicted of possessing ammunition, see 18 U.S.C.
    § 922(g)(1), after police caught him casing a video store
    while carrying an antique .38-caliber revolver loaded
    with five 9mm rounds. The government could not prosecute
    Mixon for having the gun itself; felons are prohibited from
    having “firearms,” 
    id. § 922(g)(1),
    but an “antique fire-
    arm”—like this revolver—is not a “firearm” as defined in
    the Gun Control Act, see 
    id. § 921(a)(3),
    (a)(16). A felon is
    prohibited from having “ammunition,” however, so the
    government charged Mixon with possessing the 9mm
    rounds instead of the gun. Mixon moved to dismiss the
    indictment on the theory that ammunition loaded in what
    2                                                No. 05-3795
    is not a “firearm” cannot be “ammunition” as defined in
    the Gun Control Act, see 
    id. § 921(a)(17)(A).
    The district
    court denied that motion and found Mixon guilty after a
    bench trial. We affirm.
    I.
    Local police in Glendale, Wisconsin, stopped Mixon on
    suspicion that he planned to rob a video store. At the time
    he was carrying a revolver loaded with five bullets. The
    government learned that the gun was a .38-caliber Hopkins
    & Allen revolver manufactured before 1899, and thus under
    federal law Mixon could lawfully possess it even though he
    has felony convictions for reckless homicide and reckless
    endangerment with a weapon. But the government took the
    position that the exemption for the gun did not cover the
    bullets loaded inside, and so Mixon was charged with
    possessing the ammunition.
    His first response was to argue that the bullets should
    be suppressed on the theory that the police did not have
    probable cause to stop and search him. A magistrate judge
    conducted an evidentiary hearing at which one of the
    arresting officers testified that he stopped and searched
    Mixon and another man while following up on a tip about
    suspicious men in the area. The officer also testified that he
    found the loaded gun in Mixon’s coat pocket. Mixon did not
    testify. At the conclusion of the hearing, the magistrate
    judge recommended that the district court find that the
    police had reasonable suspicion to stop the men, and that
    the men consented to be searched.
    Before the district court could take up that recommenda-
    tion, Mixon executed a plea agreement that would have
    abandoned the unresolved motion. As part of his agreement
    Mixon stipulated to the commerce element of § 922(g)(1)
    (the bullets were manufactured in Russia and brought to
    the United States through foreign commerce), but at this
    No. 05-3795                                                3
    point he still did not comprehend the implication of possess-
    ing them in an antique firearm. After entering a guilty plea,
    however, Mixon moved to withdraw that plea on the ground
    that he entered it on the mistaken belief that his federal
    sentence would run concurrently with a state sentence he
    was already serving for violating his parole. Judge
    Stadtmueller allowed Mixon to withdraw his plea and later
    recused himself from further involvement in the case.
    Judge Clevert took over. He first addressed the unre-
    solved suppression motion and received additional evidence.
    Mixon testified that he did not consent to be searched, and
    that he didn’t even know he was carrying a gun. The
    government introduced the 9mm bullets into evidence. The
    district court found Mixon not credible and adopted the
    magistrate judge’s recommendation to deny the motion to
    suppress.
    Mixon then moved to reconsider the suppression ruling
    and also filed a motion to dismiss the indictment. In the
    latter motion he argued for the first time that it is not
    a crime to possess ammunition that is loaded into an
    antique firearm. The motion to dismiss was referred to a
    magistrate judge, who reasoned that it should be denied
    because the bullets were designed for use in other guns that
    would qualify as firearms and so it was irrelevant that
    these bullets happened to be in an antique revolver. The
    district court adopted the magistrate’s recommendation and
    denied the motion to dismiss.
    Mixon then waived his right to a jury trial, and the
    parties proceeded by written stipulations. Those stipula-
    tions recount that the bullets were Russian-made 9mm Wolf
    cartridges and were loaded into a “.38 caliber Hopkins &
    Allen revolver.” But no mention is made of the age or
    “antique” character of the gun, and nothing is said about
    whether the same bullets could be used in other guns, or
    even whether they could safely be fired from this gun. The
    4                                                No. 05-3795
    district court convicted Mixon and sentenced him to 45
    months’ imprisonment.
    II.
    Mixon’s only argument on appeal is that 18 U.S.C.
    § 922(g)(1) does not apply to bullets that otherwise would
    qualify as “ammunition” as long as they are loaded into
    an antique firearm. Mixon argues that a gun is not consid-
    ered a “firearm” under the Gun Control Act if it
    was manufactured before 1899, and because ammunition is
    prohibited only if it is designed for a firearm, bullets
    designed for an antique are not prohibited for felons to
    possess. The statute provides that a felon may not “ship
    or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in
    or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition.” 18
    U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). In defining the term “firearm,” the Act
    specifically excludes from its coverage any gun that is an
    “antique,” i.e., any firearm “manufactured in or before
    1898.” 
    Id. § 921(a)(3),
    (a)(16). The government has never
    disputed that the revolver Mixon possessed was manufac-
    tured in or before 1898, but neither side presented evidence
    of that fact at trial.
    The Gun Control Act defines “ammunition” to mean
    “ammunition or cartridge cases, primers, bullets, or propel-
    lent powder designed for use in any firearm.”
    
    Id. § 921(a)(17)(A)
    (emphasis added). Bullets are “ammuni-
    tion” if they are “designed for use in any firearm.” 18 U.S.C.
    § 921(a)(17)(B) (emphasis added). If these bullets had been
    designed exclusively for use in the Hopkins & Allen re-
    volver, they would not be “ammunition” because
    by definition this antique revolver is not a “firearm.” On the
    other hand, if the bullets were designed for use, not just in
    this antique revolver, but in other guns manufactured after
    1898, then it would appear, given the literal language of the
    definition, that they are “ammunition” because they would
    No. 05-3795                                                   5
    be designed for any firearm. Mixon, though, insists that the
    only logical construction of the statute is that bullets loaded
    in an antique firearm— whether or not they also are usable
    in a gun that’s not an antique—are not “ammunition” as
    that term is used in the Gun Control Act.
    Mixon posits an interesting argument, but in the end, the
    outcome of this case must turn on the facts presented to the
    trial court. In moving to dismiss, Mixon represented that,
    for purposes of his motion, the parties disputed “no relevant
    facts.” But that is not so. What was not disputed before trial
    is that Mixon had a .38-caliber firearm loaded with 9mm
    rounds. But it’s the design of the bullets, not the location,
    that matters. There was no agreement— indeed, no effort
    by Mixon to suggest—that these bullets were “designed” for
    use in this gun. It is true that the bullets were in the
    cylinder, but that simple fact hardly establishes as a matter
    of law that they were designed for, and could be safely used,
    in this weapon. We may assume that a 9mm bullet theoreti-
    cally could be fired from a .38-caliber gun, since .38-caliber
    is roughly equivalent to 9.65mm. But Mixon did not even
    establish an equivalency between the two measures when
    he moved to dismiss, and he certainly did not show the
    absence of any dispute as to whether closeness in size of the
    bullets is all that it takes to show that a bullet is “designed”
    to be used in a gun within which it happens to fit.
    As for trial, Mixon essentially abandoned his defense
    by omitting the facts necessary to establish it from the
    stipulated evidence. As with his motion to dismiss, he failed
    to include in the stipulations any facts that might show the
    bullets were designed for or usable in this gun. More
    importantly, though, Mixon did not even insist on
    a stipulation that the .38-caliber handgun was an “antique
    firearm” or that it was manufactured in 1898 or before.
    Thus, as far as the trial evidence shows, Mixon was caught
    with both a gun and bullets that he could not lawfully
    possess as a felon.
    AFFIRMED.
    6                                         No. 05-3795
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—7-12-06
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 05-3795

Citation Numbers: 457 F.3d 615, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 17374, 2006 WL 1896396

Judges: Cudahy, Kanne, Wood

Filed Date: 7/12/2006

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024