Bowers v. Fédération Internationale De L'Automobile , 489 F.3d 316 ( 2007 )


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  •                             In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 06-2718
    LARRY BOWERS, ALAN G. SYMONS,
    CAREY JOHNSON, et al.,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    FÉDÉRATION INTERNATIONALE DE L’AUTOMOBILE,
    FORUMLA ONE ADMINISTRATION LIMITED,
    INDIANAPOLIS MOTOR SPEEDWAY CORPORATION, et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.
    No. 1:05-cv-00914-SEB-VSS—Sarah Evans Barker, Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED DECEMBER 4, 2006—DECIDED MAY 25, 2007
    ____________
    Before EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge, and CUDAHY and
    SYKES, Circuit Judges.
    CUDAHY, Circuit Judge. The defendants organized a
    car race. Although twenty cars were originally scheduled
    to race, fourteen of the twenty did not participate after
    it was discovered that a flaw in their tires rendered
    them dangerous for use at full speed on one part of the
    track. Disappointed fans sued, seeking their expenses
    in attending and viewing the race. The district court
    dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim on
    2                                               No. 06-2718
    which relief can be granted. The plaintiffs appeal; we
    affirm.
    I. Background
    The Fédération Internationale de l’Automobile (FIA) is
    an international body that governs certain types of auto-
    mobile racing. The most famous is Formula One, which
    uses single-seat cars specially designed for high-speed
    racing. The sport has traditionally been popular in Europe,
    but Formula One races (often referred to as “grand prix”
    races) have been held elsewhere in an effort to spread their
    popularity. One such race, the 2005 United States Grand
    Prix (2005 USGP or “the race”), was scheduled to be run
    at the Indianapolis Motor Speedway (IMS) in Speedway,
    Indiana, on June 17 through 19, 2005. Grand prix races
    are multi-day events, with two days of practice driving
    and qualifying laps that determine the position of the
    cars at the start of the race, followed by the race itself
    on the final day. Twenty drivers–ten teams of two, each
    representing a different auto manufacturer–were sched-
    uled to roll.
    On June 17, during the first day of practice driving,
    driver Ralf Schumacher crashed when his left rear tire
    blew out on turn thirteen of the IMS track, a high-speed
    banked turn, apparently unusual among Formula One
    race courses. Sport reporters began to see a disturbing
    pattern: Schumacher used tires manufactured by Michelin
    ETC, and another driver using Michelin tires had suf-
    fered a blow-out and crashed on that same turn the
    previous year. The next day, Michelin sent a letter to the
    FIA’s Race Director and Safety Delegate at IMS stating
    that it had warned its teams that it might not be safe to
    use its tires “unless the vehicle speed in turn 13 can be
    reduced.” Michelin acknowledged that it was too late to
    get different tires to the track for qualifying laps and that
    No. 06-2718                                                        3
    the rules required cars to race on the same sort of tires
    used to qualify. Since fourteen of the twenty cars sched-
    uled to race used Michelin tires, this was a significant
    problem.
    The FIA shot back a letter dated June 19, the day of the
    race, refusing to level the playing field (or, more precisely,
    the race track) between cars using the questionable
    Michelin tires and solid Bridgestone tires. It would alter
    neither the rules (for instance, by permitting racers to use
    different tires than those used to qualify) nor the course
    (for instance, by adding a chicane ahead of turn thirteen
    to force the Bridgestone teams to reduce their speed
    prior to the turn as well). It was the Michelin teams’ own
    fault they hadn’t brought suitable equipment to the track.
    They had basically two options: race on different tires
    and accept a penalty, or take turn thirteen slower than
    the Bridgestone teams and hope to make up time on the
    rest of the track.
    The plaintiffs’ complaint claims that in the hours leading
    up to race time, Michelin and its teams threatened not
    to participate unless changes were made to help them.
    Allegedly “[s]everal proposals were discussed . . . but no
    agreement was reached as to a solution because the FIA
    and [the] Ferrari” team, the latter armed with Bridgestone
    tires and pressing its advantage, “refused to agree to any
    solutions acceptable to the other teams.”1 The plaintiffs
    claim that the racing teams, the FIA, Michelin and IMS
    finally agreed that all the teams would participate in a
    1
    The plaintiffs’ brief claims that the parties used the tire
    problem “to promote their own ends in an internecine struggle
    over Formula One revenue.” (Br. of Appellants at 16.) We are
    not sure what the plaintiffs mean and they do not explain
    further; they may be referring to the winner’s purse. At any
    rate, this consideration is irrelevant to our resolution of the case.
    4                                              No. 06-2718
    low-speed “formation lap” (also known as a “parade lap”)
    that takes place prior to the start of racing proper, but
    that afterwards the Michelin teams would exit from the
    track, leaving only the Bridgestone teams to drive the race.
    That is precisely what happened. Everyone was furi-
    ous. Representatives of the FIA, Michelin, IMS and the
    racing teams rained accusations and recriminations
    upon one another, calling the race a “farce” and saying
    that the fans had been cheated. The racing crowd dubbed
    the affair “Indygate.”
    Several fans who attended the 2005 USGP separately
    filed purported class actions against the FIA and some
    related organizations governing Formula One racing, IMS,
    the racing teams and Michelin. They alleged that the
    defendants owed them the price of their tickets and the
    cost of travel and other expenses they had incurred in
    attending the race (only the latter is now relevant, since
    Michelin has been permitted to give the fans a full refund
    of the ticket price). The cases were consolidated in the
    Southern District of Indiana, where the district court,
    without certifying a class, dismissed the plaintiffs’ third
    amended complaint for failure to state a claim. The
    plaintiffs now appeal.
    II. Discussion
    We review a dismissal for failure to state a claim de
    novo. Moranski v. Gen. Motors Corp., 
    433 F.3d 537
    , 539
    (7th Cir. 2005). A plaintiff ’s complaint need only contain
    “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
    pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The
    statement must give “fair notice of the claims against [the
    defendant] and a reasonable opportunity to form an
    answer.” Pratt v. Tarr, 
    464 F.3d 730
    , 732 (7th Cir. 2006).
    Dismissal is appropriate if a plaintiff does not allege
    No. 06-2718                                                 5
    such a claim or if it appears beyond doubt that the plain-
    tiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle her to re-
    lief. Edwards v. Snyder, 
    478 F.3d 827
    , 830 (7th Cir. 2007).
    The plaintiffs seek to recover from the various defen-
    dants under several different theories: breach of contract
    (and tortious interference with the same), promissory
    estoppel and negligence. We discuss each theory in turn.
    A. Breach of the Ticket Contract
    The plaintiffs allege first that IMS (and, somehow, the
    other defendants) breached a contractual obligation to the
    race attendees when only six cars drove. Whenever it
    sold a ticket to the 2005 USGP, the plaintiffs claim, IMS
    (and somehow the other defendants) “promised a regula-
    tion Formula One Racing League race” in exchange for
    the ticket price. The plaintiffs then claim that in light of
    the rules governing Formula One racing, a grand prix has
    to have at least twelve cars in it. Only six cars participated
    here, breaching the contract.
    This claim arguably should fail because IMS promised
    only to admit the plaintiffs to the race grounds on the
    days of the grand prix. While we are unaware of any
    Indiana case addressing the nature of a contract formed by
    the sale of an admission ticket, cf. Skalbania v. Simmons,
    
    443 N.E.2d 352
     (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (addressing a class
    certification question in a beach of contract action by
    season ticket holders against a hockey franchise, but
    explicitly reserving the merits), most states agree that the
    seller contracts only to admit the plaintiff to its property
    at a given time. The plaintiff buys the ticket, of course,
    in order to see an event that is scheduled to occur on the
    ticket-seller’s grounds, but the seller does not contract
    to provide the spectacle, only to license the plaintiff to
    enter and “view whatever event transpire[s].” Castillo v.
    6                                              No. 06-2718
    Tyson, 
    701 N.Y.S.2d 423
    , 423 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); see
    also Petrich v. MCY Music World, Inc., 
    862 N.E.2d 1171
    ,
    1180 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); Yarde Metals, Inc. v. New
    England Patriots Ltd. P’ship, 
    834 N.E.2d 1233
    , 1236
    (Mass. App. Ct. 2005); Sweeny v. United Artists Theater
    Circuit, Inc., 
    119 P.3d 538
    , 540-41 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005);
    Six Flags Theme Parks, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue, 
    102 S.W.3d 526
    , 533 (Mo. 2003); Wichita State Univ. Intercollegiate
    Athletic Ass’n v. Marrs, 
    28 P.3d 401
    , 403 (Kan. Ct. App.
    2001). But see Miami Dolphins, Ltd. v. Genden & Bach,
    P.A., 
    545 So.2d 294
    , 296 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding
    that a provision of a season ticket agreement requiring
    a refund when games were cancelled due to labor strikes
    was triggered when a football team played a game using
    strikebreakers).
    The plaintiffs provide us no reason not to construe
    their tickets this way. While one could contract to pro-
    vide a spectacle, one wonders why an exhibitor like IMS
    would do so, given that it has control over its grounds
    but not over the performers and their scheduled perfor-
    mances. Further, a spectator could reasonably decide to
    do without a contractual right to the spectacle itself,
    trusting that the exhibitor will work with the performers
    to ensure that the spectacle goes off lest both develop a
    bad reputation that could damage their future business.
    In the present case, Formula One is struggling to take root
    in the United States, where the racing of stock cars
    (modified versions of cars designed for the general public,
    governed by NASCAR) is the preeminent automotive
    sport. “Indygate’s” potential damage to Formula One’s
    American reputation was a serious concern for everyone
    involved; some speculated at the time that the FIA might
    never hold a race at IMS again.
    Nonetheless, because we are sitting in diversity, “conser-
    vatism is in order” in construing Indiana law, Lexington
    No. 06-2718                                                  7
    Ins. Co. v. Rugg & Knopp, Inc., 
    165 F.3d 1087
    , 1092-93
    (7th Cir. 1999), so we rest our decision on a narrower
    ground. Even assuming, as the plaintiffs claim, that
    they had a contractual right to a regulation Formula One
    race (and further assuming a right to have the race
    stewards properly interpret the applicable regulations on
    the spot), they got such a race here. The plaintiffs claim
    that certain provisions of the 2005 Formula One Sport-
    ing Regulations (F1 Regulations)2 operate poorly with
    fewer than eleven racers—the first eight finishers get
    points towards the annual championship, F1 Regulations
    ¶ 21, and certain infractions may be penalized, in among
    other ways, by moving the offending car ten slots back
    in the starting grid, F1 Regulations ¶ 54(c). But while a
    six-car race under the Regulations may be less rich,
    interesting or challenging than a twelve-car race, it is
    not prohibited or nonsensical under the rules (like a
    soccer match between three teams or a basketball team
    getting a first down). These rules cannot be interpreted
    to impose a “minimum car” requirement. There is no
    reason to claim, as the plaintiffs in all seriousness do, that
    no race occurred.
    Additionally, the regulations explicitly permit any
    race for which fewer than twelve cars are available to
    be cancelled. Any league sport must address common
    complications that can prevent a contest from properly
    occurring, including the non-appearance of contestants.
    In baseball, for instance, a team that fails to field nine
    2
    The plaintiffs did not attach the F1 Regulations to their
    complaint, but the regulations were central to its allegations
    (it stated that the “tickets . . . necessarily incorporated the
    FIA regulations”), and the Regulations were subsequently of-
    fered into the record. The parties do not dispute their written
    content and agree that they should be considered on a motion to
    dismiss.
    8                                              No. 06-2718
    players (unthinkable, the plaintiffs suggest) forfeits
    the game. Official Baseball Rules § 4.17, available at
    http://www.baseball-almanac.com/rule4.shtml. In Formula
    One racing, when fewer than twelve cars are available
    for a race, officials may cancel it—no one gets points
    towards the annual championship, even if they show up
    ready to go. F1 Regulations ¶ 17. We are reluctant to
    conclude that a six-car contest deprived the plaintiffs of
    a Formula One race when, given the way the FIA has
    chosen to address no-shows in its sport, the race could
    properly have been cancelled and the plaintiffs quite
    legitimately deprived of any race whatsoever. See Castillo,
    701 N.Y.S.2d at 423 (holding that the fight in which Mike
    Tyson was disqualified for biting Evander Holyfield’s
    ear was nonetheless a regulation boxing match).
    The plaintiffs urge that even if the race could have been
    cancelled, the defendants were contractually required to
    use “reasonable efforts” not to cancel it, and that all the
    teams should have tried harder to put on a good race. But
    while every competitive sport is built around the presump-
    tion that the players will try hard to win, a contest is
    not invalidated by a player’s poor effort. A team cannot
    claim that a loss does not count because one of its mem-
    bers was dogging it. And once it is established that the
    plaintiffs received a regulation race, they admit that they
    had no additional right to a race that was exciting or
    drivers that competed well. See, e.g., Beder v. Cleveland
    Browns, Inc., 
    717 N.E.2d 716
    , 720-21 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994);
    see also Seko Air Freight, Inc. v. Transworld Sys., Inc., 
    22 F.3d 773
    , 774 (7th Cir. 1994) (“That the Chicago Cubs
    turn out to be the doormat of the National League would
    not entitle the ticketholder to a refund.”).
    While the plaintiffs were upset (and perhaps justifi-
    ably so if the complaint’s allegations are true) at the
    Bridgestone teams for putting their desire to win ahead
    of a taste for even competition, or at the Michelin teams
    No. 06-2718                                                      9
    for deciding to take their ball and go home rather than do
    the best they could, the plaintiffs had no contractual
    right to a different performance. The dismissal of their
    claim for breach of the ticket contract must be affirmed,
    and with it the dismissal of their claim that some defen-
    dants tortiously induced others to breach the contract.
    B. Breach of Other Contracts
    The plaintiffs also claim that the defendants breached
    other contracts among themselves “which impact the
    duty of each of the Defendants to present the 2005 USGP
    as represented,” and of which the plaintiffs were third
    party beneficiaries to the extent that the contracts are
    “meant to control and determine: (i) the proper operation
    of the Race; (ii) [the] application of the rules of Defendants
    and the International Sporting Code; and (iii) the obliga-
    tions of Michelin to provide safe and suitable tires for
    the Formula One automobiles entered in this Race.” As
    already noted, the complaint does not allege a violation of
    the rules, and the plaintiffs have not argued the possibility
    of a tire obligation in this court; their argument has
    focused on portions of two contracts submitted in the
    record—the Concorde Agreement and the FIA Commer-
    cial Agreement. The plaintiffs claim that further dis-
    covery will reveal that these Agreements give them the
    right to have the defendants use their best efforts to
    ensure that at least sixteen cars race in every Formula
    One event.3 It is almost unthinkable that the defendants
    granted fans of their sport the legal right to interfere
    3
    Again, neither party objects to the consideration of these
    contracts on the motion to dismiss. The contracts were under
    seal in the district court and the plaintiffs filed copies of their
    initial brief and appendix under seal, but the contracts are now
    public because neither party moved to reseal the record in this
    court. See Seventh Circuit Operating Procedure 10(a).
    10                                               No. 06-2718
    with their private business relations, though the story is
    not farfetched enough to make a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal
    appropriate on that ground. See Loubser v. Thacker, 
    440 F.3d 439
    , 441 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 
    126 S. Ct. 2944
    (2006). It is clear from the language of the contracts,
    however, that the three provisions upon which the plain-
    tiffs rely do not grant them any such right.
    One provision, Concorde Agreement § 5.3.1, imposes a
    duty upon all teams to “use their best endeavours to
    procure together that additional cars are entered into” any
    race into which fewer than twenty cars have been entered.
    But even assuming that “entry” means actually racing
    rather than registering to race, the plaintiffs could not
    have held rights under the provision as third party
    beneficiaries. Under Indiana law,4 a contract grants a non-
    party rights only if an intent to grant the rights “affirma-
    tively appear[s] from the language of the instrument when
    properly interpreted and construed.” Cain v. Griffin, 
    849 N.E.2d 507
    , 514 (Ind. 2006). The plaintiffs argue that
    extrinsic evidence can be helpful to that interpretation and
    construction, but that is true only insofar as the “back-
    ground of the circumstances known at the time of execu-
    tion” reveals the meaning of the “terms of the contract
    itself.” Biddle v. BAA Indianapolis, LLC, 
    830 N.E.2d 76
    , 86
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), aff ’d in relevant part, 
    860 N.E.2d 570
    (Ind. 2007). In the present case, section 5.3.1 explicitly
    enumerates the parties that hold rights: the “Signatory
    Teams jointly undertake to the FIA and to the Commer-
    4
    Although these contracts are between entities based outside
    the United States and govern races that are mostly run in
    Europe, the parties agree that Indiana law applies. See
    Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v. Blaker, 
    859 F.2d 512
    , 514 (7th Cir.
    1988) (holding that the parties’ silence forfeits choice-of-
    law issues).
    No. 06-2718                                                11
    cial Rights Holder” to provide twenty cars per race (em-
    phasis added); the fans are not among those listed.
    The plaintiffs also point to two other provisions in
    which all parties agree to try to ensure that at least
    sixteen drivers participate in the annual Formula One
    Championship—the racing league, not an individual
    race—and grant the FIA the power to alter the car-design
    limitations to let cars that would otherwise not meet
    Formula One requirements participate. These duties
    and powers do not relate to individual races. (It would
    be strange if they did, given that Concorde Agreement
    § 5.3.1 already requires efforts to secure twenty rather
    than sixteen cars; one of the two provisions, Concorde
    Agreement § 10.4, explicitly says it is “[w]ithout prejudice
    to Clause 5.3.”) Consequently, the contracts were not
    violated in this case, and dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims
    as third-party beneficiaries of these contracts must
    be affirmed.
    C. Promissory Estoppel
    Next, the plaintiffs claim that promissory estoppel
    binds the defendants to pay them their expenses in
    traveling to see the 2005 USGP. They allege that the
    defendants “conspired and acted together to provide
    advertising and promotion” that indicated ten teams
    and twenty cars would drive in the race, and that they
    did so with the expectation that the plaintiffs would rely
    on the representations. The plaintiffs relied; fewer than
    twenty cars drove; they want damages.
    This claim must fail because no reasonable promoter
    or racing fan would have regarded a race’s “advertising
    and promotion” concerning the number of cars scheduled
    to roll as a promise upon which someone could reasonably
    rely. Under Indiana law, a person will be estopped to deny
    12                                            No. 06-2718
    a duty to fulfill a promise only where the promise was
    made with the expectation that it would induce, and it
    does induce, reasonable reliance by the plaintiff. Brown
    v. Branch, 
    758 N.E.2d 48
    , 51 (Ind. 2001). Whether a
    statement could reasonably be taken as a reliable promise
    “depend[s] on the knowledge that the promisee brings
    to the table.” Garwood Packaging, Inc. v. Allen & Co., 
    378 F.3d 698
    , 704 (7th Cir. 2004) (applying Indiana law). If a
    plaintiff, given her background and knowledge, should
    have known that an event was doubtful and might not
    occur, then it was not reasonable for her to rely on a
    defendant’s “promise” that it would. 
    Id. at 704
     (holding
    that a former investment banker’s reliance on a business-
    man’s promise that a deal to save a failing company
    would go through “come hell or high water” was unrea-
    sonable); see also Sees v. Bank One, Ind., N.A., 
    839 N.E.2d 154
    , 164 (Ind. 2005) (holding that an attorney’s reliance
    on a bank officer’s statement that a guaranty was unen-
    forceable was unreasonable).
    In the present case, sports fans had to understand that
    numerous events could prevent a full complement of
    twenty cars from racing at a particular location on a
    particular day—dangerous track conditions, a driver’s
    sudden illness, an accident in shipping a car to the track,
    any number of things, including the possibility that, for
    some reason, a driver might refuse to race. If the plain-
    tiffs indeed went to Indianapolis only because they took
    the defendants’ advertising as a reliable promise that
    twenty drivers, no fewer, would compete, they acted
    unreasonably.
    The plaintiffs claim that this conclusion is inappropri-
    ate on a motion to dismiss, arguing that the reasonable-
    ness of a promise is a question of fact, Garwood Packaging,
    
    378 F.3d at 705
    , and that their complaint does not specify
    the nature of the defendants’ promises. But that is not
    true; the plaintiffs assert that the “promises” were adver-
    No. 06-2718                                               13
    tisements for the race and other promotional materials.
    The plaintiffs cannot seriously contend they were so naive
    as to take an advertisement for a twenty-car race as a
    reliable promise that twenty cars would roll. The dismissal
    of the promissory estoppel claim must be affirmed.
    D. Negligence
    Finally, the complaint alleges that the non-IMS defen-
    dants “assumed a duty to Plaintiffs to present the Race as
    advertised and promoted.” The defendants had no duty to
    provide a race to anyone, however, except insofar as they
    took on a contractual obligation to provide one. See INS
    Investigations Bureau, Inc. v. Lee, 
    784 N.E.2d 566
    , 576
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
    In their briefs, the plaintiffs wisely abandon that theory
    but argue instead that because the defendants attempted
    to solve their disagreements concerning the race (the
    language the plaintiffs use, taken from an FIA press
    release, is that the defendants and in particular Michelin
    undertook to “impose a solution” to the disagreement),
    they were required to make the attempt with reasonable
    care. Their attempt was negligent and led to the impasse,
    damaging the plaintiffs. This claim is difficult to under-
    stand. Indiana sometimes imposes a duty of care on a
    defendant who voluntarily undertakes to perform a task
    for a plaintiff, but only where the plaintiff relies to its
    detriment on the defendant’s help (by failing to perform
    the task itself, for instance), or where the defendant
    otherwise leaves the plaintiff worse off than if the defen-
    dant had done nothing. City of Muncie ex rel. Muncie
    Fire Dep’t v. Weidner, 
    831 N.E.2d 206
    , 212 (Ind. Ct. App.
    2005); Rose v. Sewell, 
    128 F.3d 1098
    , 1104 (7th Cir. 1997)
    (applying Indiana law). Here it is unclear how the plain-
    tiffs relied to their detriment on the defendants’ help, since
    no one but the defendants even knew of the disagreement
    14                                            No. 06-2718
    before race time and it is doubtful what an outsider could
    have done to resolve the situation if it had known. The
    plaintiffs would have been no worse off if the defendants
    threw up their hands as soon as the tire problem surfaced.
    Even if the negligence claim made sense, Indiana’s
    economic loss doctrine would still bar damages in tort for
    a product or service that fails to perform properly. Gunkel
    v. Renovations, Inc., 
    822 N.E.2d 150
    , 153-54 (Ind. 2005);
    see also id. at 151 (holding that the doctrine applies
    “whether or not the product or service is supplied in a
    transaction subject to” the Uniform Commercial Code).
    Because the plaintiffs seek to recover for a service (the
    race) that was not up to snuff, the doctrine bars their
    recovery. Dismissal of the plaintiffs’ final claim was
    appropriate.
    III. Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of
    the district court.
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—5-25-07
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-2718

Citation Numbers: 489 F.3d 316, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 12194

Judges: Easterbrook, Cudahy, Sykes

Filed Date: 5/25/2007

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024

Authorities (17)

The Lexington Insurance Company v. Rugg & Knopp, Inc., and ... , 165 F.3d 1087 ( 1999 )

INS Investigations Bureau, Inc. v. Lee , 2003 Ind. App. LEXIS 360 ( 2003 )

City of Muncie Ex Rel. Muncie Fire Department v. Weidner , 2005 Ind. App. LEXIS 1311 ( 2005 )

Wichita State University Intercollegiate Athletic Ass'n v. ... , 29 Kan. App. 2d 282 ( 2001 )

Sweeney v. United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. , 2005 Colo. App. LEXIS 341 ( 2005 )

Skalbania v. Simmons , 1982 Ind. App. LEXIS 1542 ( 1982 )

Billie J. Roe (Now Chisman) v. Brent A. Sewell, Thomas R. ... , 128 F.3d 1098 ( 1997 )

Anthony Pratt v. David Tarr , 464 F.3d 730 ( 2006 )

John W. Moranski v. General Motors Corporation , 433 F.3d 537 ( 2005 )

Garwood Packaging, Inc. v. Allen & Company, Inc. , 378 F.3d 698 ( 2004 )

Seko Air Freight, Inc. v. Transworld Systems, Inc. , 22 F.3d 773 ( 1994 )

Petrich v. MCY Music World, Inc. , 308 Ill. Dec. 968 ( 2007 )

Biddle v. BAA Indianapolis, LLC , 2005 Ind. App. LEXIS 1162 ( 2005 )

Wayne Edwards v. Donald N. Snyder, Jr., Director, Michael L.... , 478 F.3d 827 ( 2007 )

Annare L. Loubser v. Robert W. Thacker , 440 F.3d 439 ( 2006 )

Miami Dolphins, Ltd. v. GENDEN & BACH, PA , 545 So. 2d 294 ( 1989 )

Schlumberger Technology Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee/... , 859 F.2d 512 ( 1988 )

View All Authorities »