Dale Drinkwater v. Charles Larson ( 2020 )


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  •                         NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
    To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Argued December 17, 2019
    Decided January 6, 2020
    Before
    KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circuit Judge
    DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
    AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
    No. 19-1876
    DALE D. DRINKWATER,                             Appeal from the United States District
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                       Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.
    v.                                        No. 16-cv-134-wmc
    CHARLES LARSON, et al.,                         William M. Conley,
    Defendants-Appellees.                       Judge.
    ORDER
    Dale Drinkwater, a former Wisconsin prisoner, has a history of bilateral hip
    arthroplasty and chronic hip pain. While he was incarcerated, prison doctors disagreed
    over his need for surgery on one hip and denied his requests for outside consultations.
    After he was released, he sued six prison medical professionals for deliberate
    indifference toward his need for hip surgery. The district court granted the defendants’
    motion for summary judgment. On appeal Drinkwater pursues his deliberate-
    indifference claims against only two prison doctors—Drs. David Burnett and Charles
    Larson. Because Drinkwater has not adduced evidence for a reasonable jury to find that
    either was indifferent to his serious medical needs, we affirm the district court’s
    judgment.
    No. 19-1876                                                                        Page 2
    I. Background
    Drinkwater’s claims focus on events that occurred in 2010 and 2011, but his
    earlier medical treatment provides context. Now in his mid-50s, Drinkwater had both
    hips replaced in the early 1990s. In August 2009 he had an appointment with an
    orthopedic surgeon, who noted significant wear to Drinkwater’s left hip, advised that
    he might need revision surgery, and recommended that he see a hip specialist.1 Two
    months later he began his imprisonment at Fox Lake Correctional Institution.
    That December Drinkwater expressed concerns about possible pelvic
    discontinuity (a distinct form of bone loss that is typically a chronic condition in failed
    total hip replacements) to Dr. Richard Illgen, a second orthopedic physician from the
    University of Wisconsin. Dr. Illgen noted that while Drinkwater would need to undergo
    revision surgery at some point in the future, he did not believe that surgery was
    appropriate at the time because he saw no evidence of pelvic discontinuity, mechanical
    failure, or hip dislocation. Dissatisfied with Dr. Illgen’s diagnosis and reluctance to
    recommend surgery, Drinkwater refused to go to his follow-up appointment in
    February.
    In May 2010 Drinkwater slipped in the prison shower and injured his hip. He
    was transported to a nearby emergency room where x-rays revealed a broken screw in
    his hip but otherwise no sign of a fracture. The emergency-room doctor diagnosed a left
    hip contusion and recommended that Drinkwater follow up with Dr. Illgen. The doctor
    recorded his conversation with Drinkwater, highlighting Drinkwater’s express refusal
    to see any University of Wisconsin orthopedic surgeon. Drinkwater was returned to the
    prison and placed on pain management.
    Over the next few months, Drinkwater was examined numerous times by
    Dr. Charles Larson, a prison physician. At an appointment in June, Drinkwater told
    Dr. Larson that he disagreed with Dr. Illgen’s plan of care and wanted to have surgery
    at a facility other than the University of Wisconsin. Dr. Larson agreed to request
    permission for Drinkwater to be sent to Mayo Clinic or Froedtert Hospital for a second
    opinion and possible surgery. (The prison has a contract with the University of
    Wisconsin to provide medical services, so prisoners are generally allowed to seek care
    at Mayo or Froedtert only if a University of Wisconsin doctor believes that he is not
    1Revision surgery is performed to repair an artificial hip that has deteriorated
    over time due to normal wear and tear.
    No. 19-1876                                                                       Page 3
    capable of performing surgery.) On the request form, Dr. Larson noted Dr. Illgen’s
    opinion that surgery was premature and Drinkwater’s belief that a delay in surgery
    would harm his long-term outcome, but Dr. Larson did not opine on the condition of
    Drinkwater’s hip. Dr. David Burnett, the prison doctor responsible for reviewing
    prisoner requests for outside medical treatment, denied the request without
    explanation.
    After learning that his request to see a Mayo or Froedtert physician was denied,
    Drinkwater asked Dr. Larson to correct his prison medical records. Apparently
    Drinkwater believed that his medical records reflected his refusal to see any University
    of Wisconsin doctor. He wanted his records corrected to reflect that he was refusing
    treatment from only Dr. Illgen. Dr. Larson denied Drinkwater’s request, deeming
    Drinkwater’s records accurate and complete.
    Dr. Larson saw Drinkwater in September 2010, January 2011, and June 2011 for
    chronic pain management. At the first two appointments, Drinkwater did not report
    any changes in his hip functionality or an increase in pain. At the last appointment,
    Drinkwater refused to let Dr. Larson examine him and voiced frustration with the care
    that he was receiving. Drinkwater was released from prison in September 2011.
    Five years later, Drinkwater sued Drs. Larson and Burnett (and four other
    medical professionals, whom Drinkwater has dropped from the case) for showing
    deliberate indifference toward his serious medical needs by not scheduling him for hip
    surgery after his fall in the shower. The defendants moved for summary judgment,
    which the district court granted. Regarding Dr. Larson, the judge concluded that no
    reasonable inference of deliberate indifference could be made because he did not
    deviate from an accepted standard of care when he provided Drinkwater with medical
    treatment and tried to accommodate Drinkwater’s only documented request for referral
    to an outside specialist. Turning to Dr. Burnett, the judge found that the evidence
    established that the doctor reasonably relied on Dr. Illgen’s opinion that surgery was
    unwarranted at the time, so a reasonable jury could not find that he acted with
    deliberate indifference when denying Drinkwater’s request to receive a surgical
    consultation from the Mayo Clinic or Froedtert Hospital.
    II. Discussion
    To survive summary judgment Drinkwater needed to present evidence allowing
    a reasonable jury to conclude that he suffered from an objectively serious medical
    No. 19-1876                                                                       Page 4
    condition and that Drs. Larson and Burnett knew of and deliberately disregarded a
    substantial risk of harm. See Farmer v. Brennan, 
    511 U.S. 825
    , 837 (1994). The parties do
    not dispute that Drinkwater’s hip condition was objectively serious. Instead,
    Drinkwater seeks to show that Drs. Larson and Burnett knew that their decisions would
    effectively prevent him from receiving any medical care. In support he points to
    Dr. Burnett’s denial of his request to be seen by an outside specialist from Mayo or
    Froedtert, coupled with Dr. Larson’s refusal to amend his medical records to reflect that
    he did not refuse treatment from all University of Wisconsin doctors.
    Following Drinkwater’s lead, we first turn to Dr. Burnett. Drinkwater contends
    that Dr. Burnett denied his request to see an outside specialist based only on the
    contract for medical services entered with the University of Wisconsin. Because no
    medical judgment was involved, he argues, this denial necessarily constitutes deliberate
    indifference. But no reasonable jury could find that Dr. Burnett was deliberately
    indifferent. When prison doctors act as administrators instead of treating physicians, as
    Dr. Burnett did, they are entitled to rely on the judgment of the doctors who are treating
    the inmate. Rasho v. Elyea, 
    856 F.3d 469
    , 478–79 (7th Cir. 2017). Drinkwater asked to be
    seen at a facility outside the University of Wisconsin system because he disagreed with
    Dr. Illgen’s diagnosis, but he presented no evidence that Dr. Burnett knew that
    Dr. Illgen’s medical opinions were incorrect (if that were even the case); that treatment
    from another University of Wisconsin physician could not have sufficiently addressed
    his medical needs; or that refusing Drinkwater’s request to schedule an appointment at
    Mayo or Froedtert would cause Drinkwater not to receive any surgical intervention (if
    even needed). “Disagreement between a prisoner and his doctor, or even between two
    medical professionals, about the proper course of treatment generally is insufficient, by
    itself, to establish an Eighth Amendment violation.” Pyles v. Fahim, 
    771 F.3d 403
    , 409
    (7th Cir. 2014). Further, prison inmates are not entitled to demand specific care.
    See Arnett v. Webster, 
    658 F.3d 742
    , 754 (7th Cir. 2011). No reasonable jury could
    conclude that Dr. Burnett was deliberately indifferent when denying Drinkwater’s
    request.
    As for Dr. Larson, Drinkwater argues that the doctor acted with deliberate
    indifference by refusing to amend his medical records to correct his purported refusal to
    be seen by a University of Wisconsin physician. According to Drinkwater, Dr. Larson
    must have known that his refusal would effectively preclude him from being seen by
    any physician—whether from Mayo, Froedtert, or the University of Wisconsin.
    No. 19-1876                                                                        Page 5
    A reasonable jury could not conclude that Dr. Larson was deliberately
    indifferent. To be liable, Dr. Larson must have personally caused Drinkwater not to
    receive treatment. See Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 
    940 F.3d 954
    , 964–65
    (7th Cir. 2019); Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 
    430 F.3d 805
    , 810 (7th Cir. 2005). But
    Dr. Larson’s decision not to amend Drinkwater’s medical records—the utility of which
    is unclear and, in any event, was deemed by the doctor to be unnecessary—did not
    deprive Drinkwater of treatment. After Drinkwater’s request to see a specialist from
    Mayo or Froedtert was denied, he apparently never again asked for an appointment
    with an outside specialist (or at least Dr. Larson never denied such a request). If
    Drinkwater made no such request, Dr. Larson would have no reason to schedule an
    appointment for him to see a specialist. There simply is no evidence linking
    Dr. Larson’s refusal to amend Drinkwater’s medical records with Drinkwater not
    receiving surgery or further outside evaluation. See 
    Walker, 940 F.3d at 965
    –66. A
    reasonable jury, therefore, could not find that Dr. Larson was deliberately indifferent by
    rejecting Drinkwater’s request to amend his records.
    AFFIRMED
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-1876

Judges: Per Curiam

Filed Date: 1/6/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/6/2020