Milton Leblanc v. Mr. Bults, Inc. ( 2020 )


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  •                         NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
    To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    Chicago, Illinois 60604
    Submitted March 19, 2020 *
    Decided March 23, 2020
    Before
    DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge
    DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
    AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
    No. 19-2751
    MILTON J. LEBLANC,                                 Appeal from the United States District
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                          Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
    Eastern Division.
    v.                                           No. 15 C 6019
    MR. BULT’S, INC.,                                  Ronald A. Guzmán,
    Defendant-Appellee.                           Judge.
    ORDER
    After a semitruck rear-ended the car in which Milton LeBlanc was riding, he
    sued Mr. Bult’s, Inc. (the owner of the truck) and Antonio Wright (the driver) in state
    court. The defendants removed the case to federal district court, and after protracted
    litigation the court entered summary judgment against LeBlanc. Because LeBlanc’s
    argument that the district court should have entered a default judgment in his favor is
    baseless, we affirm.
    *
    We agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the appeal is
    frivolous. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(A).
    No. 19-2751                                                                           Page 2
    In mid-2013 LeBlanc was involved in two automobile collisions; only the second
    one concerned the defendants. While driving a truck owned by Mr. Bult’s, Antonio
    Wright rear-ended the car in which LeBlanc was a passenger. Nearly two years later, he
    sued Mr. Bult’s and Wright in the Circuit Court of Cook County to recover for his
    alleged back and neck injuries. The defendants removed the case to federal court
    asserting diversity jurisdiction. Mr. Bult’s is an Illinois citizen that was defending in
    Illinois state court, so LeBlanc could have objected to removal on that ground. See
    28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2); Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. v. Jackson, 
    139 S. Ct. 1743
    , 1746 (2019). But
    that defect was procedural, not jurisdictional, and LeBlanc did not raise it—let alone
    within 30 days, as required. See Thornton v. M7 Aerospace LP, 
    796 F.3d 757
    , 764 (7th Cir.
    2015).
    After three years the suit ended in stages. First, LeBlanc said that he planned to
    drop his lawsuit against Wright (the driver) and pursue his case only against Mr. Bult’s.
    This led Wright to withdraw his answer to LeBlanc’s complaint. The judge then ordered
    LeBlanc to confirm that he no longer intended to sue Wright, and LeBlanc obeyed by
    successfully moving to dismiss Wright. Later, LeBlanc moved for a default judgment,
    asserting that Mr. Bult’s had withdrawn its answer. The judge denied the motion,
    explaining that only Wright (now dismissed) had withdrawn an answer; Mr. Bult’s had
    not. Both parties then moved for summary judgment, and the judge entered summary
    judgment for Mr. Bult’s. The judge concluded that LeBlanc had not offered any
    evidence that the second collision had injured him.
    On appeal LeBlanc’s only developed argument is frivolous. He argues that
    Mr. Bult’s defaulted by withdrawing its answer to his complaint, the judge wrongly
    ruled otherwise, and the judge should not have permitted the case to proceed to
    summary judgment. But Mr. Bult’s never withdrew its answer and never defaulted;
    only Wright withdrew his answer. Mr. Bult’s continued to defend itself in the district
    court on the merits, and the judge ruled in its favor. “What is more, it would make little
    sense to enter a default after a case has been decided on the merits” where, as here, the
    timing of the answer “did not cause injury” to the plaintiff. Mommaerts v. Hartfort Life &
    Accident Ins. Co., 
    472 F.3d 967
    , 968 (7th Cir. 2007).
    We have considered other possible issues on appeal. First, we have asked
    whether LeBlanc challenges the entry of summary judgment on the merits, but we
    conclude that he does not. He focuses solely on a failed argument that he deserved a
    default judgment. He does not otherwise challenge the district court’s judgment, so any
    No. 19-2751                                                                        Page 3
    such argument is waived. Snyder v. King, 
    745 F.3d 242
    , 246 (7th Cir. 2014). Finally, we
    note that LeBlanc lists three dozen other “issues” in his brief. But he develops none of
    them, so we need not discuss them. See McCurry v. Kenco Logistics Servs., LLC, 
    942 F.3d 783
    , 791 (7th Cir. 2019).
    AFFIRMED
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-2751

Judges: Per Curiam

Filed Date: 3/23/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 3/23/2020