Shannon Prince v. Appleton Auto LLC ( 2020 )


Menu:
  •                                In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 20-1106
    SHANNON C. PRINCE,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.
    APPLETON AUTO, LLC, et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ____________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Eastern District of Wisconsin.
    No. 18-cv-1465 — Nancy Joseph, Magistrate Judge.
    ____________________
    ARGUED SEPTEMBER 22, 2020 — DECIDED OCTOBER 21, 2020
    ____________________
    Before SYKES, Chief Judge, FLAUM, and ROVNER, Circuit
    Judges.
    FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Defendant-appellee Applecars, LLC
    is a member of a network of affiliated but corporately distinct
    used-car dealerships located in Wisconsin. Plaintiff-appellant
    Shannon Prince worked at Applecars for several months in
    2018 before he was fired. Prince claims his firing was retalia-
    tory, and sued Applecars and its affiliates for racial discrimi-
    2                                                   No. 20-1106
    nation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The dis-
    trict court granted summary judgment to the defendants, not-
    ing that Applecars had fewer than fifteen employees and
    therefore was not subject to Title VII. Because there is insuffi-
    cient evidence to support Prince’s theory that we should
    pierce the corporate veil of the dealership network, and
    thereby aggregate the number of employees such that Title
    VII would apply, we affirm.
    I. Background
    Prince worked as a salesman with Applecars, LLC for sev-
    eral months in 2017 until he was fired. Defendants claim he
    was fired for performance issues, while Prince maintains de-
    fendants discriminated against him because of his race.
    Applecars operated a used car dealership in Appleton,
    Wisconsin. The Applecars dealership was affiliated with four
    other dealerships throughout Wisconsin: Wausau Auto, An-
    tigo Auto, Green Bay Auto, and La Crosse Auto. Each of these
    dealerships was independently owned by a separate Wiscon-
    sin limited liability company. In turn, defendant Robert
    McCormick owned a majority or outright share in each of
    these LLCs. Furthermore, each of the dealerships received
    management services from Capital M, Inc., which McCormick
    also owned. Applecars alone had fewer than fifteen employ-
    ees, but if the court were to aggregate all the dealerships, both
    parties agree they would have had greater than fifteen em-
    ployees.
    The overlap between these companies was substantial.
    Specifically, Capital M provided management services to
    each dealership, including marketing, financial, accounting,
    “visionary,” and payroll services; Capital M tracked shared
    No. 20-1106                                                  3
    dealership inventory, held personal employee records, and is-
    sued identical employee handbooks for each dealership; and
    Capital M’s operations manager hired, fired, and promoted
    each dealership’s general manager. McCormick was the sole
    or majority owner of each dealership. The employees of each
    dealership gathered as one for events and parties several
    times per year.
    Beyond these shared functions directed by Capital M, all
    the dealerships also advertised on a single website,
    www.199ride.com. The landing page marketed the dealer-
    ships with some language suggesting a single entity, includ-
    ing “Wisconsin’s #1 Highest Volume Independent Dealer”
    and “We are a dealer for the people.” Yet, there were other
    clear indicators that each dealership is a separate entity. The
    landing page displayed all four dealerships’ names, physical
    addresses, and phone numbers. Under a “Locations” tab, a
    visitor could access a drop-down menu with names of each
    dealership linked to their own websites. The bottom of the
    landing page included the d/b/a for each dealership as well.
    Apart from their intertwined daily operations, each deal-
    ership and its LLC owner properly maintained corporate for-
    malities and records. Capital M’s management services billed
    each dealership separately. Each dealership individually paid
    for Capital M’s management services and for the use of the
    199ride.com trademark and website. Each dealership had a
    distinct general manager, its own bank accounts, and its own
    financial reports. The dealerships also filed and paid their
    own taxes, paid their own employees (and issued their own
    W-2 forms for their employees), and entered into their own
    contracts for business purposes.
    4                                                   No. 20-1106
    In response to his termination, Prince initially filed a Wis-
    consin state law Administrative Complaint, which he then
    withdrew in favor of bringing this action in federal court. At
    his request, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
    issued Prince a Right to Sue letter. Prince brought suit alleging
    Title VII violations against defendants in the Eastern District
    of Wisconsin. In the fall of 2019, the parties consented to a
    magistrate judge’s ability to enter final judgment in the case.
    In December 2019, the magistrate judge granted defendants’
    motion for summary judgment, finding that Applecars was
    not liable under Title VII because, with fewer than fifteen em-
    ployees, it was not an “employer” under the statutory defini-
    tion. Prince timely appealed.
    II. Discussion
    We review this grant of summary judgment de novo,
    viewing the record and drawing all reasonable inferences in
    the light most favorable to Prince, the non-moving party.
    Hansen v. Fincantieri Marine Grp., LLC, 
    763 F.3d 832
    , 836 (7th
    Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving
    party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
    material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
    matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
    Congress exempted small businesses from the strictures of
    Title VII. The statute only applies to an “employer,” which it
    defines as “a person engaged in an industry affecting com-
    merce who has fifteen or more employees for each working
    day in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current
    or preceding calendar year.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). The parties
    agree that Applecars alone never met the fifteen-employee
    threshold during the relevant time period; they also agree that
    if all related dealerships were aggregated, there would be
    No. 20-1106                                                               5
    more than fifteen employees altogether. The dispute therefore
    rests solely on the question of whether we ought to pierce the
    dealerships’ corporate veils and aggregate the dealerships’
    employees to render them subject to Title VII.
    Fortunately, we have analyzed such a situation before. The
    leading case is Papa v. Katy Industries, Inc., 
    166 F.3d 937
    (7th
    Cir. 1999). There, we addressed “what test to use to determine
    whether an employer that has fewer than 15 … employees,
    and thus falls below the threshold for coverage by the major
    federal antidiscrimination laws, … should be deemed covered
    because it is part of an affiliated group of corporations that
    has in the aggregate the minimum number of employees.”
    Id. at 939
    (citations omitted). We noted that the purpose of ex-
    empting small businesses from Title VII was not to encourage
    discrimination by them but rather “to spare very small firms
    from the potentially crushing expense of mastering the intri-
    cacies of the antidiscrimination laws, establishing procedures
    to assure compliance, and defending against suits when ef-
    forts at compliance fail.”
    Id. at 940.
    We then laid out three cir-
    cumstances when the existence of an affiliated company
    would result in potential liability under Title VII.1 The instant
    case only concerns one such ground, on which Prince raises
    his appeal:
    1 In particular, employee aggregation is appropriate “where: (1) the
    enterprise has purposely divided itself into smaller corporations to dodge
    requirements imposed by the anti-discrimination laws; (2) a creditor of
    one corporation could, by piercing the corporate veil, sue its affiliate; or
    (3) the affiliate directed the discriminatory act or practice of which the
    plaintiff complains.” Bridge v. New Holland Logansport, Inc., 
    815 F.3d 356
    ,
    364 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing 
    Papa, 166 F.3d at 940
    –42).
    6                                                   No. 20-1106
    The first situation is where, the traditional con-
    ditions being present for “piercing the veil” to
    allow a creditor, voluntary or involuntary, of
    one corporation to sue a parent or other affiliate,
    the parent or affiliates of the plaintiff’s employer
    would be liable for the employer’s debts. If be-
    cause of neglect of corporate formalities, or a
    holding out of the parent as the real party with
    whom a creditor nominally of a subsidiary is
    dealing, a parent (or other affiliate) would be li-
    able for the torts or breaches of contract of its
    subsidiary, it ought equally to be liable for the
    statutory torts created by federal antidiscrimi-
    nation law. In such a case the parent by its ac-
    tions has forfeited its limited liability. This ap-
    proach is conventional in discrimination cases
    where the employee of a subsidiary seeks to af-
    fix liability on the parent for reasons unrelated
    to the subsidiary’s being within the exemption
    for employers who have only a few employees.
    Id. at 940–41
    (citations omitted).
    Piercing the corporate veil for the purpose of employee ag-
    gregation requires a plaintiff show more than a degree of in-
    tegration of corporate operations. In Papa, a consolidated ap-
    peal of two discrimination cases, each plaintiff unsuccessfully
    sought to aggregate employees by piercing the corporate veil.
    In the first case, we denied veil-piercing
    , id. at 942,
    even
    though the subsidiary Walsh Press Company, Inc. had a “de-
    gree of integration” with the parent company Katy Industries,
    Inc
    , id. at 939.
    Katy fixed the salaries of Walsh employees, pro-
    No. 20-1106                                                   7
    vided pension plans for Walsh employees, funded Walsh, in-
    tegrated Walsh’s computer operations, provided Walsh with
    its own subaccounts within Katy’s checking account (in lieu
    of Walsh having its own bank account), and required that
    Walsh seek its approval for writing checks of more than
    $5,000.
    Id. Similarly, in the
    second case, despite noting a “de-
    gree of integration” between GJHSRT, a trucking company,
    and Frederick Group of Companies, the affiliated group of
    which it was a part
    , id., we declined to
    pierce the corporate
    veil
    , id. at 942.
    Among the Frederick affiliates, payroll, bene-
    fits, and computer operations were centralized.
    Id. at 939
    . Ad-
    ditionally, the board of directors’ membership overlapped be-
    tween the two companies and employees moved between af-
    filiates.
    Id. Despite the level
    of integration in both cases, we found the
    facts did not support veil-piercing, in part, because “[f]irms
    too tiny to achieve the realizable economies of scale or scope
    in their industry will go under unless they can integrate some
    of their operations with those of other companies, whether by
    contract or by ownership.”
    Id. at 942.
    More to the point:
    Why should it make a difference if the integra-
    tion takes the form instead of common owner-
    ship, so that the tiny employer gets his pension
    plan, his legal and financial advice, and his pay-
    roll function from his parent corporation with-
    out contractual formalities, rather than from in-
    dependent contractors?
    That is all that’s involved in the cases before
    us. … There is no showing that an ordinary
    creditor of one of the subsidiaries could pierce
    8                                                  No. 20-1106
    the corporate veil and sue the parent corpora-
    tion or any of the other subsidiaries.
    Id. More recently, in
    Bridge v. New Holland Logansport, Inc., we
    reiterated that employee aggregation is appropriate only in
    certain enumerated circumstances, such as where “a creditor
    of one corporation could, by piercing the corporate veil, sue
    its 
    affiliate.” 815 F.3d at 364
    . We emphasized that the test is
    not whether (or to what extent) corporations are integrated,
    but rather whether the integration serves to manipulate cred-
    itors and thus warrant veil-piercing under relevant state law.
    See
    id. at 364–65.
    We therefore considered each entities’ oper-
    ations, integrated or otherwise, only to the extent they bore
    on the determinative question: whether the two entities “ne-
    glected forms intended to protect creditors from being con-
    fused about whom they can look to for the payment of their
    claims.”
    Id. at 364
    (quoting 
    Papa, 166 F.3d at 943
    ).
    In deciding whether the number of employees of defend-
    ant New Holland Logansport (the plaintiff’s former em-
    ployer) and New Holland Rochester should be aggregated in
    Bridge, we held aggregation was not appropriate because the
    companies had respected the corporate formalities. We
    acknowledged that the entities “did do a fair amount of shar-
    ing,” including sharing similar names, directors, certain em-
    ployees’ services, equipment, manuals, programs to track and
    access inventory, centralized benefits, and addresses on their
    tax return.
    Id. at 364
    . But even though the substantial overlap
    in their operations “bespeaks a certain degree of integration,”
    it “does not suggest [] a misuse of corporate form,” confusing
    creditors of which company might be liable for a debt.
    Id. The companies had
    separate invoices, bank accounts, tax returns,
    No. 20-1106                                                             9
    locations, inventories, advertising, and management of oper-
    ations, falling short of demonstrating that Logansport was a
    “mere instrumentality or adjunct” of Rochester to warrant
    piercing the corporate veil.
    Id. at 365.
    Even their use of a single
    shared website did not upset this conclusion. Although the
    website contained specific statements that, in isolation,
    “impl[ied] that New Holland … was a single company with
    multiple store locations,” the website’s language, viewed as a
    whole, gave the impression that the entities were distinct cor-
    porations. See
    id. The website listed
    physical addresses for
    each and referred to them as separate companies. Because the
    “corporate forms were [not] so ignored or manipulated as to
    perpetrate a fraud on the companies’ creditors,” we affirmed
    summary judgment for the employer.
    Id. Because piercing the
    corporate veil is governed by state
    law,2 we must also look to Wisconsin state law to help us de-
    termine whether we ought to pierce the corporate veil. The
    Wisconsin Supreme Court “recognizes that the corporation is
    a separate entity and is treated as such under all ordinary cir-
    cumstances.” Fontana Builders, Inc. v. Assurance Co. of Am.,
    
    882 N.W.2d 398
    , 414 (Wis. 2016) (citation and internal quota-
    tion marks omitted). “Piercing the corporate veil is appropri-
    ate only when applying the corporate fiction would accom-
    plish some fraudulent purpose, operate as a constructive
    fraud, or defeat some strong equitable claim.”
    Id. (citation and internal
    quotation marks omitted).
    2 We held in Bridge that “[v]eil-piercing is governed by state law” and
    applied Indiana law because both entities were incorporated 
    there.” 815 F.3d at 364
    . The parties here agree that the Wisconsin law on veil-
    piercing applies.
    10                                                 No. 20-1106
    Having reviewed Papa, Bridge, and Wisconsin precedent
    on the issue, we now turn to the facts at hand. The logic in
    Papa that it makes sense for affiliated small businesses to share
    some operational efficiencies applies to the coordination be-
    tween Applecars, the other dealerships, and Capital M. 
    See 166 F.3d at 942
    . Applecars and its related dealerships over-
    lapped a great deal in terms of operations, particularly in the
    areas of shared services received from Capital M. But we have
    already deemed it legitimate to share those services, such as
    marketing, financial, accounting, and employee records,
    without risking veil-piercing. That McCormick was the sole
    or majority owner of the business is not dispositive; indeed,
    the fact that other owners held shares in some dealerships but
    not others is a textbook reason for such companies to maintain
    formal corporate separation, even if they contracted together
    for some services. See
    id. True, the dealerships
    shared a web address (where they
    were advertised and counted together as Wisconsin’s largest
    independent used car dealership), perhaps weighing in favor
    of piercing the veil. But that alone is not enough, particularly
    where 199rides.com, much like newhollandrochester.com,
    identified the dealerships separately by name and by address,
    and importantly, where the companies in question respected
    every corporate formality. See 
    Bridge, 815 F.3d at 365
    . The un-
    disputed evidence that the dealerships properly kept records
    and maintained separate financial accounts overwhelms any
    slight doubts brought on by the website.
    Id. (“Though the op-
    erations of these two small businesses were in some ways
    combined, their identities were separate enough that piercing
    the veil between affiliates would be inappropriate here.”).
    No. 20-1106                                                   11
    None of the Wisconsin courts’ bases for veil-piercing
    apply either. There is no evidence that respecting the
    dealerships’ corporate forms will allow them to “accomplish
    some fraudulent purpose, operate as a constructive fraud, or
    defeat some strong equitable claim.” Fontana 
    Builders, 882 N.W.2d at 414
    (citation omitted). Prince tries to argue that it
    would defeat his own strong equitable Title VII claim, but this
    is insufficient. As defendants point out, under this logic any
    Title VII or other federal discrimination complainant could
    pierce the corporate veil with no evidence whatsoever beyond
    his own allegations. This is not enough.
    Prince cites a Seventh Circuit case, Parker v. Scheck Mechan-
    ical Corp., 
    772 F.3d 502
    (7th Cir. 2014), and a Wisconsin Su-
    preme Court case, Wiebke v. Richardson & Sons, Inc.,
    
    265 N.W.2d 571
    (Wis. 1978), to buttress his argument that Ap-
    plecars failed to sufficiently separate itself from its affiliates so
    as to warrant veil-piercing. Neither case controls. In Parker we
    reversed a district court’s entry of summary judgment where
    the plaintiff argued the corporate identities of his employer
    and an affiliated company were blurred. The evidence indi-
    cated that the related companies shared office space, corpo-
    rate officers, and some operations.
    Id. at 504.
    The critical dif-
    ference between Parker and the instant appeal (and Papa and
    Bridge) is that no discovery had taken place in Parker before
    summary judgment was granted.
    Id. at 507.
    The Parker court
    held that the plaintiff “d[id] not have overwhelming eviden-
    tiary support for the proposition that the line between the two
    companies is blurred,” but allowed the case to revive because
    the defendants did not meet their initial burden to show no
    material question of fact.
    Id. By contrast, the
    parties here have
    taken discovery and submitted substantial evidence, which
    12                                                  No. 20-1106
    indicates that the dealerships’ corporate forms do not improp-
    erly overlap.
    Nor does Wiebke support Prince’s contention that this case
    “truly is one of the rare occasions where a company has orga-
    nized, controlled and conducted its corporate affairs in such
    a way that there is no separation between itself and its affili-
    ates.” In Wiebke, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that
    Wiebke, a personal employee of Richardson, could recover a
    debt owed by Richardson from Richardson’s 
    company. 265 N.W.2d at 572
    . Wiebke had loaned $6,000 in exchange for
    a promissory note signed by Richardson in his individual ca-
    pacity.
    Id. At that time,
    Richardson was also the president and
    sole shareholder of his company.
    Id. Richardson deposited Wiebke’s
    check into the corporation’s account.
    Id. at 573.
    He
    claimed that, because he did not have a personal checking ac-
    count, he would draw checks on the corporation’s account to
    pay personal expenses.
    Id. When Richardson defaulted
    on the
    loan, the corporation, not Richardson, paid Wiebke an interest
    payment in the form of a corporate check that was displayed
    on corporate records as a corporate expense.
    Id. The debt re-
    mained unpaid.
    Id. The court held
    that this messy commingling of personal
    and corporate funds invited it to pierce the corporate veil.
    “Richardson failed to draw the line between his individual
    and corporate affairs and is in a poor position to ask the court
    to do so.”
    Id. at 574.
    The facts of this case demonstrate what is
    lacking in Prince’s complaint: any suggestion that the dealer-
    ships failed to properly maintain their corporate personhood,
    records, or funds.
    As we wrote in Papa, it is “nonsense” to suggest that a cor-
    porate group must erect firewalls among its affiliates or else
    No. 20-1106                                                    13
    risk Title VII 
    liability. 166 F.3d at 943
    . “The corporate veil is
    pierced, when it is pierced, not because the corporate group
    is integrated … but (in the most common case) because it has
    neglected forms intended to protect creditors from being con-
    fused about whom they can look to for the payment of their
    claims.”
    Id. (citations omitted). Here,
    there is no evidence the
    defendants neglected corporate forms or risked confusing
    creditors. While substantially integrated, the dealerships
    properly maintained separate accounts, identities, and corpo-
    rate records. In this case, there is no basis to pierce the corpo-
    rate veil.
    III. Conclusion
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the
    district court.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 20-1106

Judges: Flaum

Filed Date: 10/21/2020

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/22/2020