Good Shepherd Manor Foundation, Inc. v. City of Momence ( 2003 )


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  •                            In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    For the Seventh Circuit
    ____________
    No. 02-3536
    GOOD SHEPHERD MANOR FOUNDATION, INC., an Illinois
    not-for-profit corporation, GOOD SHEPHERD MANOR GROUP
    HOMES, INC., an Illinois not-for-profit corporation,
    GOOD SHEPHERD MANOR, INC., an Illinois not-for-profit
    corporation,
    Plaintiffs-Appellants,
    v.
    CITY OF MOMENCE, a municipal corporation,
    WILLIAM PETERSON, JAMES SAINDON, et al.,
    Defendants-Appellees.
    ____________
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Central District of Illinois.
    No. 01 CV 2105—Michael P. McCuskey, Judge.
    ____________
    ARGUED FEBRUARY 26, 2003—DECIDED MARCH 24, 2003
    ____________
    Before FLAUM, Chief Judge, and EASTERBROOK and
    KANNE, Circuit Judges.
    FLAUM, Chief Judge. The City of Momence (“the city”)
    shut off the water supply to a property lot, claiming that
    the owners had refused to fulfill an agreement to extend
    the property’s water and sewage lines to the northern
    border of the property. Good Shepherd Manor Founda-
    tion, Inc., Good Shepherd Manor Group Homes, Inc., and
    2                                              No. 02-3536
    Good Shepherd Manor, Inc. (collectively “Good Shepherd”),
    who own the property and use it to provide housing
    for developmentally disabled adults,1 brought suit against
    the city, its mayor, and its aldermen alleging various
    federal claims. The district court allowed most of the
    claims to proceed to jury trial, but it limited the theories
    under which Good Shepherd could press two of their
    claims. The jury found in favor of the city. Good Shepherd
    now appeals, arguing that the district court erred in
    three ways: 1) limiting the theories of liability that Good
    Shepherd could present to the jury; 2) refusing certain
    jury instructions that Good Shepherd had submitted; and
    3) excluding the testimony of Good Shepherd’s expert wit-
    ness. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.
    I. Background
    Good Shepherd provides housing and related services
    for developmentally disabled adults. Pursuant to a State
    of Illinois mandate, Good Shepherd has moved the dis-
    abled adults that it cares for from a shelter care facility
    to a group home environment. Group home environments
    are highly beneficial for certain developmentally disabled
    adults.
    Prior to 1998 Good Shepherd constructed six group
    homes. It obtained a grant to extend the city’s water
    and sewer lines to these homes and the city provided water
    and sewage services. In 1998 Good Shepherd purchased
    an additional lot for two new homes. They applied to the
    city for water and sewage permits. The city requested that
    1
    Good Shepherd Manor Foundation owns the property. Good
    Shepherd Manor Group Homes leases the land and operates the
    group homes on the property. Good Shepherd Manor provides
    professional services to the residents of the homes.
    No. 02-3536                                               3
    Good Shepherd extend the water lines on their property
    to the northern boundary to provide service to a lot that
    was owned by a Jehovah’s Witness Congregation. Accord-
    ing to Good Shepherd the lines were to be extended only
    on the condition that the Congregation would pay for the
    expense of extending the lines. Good Shepherd and the
    Congregation were unable to reach an agreement about
    paying the costs, and the lines were never extended to
    the northern border of Good Shepherd’s property. Good
    Shepherd built the new homes, and the city turned on
    the water in March 2001. On April 26, 2001, after learn-
    ing that the lines had not been extended and just prior
    to the grand opening of the homes, the city turned off
    the water to these two homes. The city claims that it
    shut off the water because Good Shepherd would not ex-
    tend the lines to the northern border as agreed upon.
    Because there was no water service, Good Shepherd
    was unable to secure occupancy permits for the homes.
    Good Shepherd brought suit alleging violations of the
    Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA), the Americans
    with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, and
    the Constitution. Good Shepherd sought injunctions as
    well as declaratory relief and damages. The court granted
    an emergency Motion for Mandatory Preliminary Injunc-
    tion. Pursuant to this injunction, on May 11, 2001, the city
    turned on the water. The city filed lawsuits in state
    court attempting to prevent the county from issuing per-
    manent occupancy permits. These attempts failed.
    In the federal district court both parties moved for
    summary judgment. These motions were denied. The
    district court did however limit the theories under
    which Good Shepherd could pursue its FHAA and ADA
    claims. Good Shepherd was seeking liability for discrim-
    ination under the theory of discriminatory intent and
    impact and under a theory that the city failed to pro-
    vide reasonable accommodations. The district court ruled
    4                                             No. 02-3536
    that the reasonable accommodation analysis was not
    applicable to the facts of the case and thus precluded
    Good Shepherd from presenting that theory at trial.
    A jury trial followed. The jury found in favor of the
    city. Good Shepherd appeals.
    II. Discussion
    Good Shepherd’s primary challenge on appeal is to the
    district court’s ruling that it could not present a theory
    of failure to reasonably accommodate. Additionally Good
    Shepherd challenges the district court’s decision to ex-
    clude Good Shepherd’s expert witness, and the district
    court’s rejection of two of Good Shepherd’s proposed jury
    instructions. We start our analysis with their primary
    challenge.
    A. Reasonable Accommodation
    As a preliminary matter the requirements for showing
    failure to reasonably accommodate are the same under
    the ADA and the FHAA so we can treat these issues as
    one. Oconomowoc Residential Programs, Inc. v. City of
    Milwaukee, 
    300 F.3d 775
    , 783 (7th Cir. 2002). These stat-
    utes require a public entity to reasonably accommodate
    a disabled person by making changes in rules, polices,
    practices or services as is necessary to provide that per-
    son with access to housing that is equal to that of those
    who are not disabled. 
    Id.
    Good Shepherd claims that the city failed to provide a
    reasonable accommodation when it refused to reconsider
    its ad hoc decision to shut off the water supply to the lot
    in question. The district court rejected this argument,
    basing its holding on Hemisphere Building Co. v. Village
    of Richton Park, 
    171 F.3d 437
     (7th Cir. 1999). In that case
    No. 02-3536                                               5
    this court explained that we confine “the duty of reason-
    able accommodation in ‘rules, polices, practices, or ser-
    vices’ to rules, policies, etc. that hurt handicapped people
    by reason of their handicap, rather than that hurt them
    solely by virtue of what they have in common with other
    people, such as a limited amount of money to spend on
    housing.” 
    Id. at 440
    . Focusing on this language, the dis-
    trict court noted:
    In this case, the service of water is something that is
    needed by all people. Therefore, the City’s failure to
    provide the “reasonable accommodation” of providing
    water to Plaintiff’s group homes did not hurt Plain-
    tiff’s residents by reason of their handicap but, in-
    stead, hurt them solely by virtue of what they have
    in common with other people, the need of water.
    This conclusion is correct, and is an appropriate applica-
    tion of the legal principle announced in Hemisphere, and
    therefore we do affirm.
    It is worth noting the city in asking us to affirm inex-
    plicably advances a separate—and unsound—argument,
    revealing a misunderstanding of that ruling and of the
    law of this circuit. The city suggests that when this court
    in Hemisphere said “by reason of their handicap” it was
    referring to the motivation behind the failure to accom-
    modate. Thus, the city summarizes their argument as,
    “This is not a ‘reasonable accommodation’ case since
    there is no evidence that the city’s actions were taken
    because of the proposed residents’ handicaps.” This is an
    irrelevant argument. The Hemisphere language was re-
    ferring to the harmful effect that the failure to accom-
    modate has on the handicapped. For example if a city
    required all houses to have narrow doorways, and the
    city failed to waive this requirement, this might harm
    people in wheelchairs by reason of the fact that they are
    in wheelchairs. In such a case the city would be required
    6                                              No. 02-3536
    to waive this rule for wheelchair-bound residents wher-
    ever such waiver was reasonable. This requirement to
    reasonably accommodate would exist regardless of the
    motivation behind the narrow-doorway rule. If the city
    unreasonably refused to waive the rule, the plaintiffs
    would be under no obligation to prove that the rule was
    motivated by an animus toward handicapped people. The
    error in the city’s logic is all the more clear when we
    consider that reasonable accommodation is a theory of
    liability separate from intentional discrimination. If the
    motivation of the city in cutting off the water to Good
    Shepherd was based on their handicap, then Good Shep-
    herd would have been entitled to judgment under the
    theory of intentional discrimination—this is precisely the
    question that was tried to the jury at the district court.
    “Failure to reasonably accommodate” is an alternative
    theory of liability. The theory would be entirely redun-
    dant if it required proof that the defendants’ actions
    were motivated by animus towards the handicapped. In-
    deed for the reasonable accommodation theory to be
    meaningful, it must be a theory of liability for cases where
    we assume there is a valid reason behind the actions of
    the city, but the city is liable nonetheless if it failed to
    reasonably accommodate the handicap of the plaintiff.
    Good Shepherd argues that the failure to accommodate
    in this case did harm the developmentally disabled adults
    “by reason of their handicap.” Good Shepherd explains
    that developmentally disabled adults gain a specific bene-
    fit from group living. This point is uncontested and well
    established in our case law. See Brandt v. Village of
    Chebanse, 
    82 F.3d 172
    , 174 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that for
    many disabled residents “joint living arrangements are
    essential”); Oconomowoc, 
    300 F.3d at 787
     (“[G]roup living
    arrangements can be essential for disabled persons . . . and
    not similarly essential for the nondisabled.”). Good Shep-
    herd then explains that by not supplying their lot with
    No. 02-3536                                                 7
    water and sewage, the city harmed the disabled adults
    by preventing them from living in the group homes. Thus,
    Good Shepherd contends, the harm was “by reason of their
    disability” because the potential residents were denied
    the benefit they, as developmentally disabled adults, re-
    ceive from group living.
    This reasoning is too attenuated. The city did not deny
    developmentally disabled adults the opportunity for
    group living. The city denied water to a certain lot, and
    because that lot has no water it cannot be inhabited
    by Good Shepherd’s residents, or by anyone else for that
    matter. These developmentally disabled adults are no
    differently affected by the lack of water than any other
    resident would have been. A residence with no water sup-
    ply is unlivable. Any resident, handicapped or not, would
    have to find another place to live. The whole purpose
    behind the FHAA and ADA reasonable accommoda-
    tion provisions is to “ ‘prohibit[ ] local governments from
    applying land use regulations in a manner that will . . . give
    disabled people less opportunity to live in certain neigh-
    borhoods than people without disabilities.’ ” Oconomowoc,
    
    300 F.3d at 784
     (quoting Smith & Lee Association v. City
    of Taylor, 
    102 F.3d 781
    , 795 (6th Cir. 1996)) (second
    alteration in original). Cutting off water prevents anyone
    from living in a dwelling, not just handicapped people,
    and therefore the prohibitions found in the FHAA and
    the ADA do not apply to this case.
    Good Shepherd wants us to adopt a principle that be-
    cause a rule, policy, etc. that adversely affects all resi-
    dents’ ability to access a dwelling also affects disabled
    residents’ access, a city must therefore provide a reason-
    able accommodation to such a rule, policy, etc. under the
    FHAA and the ADA. Good Shepherd’s logic would create
    an exemption for the disabled from almost any zoning
    rule that creates a general inconvenience or expense.
    This circuit has made clear that such an outcome is not
    8                                              No. 02-3536
    intended by the statutes: “[I]t would be absurd to think
    that the FHAA overrides all local regulation of home
    construction.” Hemisphere, 
    171 F.3d at 440
    . For that rea-
    son, as we explained in Hemisphere, courts do not take
    into account financial hardships that zoning rules may
    create generally, even if disabled people are more likely
    to be poor. 
    Id.
     Doing so could lead to all sorts of unin-
    tended results, for example handicapped people “in the
    name of reasonable accommodation, could claim a real
    estate tax rebate under the Fair Housing Amendments
    Act.” 
    Id. at 441
    . As we explained in Hemisphere, “To sup-
    port so radical a result, something more than a spinning
    out of the logical implications of ‘reasonable accommoda-
    tion’ is necessary.” 
    Id.
     The rule Good Shepherd asserts is
    no different from the logic we rejected in Hemisphere.
    Good Shepherd’s case is even weaker because it ap-
    pears that the city would have turned on the water if
    Good Shepherd had extended the water and sewage lines
    to the northern border. As such, Good Shepherd is really
    arguing that the city should have waived the line exten-
    sion requirement in accommodation to the developmen-
    tally disabled adults who wished to live in the house.
    But this approach also fails to establish a viable theory
    of liability. Such a scenario is analogous to cases where
    cities require all residents to install sprinklers. In Hemi-
    sphere we explained that such a requirement does not
    raise an issue of reasonable accommodation: “We thus
    disapprove the district court cases in this circuit which
    have held that a city must, if requested by a handi-
    capped person, waive its requirements for the installation
    of sprinklers because the requirements make the homes
    more expensive for the handicapped—as for everyone.”
    Hemisphere, 
    171 F.3d at 441
    . In those cases the cities
    essentially said that people could not live on the lots
    unless they installed sprinklers. In the case before us
    No. 02-3536                                                     9
    the city said essentially the same thing—no one can live2
    on the lot in question unless the resident extends the
    water and sewage lines to the northern border of the
    property.3
    The only way Good Shepherd could prevail would be
    to show that the city shut off their water and refused
    to turn it back on even if Good Shepherd extended the
    pipes, and that there were virtually no other lots upon
    which group housing could be built. Under such facts
    they might have a claim, not for the city’s actions in
    shutting off their water, but for the city’s failure to
    provide any property upon which a group home could be
    built. See, e.g., Oconomowoc, 
    300 F.3d at 787
     (where city
    refused to waive an ordinance that prohibited a group
    home from being built within 2500 feet of another group
    home, the court held that the city failed to provide rea-
    sonable accommodation because this rule “precludes
    new group homes from opening in most of the City of
    Milwaukee, thus preventing disabled adults who cannot
    live without some support from residing in almost all
    residential neighborhoods within the City”). But that is
    2
    Turning off the water supply to a residence has the same
    practical effect as a rule that prohibits the residence from being
    inhabited.
    3
    This is not to say that the city did or did not have a right
    to make this demand. But that is irrelevant to our analysis. As
    the district court noted, the question of whether Good Shepherd
    was actually required to extend the pipes to the northern border
    was not being decided during the trial. As long as a demand
    affects all people equally, then there is no FHAA or ADA issue
    regardless of whether that demand was valid under state law. The
    question of whether the city could have validly required Good
    Shepherd to extend the lines is a question for state court. We
    are only concerned here with claims that fall under the FHAA
    and the ADA.
    10                                            No. 02-3536
    not the case before us. Good Shepherd has made no such
    allegations and rests its case solely on the faulty prem-
    ise that the lack of water in this case somehow affects
    the developmentally disabled differently from the rest of
    the population.
    In the end Good Shepherd has presented nothing to
    suggest that the alleged rules or actions of the city af-
    fected the developmentally disabled any differently than
    they affected all other people. For this reason the dis-
    trict court appropriately prevented them from proceeding
    under the reasonable accommodation theory.
    B. The Expert Witness
    The district court ruled that Susan Connor, Good Shep-
    herd’s expert witness who is a law professor and who
    works in urban planning, could not testify. We review
    the district court’s decision to exclude expert testimony
    for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Crotteau, 
    218 F.3d 826
    , 831 (7th Cir. 2000). The proffered testimony
    was largely on purely legal matters and made up solely
    of legal conclusions, such as conclusions that the city’s
    actions violated the FHAA. The district court correctly
    ruled that expert testimony as to legal conclusions that
    will determine the outcome of the case is inadmissi-
    ble. United States v. Sinclair, 
    74 F.3d 753
    , 757 n.1 (7th
    Cir. 1996). Furthermore, Good Shepherd argued that it
    wanted to present the testimony to show that the city had
    no legal basis for shutting off the water because Good
    Shepherd was not required to extend the lines to the
    northern boundary. The district court ruled that this
    testimony, on top of consisting of legal conclusions, would
    have been irrelevant since the issue was not being
    tried. This ruling was plainly not an abuse of discretion.
    Good Shepherd tries to pursue an alternative argu-
    ment. The court, over Good Shepherd’s objections, allowed
    No. 02-3536                                               11
    the city to claim at trial that the reason it shut off the
    water was because Good Shepherd failed to extend the
    lines to the northern border. This claim was introduced
    to rebut the allegation that they shut off the water with
    a discriminatory purpose. Good Shepherd claims that
    this was error because the city was allowed to argue
    that Good Shepherd had a duty to extend the lines,
    while Good Shepherd was prevented from providing an
    expert to testify that they had no such duty. Good Shep-
    herd misunderstands the court’s ruling on this point. The
    court did not allow the city to argue that Good Shep-
    herd was actually required to extend the lines; instead
    the city was only allowed—and the court made this lim-
    itation clear—to argue that the dispute over the exten-
    sion was the motivating factor in shutting off the water.
    The district court stated: “[The city] will not be allowed
    to turn this case into a trial on whether Plaintiffs [Good
    Shepherd] have any obligation to provide the water and
    sewer lines which are not at issue.” Given this limitation,
    the district court was correct to rule that it was still
    irrelevant whether the city was correct in claiming that
    Good Shepherd had a duty to extend the lines; the only
    relevant question was whether the dispute motivated
    the city to shut the water off. In fact it is even irrelevant
    to ask if the city thought they were in the right on the
    dispute; they could have been trying to squeeze Good
    Shepherd. It does not matter as long as the motivation
    was not discriminatory against disabled people, and the
    district court limited the evidence to that point.
    C. Jury Instructions
    Good Shepherd raises two challenges to the instruc-
    tions the district court gave the jury. Their first claim is
    that the district court should have instructed the jury
    on reasonable accommodation. Because the district court
    12                                             No. 02-3536
    was correct in not allowing Good Shepherd to present the
    reasonable accommodation theory to the jury, it follows
    that the district court was correct in not instructing the
    jury on this theory.
    Good Shepherd’s second claim is that the district court
    erred in not providing the jury with the following instruc-
    tion:
    Plaintiffs are not required to show that Defendant
    City of Momence intended to discriminate in order to
    establish Plaintiff’s claim in count 1 under the Fair
    Housing Act. Plaintiffs must only prove by a prepon-
    derance of the evidence that Defendant City of
    Momence violated the Fair Housing Act by showing
    that Defendants’ conduct actually or predictably had
    a substantial adverse impact on the residents of the
    group homes.
    We review jury instructions to determine if, as a whole,
    they were sufficient to inform the jury correctly of the
    applicable law. Dadian v. Village of Wilmette, 
    269 F.3d 831
    , 839 (7th Cir. 2001). The district court correctly de-
    cided that Good Shepherd’s proposed instruction was
    deficient because it did not contain a statement that the
    adverse impact of the alleged conduct had to arise be-
    cause of the residents’ handicap. The district court made
    note of this and Good Shepherd requested leave to tender
    an amended instruction. Good Shepherd never did so. They
    are therefore stuck arguing for the instruction as ini-
    tially proposed. And we agree that the proposed instruc-
    tion is deficient. It is too broad. The instruction as pro-
    posed would encompass almost any housing regulations
    the city chose to implement. Additionally, even if the
    instructions actually given failed, as Good Shepherd claims,
    to instruct the jury on discriminatory effect, this was not
    an error. For the same reasons that this is not a reason-
    able accommodation case, it is not a discriminatory effect
    No. 02-3536                                              13
    case and therefore the jury could not have found in favor
    of Good Shepherd on a claim of discriminatory effect.
    The adverse discriminatory effect alleged by Good Shep-
    herd arose from the city’s act of shutting off their water.
    This is essentially the same argument that Good Shep-
    herd made when they claimed that the city had a duty
    to reasonably accommodate them by turning their water
    back on. Just as we said in that context, water is some-
    thing that is used by everyone, and therefore the act
    of shutting off the water did not adversely affect the
    developmentally disabled adults by reason of their handi-
    cap. In fact, given the specifics of this case, there can be
    no discriminatory effect if there was no discriminatory
    intent. Because a lack of water prevents anyone from
    accessing a residence, the only way Good Shepherd could
    have proven discriminatory effect would have been to
    show that the city would not have shut off the water of
    similarly situated non-disabled residents. If they had
    done that, they would have proven discriminatory intent.
    The district court therefore correctly viewed this as a
    discriminatory intent case and did not err in refusing
    Good Shepherd’s proposed instruction.
    III. Conclusion
    Cutting off someone’s water does not affect disabled
    persons differently from non-disabled persons, and so Good
    Shepherd was appropriately prevented from proceeding
    under a theory of failure to provide reasonable accom-
    modation. Furthermore, the district court did not err in
    excluding the testimony of Susan Connor or in instruct-
    ing the jury. The judgment of the district court is there-
    fore AFFIRMED.
    14                                        No. 02-3536
    A true Copy:
    Teste:
    ________________________________
    Clerk of the United States Court of
    Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
    USCA-02-C-0072—3-24-03