William Camacho-Valdez v. Merrick Garland ( 2022 )


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  •                              In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Seventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 21-3112
    WILLIAM A. CAMACHO-VALDEZ,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    MERRICK B. GARLAND,
    Attorney General of the United States,
    Respondent.
    ____________________
    Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals.
    No. A201-358-408
    ____________________
    SUBMITTED FEBRUARY 18, 2022 — DECIDED APRIL 6, 2022
    ____________________
    Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and ROVNER and BRENNAN,
    Circuit Judges.
    SYKES, Chief Judge. William Camacho-Valdez, a native and
    citizen of Guatemala, petitioned for review of the denial of
    his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and
    relief under the Convention Against Torture. His attorney,
    Daniel Thomann, filed an emergency motion for a stay of
    removal along with the petition. But he did not pay the
    2                                                 No. 21-3112
    docketing fee or submit a motion to proceed in forma pauperis
    on his client’s behalf.
    We issued a temporary stay and ordered the government
    to respond to the motion. After reviewing the government’s
    response, we ordered Camacho-Valdez to file a supplement
    because the original stay motion contained little discussion
    of the merits of his claims. The deadline for the supplement
    passed, but Thomann filed nothing. Almost two weeks later,
    we issued an order reminding him of his obligation and
    gave him three more weeks to file the supplement. He
    missed that deadline too. After three more weeks of radio
    silence—more than eleven weeks after we ordered the
    supplement—we denied the stay motion and ordered
    Thomann to show cause why he should not be disciplined
    for failing to comply with two court orders. He responded a
    day late and explained that he had missed our earlier orders
    because the notifications on his smartphone were not work-
    ing. That excuse is unacceptable.
    Meanwhile, the docketing fee remains unpaid, despite
    multiple reminders and extensions of time. Nor has
    Thomann filed a proper motion seeking permission for his
    client to proceed in forma pauperis. See FED. R. APP. P. 24(b).
    We warned in our reminders and extension orders that
    failure to pay the fee or file an in forma pauperis motion
    would result in dismissal. Those warnings went unheeded,
    so we now dismiss the petition for review.
    Because Thomann has repeatedly failed to comply with
    our orders in this case without a valid excuse, we impose a
    sanction of $1,000, which he must pay to the clerk of court
    within 30 days. Finally, Thomann’s practice in this court
    demonstrates a disturbing pattern of neglect of his clients
    No. 21-3112                                                 3
    and court orders. Indeed, in the past seven years, we have
    issued 24 show-cause orders against him in a dozen cases.
    Yet he has never faced consequences. In light of this history,
    we order Thomann to show cause within 21 days why he
    should not be suspended or removed from this court’s bar.
    I. Background
    On November 12, 2021, Camacho-Valdez, through
    Thomann as his attorney, petitioned for review of the denial
    of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and
    relief under the Convention Against Torture. Removal was
    scheduled to occur that same day, so Thomann filed an
    emergency motion for a stay of removal with the petition.
    The motion stated in very general terms that the petition was
    likely to succeed because the immigration agency over-
    looked Camacho-Valdez’s claim that he feared persecution
    based on his family membership and erroneously concluded
    that he could reasonably relocate within his home country.
    The motion also mentioned in passing that there may be
    grounds to reopen the agency proceedings based on ineffec-
    tive assistance of counsel.
    We entered a temporary stay and ordered a response
    from the government. The government responded that
    Camacho-Valdez was not likely to succeed on the merits
    because he never argued before the immigration judge that
    his family membership put him in danger and the stay
    motion failed to identify any particular flaw in the agency’s
    conclusion that he could safely relocate within Guatemala.
    The stay motion was indeed perfunctory, with only a
    single, highly generalized paragraph about the substance of
    Camacho-Valdez’s claims. Moreover, we had not yet re-
    4                                                 No. 21-3112
    ceived the administrative record at that early point in the
    case. Lacking any basis on which to evaluate the propriety of
    a stay, we ordered Camacho-Valdez to file a supplement to
    the motion by December 10. We reasoned that a supplement
    could help us determine whether the petition for review was
    likely to succeed on the merits—a critical factor in determin-
    ing whether a stay is appropriate. See Nken v. Holder, 
    556 U.S. 418
    , 434 (2009).
    In addition to the shortcomings in the stay motion,
    Thomann neither paid the docketing fee nor filed a motion
    seeking permission for Camacho-Valdez to proceed in forma
    pauperis within the 14-day window specified in Circuit
    Rule 3(b). See also FED. R. APP. P. 3(e). On December 6 the
    clerk’s office issued a notice that the fee was overdue and
    warned that the failure to pay it or file an in forma pauperis
    motion within 14 days would result in dismissal.
    By December 21 Thomann had not filed a supplement to
    the stay motion, which was due on December 10. Nor had he
    requested an extension of time. On our own motion, we
    issued an order reminding him of his obligation and extend-
    ing the deadline to comply to January 11, 2022. We also
    ordered him to advise us of the status of any motion to
    reopen the agency proceedings.
    Weeks passed and Thomann still filed nothing: no sup-
    plement, no docketing fee, no in forma pauperis motion. On
    February 2—three weeks after the extended deadline ex-
    pired—we denied the motion to stay removal. Concerned
    about Thomann’s silence, we ordered him to show cause by
    February 16 why he should not be disciplined for failing to
    comply with the court’s orders.
    No. 21-3112                                                5
    Thomann finally surfaced on February 17, the day after
    his response to the show-cause order was due. He moved for
    leave to file a late response and tendered his response. He
    also moved for a one-week extension of time to pay the
    docketing fee or submit a motion to proceed in forma pau-
    peris.
    In his response to the show-cause order, Thomann ex-
    plained that he has been working from home since the
    beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic and has been relying
    on his smartphone “as the primary means of receiving
    phone, data, and email communication.” At some point after
    he filed the petition for review in this case, his smartphone
    notifications malfunctioned, which (as he explained) “had
    happened in the previous years since counsel obtained his
    smartphone.” Because his smartphone notifications were not
    working properly, he did not see our orders “and thus failed
    to respond.”
    We directed the clerk to file Thomann’s late response to
    the show-cause order. We also extended the deadline to pay
    the docketing fee (or file an in forma pauperis motion) to
    March 1. Thomann still did not comply. On March 24—more
    than three weeks after the latest extension expired—he
    moved for another extension of time to March 28. He said he
    had discussed an in forma pauperis motion with his client and
    prepared an affidavit, but he “needs the facility [where
    Camacho-Valdez is detained] to return a signed copy.” We
    granted the request and again extended the deadline, this
    time to March 28. Thomann again did not comply. On
    March 30 he sought leave to file a late motion for in forma
    pauperis status. He explained that he had not received his
    client’s signed affidavit and subsequently learned that his
    6                                                 No. 21-3112
    client had been removed to Guatemala. He submitted a
    boilerplate in forma pauperis motion but no affidavit from his
    client.
    II. Discussion
    A. Dismissal of Petition for Review
    We begin with the petition for review. The clerk of court
    is authorized to dismiss an appeal if the docketing fee is not
    paid when the case is filed or within 14 days after docketing.
    7TH CIR. R. 3(b); see also FED. R. APP. P. 3(e) (requiring pay-
    ment of all required fees when the appeal is filed). Thomann
    did not tender the docketing fee when he filed the petition
    for review on November 12, so the case was docketed with-
    out payment and the fee was due not later than
    November 26, 2021. By December 6 the fee remained unpaid,
    and no motion seeking in forma pauperis status had been
    filed. So the clerk’s office notified Thomann of the overdue
    fee and warned that the petition would be dismissed if he
    failed to pay it or file a motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
    Three and a half months passed but Thomann neither paid
    the fee nor moved for in forma pauperis status. On March 24
    he belatedly requested an extension of time to March 28,
    which we granted.
    To date the fee remains unpaid. On March 30—two days
    after the much-extended deadline—Thomann submitted a
    motion for leave to file a late in forma pauperis motion and
    tendered a boilerplate motion but no affidavit from
    Camacho-Valdez. The motion does not comply with the
    requirements of Rule 24(b), which requires an affidavit from
    the litigant about his financial status (among other infor-
    No. 21-3112                                                 7
    mation). Accordingly, we dismiss the petition for review
    pursuant to Circuit Rule 3(b).
    B. Sanctions
    We now turn to Thomann’s response to our order to
    show cause. Under Rule 46 of the Federal Rules of Appellate
    Procedure, we may suspend, disbar, or discipline a member
    of our bar “for conduct unbecoming a member of the bar.”
    FED. R. APP. P. 46(b), (c). This standard is obviously quite
    general. The Supreme Court has broadly construed it to
    mean “conduct contrary to professional standards that
    shows an unfitness to discharge continuing obligations to
    clients or the courts[] or conduct inimical to the administra-
    tion of justice.” In re Snyder, 
    472 U.S. 634
    , 645 (1985).
    Sanctions decisions “should be carefully tailored to the
    circumstances of the particular situation.” United States v.
    Stillwell, 
    810 F.2d 135
    , 136 (7th Cir. 1987). A number of
    factors are relevant, including our duty to protect litigants
    and the court from counsel’s neglect or misfeasance, the
    need to deter counsel and other attorneys from engaging in
    similar conduct, and the effect of the sanction on the lawyer
    involved. Id.; see also Waldon v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Store
    No. 1655, 
    943 F.3d 818
    , 825 (7th Cir. 2019) (explaining the
    special need for sanctions when counsel’s unbecoming
    conduct affects other litigants or misleads the court).
    In his response to the show-cause order, Thomann offers
    no reasonable excuse to justify his neglect of this case. He
    asserts that he was unaware of our orders to file a supple-
    ment to the stay motion because his smartphone’s email
    notifications were not working properly. He says that he has
    fixed his phone and now regularly checks the court docket.
    8                                                   No. 21-3112
    Thomann’s explanation is unacceptable. No reasonable
    lawyer relies on smartphone notifications to monitor email
    communications or as a substitute for regularly checking the
    court docket. That’s true in any case, but Thomann’s care-
    lessness is particularly disturbing here because Camacho-
    Valdez was detained and facing imminent removal. See In re
    Riggs, 
    240 F.3d 668
    , 671 (7th Cir. 2001) (disbarring an attor-
    ney and emphasizing that the “[a]bandonment of one’s
    (imprisoned) client in a criminal case is one of the most
    serious offenses a lawyer can commit”); United States v.
    Santiago-Gonzalez, 
    816 F.2d 336
    , 337 (7th Cir. 1987) (suspend-
    ing an attorney and highlighting the seriousness of missing
    deadlines without requesting extensions while her client was
    incarcerated). It was urgently necessary for Thomann to
    keep up to date on his client’s case with more diligence than
    waiting for smartphone email notifications. Because he did
    not comply with our orders, we lacked sufficient infor-
    mation to evaluate the stay motion and therefore denied it.
    Beyond his inexcusable disregard of our orders to sup-
    plement the stay motion, Thomann failed to pay the docket-
    ing fee or submit a proper motion to proceed in forma
    pauperis—despite several reminders and warnings about the
    consequences of failing to satisfy one of these requirements.
    As a result, he left us no choice but to dismiss the petition for
    review. In the meantime, without a stay of removal,
    Camacho-Valdez was indeed removed.
    Thomann’s indifference to his basic responsibilities in
    this case demonstrates that he has not fulfilled his profes-
    sional duties to his client or the court. Sanctions are amply
    justified—indeed, they are a necessary response to
    Thomann’s abandonment of his client and also as a deter-
    No. 21-3112                                                               9
    rent. See United States v. Song, 
    902 F.2d 609
    , 610 (7th Cir.
    1990); Stillwell, 
    810 F.2d at 136
    . We therefore order Thomann
    to pay a fine of $1,000 to the clerk of court within 30 days of
    this decision.
    C. New Order to Show Cause
    Thomann’s misconduct in this case is not isolated. On the
    contrary, in the past seven years, we have issued 24 show-
    cause orders against him in 12 cases for similar disregard of
    court orders and basic professional duties. 1 In each case
    Thomann’s clients were immigrants vulnerable to removal,
    and he offered flimsy excuses for neglecting their cases. He
    never faced consequences, however, because he eventually
    responded to our show-cause order—often, however, only
    after a second or third—and we permitted the cases to
    proceed.
    More serious consequences are now clearly necessary to
    address Thomann’s pattern of neglecting his professional
    responsibilities, especially considering the particular vulner-
    ability of the clients he routinely represents. For seven years
    1 More precisely, in the past seven years, we have issued 24 show-cause
    orders against Thomann in 12 cases involving 15 petitions for review,
    three of which were consolidated with earlier petitions relating to the
    same client. Camacho-Valdez v. Garland, No. 21-3112 (ECF No. 11); Mejia v.
    Garland, No. 21-2088 (ECF Nos. 16, 17, 18); Jurek v. Garland, No. 21-2082
    (ECF No. 7); Cuenca Brito v. Garland, No. 21-1278 (ECF No. 12); Casas v.
    Garland, No. 20-1739 (ECF Nos. 21, 22, 25, 37); Mabuneza v. Garland,
    Nos. 20-1799 & 20-2998 (ECF Nos. 10, 23, 25); Ferreyra v. Barr,
    Nos. 18-3021 & 19-2055 (ECF Nos. 16, 30, 31); Umrani v. Barr, No. 18-1229
    (ECF Nos. 9, 10); Galindo-Olaguez v. Sessions, No. 18-1113 (ECF Nos. 9,
    10); Cortina-Chavez v. Sessions, No. 17-2116 (ECF No. 7); Yusev v. Sessions,
    Nos. 16-1338 & 16-2242 (ECF Nos. 9, 18); Delgado-Arteaga v. Sessions,
    No. 16-1816 (ECF No. 13).
    10                                               No. 21-3112
    he has persisted in a course of conduct unbecoming a mem-
    ber of the bar of this court. Accordingly, we order Thomann
    to show cause within 21 days of this decision why he should
    not be suspended or removed from our bar. FED. R. APP.
    P. 46(b).
    III. Conclusion
    In sum, we dismiss the petition for review for failure to
    pay the docketing fee or file a motion to proceed in forma
    pauperis that complies with Rule 24(b). We reject Thomann’s
    explanation for his repeated failure to comply with court
    orders in this case and impose a fine in the amount of $1,000
    as a sanction pursuant to Rule 46(c). Payment is due to the
    clerk of court within 30 days of this decision. Finally,
    Thomann is ordered to show cause why he should not be
    suspended or removed from the bar of this court pursuant to
    Rule 46(b) for failing to discharge his obligations to his
    clients and the court in the cases we have identified above.
    His response is due within 21 days of this decision.
    The clerk of court shall forward a copy of this opinion,
    which serves as a public reprimand, to the Attorney Regis-
    tration and Disciplinary Commission of the Illinois Supreme
    Court for any action it deems appropriate.
    PETITION DISMISSED, SANCTION IMPOSED,    AND
    NEW ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE ISSUED