James Howe v. Latoya Hughes ( 2023 )

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-1368
JAMES G. HOWE, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
LATOYA HUGHES, * in her official capacity as Acting Director
of the Illinois Department of Corrections, et al.,
Defendants-Appellants.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Illinois.
No. 3:14-cv-844 — Staci M. Yandle, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED JANUARY 10, 2023 — DECIDED JULY 24, 2023
____________________
Before SCUDDER, KIRSCH, and JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit
Judges.
SCUDDER, Circuit Judge. Very weighty interests are at stake
when a state institutes a program of civil commitment for sex
* Latoya Hughes replaced Rob Jeffreys as Acting Director of the Illi-
nois Department of Corrections on April 1, 2023, so we have substituted
her as a party to this case. See Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).
2 No. 22-1368
offenders who, though never tried for or convicted of a crime,
are found too dangerous for release. On the one hand is the
state’s interest in promoting public safety, and on the other is
an individual’s liberty interest. The Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause permits the balance of these interests to
tip in the state’s favor—but only if the state adheres to partic-
ular mandates to ensure the liberty restrictions go no further
and last no longer than necessary. The necessary balance re-
quires states to afford sex offenders treatment sufficient to
permit a realistic opportunity for rehabilitation and, ulti-
mately, release.
The broader issues presented in this case are all about this
constitutionally necessary balancing—all about whether Illi-
nois, in implementing a civil commitment program under the
state’s Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, is complying with its
obligations under the Fourteenth Amendment. The record be-
fore us leaves us concerned that the state is not holding up its
end of the balance. Civil detainees under the state’s Sexually
Dangerous Persons Program receive minimal treatment, rais-
ing serious questions whether rehabilitation and release are
realistically available to them.
Yet we can decide this appeal without fully immersing
ourselves in the broader issues. The district court, though un-
derstandably focused on curing the constitutional defects in
Illinois’s civil commitment program, issued too broad an in-
junction under the strictures of the Prison Litigation Reform
Act. We therefore reverse and remand.
No. 22-1368 3
I
A
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees that no state shall
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.” How this applies in the context of criminal
law is all too familiar. To find someone guilty of a crime and
thus deprive them of liberty, the state must abide by a wide
array of due process protections. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 364 (1970); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976).
And to cement the deprivation of liberty with a criminal sen-
tence, the state must continue to ensure due process of law.
See Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980). For all but the
most serious offenses, this process culminates in a sentence
that establishes a definite term of imprisonment—one with an
end date.
In the context of civil commitment, though, the protections
of the Fourteenth Amendment operate a little differently. The
Supreme Court “repeatedly has recognized that civil commit-
ment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of
liberty that requires due process protection.” Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979). At the same time, however, the
Court has acknowledged that states have “a legitimate inter-
est … in providing care to [their] citizens who are unable be-
cause of emotional disorders to care for themselves.” Id. at
426. This interest, the Court has explained, parallels states’
“authority under [their] police power to protect the commu-
nity from the dangerous tendencies of some who are mentally
ill.” Id. So the Court has upheld state programs that civilly de-
tain individuals as long as the detainee suffers from a mental
illness and exhibits some form of violent behavior. See, e.g.,
Addington, 441 U.S. at 426 (“[T]he State has no interest in
4 No. 22-1368
confining individuals involuntarily if they are not mentally ill
or if they do not pose some danger to themselves or others.”);
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357–58 (1997) (“States have
in certain narrow circumstances provided for the forcible civil
detainment of people who are unable to control their behavior
and who thereby pose a danger to the public health and
safety.”); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 78 (1992) (“[K]eeping
[a detainee] against his will in a mental institution is improper
absent a determination in civil commitment proceedings of
current mental illness and dangerousness.”).
No doubt civil confinement “constitutes a significant dep-
rivation of liberty” and “can engender adverse social conse-
quences,” thereby “requir[ing] due process protection.” Ad-
dington, 441 U.S. at 425–26. The Fourteenth Amendment re-
quires states to balance their interests—caring for citizens suf-
fering from mental illness and protecting the community—
against the liberty interests of those who it seeks to civilly de-
tain. See id. at 425 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976)). This balance can only be struck where the state’s in-
terest in civil commitment is not punitive. See id. at 428; Allen
v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 373–74 (1986); Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80;
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.
Unlike incarceration following a criminal conviction, civil
commitment often does not have a set end date. That follows
from the purpose of civil commitment—to provide rehabilita-
tion and treatment, not retribution and deterrence. See Allen,
478 U.S. at 369–70; Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363–64. “[B]ecause it
is impossible to predict how long it will take for any given
individual to recover,” the Supreme Court has explained, it is
permissible “to leave the length of commitment indetermi-
nate, subject to periodic review.” Jones v. United States, 463
No. 22-1368 5
U.S. 354, 368 (1983). That periodic review is important: a civil
detainee “is constitutionally entitled to ‘immediate release
upon a showing that [he] is no longer dangerous or mentally
impaired.’” Hughes v. Dimas, 837 F.3d 807, 808 (7th Cir. 2016)
(alteration in original) (quoting Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 368–69).
As long as the state diligently reevaluates detainees’ mental
health status and dangerousness, though, it may continue to
commit them indefinitely. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358.
This is where treatment comes into play. Civil detainees
must actually “receive treatment for the disorders that led to
their confinement and be released when they’ve improved
enough no longer to be dangerous.” Hughes, 837 F.3d at 808
(citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 368–69, and Allen, 478 U.S. at 369–
74); see also Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982)
(“When a person is institutionalized—and wholly dependent
on the State— … a duty to provide certain services and care
does exist.”). It is not enough for a state to purport to offer
treatment but in reality provide next to nothing (or nothing at
all). See United States ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520 F.2d 931,
936 (7th Cir. 1975) (“It is well settled that realities rather than
benign motives or noncriminal labels determine the relevance
of constitutional policies.”), abrogated on other grounds by Ad-
dington, 441 U.S. at 427–31. Indefinite civil commitment with
no meaningful treatment and no realistic possibility of release
violates the constitutional command that “the nature of com-
mitment [must] bear some reasonable relation to the purpose
for which the individual is committed.” Foucha, 504 U.S. at 79.
The essential takeaway is that civil detainees are “entitled
to non-punitive programs designed using the exercise of pro-
fessional judgment.” Allison v. Snyder, 332 F.3d 1076, 1080 (7th
Cir. 2003) (citing Romeo, 457 U.S. at 321–22). Indeed, states
6 No. 22-1368
must invest resources to ensure that their civil commitment
programs—both in design and in practice—provide detainees
sufficient treatment to make release a realistic possibility. If a
state fails to do so and its program becomes “such a substan-
tial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice,
or standards as to demonstrate that the person responsible ac-
tually did not base [their decisions] on such a judgment,” then
the state has violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Romeo, 457
U.S. at 323.
B
Illinois’s Sexually Dangerous Persons Act authorizes the
state’s Director of Corrections—currently Latoya Hughes, the
lead defendant—to involuntarily commit and indefinitely de-
tain individuals who have been charged with a crime and
found to “suffer[ ] from a mental disorder … coupled with
criminal propensities to the commission of sex offenses” and
“propensities toward acts of sexual assaults or acts of sexual
molestation of children.” 720 ILCS 205/1.01, /3, /3.01, /8. The
Act ensures that the Director “shall provide care and treat-
ment for the person committed to him designed to effect re-
covery.” Id. at 205/8. Once detainees have recovered enough
to be deemed “no longer dangerous,” the state must dis-
charge them. Id. at 205/9(e). The state may conditionally dis-
charge detainees under continued supervision, but only if “it
is impossible to determine with certainty under conditions of
institutional care that the person has fully recovered.” Id.Recognize that the Act, by its terms, aligns with the man-
dates of the Due Process Clause. Indeed, the Supreme Court
reviewed the Act in Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986), and
came to that exact conclusion. The Court determined that the
Act provides for civil—rather than criminal—commitment,
No. 22-1368 7
stressing that Illinois “disavowed any interest in punishment,
provided for the treatment of those it commits, and estab-
lished a system under which committed persons may be re-
leased after the briefest time in confinement.” Id. at 370. It is
because of these very characteristics of the Act—the lack of
punitive intent, the availability of treatment, and the realistic
possibility of release—that Illinois does not violate the Four-
teenth Amendment when it detains sexually dangerous per-
sons. See Hughes, 837 F.3d at 808 (reversing and remanding
where it was “unresolved” in the record whether Illinois was
providing detainees with treatment and release consistent
with the Act); Allison, 332 F.3d at 1079 (explaining that be-
cause sexually dangerous persons receive treatment under
the Act, Illinois’s decision to house them in prison facilities
does not “signify punishment”).
II
Our observation that the Act is constitutional in its general
design does not resolve this appeal, however. Grave ques-
tions remain about how the Act is applied in practice. Recall
that “realities rather than benign motives or noncriminal la-
bels determine the relevance of constitutional policies,”
Coughlin, 520 F.2d at 936, so civil detainees must actually “re-
ceive treatment for the disorders that led to their confinement
and be released when they’ve improved enough no longer to
be dangerous.” Hughes, 837 F.3d at 808. This case implicates
these practical concerns.
A
The plaintiffs—James Howe, Jacob Kallal, and George
Needs—have been committed under the Act to the Big
Muddy River Correctional Center Sexually Dangerous
8 No. 22-1368
Persons Program. Howe was conditionally discharged on
May 24, 2023, while Kallal and Needs remain at Big Muddy.
The treatment program at Big Muddy includes three kinds
of group therapy: core therapy, offense-specific therapy, and
didactic (or educational) therapy. Every detainee participates
in a core therapy group that meets weekly. Only those detain-
ees who have acknowledged their prior sexual misconduct
may participate in offense-specific and didactic therapy
groups. Offense-specific therapy groups cover topics such as
Victim Empathy, Cycles of Sexual Offending, and Relapse
Prevention. Similarly, didactic therapy groups address topics
like Anger Management, Social Skills, Substance Abuse, and
Expressive Art. Didactic therapy sessions are offered on a ro-
tating basis. Big Muddy does not provide individual therapy.
The treatment program consists of four sequential phases.
To advance to the next phase, a detainee must maintain a
clean disciplinary record, show progress in therapy, and com-
plete certain assessments. Therapists evaluate detainees semi-
annually and provide them with a copy of their evaluations
as well as six-month treatment plans, but detainees may dis-
cuss their evaluations with the therapists only in group ther-
apy, not one-on-one.
The state contracts with Wexford Health Sources, a
healthcare services company, to evaluate detainees for re-
lease. Wexford reviews the risk posed by each detainee seek-
ing release with reference to the detainee’s semi-annual re-
ports, treatment plans, therapists’ case notes, and interviews
with therapists and the detainee. Based on this information,
Wexford recommends either discharge, conditional dis-
charge, or continuation in the Big Muddy program.
No. 22-1368 9
B
In July 2014 the plaintiffs filed this lawsuit alleging that
the treatment program at Big Muddy was being run in a con-
stitutionally deficient manner. Over four years later, in Octo-
ber 2018, the district court held a two-day bench trial in which
the plaintiffs testified as fact witnesses and Dr. Dean
Cauley—a former clinical team leader and therapist at the
Florida Civil Commitment Center for Sexually Violent Preda-
tors—testified as an expert witness. The district court issued
its findings of fact and conclusions of law three years later, in
September 2021.
We follow the lead of both parties in accepting the district
court’s factual findings, though we note that significant time
has passed since the trial, which has no doubt led to opera-
tional changes within the Big Muddy program. Indeed, both
parties disputed the existence, nature, and legal significance
of intervening developments in their post-trial papers and at
oral argument. But it is not our role to pass judgment on such
assertions for the first time on appeal, nor is any purported
legal development relevant to our legal analysis. We are con-
fident that a justiciable controversy remains regardless of any
operational changes at Big Muddy or the conditional release
of one of the named plaintiffs. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189 (2000); Bow-
sher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986). To the extent that any
changes to the Big Muddy program have legal significance to
the nuts and bolts of what prospective relief is appropriate,
the district court is better situated to explore those issues and
will have a chance to do so on remand. Our focus, meanwhile,
is on how things were at Big Muddy in October 2018.
10 No. 22-1368
At that time Big Muddy housed 170 civil detainees with
three therapists on staff. The 170 detainees were split into
twelve core therapy groups, which met once per week for one
hour. Many of the offense-specific and didactic therapy
groups were on hold—including, for example, the Victim Em-
pathy group, which had not been offered since 2015.
Testifying for the plaintiffs, Dr. Cauley surveyed data
from a national network of civil commitment facilities and
opined that Big Muddy’s program offerings and operation fell
significantly short of professional norms. Every other facility
on record, Dr. Cauley explained, provides multiple core
group therapy sessions per week, whereas Big Muddy stands
alone in offering just one weekly session. And as a result of
such infrequent meetings, Big Muddy only provides one hour
of weekly core therapy, in contrast to the national average (7.5
hours) and the generally accepted minimum (5 hours). Simi-
larly, Dr. Cauley testified that certain offense-specific and di-
dactic groups, such as Substance Abuse and Victim Empathy,
are “critical” to detainees’ treatment and should always be
available, even to detainees who have not yet acknowledged
their prior misconduct. But Big Muddy had indefinitely can-
celed these treatment offerings. Finally, Dr. Cauley explained
that evaluators should prioritize indicators such as age and
the passage of time over past conduct when considering de-
tainees’ discharge petitions. Wexford, however, did not even
consider age or passage of time and instead gave meaningful
weight to detainees’ past conduct.
The district court accepted Dr. Cauley’s findings and con-
cluded that the disparity between Big Muddy’s treatment
program and professional standards amounted to a constitu-
tional violation. Alongside entering its findings of fact and
No. 22-1368 11
conclusions of law, the district court issued a three-pronged
permanent injunction, requiring that Big Muddy
• provide the plaintiffs a minimum of 7.5
hours of core group therapy per week, with
each session lasting no less than 90 minutes;
• reinstate all inactive offense-specific and di-
dactic groups, including groups that
Dr. Cauley identified as foundational (such
as Substance Abuse) as well as other groups
on hold (such as Expressive Art); and
• use independent evaluators other than Wex-
ford to perform discharge evaluations.
The state moved for reconsideration. It claimed the injunc-
tion was overbroad under the Prison Litigation Reform Act,
which limits the possible scope of prospective relief in civil
actions “with respect to prison conditions.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3626(a)(1)(A). The district court saw no overbreadth and
therefore denied the state’s motion.
The state now appeals.
III
Without disputing that constitutional violations were oc-
curring at Big Muddy, the state presses a narrower point on
appeal. It challenges only the scope of the injunction under
the PLRA. On that limited front, we agree. The PLRA restricts
the district court’s injunctive power, and the current injunc-
tion is overbroad.
A
Through the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Congress man-
dated that “[p]rospective relief in any civil action with respect
12 No. 22-1368
to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to
correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plain-
tiff or plaintiffs.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A). The plaintiffs first
attempt to sidestep the PLRA by asserting that it does not ap-
ply to their claims at all.
Their efforts on this front are forfeited. The district court
made clear as early as 2014, when it first screened the plain-
tiffs’ claims, that it saw this case as governed by the PLRA.
Furthermore, the state expressly argued that the injunction vi-
olated the PLRA in its October 2021 motion for reconsidera-
tion. Even then the plaintiffs did not raise this argument until
seven months later, once the case was on appeal. That is too
late. See Allen v. City of Chicago, 865 F.3d 936, 943–44 (7th Cir.
2017); see also United States v. Knox, 624 F.3d 865, 873 n.6 (7th
Cir. 2010) (treating arguments as forfeited, rather than
waived, when it was “not clear” that the defendant made a
strategic choice not to make them).
Because the district court will need to reconsider the scope
of its injunction on remand, we nevertheless exercise our dis-
cretion to consider the plaintiffs’ forfeited arguments to make
clear that they fail as a legal matter. See Hacker v. Dart, 62 F.4th
1073, 1082 (7th Cir. 2023). The plaintiffs’ first contention—that
they are not “prisoners” under the PLRA—misreads the rele-
vant statutory language. While other provisions of the PLRA
are limited to suits brought “by prisoners,” the provision at
issue here is not so constrained. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)
(imposing exhaustion requirements on suits brought “by a
prisoner”), with 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) (restricting federal
courts’ injunctive authority “in any civil action with respect
to prison conditions”).
No. 22-1368 13
The plaintiffs next contend that because their treatment is
the very “basis” for their continued confinement, not a condi-
tion of their confinement, their suit is not one “with respect to
prison conditions.” But this view runs headlong into the Su-
preme Court’s conditions-of-confinement jurisprudence,
which applies when interpreting the PLRA. See Porter v.
Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 527–28 (2002). In Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544
U.S. 74 (2005), the Court held that a prisoner’s challenge to
parole proceedings was a challenge to the conditions of his
confinement even though parole proceedings are effectively
the basis for a prisoner’s continued confinement. See id. at 82.
The Court has since articulated the standard this way: if an
inmate’s legal victory does not “necessarily imply the invalid-
ity of his conviction or sentence,” his claim remains a “prison-
conditions claim” governed by the PLRA. Nance v. Ward, 142
S. Ct. 2214, 2222 (2022) (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477, 487 (1994)). Applied to this case, a victory for the plain-
tiffs (such as an injunction requiring constitutionally ade-
quate treatment) would not necessarily imply their speedier
discharge from the Big Muddy program. So the plaintiffs’ ar-
gument on this front fails as well.
B
Returning to the text of the PLRA, we see that Congress
mandated that any injunction with respect to prison condi-
tions “extend no further than necessary to correct the viola-
tion,” be “narrowly drawn,” and be “the least intrusive means
necessary to correct the violation.” 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
Interpreting this very limitation, we have explained that fed-
eral courts must take care not to “conflate[ ] what is constitu-
tionally adequate … with what is constitutionally required.”
14 No. 22-1368
Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 683–84 (7th Cir. 2012) (emphasis
in original).
Our case law has identified two dimensions to the PLRA’s
mandate against overbreadth. First, an injunction that im-
poses numeric requirements cannot do so at a level that ex-
ceeds the constitutional floor. See Rasho v. Jeffreys, 22 F.4th 703,
713–14 (7th Cir. 2022) (reversing a district court injunction
that “set staffing at levels sufficient to exceed the constitutional
minimum” (emphasis in original)). That is not to say that fed-
eral courts may never set numeric benchmarks. See id. at 713.
To the contrary, the Supreme Court blessed such an injunc-
tion in Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 538–41 (2011), after inten-
sive fact-finding established that a specific numeric target
“was necessary to remedy the constitutional violations.” Id. at
540. But such injunctions cannot extend further than neces-
sary to address the violation at issue.
The second dimension to the PLRA’s limit on prospective
relief is that such relief may not be too prescriptive. At bot-
tom, federal courts must ensure that “substantial discretion
and flexibility” remain “in the hands of the prison adminis-
trators.” Westefer, 682 F.3d at 685; see also Romeo, 457 U.S. at
317. That is essential if an injunction is to be narrowly drawn
and as unintrusive as possible.
The injunction before us here is overbroad in both re-
spects. It requires that the Big Muddy Program provide 7.5
hours of weekly core group therapy despite the district
court’s express finding that 5 hours of core therapy per week
would be constitutionally adequate. Indeed, Dr. Cauley—the
plaintiffs’ expert—favorably referenced other treatment pro-
grams that provide only 5 hours of core therapy per week.
Although he explained that those programs had other
No. 22-1368 15
therapeutic and educational opportunities available for de-
tainees, the injunction entered by the district court does not
give Big Muddy flexibility to implement, say, 7.5 hours of any
form of weekly group therapy. Rather, the injunction requires
7.5 hours of core group therapy, which is above the constitu-
tional floor and therefore extends further than necessary to
remedy the violation.
The remaining provisions of the injunction fail for a differ-
ent reason: they are too prescriptive. As to the reinstatement
of canceled offense-specific and didactic groups, the injunc-
tion does not give Big Muddy the option to rotate between
programs based on actual need. While the evidence may sup-
port a finding that some groups (like Victim Empathy or Sub-
stance Abuse) should be offered with more consistency, it
does not support the same finding with respect to all groups
(such as Expressive Art, which the injunction includes). And
the injunction’s prohibition on Wexford providing evaluation
services to the program is even less grounded in the evidence.
While it is true that a detainee’s past conduct is only relevant
to their continued detention to the extent it sheds light on
their present dangerousness, see O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U.S. 563, 574–75 (1975); Allen, 478 U.S. at 371, on this record
we see no constitutional hook to single out a specific contrac-
tor and prohibit them from providing services to state facili-
ties. Doing so is not the least intrusive means available to cor-
rect the constitutional violation at issue.
IV
It is sufficient for purposes of resolving this appeal to con-
clude the injunction is overbroad. But because we remand for
the district court to craft a new injunction consistent with the
16 No. 22-1368
PLRA and our opinion, we offer some parting thoughts to
help guide this litigation across the finish line.
First, the parties should ensure that they present thorough
evidence to the district court as to what kind and level of treat-
ment they believe constitutes the constitutional floor. See
Westefer, 682 F.3d at 683–84; Romeo, 457 U.S. at 322–23. If the
parties fail to do so, or if their evidence is irreconcilable, the
district court remains free to employ the resources at its dis-
posal to develop a strong evidentiary foundation for its forth-
coming injunction. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 706(a) (permitting
the court to appoint its own expert witness).
Second, the district court must take care to connect any pro-
spective relief to a specific constitutional violation. For in-
stance, if the district court remains concerned about Wexford
relying too heavily on past conduct when evaluating detain-
ees for discharge, it needs to explain how its concern maps
onto the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Hughes, 837 F.3d at 808 (explaining that the Fourteenth
Amendment requires inmates be released if they are no
longer dangerous); Allen, 478 U.S. at 371 (approving of Illi-
nois’s civil commitment program because it “primarily” uses
past conduct “to show the accused’s mental condition and to
predict future behavior”). And it must tailor its injunction to
addressing only those constitutional concerns.
Third, the state may not continue to rely on cost and logis-
tical difficulties to evade its constitutional obligations. The
PLRA does not shield states from unwanted expenditures
necessary to comply with constitutional mandates. See Arm-
strong v. Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d 1058, 1071 (9th Cir. 2010)
(“[T]he question is not whether the relief the court ordered …
is expensive, or difficult to achieve, but whether the same
No. 22-1368 17
vindication of federal rights could have been achieved with
less involvement by the court in directing the details of [the
prison’s] operations.”). If Illinois continues to operate the Big
Muddy program in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,
it may expose itself to far more drastic and costly measures
than those it has so far avoided in this case. See generally
Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (affirming an injunction that required
California to reduce its prison population by roughly 40,000
inmates).
Fourth, this case is nearly a decade old, and we urge the
district court and the parties to work together to bring it to a
prompt resolution following remand. The district court can
and should set an aggressive briefing schedule, and the par-
ties must do everything in their power to comply. The district
court may suggest the parties try mediation to speed up the
process. If it does so, we expect they will engage in good faith.
* * *
No doubt the Constitution permits Illinois to operate a
civil confinement program for sexually dangerous persons.
But it does so only as long as there is a careful balancing of the
state’s interest in the safety of its citizens against those indi-
viduals’ liberty interest. By providing inadequate treatment
and, as a result, depriving detainees of a realistic possibility
of release, Illinois has failed to uphold its end of the balance.
The state should right these constitutional wrongs without
delay.
Still, the district court’s injunction is overbroad under the
PLRA, so we VACATE the injunction and REMAND for fur-
ther proceedings consistent with this opinion.