In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-2527
SARAH THOMAS, individually and as legal guardian of C.S., a
minor child,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NEENAH JOINT SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 1:21-cv-00366 — William C. Griesbach, Judge.
____________________
ARGUED FEBRUARY 22, 2023 — DECIDED JULY 20, 2023
____________________
Before HAMILTON, KIRSCH, and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
KIRSCH, Circuit Judge. Sarah Thomas brought this suit on
behalf of herself and her child, C.S., alleging that several
Neenah Joint School District staff members violated C.S.’s
Fourth Amendment rights when disciplining her. Rather than
sue the individual staff members involved in C.S.’s discipline,
Thomas pursued only a Monell claim against the District and
asserted that it had a de facto practice of using excessive force
2 No. 22-2527
or threats of force against students with behavioral disabili-
ties like C.S. The district court dismissed the suit because
Thomas failed to plausibly allege a widespread custom or
practice of violating disabled students’ Fourth Amendment
rights. We agree and affirm.
I
In reviewing the dismissal of Thomas’s complaint, we ac-
cept all well-pleaded facts as true and draw all reasonable in-
ferences in her favor. Gociman v. Loyola Univ. of Chi.,
41 F.4th
873, 878 (7th Cir. 2022). C.S. attended sixth grade at a middle
school within the Neenah Joint School District during the
2019–2020 school year. C.S. has multiple developmental and
cognitive disabilities that affect her capabilities at school, in-
cluding autism spectrum disorder, attention deficit hyperac-
tivity disorder, and obsessive-compulsive disorder. She had
an Individualized Education Plan—a program aimed at sup-
porting the education of a child with disabilities—and was of-
ten taught and supervised by special education teacher Jason
Fridley.
On February 13, 2020, C.S. attempted to use the elevator in
a school hallway. Fridley told C.S. to stop, and when C.S. did
not comply, he pushed her into the wall and held her there for
several minutes, causing physical pain and mental distress.
Andrew Braunel, the school’s acting administrator, stepped
in and assisted Fridley as C.S. continued to resist. Thirteen
minutes later, school resource officer Rob Ross arrived,
grabbed C.S. by the arm, forced her onto the floor, and pinned
her face down while handcuffing her hands behind her back.
Unable to restrain 13-year-old C.S. on his own, Ross held her
in the prone position on the floor for nine minutes as he
waited for two more police officers to arrive. When Ross
No. 22-2527 3
asked Fridley what had happened, Fridley responded that
C.S. “wanted to take the elevator today.” Ross asked, “Okay,
that’s all?” to which Fridley replied, “Yep.” Ross told Fridley
and Braunel that C.S. had to be detained because she was be-
ing physically violent.
When the other officers arrived, they lifted C.S. into a
wheelchair with her hands still bound behind her back. They
wheeled her into the elevator and brought her down to the
first floor of the school, where they again placed her in a prone
position on the floor and bound her legs before seating her
back in the wheelchair. The officers kept C.S. handcuffed and
bound until her mother eventually arrived and took her
home. The entire incident lasted 34 minutes. Thomas alleged
that neither school staff nor the officers attempted to calm C.S.
as she cried and struggled to understand why she was being
restrained. She also alleged that Fridley, Braunel, and Ross
spoke in whispers while coordinating their actions and com-
municated that they were “all on the same page” about using
continued restraint on C.S.
The amended complaint also describes an incident that oc-
curred less than two weeks later, in which C.S. may have
scratched or grabbed another student and was required to eat
her lunch in the school office as punishment. While there, C.S.
allegedly became anxious and dysregulated, prompting staff
including Fridley to respond “with similar aggressive
force[.]” Once again, school staff called the police department
to restrain C.S. The District also sought a juvenile delinquency
prosecution of C.S. but charges were dropped when C.S. was
found not competent to stand trial. The complaint also refers
to an unspecified incident in March 2020 but provides no facts
about what happened. Lastly, the complaint describes an
4 No. 22-2527
incident involving A.S. (Thomas’s son and C.S.’s older
brother) who had previously attended the same middle
school. In April 2016, A.S. allegedly bit a fellow student who
was bullying him, and the school’s then-principal requested
the Neenah police department bring charges against A.S. His
prosecution was also dropped after a finding that he was in-
competent to stand trial.
From these incidents, Thomas alleged that the District had
a “practice or protocol of utilizing excessive punitive and re-
taliatory force or threats of force to punish students with be-
havioral disabilities.” She asserted that this practice “appears
to have been known and understood” by the school staff in-
volved in these incidents. The District moved to dismiss
Thomas’s claim, arguing that she failed to allege a municipal
policy or custom of violating students’ Fourth Amendment
rights as required to establish municipal liability under Monell
v. Department of Social Services,
436 U.S. 658 (1978). The district
court agreed and dismissed Thomas’s amended complaint.
II
We review a dismissal for failure to state a claim under
Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Warciak v. Subway Rests., Inc.,
949 F.3d
354, 356 (7th Cir. 2020). A complaint must allege “enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Facial plausibil-
ity exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that al-
lows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the de-
fendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory state-
ments, do not suffice.”
Id.
No. 22-2527 5
Section 1983 provides a civil remedy against any “person”
who violates a plaintiff’s federal civil rights while acting un-
der color of state law.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Monell, the Supreme
Court held that municipalities—such as school districts—are
“person[s]” who may be sued under § 1983.
436 U.S. at 690.
Municipalities may be sued only for their own violations of
federal law, however, and cannot be held vicariously liable
for the constitutional torts of their employees. Dean v. Wexford
Health Sources, Inc.,
18 F.4th 214, 235 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Mo-
nell,
436 U.S. at 691–94).
For a Monell claim to survive a motion to dismiss, a plain-
tiff must plead facts that plausibly suggest that: (1) she was
deprived of a constitutional right; (2) the deprivation can be
traced “to some municipal action (i.e., ‘a policy or custom’),
such that the challenged conduct is properly attributable to
the municipality itself”; (3) “the policy or custom demon-
strates municipal fault, i.e., deliberate indifference”; and
(4) “the municipal action was the moving force behind the
federal-rights violation.”
Id. (cleaned up); see also Spiegel v.
McClintic,
916 F.3d 611, 617 (7th Cir. 2019). All requirements
“‘must be scrupulously applied’ to avoid a claim for munici-
pal liability backsliding into an impermissible claim for vicar-
ious liability.” Bohanon v. City of Indianapolis,
46 F.4th 669, 676
(7th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted).
The district court expressed skepticism that the staff mem-
bers’ conduct violated C.S.’s Fourth Amendment rights—Mo-
nell’s first requirement—but ultimately granted the District’s
motion to dismiss for Thomas’s failure to adequately plead a
policy or custom. We agree that Thomas’s Monell claim unrav-
els at its second step. Three types of municipal action support
Monell liability: “(1) an express policy that causes a
6 No. 22-2527
constitutional deprivation when enforced; (2) a widespread
practice that is so permanent and well-settled that it consti-
tutes a custom or practice; or (3) an allegation that the consti-
tutional injury was caused by a person with final policymak-
ing authority.” Spiegel,
916 F.3d at 617 (quotation marks omit-
ted).
Thomas relies solely on the second type, arguing that the
District had an uncodified common practice of violating the
Fourth Amendment rights of students with disabilities. To
succeed on that theory, she must allege facts permitting a rea-
sonable inference “that the practice is widespread and that the
specific violations complained of were not isolated incidents.”
Gill v. City of Milwaukee,
850 F.3d 335, 344 (7th Cir. 2017). Alle-
gations of “a few sporadic examples of an improper behavior”
will not suffice. Flores v. City of South Bend,
997 F.3d 725, 733
(7th Cir. 2021) (concluding that a complaint offering three ex-
amples of one officer speeding did not plausibly suggest that
a city had a widespread practice of allowing officers to speed).
Thomas failed to plausibly allege that the District had a
widespread practice of using excessive force to punish stu-
dents with behavioral disabilities. In support of her claim, she
alleged facts about: (1) the acting school administrator’s in-
volvement in the February 13 incident; (2) comments ex-
changed between the school staff that day about being “on the
same page”; (3) an incident on February 25 when C.S. had
lunch in the school office; and (4) an incident involving C.S.’s
brother from 2016.
These allegations do not “permit the reasonable inference
that the practice is so widespread so as to constitute a govern-
mental custom.” Gill,
850 F.3d at 344. At the outset, the allega-
tions about C.S.’s brother are not relevant to our analysis. The
No. 22-2527 7
incident involving A.S.—in which he allegedly bit another
student and the District pursued a juvenile prosecution in re-
sponse—occurred four years before any of the alleged inci-
dents involving C.S. Thomas also never alleged that A.S. was
subject to any sort of excessive force, the constitutional viola-
tion at the heart of Thomas’s complaint. For both reasons, the
allegations about A.S.’s treatment lend no support to
Thomas’s widespread practice theory.
Thomas’s allegations about C.S.’s treatment, moreover,
fail to demonstrate a widespread pattern or practice of Fourth
Amendment violations. Thomas alleged that when Braunel
did not question Fridley’s actions before helping restrain C.S.
on February 13, he indicated approval of Fridley’s use of re-
straint. But Braunel’s mere assistance during one event does
not support a reasonable inference that the District had a de
facto policy of using excessive force to punish students. And
nothing about comments exchanged between Fridley,
Braunel, and Ross—about being “on the same page”—tells us
anything about the existence of a widespread practice of us-
ing excessive force. Additionally, the allegations about the
lunchtime incident on February 25 and the unspecified inci-
dent in March 2020 do not plausibly suggest a widespread
practice of excessive force. The details surrounding these in-
stances are so scarce that we cannot infer that excessive force
was used. For the February 25 event, Thomas alleged that
when C.S. was sent to the school office after a physical alter-
cation with another student, she became dysregulated and
school staff including Fridley “responded with similar ag-
gressive force” as the incident two weeks earlier. The com-
plaint contains no facts regarding the amount or kind of force
any staff member used in restraining C.S. Even less is known
about the March incident. All Thomas alleged is that there
8 No. 22-2527
was “one further [incident] in March 2020.” Absolutely noth-
ing can be deduced from this allegation, such as what hap-
pened, who was involved, or whether any force was used at
all.
At bottom, Thomas’s allegations of two isolated incidents
fail to plausibly allege that the District has a widespread prac-
tice of using excessive force to punish students with behav-
ioral disabilities. Accordingly, she has failed to state a claim
under Monell.
AFFIRMED
