Carlous Horton v. Stanley Lovett ( 2023 )


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  •                               In the
    United States Court of Appeals
    for the Seventh Circuit
    ____________________
    No. 21-1004
    CARLOUS S. HORTON,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.
    STANLEY LOVETT, Warden,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ____________________
    Appeal from the United States District Court for the
    Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.
    No. 19 CV 50150 — Iain D. Johnston, Judge.
    ____________________
    ARGUED FEBRUARY 8, 2022 — DECIDED JULY 7, 2023
    ____________________
    Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and SCUDDER and JACKSON-
    AKIWUMI, Circuit Judges.
    SYKES, Chief Judge. In 2012 a federal jury in the Western
    District of Missouri convicted Carlous Horton of multiple
    drug-trafficking, firearm, and wire-fraud crimes based on
    his involvement in a large drug-distribution organization.
    Horton had been convicted of state drug felonies on four
    prior occasions, including in 1995 in Illinois for possessing
    cocaine with intent to deliver in violation of 720 ILL. COMP.
    2                                                             No. 21-1004
    STAT. 570/401(c)(2). So he faced a mandatory life sentence on
    two of the drug counts, see 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(A), and an
    enhanced sentence of 15 years to life on the firearm count
    under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), 
    18 U.S.C. § 924
    (e). The district court imposed two life sentences on the
    drug counts as required by § 841 and a life sentence on the
    firearm count, all to run concurrently, and concurrent terms
    of varying lengths on the remaining counts.
    Horton’s direct appeal failed in the Eighth Circuit. He
    then sought collateral relief in the sentencing court under
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    , but that motion likewise failed. At that
    point further § 2255 review was largely barred. Under
    § 2255(h) a successive motion is permitted if and only if it
    contains “newly discovered evidence” of innocence or is
    based on a “new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive
    to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court.”
    Horton thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus under
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2241
     in the Northern District of Illinois, where he
    was then confined, 1 seeking another round of collateral
    review via the “saving clause” in 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    (e). Ordi-
    narily a § 2255 motion in the sentencing court is the exclu-
    sive method for a federal prisoner to collaterally attack his
    conviction or sentence, but § 2255(e) preserves a path to
    collateral review via habeas. On its face the saving-clause
    gateway to habeas review is narrow: the statute provides
    1 A habeas petition must be filed in the district where the prisoner is
    confined. 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 2242
    , 2243; Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 
    542 U.S. 426
    , 434–35
    (2004). Horton was confined in a federal prison in the Northern District
    of Illinois when he filed his § 2241 petition. He has since been transferred
    to a federal prison in Colorado. The change in his custodian does not
    affect our jurisdiction. See In re Hall, 
    988 F.3d 376
    , 377–78 (7th Cir. 2021).
    No. 21-1004                                                    3
    that a federal prisoner’s § 2241 motion “shall not be enter-
    tained” unless the remedy by motion under § 2255 “is
    inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.”
    § 2255(e).
    Our decision in In re Davenport opened the saving-clause
    gateway for certain habeas claims premised on new
    statutory-interpretation decisions. 
    147 F.3d 605
     (7th Cir.
    1998). Channeling postconviction review to the § 2255
    remedy and restricting prisoners to one such motion—with
    limited exceptions for newly discovered evidence and new
    rules of constitutional law—blocks prisoners from seeking
    the benefit of later statutory-interpretation decisions. We
    held in Davenport that § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective”—
    and § 2241 is therefore available—when the limits on succes-
    sive § 2255 motions bar relief and the prisoner’s claim is
    based on a new interpretation of a criminal statute that was
    previously foreclosed by circuit precedent. Id. at 610–11.
    Horton’s habeas petition proposed to raise a Davenport
    claim challenging his life sentences based on Mathis v. United
    States, 
    579 U.S. 500
     (2016). The government conceded that
    two of Horton’s prior drug convictions are not proper § 841
    predicates under Mathis and a third—the 1995 Illinois co-
    caine conviction mentioned above—also could not be count-
    ed as a predicate under our decision in United States v. Ruth,
    
    966 F.3d 642
    , 647 (7th Cir. 2020). But the government op-
    posed relief, arguing that although Horton’s habeas petition
    was premised on new statutory-interpretation develop-
    ments, he had not been previously precluded by Eighth
    Circuit precedent from making a Ruth-like argument and
    thus did not satisfy Davenport’s saving-clause test. The
    district judge agreed and denied relief.
    4                                                        No. 21-1004
    Horton appealed, and we recruited pro bono counsel to
    assist him in presenting the complex procedural and sub-
    stantive issues raised in his § 2241 petition. 2 After briefing
    and oral argument, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
    Jones v. Hendrix, 
    142 S. Ct. 2706
     (mem.) (2022), which raised
    the question whether Davenport’s interpretation of the saving
    clause—and similar interpretations adopted in other cir-
    cuits—is correct. Because Horton’s habeas petition depends
    on the continued viability of our decision in Davenport, we
    held this appeal for the Court’s ruling in Jones v. Hendrix.
    That decision is now in. The Supreme Court has rejected
    Davenport’s interpretation of the saving clause. Jones v.
    Hendrix, 21-857, 
    2023 WL 4110233
    , at *7 (June 22, 2023). As
    the Court explained:
    Section 2255(h) specifies the two limited condi-
    tions in which Congress has permitted federal
    prisoners to bring second or successive collat-
    eral attacks on their sentences. The inability of
    a prisoner with a statutory claim to satisfy
    those conditions does not mean that he can
    bring his claim in a habeas petition under the
    saving clause. It means that he cannot bring it
    at all. Congress has chosen finality over error
    correction in his case.
    
    Id. at *9
    . The Court’s ruling abrogates Davenport.
    Under Jones v. Hendrix, Horton cannot bring his statutory
    claim in a § 2241 habeas petition via the saving clause;
    2 Attorney Thomas L. Shriner of Foley & Lardner LLP accepted the
    representation and has ably discharged his duties. We thank him for his
    service to his client and the court.
    No. 21-1004                                                   5
    indeed, “he cannot bring it at all.” Id. We therefore affirm the
    district court’s judgment denying his § 2241 petition, though
    on different grounds.
    AFFIRMED
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-1004

Filed Date: 7/7/2023

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/24/2023