In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-2957
CHRISTINE BOARDMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:18-cv-2728 — Rebecca R. Pallmeyer, Chief Judge.
____________________
ARGUED SEPTEMBER 19, 2023 — DECIDED DECEMBER 26, 2023
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK, WOOD, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges.
WOOD, Circuit Judge. Service Employees International Un-
ion (“International”) is a North American labor union that
represents people in health care, public services, and various
other fields. It functions through a network of local affiliates.
The present case arose when, alarmed by internecine hostili-
ties within Local 73 (covering Illinois and northwest Indiana),
the International intervened by imposing an emergency trus-
teeship on the Local. Among other things, the Trustee
2 No. 22-2957
removed the Local’s President, Christine Boardman, from of-
fice.
Boardman fought back with a lawsuit under the Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (“the Act”),
29
U.S.C. § 411, et seq. She alleges that the International’s as-
serted justification for the trusteeship was pretextual, and that
International President Mary Kay Henry imposed the trustee-
ship to retaliate against Boardman for speech that is protected
under the Act. After some motion practice and discovery, the
defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. The
district court ruled in their favor, and we affirm.
I
From November 2000 until the International imposed the
trusteeship on August 3, 2016, Boardman served as President
of the Local. At some point, relations between Boardman and
Henry became strained. When Henry first ran for Interna-
tional President in 2010, Boardman told several people that
she supported Henry’s opponent. In 2012, Boardman advised
Henry that the International was “making a big mistake” by
granting another union the exclusive right to organize nurses
in the Midwest. In 2014, the International ordered the Local
and another local union affiliate to suspend their competing
efforts to organize a group of health clinic workers. Boardman
sent Henry an email pointedly criticizing this decision. Fi-
nally, in 2015, the International endorsed Hillary Clinton in
the Democratic primary election—an endorsement Henry
supported. Boardman favored Bernie Sanders and communi-
cated this to the International Executive Vice President. Ac-
cording to Boardman, these events created a “pattern of dis-
sent” for which Henry sought to punish Boardman.
No. 22-2957 3
As the International tells the story, the trusteeship was
necessary to address longstanding political infighting be-
tween the Local’s two highest-ranking officials: Boardman
and Secretary-Treasurer Matthew Brandon. The International
was well aware of that feud, as the two leaders had brought
their grievances to Henry and the International’s attention on
numerous occasions. During a Local Executive Board meeting
in August 2015, Brandon opposed Boardman’s recommenda-
tion to fill a vacant vice-president position. Two days later,
Brandon emailed Henry and several International officials,
describing the environment at the Local as “hostile” and stat-
ing that he “[would] continue to oppose” Boardman’s deci-
sions. Brandon emailed Henry again later that week, this time
to denounce the Local’s “crisis of leadership” and inform
Henry that Boardman had fired Wayne Lindwall, a Division
Director, who Brandon believed was fired in “retaliation” for
not being “loyal to [Boardman].”
The International tried to smooth the waters. On August
18, 2015, Henry appointed two personal representatives to
“assist [the Local]’s leaders with carrying out [its] priori-
ties[.]” That step alone did not do the job: soon after, a Local
Executive Board Meeting was disrupted by several armed
people shouting and demanding that Boardman reinstate
Lindwall. Boardman believed they were “aviation police” or
“from one of [the] other bargaining units.” She later rehired
Lindwall, and conflict at the Local subsided over the follow-
ing months. In January 2016, Boardman announced to the Lo-
cal’s Executive Board and general membership her intent to
retire as President. On March 30, 2016, Boardman followed up
with a public statement that she planned to retire in June and
to name Brandon as her interim successor. By May 2016,
Henry’s personal representatives had left the Local.
4 No. 22-2957
Tensions soon reignited. First, Boardman fired Lindwall
for a second time. In June 2016, Boardman rescinded her plan
to retire. Brandon asserted that the recission came too late and
that he was now the rightful President of the Local. On July 1,
2016, Boardman filed internal disciplinary charges against
Brandon and suspended him for 30 days. Boardman appealed
to Henry and the International to “assume original jurisdic-
tion” over her charges.
Chaos erupted during a Local Executive Board meeting on
July 15, 2016. Anticipating that Brandon would contest her au-
thority to lead the meeting, Boardman hired off-duty police
officers to attend. Armed supporters of Brandon appeared,
shouting that Boardman should “let Brandon take over.”
Boardman filed internal charges against Brandon in which
she described the meeting as a “coup d’état.” She added that
concern that “violence might erupt” led the Local to postpone
a general membership meeting scheduled for the following
day.
On August 1, 2016, Deedee Fitzpatrick, the Deputy Chief
of Staff at the International, sent Henry a memorandum de-
tailing the “serious breakdown in the internal democratic
governance structure” at the Local and concluding that no
“measure short of an emergency trusteeship … would restore
the stability” needed. Unlike a regular trusteeship, an emer-
gency trusteeship may be imposed prior to a hearing. Article
VIII, Section 7(f) of the International’s constitution permits an
emergency trusteeship if “in the judgment of the International
President, an emergency situation exists within the Local Un-
ion.”
Henry issued an Emergency Trusteeship Order on August
3, 2016. The order cites Boardman and Brandon’s “[i]ncessant
No. 22-2957 5
in-fighting” that escalated to the point of “impeding the Lo-
cal’s ability to carry out its basic governance functions.” It
states that a trusteeship was necessary to “restore the orderly
and democratic function of the Local, safeguard the interests
of the Local membership and the Local’s financial resources,
and assure that the Local is meeting its representation and col-
lective bargaining responsibilities.” Boardman was removed
from her position as President by operation of the trusteeship.
In accordance with its constitution and bylaws, the Interna-
tional eventually held a hearing and determined that the
emergency trusteeship was warranted.
Boardman challenged her demotion in a suit under the Act
against the International, the Local, Henry, and two of the
trustees named in Henry’s order—Eliseo Medina and Dian
Palmer. Counts Three and Six allege that the trusteeship was
improper under Title III of the Act, which governs when and
how labor organizations can impose trusteeships. In addition,
she asserted theories under Title I of the Act, which creates a
“Bill of Rights” for union members. Counts Two and Five al-
lege that the defendants imposed the trusteeship in retaliation
against Boardman for her protected speech. The remaining
counts challenge the consequences of the trusteeship, includ-
ing Boardman’s removal from her position and termination of
her union membership.
The district court concluded that the trusteeship was val-
idly imposed under Title III. Because Boardman’s Title I
claims rest on her allegations that the trusteeship was invalid,
the court held that summary judgment on her remaining
claims was also proper. Boardman now appeals.
6 No. 22-2957
II
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo. Stevens v. United States Dep’t of State,
20 F.4th 337, 342
(7th Cir. 2021). Summary judgment is appropriate when there
is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). We
construe the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmov-
ing party (Boardman) and draw all reasonable inferences in
her favor. Miller v. Chicago Transit Authority,
20 F.4th 1148,
1155 (7th Cir. 2021).
Boardman’s Title III claims hinge on whether the trustee-
ship was validly imposed. The district court held that if at
least one proper purpose for imposing it exists, a claim that
the trusteeship was retaliatory fails. On appeal, Boardman ar-
gues that the district court erred as a matter of law in applying
this “sole proper purpose” standard. She proposes that we
adopt an alternative standard, akin to a mixed-motives test,
under which a finding that the International had “one bad
motive” is “sufficient to defeat the trusteeship in its entirety,
regardless of other asserted bases for its imposition.”
As an initial matter, Boardman at least forfeited, if not
waived, her ability to challenge the legal standard applied by
the district court. It is well settled that arguments not raised
in the district court are waived on appeal. Kunz v. DeFelice,
538
F.3d 667, 681 (7th Cir. 2008). Boardman never contested the
application of a “sole proper purpose” standard at the sum-
mary judgment stage. Nor did she propose an alternative le-
gal standard. Instead, Boardman’s briefs and arguments ac-
cepted the sole proper purpose standard and asserted that she
satisfied it, because the sole reason for imposing the trustee-
ship was impermissible retaliation.
No. 22-2957 7
Even assuming Boardman merely forfeited this argument,
she cannot prevail. We already have rejected her proposed
“one bad motive” standard. In Serafinn v. Local 722, Int’l Broth-
erhood of Teamsters,
597 F.3d 908, 914 (7th Cir. 2010), we stated
that “[a] mixed-motive theory of liability is never proper in a
suit brought under the [Act].” And in Int’l Brotherhood of Boil-
ermakers v. Local Lodge 714,
845 F.2d 687, 693 (7th Cir. 1988),
we concluded that a trusteeship was validly imposed because
“financial malpractice was the (or a) bona fide purpose of the
trusteeship[.]” (emphasis added). Indeed, Boardman has not
referred us to any decision that adopts her proposed stand-
ard. Thus, the district court did not err in applying a sole
proper purpose standard.
Applying this standard here, the dispositive question is
whether the International’s decision to impose the trusteeship
was supported by a (i.e., at least one) valid statutory purpose.
The Act provides that a trusteeship may be established only
for the purposes of “correcting corruption or financial mal-
practice, assuring the performance of collective bargaining
agreements or other duties of a bargaining representative, re-
storing democratic procedures, or otherwise carrying out the
legitimate objects of such labor organization.”
29 U.S.C. § 462.
Henry’s order stated that a trusteeship was necessary, among
other reasons, for the enumerated purpose of “restor[ing]
democratic procedures at the Local.” The order cited the
“[i]ncessant in-fighting” between Boardman and Brandon—
behavior that “imped[ed] the Local’s ability to carry out its
basic governance functions such as conducting Executive
Board and general membership meetings.” Henry’s order
also mentioned concerns about the Local’s finances. We set
that part to one side, because the stated purpose of
8 No. 22-2957
“restor[ing] democratic procedures” suffices on its own to up-
hold the trusteeship.
The undisputed evidence in the record supports this as-
serted basis for the trusteeship. As early as August 2015, Bran-
don emailed Henry denouncing the “crisis of leadership” at
the Local. To the extent that Henry’s appointed personal rep-
resentatives mitigated these problems, their success was tem-
porary. Political infighting between the Local’s top two lead-
ers reached its peak in the month preceding the trusteeship.
Boardman filed two sets of disciplinary charges against Bran-
don, suspended him, and rescinded her previously an-
nounced intent to retire. Brandon struck back with challenges
to Boardman’s authority to lead the Local. Tension was so
high that Boardman hired off-duty police officers to attend a
Local Executive Board meeting on July 15. That meeting was
disrupted by armed supporters of Brandon, demanding that
Boardman retire and “let Brandon take over.” Though she
now disputes that the meeting was “chaotic,” Boardman her-
self described it as a “coup d’état” in the second set of charges
she filed against Brandon. Based on this undisputed chain of
events, any reasonable juror would conclude that Henry had
a legitimate basis for governance concerns.
Boardman asks us to second-guess the International’s de-
cision about how best to govern its internal affairs. But that is
not our role. See Local Lodge 714, 845 F.2d at 693 (concluding
the trusteeship was valid “even if less drastic methods would
have sufficed”). We are especially hesitant to invade the au-
tonomy of labor organizations. The International considered
options short of an emergency trusteeship and concluded that
nothing else would restore stability at the Local. Fitzpatrick’s
memorandum cautioned Henry that waiting for the
No. 22-2957 9
resolution of disciplinary proceedings would “take too long”
and risked “distract[ing] Boardman and Brandon from the
operation of the Local.” Henry’s earlier attempts to appoint
personal representatives had proved inadequate. Moreover,
Boardman herself asked the International to intervene when
she requested that Henry adjudicate her disciplinary charges
against Brandon. We may not second-guess the Interna-
tional’s chosen method of intervention simply because Board-
man dislikes it.
Boardman nonetheless contends that summary judgment
was not appropriate because “a reasonable jury could find an-
imus between Henry” and Boardman. But whether Henry
and Boardman had bad blood between them is not disposi-
tive. Even if we assume, as the district court did, that Henry’s
animus also lay behind her decision to impose the trusteeship,
no reasonable juror could find that her decision was pre-
textual. Since one valid purpose suffices to uphold a trustee-
ship, we need not consider Boardman’s allegations of addi-
tional improper motives.
Regardless, the evidence supporting her retaliation theory
is sparse. Boardman presents no evidence suggesting that her
instances of speaking out against Henry between 2010 and
2015 are causally related to Henry’s decision to impose the
trusteeship in 2016. Inferences supported only by speculation
or conjecture are not sufficient to survive summary judgment.
Boss v. Castro,
816 F.3d 910, 916 (7th Cir. 2016). That the gov-
ernance issues at the Local occurred over a nine-month period
also undercuts any inference of retaliation. See Kelly v. Munic-
ipal Courts of Marion County,
97 F.3d 902, 912 (7th Cir. 1996)
(four-month gap between protected speech and termination
undercut inference of retaliation).
10 No. 22-2957
Boardman additionally argues that the International’s “re-
peated departures” from its constitution and bylaws evince
bad motive. She argues that bad motive lay behind the Inter-
national’s decisions to impose an emergency trusteeship, to
grant two extensions of time for good cause during the hear-
ing process, and to deny Boardman “party status” at the hear-
ing (which would have allowed her to call and cross-examine
witnesses). Yet each of these decisions is specifically permit-
ted by the International’s constitution and bylaws. Further,
Boardman has failed to show that she was “treated differently
from similarly situated union members who did not exercise
their right to free speech.” Serafinn,
597 F.3d at 918. Henry’s
decision to impose an emergency trusteeship in response to
Boardman’s actions did not stand alone. The record shows
that Henry imposed at least four emergency trusteeships on
other locals during her presidency, including one before Au-
gust 2016. Boardman presents no evidence suggesting that the
International employed different procedures from those it
used here, in connection with these four other emergency
trusteeships.
III
In sum, ample evidence in the record demonstrates that
the International imposed this trusteeship to restore govern-
ance stability at the Local. This one proper purpose suffices to
uphold the trusteeship, without regard to any improper mo-
tives that Henry may have had. The district court thus appro-
priately granted summary judgment in favor of the defend-
ants on Boardman’s Title III claims. And because Boardman’s
Title I claims rest on the assertion that the trusteeship was in-
valid, her remaining claims fail as well.
We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
