United States v. Temne Hardaway ( 2021 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 19-3448
    ___________________________
    United States of America,
    lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee,
    v.
    Temne Adah Hardaway,
    lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant.
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Eastern District of Missouri - St. Louis
    ____________
    Submitted: January 15, 2021
    Filed: June 7, 2021
    ____________
    Before COLLOTON, WOLLMAN, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.
    Temne Hardaway appeals after she entered a conditional guilty plea to a charge
    of conspiracy to commit money laundering. She challenges an order of the district
    court1 denying her motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of venue or to transfer
    venue to another judicial district. We conclude that there was no error in the ruling
    and affirm the judgment.
    Law enforcement agents discovered Hardaway’s identity while investigating
    a drug trafficking conspiracy in St. Louis. The Drug Enforcement Administration
    learned that Gerald Hunter regularly transported cocaine and fentanyl from Los
    Angeles to St. Louis. Hunter fled when agents in Missouri attempted to apprehend
    him. During a subsequent investigation into Hunter’s whereabouts, agents discovered
    that Hardaway used proceeds from Hunter’s drug trafficking in Missouri to purchase
    a home in Los Angeles.
    A grand jury in the Eastern District of Missouri charged Hardaway with one
    count of conspiracy to commit money laundering. See 
    18 U.S.C. § 1956
    (a)(1)(B)(i),
    (h). Hardaway moved to dismiss the indictment for lack of venue. Hardaway
    asserted that the “only money laundering event” that the government alleged against
    her was the purchase of the residence in Los Angeles—a transaction that occurred
    entirely in California. On that basis, Hardaway maintained that venue was improper
    in the Eastern District of Missouri and that the indictment should be dismissed.
    Alternatively, Hardaway sought a change of venue to the Central District of
    California. The district court denied the motion, and Hardaway entered a conditional
    guilty plea that reserved the right to appeal the court’s ruling on her motion. The
    court sentenced Hardaway to 18 months’ imprisonment.
    On appeal, Hardaway renews her contention that venue is improper in the
    Eastern District of Missouri. The Constitution provides that an accused enjoys the
    1
    The Honorable John A. Ross, United States District Judge for the Eastern
    District of Missouri, adopting the report and recommendations of the Honorable
    Patricia L. Cohen, United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of
    Missouri.
    -2-
    right to a trial by jury in the State and district where the crime was committed. U.S.
    Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. Const. amend. VI. The federal rules of criminal
    procedure likewise direct that “the government must prosecute an offense in a district
    where the offense was committed.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 18.
    Hardaway maintains that venue is improper in Eastern Missouri because the
    government’s only evidence connecting her to the money laundering conspiracy is a
    financial transaction from California. When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack
    of venue, however, the court must presume the truth of the allegations in the
    indictment and consider whether venue is proper based on those allegations. See
    Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 
    342 U.S. 337
    , 343 n.16 (1952); United
    States v. Engle, 
    676 F.3d 405
    , 415-16 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Snipes, 
    611 F.3d 855
    , 866 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Jensen, 
    93 F.3d 667
    , 669 (9th Cir.
    1996). “An indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand
    jury, . . . if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits.”
    Costello v. United States, 
    350 U.S. 359
    , 363 (1956) (footnote omitted). To go beyond
    the face of the indictment, and challenge the sufficiency of the government’s evidence
    on venue, Hardaway was required to proceed to trial and put the government to its
    burden of proof.
    The indictment on its face supports venue in the Eastern District of Missouri.
    Count 4 charges that Hardaway and Hunter “did knowingly combine, conspire, and
    agree with each other” to commit money laundering in “the Eastern District of
    Missouri, the Central District of California, and elsewhere.” The indictment need not
    detail specific acts that support the charge, and Count 4 does not do so. Taking the
    allegations in the indictment as true, there was venue in the Eastern District of
    -3-
    Missouri to try the allegation that Hardaway conspired to commit money laundering
    in “the Eastern District of Missouri” and elsewhere.2
    Hardaway contends alternatively that the district court should have transferred
    venue to the Central District of California. A district court “may” transfer a
    proceeding against a defendant to another district “for the convenience of the parties,
    any victim, and the witnesses, and in the interest of justice.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 21(b).
    In evaluating the district court’s exercise of discretion, we consider a number of
    factors, including the “location of events likely to be in issue,” “location of possible
    witnesses,” “location of documents and records likely to be involved,” “expense to
    the parties,” and “location of counsel.” United States v. McGregor, 
    503 F.2d 1167
    ,
    1170 (8th Cir. 1974) (quoting Platt v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 
    376 U.S. 240
    , 244
    (1964)).
    Hardaway contends that the relevant factors all favor transfer. The district
    court correctly observed, however, that the investigation into the drug proceeds was
    conducted in St. Louis, the relevant documents were in St. Louis, witness expenses
    for Hardaway’s defense would be paid by the government, and Hardaway’s counsel
    was in St. Louis. Hardaway may reside in the Central District of California, but the
    location of a defendant’s home “has no independent significance” in the venue
    analysis. Platt, 
    376 U.S. at 245
    . The district court considered the proper factors and
    2
    Even going beyond the face of the indictment, Hardaway’s admissions
    demonstrate that venue was proper. Hardaway acknowledged in her plea
    agreement that the “source of the proceeds” to purchase the residence in Los Angeles
    “came from the distribution of fentanyl in the Eastern District of Missouri.” Venue
    for conspiracy to commit money laundering is proper “in any . . . district where an act
    in furtherance of the . . . conspiracy took place.” 
    18 U.S.C. § 1956
    (i)(2). The act
    need not be an element of the conspiracy offense. Whitfield v. United States, 
    543 U.S. 209
    , 218 (2005). Hunter’s sales of controlled substances in the Eastern District of
    Missouri furthered the money laundering conspiracy by generating funds that
    Hardaway used to purchase the home in Los Angeles.
    -4-
    articulated a sound basis for declining to transfer venue. There was no abuse of
    discretion.
    The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    ______________________________
    -5-