United States v. Montrivel Woods ( 2021 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 20-1755
    ___________________________
    United States
    Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Montrivel Deon Woods
    Defendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the Northern District of Iowa - Cedar Rapids
    ____________
    Submitted: May 10, 2021
    Filed: June 24, 2021
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before SMITH, Chief Judge, SHEPHERD, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Montrivel Woods appeals the sentence imposed upon him after his second
    term of supervised release was revoked, contending that the district court1 imposed
    a substantively unreasonable sentence. Having jurisdiction pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and finding no error, we affirm.
    1
    The Honorable Linda R. Reade, United States District Judge for the Northern
    District of Iowa.
    In 2007, Woods was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base and
    was sentenced to 248 months imprisonment followed by 8 years supervised
    release. Woods began serving his initial term of supervised release in 2015;
    however, in April 2017 the district court revoked his supervised release for
    violations of its terms, including a new law violation and association with a felon
    or person engaged in criminal activity. The district court sentenced Woods to eight
    months imprisonment to be followed by five years supervised release. Woods
    began serving this second term of supervised release in December 2017.
    In April 2020, the district court revoked Woods’s second term of supervised
    release. The district court found that Woods violated conditions of his supervised
    release by: (1) failing to participate in required substance abuse testing;
    (2) committing a Grade C new law violation by participating in an assault in the
    violent beating of an individual outside a Cedar Rapids, Iowa club;
    (3) communicating or interacting with felons or persons engaged in criminal
    activity in that Woods’s accomplices in the assault were felons; and (4) failing to
    truthfully answer inquiries of his probation officer with respect to Woods’s
    questioning by law enforcement following the assault. The United States
    Sentencing Guidelines advisory sentencing range was 8 to 14 months. The district
    court sentenced Woods to an above-Guidelines-range sentence of 24 months
    imprisonment with no supervised release to follow.
    Woods contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the
    district court “failed to consider highly mitigating factors that should have received
    substantial weight,” namely “Woods’s substantial successes and achievements
    during his supervised release.” Specifically, Woods points out that he was
    discharged early from a residential facility at the urging of his probation officer;
    had successfully completed substance abuse treatment and alcohol testing; had a
    strong employment history; and was holding two jobs, one of which he had held
    since 2015.
    -2-
    “We review the reasonableness of [a] revocation sentence for abuse of
    discretion.” United States v. Asalati, 
    615 F.3d 1001
    , 1006 (8th Cir. 2010). “A
    district court abuses its discretion and imposes an unreasonable sentence when it
    fails to consider a relevant and significant factor, gives significant weight to an
    irrelevant or improper factors, or considers the appropriate factor but commits a
    clear error of judgment in weighing those factors.” United States v. Kreitinger,
    
    576 F.3d 500
    , 503 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); see also 
    18 U.S.C. § 3583
    (e)
    (“The court may, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a)(1),
    (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7) . . . revoke a term of
    supervised release, and require the defendant to serve in prison all or part of the
    term of supervised release authorized by statute for the offense that resulted in such
    term of supervised release . . . .”). “In conducting this review, we are to ‘take into
    account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from
    the Guidelines range.’” United States v. Feemster, 
    572 F.3d 455
    , 461 (8th Cir.
    2009) (en banc) (quoting Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 51 (2007)). However,
    it is “the unusual case when we reverse a district court sentence—whether within,
    above, or below the applicable Guidelines range—as substantively unreasonable.”
    Id. at 464 (quoting United States v. Gardellini, 
    545 F.3d 1089
    , 1090 (D.C. Cir.
    2008)).
    The record reflects that the district court heard and specifically considered
    argument by Woods’s attorney that a sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines
    range was appropriate in which counsel mentioned each of the “mitigating” factors
    which Woods now contends the district court failed to consider. See United States
    v. Wilcox, 
    666 F.3d 1154
    , 1157 (8th Cir. 2012) (stating that, where the defendant
    presents arguments about his mitigating factors at sentencing, an appellate court
    may presume that the district court considered and rejected those factors). Further,
    the district court stated that it was considering “the uncontested portions of the
    presentence investigation report,” and the report recounts that Woods completed
    substance abuse treatment and remote alcohol testing, was discharged early from a
    residential facility, and was maintaining employment with two employers at the
    time of his arrest.
    -3-
    In short, the record belies Woods’s contention that the district court failed to
    consider the mitigating factors he identifies in this appeal, and the district court
    acted within its discretion in giving greater weight to some factors and less weight
    to those urged by Woods and imposing an upward variance. United States v.
    David, 
    682 F.3d 1074
    , 1077 (8th Cir. 2012) (reviewing upward variance for abuse
    of discretion). “The district court has wide latitude to weigh the § 3553(a) factors
    in each case and assign some factors greater weight than others in determining an
    appropriate sentence.” United States v. Bridges, 
    569 F.3d 374
    , 379 (8th Cir.
    2009). Ultimately, the district court was entitled to give more weight to certain
    factors including the seriousness of Woods’s criminal conduct in this case, the
    facts and circumstances of that conduct, his criminal history, his lack of respect for
    authority, the high risk of recidivism, and the need for deterrence. See 
    18 U.S.C. §§ 3583
    (e), 3553(a)(1), 3553(a)(2)(B)-(D).           Moreover, the district court
    acknowledged that it was imposing an above-Guidelines-range sentence but
    concluded it was fully “supported by the facts and circumstances” of this case. We
    agree.
    Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
    ______________________________
    -4-